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Abstract	
The lives of Indigenous Peoples, their compatriots, future generations, nonhuman, and 
physical environments are inextricably entangled. Intergenerational environmental justice 
(IEJ) examines aspects of that entanglement. Specifically, it focuses on obligations and 
duties to provide future generations with environments in which to flourish.  
 
I argue there are three fundamental, interrelated weaknesses in existing theories of IEJ. First, 
theories take insufficient regard of power relations in settler states. Not only are political and 
judicial systems framed within Western traditions, but so too are justice theories. Theorists, 
therefore, appear to endorse and perpetuate the assimilationist project. Second, these 
theories do not account for entanglements of human cultures, human-nonhuman, past, 
present and future generations in an adequately inclusive manner. These theoretical 
oversights exclude aspects of Indigenous people’s philosophies and extant lifeways within 
their frameworks. The theories are unable to accommodate the multiple temporal, spatial and 
interspecies entanglements that define aspects of Indigenous identity and being. Third, 
bound by specific ontological parameters, IEJ becomes paralysed in a web of seemingly 
intractable problems for human and nonhuman within the settler states. To make these 
arguments, I draw on IEJ theories, critical and decolonial scholarship, and Aotearoa Māori 
and Australian Aboriginal philosophic perspectives. Case study examples demonstrate that in 
at least two settler states existing theories of IEJ become unworkable at the intersection with 
Indigenous communities drawing from different philosophical foundations.  
 
Māori and Aboriginal philosophic approaches to IEJ highlight two things. First, Western IEJ 
limits the agency of Indigenous communities to fulfil obligations and duties to past and future 
generations—human and nonhuman—and the environment. And second, by decolonising 
theory it is feasible to ensure Indigenous and non-Indigenous members of the settler states 
are embraced by theory, addressing the iniquity of assimilationist practice. Decolonised IEJ 
embraces multiple entanglements—Indigenous-settler, human-nonhuman, 
past-present-future—freeing it from a paralyses caused by Western ontological framings.  
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Glossary1	
Frequently	used	Māori Words	
Aotearoa - the Māori name for New Zealand. It is used alone and as Aotearoa New Zealand. Māori and 
English are both official languages in the country. 
Hapu - extended family, the hapu was the primary political group of pre-European Māori society.  
Hau - breath of life and a power for good.  
Hui - meeting.  
Iwi - tribe. An iwi is made up of a number of hapu. 
Kaitiaki (n) - guardian, protector, carer. 
Kaitiaki (v) - to guard, protect, care for. 
Kaitiakitanga - the guiding principles of care for the environment and future generations.  
Kanohi ki te kanohi - face-to-face. 
Kai Moana - sea food. 
Mana - respect, prestige, charisma. 
Mana Moana - authority over the sea, respect coming from guardianship of the seas and sea life. 
Mana Whenua - authority over a land area, respect coming from good guardianship of the land and life 
forms. 
Manaatikanga - customs of hospitality. 
Mauri - life force. 
Maunga - mountain. 
Moana - sea. 
Mokopuna - grandchildren, future generations.  
Pākehā - white New Zealander. 
Rahui - temporary prohibition placed over an area, to allow for regeneration of resources, or as mark of 
respect after a tragic death. 
Rohe - territory. 
Runanga - An authority acting on behalf of iwi and hapu.  
Tangata Whenua - people of the land, Māori.  
Tapu - potentiality to be, sacred, also prohibited, restricted, set apart. 
Te Ao Turoa - the world of the gods. 
Te Tiriti - the Māori language version of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Tiana - child, junior partner. 
Tikanga - Māori custom and lore. 
Tinana - body. 
Taonga - treasure, property. 
Tūpuna - ancestor. 
Turangawaewae - home place, where you belong and have a right to stand through kinship and 
whakapapa. 
Wairua - akin to soul. 
Whakapapa - to place in layers- the complex genealogy connecting all material and spiritual things. 
Whanau - family. 
Whenua - land.  
                                                
1 Sources: personal translations cross-referenced against:  
Henare, M. (2001). Tapu, Mana, Mauri, Hau, Wairua. In J. A. Grim (Ed.), Indigenous Traditions and Ecology. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Mead, H. M. (2003). Tikanga Māori. Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand: Huia publishers. 
Shirres, M. P. (1982). Tapu. The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 91(1), 29–51. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20705620 
Te Reo Māori: Māori Dictionary http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz/. 
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Chapter	1		 Introduction	 	
You know, I have a culture. I am a cultured person. 
[Speaks language.]   
I am not something that fell out of the sky, for the pleasure of somebody putting another 
culture into this cultured being. I am not 'an aboriginal' or indeed 'Indigenous'. I am 
Arrente-Alyawarra First Nations person. A sovereign person from this country. 
[Speaks language.] 
I didn't come here from overseas. I came from here. My language. In spite of whiteness 
trying to penetrate into my brain by assimilationists I am alive. I am here, and I speak my 
language. I practice the cultural essence of me. 
Don't try to suppress me. And don't call me a problem. I am not a problem. I have never 
left my country, nor have I ceded any part of it. Nobody has entered into a treaty, or talked 
to me about who I am. I am: Arrente-Alyawarra; Female; Elder; From this country. 
 
Please remember I am not the problem. 
(Kunoth-Monk, 2014)  
 
This thesis challenges orthodoxy. It suggests that, despite best intentions, some underlying 
assumptions of Western justice theories delegitimise their claims to universality. 
Furthermore, in making universalist claims they perpetuate the colonial project—a project 
designed, among other things, to suppress and destroy Indigenous Peoples. This may seem 
a distant problem. The colonial project has succeeded in keeping Indigenous Peoples and 
the Indigenous ‘problem’ to which Rosalie Kunoth-Monk refers above, so far to the margins 
that well-meaning people are not immediately cognisant of potential transgressions of justice 
in their own theory.2 Furthermore, and constructively, this thesis proposes that by 
relinquishing the myth of universality and seeking input from Indigenous ontologies, it is 
possible to fashion more robust imaginings of justice from which to respond to the crises 
facing the globe.3 Makere Stewart-Harawira argues, ‘[t]o date … outside of Indigenous 
scholarship itself, within academic circles little serious attention has been paid to examining 
the possibilities inherent in Indigenous ontologies’ to address global problems 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 34). This thesis seeks to address aspects of that lacuna by 
establishing the content and context of an intergenerational justice (IJ) that will accommodate 
the needs of the Indigenous people in the settler states.  
 
Narrowing to (slightly) more manageable proportions, the thesis focuses on IJ, and even 
more specifically on intergenerational environmental justice (IEJ). Finally, it subjects IEJ to 
                                                
2 Here and throughout ‘Indigenous Peoples’ is used as a proper noun. I have therefore capitalised the first letters 
of the name. Where lower case first letters appear in a quotation, I have not adjusted them. 
3 The crises and Indigenous contribution to the ‘world order’ are examined in depth by Makere Stewart-Harawira 
in (Stewart-Harawira, 2005). 
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the scrutiny of a decolonial lens. For liberal theorists of environmental philosophy, 
environmental ethics, and political philosophy it identifies underlying assumptions that make 
their formulations of IEJ unworkable in some contexts, that is, for some Peoples. For liberal 
philosophers it provides a bridge between Western, Māori and Aboriginal philosophy. For 
Indigenous Peoples, and Māori and Aboriginal particularly, and indigenous studies scholars 
this thesis identifies with some specificity why we—Māori and Pākehā, Aboriginal and white 
Australians—continue to ‘talk past each other’. The thesis offers a metaphilosphical account 
of the incompatibilities of the epistemological and ontological foundations of liberal, Māori and 
Aboriginal philosophy and theories of IJ particularly. And it is a validation of philosophic 
traditions outside the Western canon.  
 
I approach the IEJ canon from a perspective of deficit – a deficit which resides in Western 
thought and ontology. I draw on Māori, Aboriginal and North American First Nations works to 
expose this deficit in IEJ. I say ‘deficit’ deliberately provocatively. The thinkers and theorists 
who inform the work are members of the cultures displaced by colonialism in the settler 
states. Aotearoa New Zealand,4 Australia, Canada and USA, four states settled by colonial 
Britain, are settler states by virtue of the colonial imperative to not only extract resources and 
hence wealth from the colony, but also to settle the land permanently with their own people 
and to govern with structures and laws derived from the UK and Europe.5 The lands of the 
existing population (the Indigenous Peoples) were forcibly taken, the original inhabitants and 
their descendants subject to genocide and systematic degradation. Indigenous populations 
are now minorities forced to operate within the (coercive) dominant political, legal and social 
paradigms. Within these states, Indigenous Peoples suffer ongoing oppression and 
disadvantage. A not insignificant part of the colonial project was/is the denigration and 
repudiation of Indigenous philosophy, political structures, epistemologies, and ontologies 
(Durie, 1998; Mikaere, 2005; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Turner, 
2008; Watson, 2002; 2015; Whyte, 2015; 2017).  
 
However, despite centuries of effort to eliminate Indigenous life ways, knowing, culture and 
the languages in which these philosophies, political structures, epistemologies, and 
                                                
4 Māori and English are both official languages in Aotearoa New Zealand (along with NZ Sign Language). 
Aotearoa is the Māori word used to name the settler state also known as New Zealand. Officially the names may 
be used alone, or in combination. I choose to use Aotearoa throughout this thesis to name the country of my birth, 
the country of my ancestors tracing to both the first Polynesian settlers and early English and Irish settlers. I give 
more comprehensive personal whakapapa (genealogy) in Chapter 7. 
5 It may also be argued the countries of South America are also settler states in that descendants of their colonial 
rulers, principally Spain and Portugal, also alienated large tracts of land from Indigenous Peoples, settled in situ 
and have imposed legal and political structural controls over the nations. 
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ontologies are embedded, they live on ( Durie 2010; Watson 2015; Whyte 2015) and 
resonant to the remnant Indigenous citizens of the settler states.6 Furthermore, for those 
whom Indigenous philosophy is the core way of being, thinking, and constructing the good 
life, liberal philosophy and political philosophy are poor surrogates, they are unable to support 
their definitions of the good life. And to some members of the settler states it is this cultural 
tenacity that is the ‘Indigenous problem’. There remains a strong spoken and unspoken belief 
that Indigenous Peoples and their compatriots will be better off once everyone is aligned with 
Western values. This thesis takes a contrary view—it suggests in matters of IEJ all members 
of these societies can benefit from embracing aspects of Indigenous philosophy and values.7 
It suggests Western orthodoxy is unable to contend with the lived experience and needs of 
the settlers of the settler states in the context of IEJ. I seek a path within IEJ to that end. 
 
Divided into three sections, this thesis begins by examining the framing of Western liberal 
environmental, intergenerational and Indigenous justice theory and secondly reviews 
decolonial theory.8 The second section of three chapters looks at Māori and Aboriginal 
experiences of values-conflict with politics, law and IJ theories. Existing Western IEJ theory is 
tested against the extant life ways and IEJ obligations and duties of specific Māori and 
Aboriginal iwi and clans. The structure of these first two sections is deliberately mechanistic 
                                                
6 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders made up 3% of the total 
Australian population as at 30 June 2011 (the most recent figures published on their website). In Aotearoa New 
Zealand Māori are 14.9% (as at 15 March 2013 according to the Statistics New Zealand website), Canadian First 
Nations people 5.09% (Statistics Canada 2011) and in the USA First Nations people 1.3% (U.S. Census Bureau - 
however this number is restricted to Native Americans who are classified as ‘American Indian and Alaska Native 
alone’) of the totals. 
7 I do not question the possibility of Indigenous philosophy as others have done. I am applying a Western word to 
an Indigenous context, and acknowledge there is a risk of constraining how we imagine the thinking by applying a 
Western label. I distinguish cosmology from philosophy by understanding cosmology to incorporate elements of 
the transcendent and spiritual. Greene identifies Indigenous cosmologies as reflexive, and often describing ‘a 
moral order that governed both nature and man’ (Greene, H. F., 2011: 127). These cosmologies may, in contrast 
to the European conceptualisations, be holistic and/or communitarian and/or nonmaterial and/or place based 
and/or temporally non-linear. Philosophy I regard as having fewer transcendental elements than cosmology. 
However, in Māori philosophy the transcendental is always present. The spiritual is constantly entangled with the 
material (Int. MH.).  
I am also cautious about using the term ‘cosmology’ which has, from my perspective at least, anthropological 
overtones of inferiority to the organised religions and philosophies of the West. In that the philosophies of Māori 
and Aboriginal and other Indigenous Peoples may contain the transcendental I suggest that makes them no less 
evolved than say the body of Christian philosophy. Indeed, each has an extensive pedigree. For instance, Māori 
philosophies tracing back millennia to Asian roots (Henare, 2001), and Aboriginal philosophies developing over 
the course of the 65,000 years of continental Australian habitation. 
Because of my disquiet with the settler colonial narrative which casts Indigenous cosmology as inferior to 
Christianity and Western philosophy, I will on most occasions refer to that which some may call cosmology, as 
philosophy, belief systems or worldviews. Where I use cosmology, I will be specifically referring to the bodies of 
knowledge containing explanations of life, life form, earth, universe, creation and the transcendental. 
8 I take Western and liberal as descriptors for the philosophic and political environment that dominates within the 
Anglo-American academy and politics. Each term links back to the enlightenment thinkers, and the tradition of 
focussing on individual capacity for reason and self-governance as the sites of good and social wellbeing. The 
tradition is explored incrementally throughout the thesis. ‘Western’ and ‘liberal’ will be used interchangeably 
throughout. 
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and dichotomised to draw attention to the structure of Western epistemology. The 
dichotomies are collapsed in the final section which, drawing heavily from Māori philosophy 
and referencing Aboriginal philosophy, challenges two major conceptual disjunctures in the 
current literature—understandings of time, and sites of dignity. The goal is to establish a 
reimagined and inclusive IEJ from within the human rights and capabilities approaches to 
justice. To do this the structure takes a narrative style. The purpose is to explore an imagining 
of IEJ which accounts for Indigenous norms on Indigenous terms, and how they might be 
applied in national and international responses to climate change and environmental 
degradation. The emphasis throughout is that these are lived experiences: neither the author 
nor the peoples referenced are suggesting cultures are set in stone. On the contrary, it is the 
very dynamic nature of culture and philosophy that legitimises the propositions within.  
 
The remainder of this introduction is focused on the philosophic and cosmological cleavages 
between Western and Indigenous worldviews. It sets these cleavages up as dichotomies. 
This oversimplifies the complex continua of ways of being. The reality is that worldviews are 
fuzzy not dichotomised. Highlighting cleavages, however, establishes the context for and 
nature of the claim that existing IEJ is hegemonic.  
Western	Liberal	Worldview	
The settler states are liberal democracies.9 Individuals elect representatives to govern the 
state, and each individual has rights against the state—rights to due legal process; freedom 
of expression, action, and movement; equality and respect; freedom of religion and ideology. 
The settler states value and claim to uphold the principles of human rights, human equality, 
and human dignity. These principles have evolved within a distinctive Western liberal 
worldview and are integral to liberal justice theory. While expressed as universals, these 
principles are generated within a prescribed universe which imposes limitations on IJ, 
environmental justice (EJ), and Indigenous justice. 
 
Many conceptions of IJ arising from European worldviews struggle to account for the scale of 
threats posed by the outcomes of industrialisation and ‘development’—climate change,10 
                                                
9 To some extent ‘the West’, ‘settler states’ and ‘liberal democracies’ are used interchangeably throughout. ‘The 
West’ and ‘liberal democracies’ apply to a greater number of countries, however the political and legal regimes 
within these domains are similarly based in Anglo-European traditions. The settler states are a subset of the 
former two groups, defined as previously mentioned by their former status as British colonies within whose 
borders colonists displaced Indigenous populations and allocated lands to themselves for permanent settlement. 
10 Sea level rise, desertification, drought, flooding, increasing incidents of storm events, heat waves, changing 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
17 
resources extraction,11 and environmental degradation,12 that is, threats to environmental 
sustainability—to temporally distant others. European worldviews are characterised by 
Bosselmann as ‘dualism (of nature and humans), anthropocentrism, materialism, atomism, 
greed (individualism gone mad) and economism (the myth of no boundaries and limitless 
opportunities)’ (Bosselmann, 2011: 205). It is grounded in a dichotomous relationship 
between human and the environment, reinforced by enlightenment and post-enlightenment 
empiricism and the scientific quest to delve deeply into the smallest component parts of the 
whole (Barad, 2003). Within this view, nature is seen as primarily of instrumental value 
(Locke, 1997), a resource for human advancement with no, or little, or unquantifiable intrinsic 
value.13 ‘Every Man’, said John Locke, ‘[has] a right to the Creatures … [and] if anyone had 
… made himself a Property in any particular thing … [to pass it to] his Children, and they 
[have] a right to succeed it, and possess it’ (Locke, 1997: Treatise 1, Chapter IX, §87). Once 
‘possessed’ nature is property with value. Value is understood to lie in the economic benefits 
that nature provides—and ownership of nature or at least elements of nature is the 
foundation of the economy.14 It is frequently portrayed as wild and savage, to be dominated 
and tamed by man, particularly in the Christian tradition from which this worldview grew 
(Rahner, 1993). Fundamentally the world has been divided into the unquantifiable 
undeveloped environment and the quantifiable economy (Purdy, 2015). It seems that for 
many there is a fundamental disconnect and a wilful blindness to the entanglement of 
economy, environment, and human wellbeing. Put another way, the elements of the Western 
tradition foster ignorance of entangled human and nonhuman.  
 
John Stuart Mill identifies, with an almost breathless incredulity, how,  
…it is to be remarked that some objects exist or grow up spontaneously, of a kind suited 
to the supply of human wants. There are caves and hollow trees capable of affording 
shelter; fruits, roots, wild honey, and other natural products, on which human life can be 
supported. (Mill, 2004: 19)  
                                                                                                                                                  
disease vectors, glacier and ice-sheet melt, increased earthquake and volcanic activity, changing seasonal 
patterns, species loss and stress, loss of human habitat and damage to the built environment and infrastructure 
(Ajai; Bengtsson, et al. 2011, Braganza 2011, Crutzen 2002, IPCC 2010, Lenton 2011, McGuire 2010, 
Meinshausen 2011, Rockstrom 2009, Schellnhuber 2011, Steffen 2007, Steffen 2011, Zalasiewicz 2008). 
11 Including but not necessarily limited to mineral extraction, old stand and native forest removal, fishing, habitat 
removal, dams and water redirection. 
12 Soil nutrient depletion and erosion, soil, air and water pollution and toxicity, mineral depletion, loss of ecological 
integrity and plant and animal species reduction and extinction (Bosselmann 2011, Brundtland 1987, Collins 2013, 
Hiskes 2005, 2009, Holland 2008, Sachs 2011). 
13 By ‘nature’ I mean the dynamic physical world, including all animate and inanimate life forms (animal (including 
human) and plant), landscape and earth, waters, ocean and atmospheric systems. It will be used interchangeably 
with the words ‘nonhuman’ and ‘environment’ throughout the thesis. The term cosmos goes beyond nature to 
include the transcendental. 
14 Which is of particular importance in democracies in which governments’ performance is measured by economic 
progress and GDP. 
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He proceeds to describe the power nature provides—the ‘active energies’ (ibid: 20)—which 
can supplement and supplant human labour to produce goods. He even suggests, 
presciently, the air (if scarce enough) could become a source of wealth. Land and water are 
part of the economy by dint of scarcity. That which is not scarce, however, ‘cannot … bear 
any value’ (ibid.: 22). The value lies in human wants and needs, not in any intrinsic quality of 
the nonhuman.    
 
Underpinning modern appeals to justice is the dignity of the human person (Kateb, 2011; 
Rosen 2012; Waldron 2012). Kateb suggests it is dignity that distinguishes human from 
nonhuman (ibid.). That is, human dignity supports the dichotomy. However, human dignity, a 
universalistic notion, is inherently partial. The deep-seated well of anthropocentrism is fed 
from the stream of human dignity. Interestingly, while the philosophical conceptualisation of 
human dignity traces back to Aristotle, it is a concept with many conceptualisations. It has 
been used to unite and divide, level and stratify, distinguish and blur distinction (Rosen, 2012; 
Schroeder, 2010; Waldron, 2012). Although conceptually quixotic, human dignity is 
(unquestioningly) used as the basis for liberal justice. It denotes people’s rights to value, 
respect, and equality as independent, individual, property accessing human beings. Liberal 
justice demands all citizens have equal access to dignity supporting environments. These are 
just demands. In so doing however liberal justice locates dignity in a particularly Western 
way: on the liberal account, human dignity is materialistic, individualistic, anthropocentric. 
Furthermore, it is resolutely forward-looking. The focus here, by way of foreground to the 
thesis, is on the particular Western interpretation of the conditions of and for dignity that 
frames the way that theories of IEJ have been formulated. 
 
Over the following pages I identify some key cleavages between Western liberalism and 
Indigenous worldviews which are problematic in justice theorising. They are presented as 
dichotomous—see Figure 1.1, page 20—however, again I stress, this is a crude 
representation. These positions rest along continua within cultures and between cultures. 
The point here is that theories generated from the Western ontologies in the left column are 
incompatible with justice generated from the Indigenous ontological positions such as those 
in the right column. Neither can claim to be ‘universal’. My goal in laying this out 
schematically in the introduction is to delineate the parameters of this project.  
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Materialism	
In the liberal West, property ownership is a right, and indeed access to property is regarded 
as fundamental to attaining full human dignity (see for instance Nussbaum, 2007; Nussbaum 
2011). Physical property is owned land or something generated from resources extracted 
from the land.15 It is the source of wealth and wellbeing. So inextricably is it bound to notions 
of wellbeing, liberal governments assess their success by measures of growth in national 
wealth, generally gross national product (GNP).  
 
Within the liberal Western worldview land, sea, lakes, and waterways are divided into 
quantified property, to be owned, worked/exploited, and transferred. From them wealth may 
be generated. Terrestrial, aquatic and aerial spaces and nonhuman life forms are owned by 
the state, corporations or individuals, or are understood to be available to be owned, used or 
disposed of by individuals, corporations or states. This ownership right is problematic for both 
IJ and EJ. It gives the owner almost absolute rights to do as they will with the property and all 
 
Liberal/Rationalist Worldview  Indigenous/Grounded Worldview 
Material 
Property ownership is inherent in dignity. 
All that is not human may be property. 
Property rights entitle owners to extract ‘value’ from property 
with few limiting proscriptions or prohibitions. 
Property may be transferred between individual 
humans—property law is concerned with the interpersonal 
obligations not the property itself.  
 
Non-material 
Production is geared to sufficiency, without a focus on surplus. 
‘Ownership’ of land is neither an individual right, nor a concept. 
Relationship to land is approached from a custodial 
perspective.  
While territory is described and marked, the relationship with 
territory rests with the collective not individuals. 
‘Land law’ is based in custodial obligation. 
 
Property-based 
Landform, waterways, lakes and seas are measurable and 
quantifiable property. 
Measured spaces are divided into ownership parcels of 
property—national, regional, community, and individual. 
Property has monetary value. 
Property may be transferred between parties for like property 
or monetary recompense. 
Spaces are inhabited by humans as property or are ‘natural’. 
Property contains resources which may be accessed by 
humans for generation of wealth. 
 
Place-based 
Landform, waterways, lakes and seas are places with which the 
culture creates relationships - often spiritual relationships - 
around which story, myth and legend revolve. 
Law comes from the land, it prescribes relationships, 
obligations, duties, and ways of being. 
Place is integral to community and cultural identity.  
Without place culture is decimated 
Individualistic 
The individual, while part of society and supported by 
communities, is of ultimate importance. 
Where community conflicts with individual the individual is 
privileged. 
Society should not unduly constrain individual freedoms. 
Society has a duty to support individually inhering dignity. 
Communitarian 
The value of the individual comes from the strength of the 
community.  
Obligations to the community are paramount.  
The collective has responsibility to support the individual. 
The strength of the whole depends on everyone, everyone 
                                                
15 I am therefore distinguishing property from meaning the fundamental access to the mere means of survival, 
and from the post-material ‘stage’ in which material needs are satisfied and values ascend in importance. See for 
instance Chapter 3 in John Meyer’s Engaging the Everyday for an analysis of these positions (Meyer, 2015). 
There is too Intellectual Property, generated by the human mind. 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
20 
 within the group has intrinsic value. 
Anthropocentric 
Mankind is the dominant life force, and justice concerns only 
mankind.  
Non-human nature is of instrumental value: it is valued for its 
potential to humanity.  
Cultural and natural environments are separate. Cultural 
environments are regarded by some as more valuable and 
important than natural environments. 
“Nature’ is wild, out-there and incidental  
On most accounts dignity inheres in the human alone. 
 
Holistic 
Human part of an integrative whole: justice for human requires 
justice for all elements of the environment living and non-living. 
Human is not privileged. 
All living things are interrelated: overarching principle is 
balance. 
Cultural identity and cultural structure is deeply entwined in and 
with non-human elements of environment. 
Value is sited in the integrative, symbiotic whole. 
‘Nature’ in everywhere, everything. 
Dignity and integrity inhere to everything and to the whole. 
 
Discontinuous temporality 
The present is the most important time period there is. 
The past exists and is less important than the present. 
The future is a potential time for the currently living to inhabit: 
the far future is of little significance in current decision-making. 
 
Continuous temporality 
Present is not privileged. 
Past and future are integral to present. 
Conceptions of time as a loop, rather than charting a linear path 
constantly into the future. 
Figure1.1:  Mismatched Discourses 
 
that lies therein (Graham, 2012). Changes that appear minor alterations when conducted by 
one property owner on one set tract, can be cumulatively large, enormous even, when 
repeated across numerous tracts (Freygogle, 2012). The impacts may accumulate beyond 
the property per se, the owner, and immediate community, and through time to future 
generations (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010). The effects become issues of IEJ versus individual 
property rights. Within the liberal context these immediate individual property rights tend to 
dominate, and trump community or intergenerational rights (Purdy 2015). Liberal materialism, 
manifest as capitalism, is premised on ownership of nonhuman assets and infinite economic 
growth trajectories, increasing wealth and ever sophisticated technological fixes (Stern, 
2007).  
 
Previously, the concerns of IJ focussed on ensuring the living did not save too much for future 
generations (Gardiner, 2011b; Stern, 2007). At issue was the fear future generations would 
reap benefits while the living bore the burdens. The allocation of burdens has been inverted 
in modern IEJ theory. Today the focus is on ensuring ‘the profligate generation’ (Gardiner, 
2011b: 153) do not plunder the earth at the expense of the wellbeing of future generations. 
Climate change ethics and political responses to climate change provide interesting insights 
into liberal materialism. As scientists call for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, 
sections of the capitalist machine, members of the public and politicians call for continuing 
growth and continuity of practice. Some look to new technology and geo-engineering for 
salves and to bolster than continuity. There need be, on this account, no rupture of nor 
challenge to practice. The ongoing reliance on science to facilitate future growth remains.  
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In this scenario, living generations do not have to curtail environmentally damaging activities. 
Science, the inheritance from the living, will sufficiently compensate the future for any 
damaged caused by the benefits accrued by the living. At the intersection with Indigenous 
justice, this worldview can be problematic. Science and technology are poor substitutes. 
They have no compensatory value to people for whom nonhuman are kin, history and the 
sacred are emplaced and cultural continuity and survival depends on environmentally 
protective practice and stable physical connection.  
 
Individualism	
Locating the individual as the significant unit of justice is integral to many liberal theories (see 
notably the work of the two ‘greats’ of the twentieth century Robert Nozick and John Rawls 
(Nozick, 1999; Rawls 2009), and for a more recent and nuanced account Sharon Krause 
(Krause, 2015)). The individual person is the rights bearer. Where rights of the individual are 
privileged over community the individual is protected from domination by unreasonable or 
undignified constraint by the community or factions within the community (Nozick, 1999). 
Issues of IJ, EJ and Indigenous justice, however, concern both individual and community, 
may be generated by community and in large measure require community-level responses 
(Gardiner, 2010).  
 
As identified earlier, underscoring individualism is the idea of human dignity. There are two 
broad justificatory claims from which human dignity is conceptualised within the liberal 
tradition. It is conceived as an intrinsic quality or as a status (Rosen, 2012; Schachter, 1983; 
Schroeder, 2010). On the intrinsic account, humans have dignity because it is an inviolable 
quality, a special condition of humanness. Dignity requires that people are treated equally, 
have access to sufficient resources to live a fulfilling life, to exercise a range of basic 
freedoms and to be free from restrictions to fulfilment (Rosen, 2012; Schachter, 1983; 
Schroeder, 2010). On the status account, humans have dignity because they are ‘other’, 
separate from nature. Status dignity, in its twentieth and twenty-first century conations, levels 
all people up to the same status—none above, none below, all equal—which then imposes 
the same obligations as listed for intrinsic dignity (for the most developed account of equal 
status dignity see Jeremy Waldron’s Tanner Lectures, Waldron, 2012).  
 
Where IJ is conceived as a contractual agreement to redistribute benefits and burdens, 
locating justice in the dignity of the individual can be problematic. The individuals of the future 
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are unidentifiable and theoretically can offer nothing to the living. This is the crux of Derek 
Parfit’s non-identity problem (Parfit, 1984)—aspects of which are addressed later. But, the 
environmental problems of IJ and EJ are communal. A justice that preferences individual over 
community, is then shackled. Individualist approaches are inadequate to the task of crafting IJ 
to meet a problem caused by communities and affecting communities of unknown others 
(Ball, 1985; Caney, 2008; Hiskes, 2005; Hiskes, 2009; de Shalit,1995; Parfit 1984). 
 
So far I have suggested a major impediment to IEJ is individualism, and it may appear that all 
liberal theories of IJ are woven from identical individualist threads. That is not so. There are 
variations. Western justice theories sit along the continuum from individualism to 
communitarianism (see for instance: de Shalit, 1995; Kymlicka, 1994; MacIntyre, 1984; 
Taylor, 1997; Walzer, 1990, for communitarian approaches). Communitarians suggest 
community is the foundation of human wellbeing. They site individual wellbeing within and 
dependent on the strength and wellbeing of their society. De Shalit (ibid) constructs a 
communitarian theory of IJ, which overcomes the contractual impediments mentioned above 
by including future generations as members of the ongoing community and community 
projects. However, the political environment of the settler states and dominant culture still 
tend towards the individualistic.  
 
While the communitarian philosophies of Kymlicka, MacIntyre, Taylor, or Walzer for instance, 
might be able to encompass aspects of Indigenous communal ontologies, the theory is 
separate from the colonial/post-colonial experience of Māori and Aboriginal. In this their 
ability to effect justice for peoples for whom community is the source of individual dignity 
becomes problematic. For such communitarian peoples’ imaginings of dignity supporting 
environments are communal environments rather than solely a function of individual 
actualisation (Carruthers, 2010). Additionally, there are ontological differences between 
communitarians, Māori, and Aboriginal in defining what constitutes ‘community’.  
 
Anthropocentrism	
Dignity is so tightly glued to human in the liberal conceptualisations many theorists refer to 
dignity without prefixing ‘human’. This is not particularly problematic as prior to the late 20th 
early 21st centuries, all theorists bar one (Thomas Aquinas) understood dignity as 
attributable to humans alone (Rosen, 2012; Saccà, 2013; Schachter, 1983; Schroeder, 
2012). The problem lies in conceiving of this as a neutrally universal conceptualisation and in 
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the impact it has on understanding human immersion in, entanglement with, and dependence 
on, nonhuman.  
 
Dignity is used as a tool to separate human from nonhuman—to maintain a ‘convenient 
fiction’ of ‘human exceptionalism and separation from the rest of the natural world’ 
(Schlosberg, 2014: 75). Locke, drawing from First Testament scriptures, understands the 
relationship of human to nonhuman to be one of ‘Dominion over’ (Locke, 1997: Book 1 §28). 
Species and environment are given by God to all ‘Mankind in common’ (Locke, 1997: Book 1 
§230). Human and nonhuman are disentangled by the human right to use nonhuman as 
property and to ‘make use of those things, that [are] necessary or useful to his Being’ (Locke, 
1997: Book 1 §86). Similarly, in the twentieth century the liberal giants Rawls and Nozick 
develop theories of liberal justice for human alone, conceptualised outside of, and apart from 
the nonhuman realm (Rawls, 2009; Nozick, 1999).  
 
Whether people acknowledge it or not, human life is dependent on the environment. People, 
like any planetary life-form, depend on an ideal climate—not too hot, not too cold, not too wet, 
not too dry. Clean water and air, and adequate supplies of nutrients so foods can flourish, are 
the fundamental building blocks of life, the component parts, as it were, of survival. These 
basics are addressed by some theories—Humans Rights and the Capabilities Approaches 
spring to mind immediately (for instance such works as Hiskes, 2005; 2009; Holland, 2008a; 
2008b; Nussbaum 2007; 2011; Schlosberg, 2012; 2014). However, there are people who 
seek more than this from the environment. For them, it can also be a source of enjoyment, 
mental and physical sustenance, of spiritual nourishment and/or psychological strength, 
beauty and artistic inspiration, physical challenge and risk—non-monetary, non-material 
benefits of a healthy and vibrant environment. And there can be more.  
 
For some people, there is a deep twining of self with environment, a recognition of 
dependency and/or a willingness to acknowledge and celebrate the immersive. For Māori 
and Aboriginal culture and environment are inseparable: culture is tied to place—degraded 
place is cultural death (Durie, 1998; 2010; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; 
Watene, 2016; Watson 2002; 2015; Yunupingu 1997). And there is more still. Self can be and 
is defined by some in relationships with nonhuman kin. This is to understand human and 
nonhuman in an intimate commingling (Henare 2001; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Randall, 
2003; Roberts, 2004; Walker 1992; Watson, 2015). However, theirs is not the dominant voice 
within the liberal Western discourse. That discourse remains firmly embedded in separation: 
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human or nature; mankind against nature; humanity’s domination of nature; and economic 
exploitation of nature.  
 
IJ requires in part an assessment of the environmental conditions future generations will be 
left: the living must decide what, if any, obligations exist to those who will inherit the legacies 
of current consumption practices. They must decide what benefits they may extract at the 
cost of delayed burdens to be pushed to future generations. EJ requires an examination of 
the distribution of the costs amongst peoples, and a commitment to ensure they are not 
disproportionately borne by people of colour, Indigenous communities and minorities within 
states and internationally. Indigenous justice requires an examination of the form in which 
dignity is conceptualised within cultures of Indigenous Peoples and a commitment to 
providing dignity supporting environments as defined by their own cultural traditions.  
 
Temporality	
The West describes time scientifically. It tick-tocks forward. People are ‘time poor’, work 
‘24/7’, and trudge towards vacations, anniversaries and year’s end. Economics and business 
have a generally short-term focus—quarterly, and annual reports, 5-10 year strategic plans.16  
Governments are re-elected on 3-4 year cycles. While physicists may delve into the 
complexities of space-time dimensions, everyday politics focus on culturally significant past 
events, the present and near future. On superficial and perhaps cynical observation 
governments appear to think and plan in periods marked by political terms—even the weekly 
public opinion polling cycle. 
 
Climate change, landform degradation, species extinctions, loss of top-soils, and various 
forms of toxic pollution have brought attention to very long-term future time, and a very 
long-term regard in justice theory. The questions taxing theorists and policymakers relate to 
benefit- and burden-sharing between those who pollute and degrade and those upon whom 
that pollution and degradation most imposes. What proportion of benefits may the living take, 
and how much of the burden must future generations shoulder? 
 
Rather like in economics and politics, most theories of IEJ focus on the immediate and/or 
near distant future (de-Shalit, 1995; Gardiner, 2011b; Hiskes, 2009; Parfit, 1984; Thompson, 
                                                
16 That said some companies are now focussing further forward. SoftBank of Japan for instance has a 300-year 
vision/business plan (SoftBank Corporate Group, 2017). 
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2010). It is hard to conceptualise obligations of justice into the very far future where 
beneficiaries may not be identified nor their circumstances fathomed. Are the obligations 
dependent on identity, nationhood, distribution, contract? None of these provide any certainty 
from which to act.  
 
Some theorists, for whom continuity of community and/or recognition of inherited gifts and 
benefits are important, integrate obligations to ancestors in their IJ theory (O'Neill, 1993; 
Page, 1999; 2007b). The suggestion is, we owe to future generations at least a similar 
package of goods as were inherited from the previous generation. This is, however, a rare 
argument within the canon. The point here is that time is understood within the Western 
worldview to have primarily linear characteristics. That which passes is not and cannot be 
revisited. It cannot re-emerge. Time is understood as forward facing with the past behind and 
in the background.  
 
This loss of past is not the only experience Aboriginal Australians or Māori have of time 
(Love, 2013; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Watson, 2015). Where IEJ assumes this linear 
projection in which the bulk of obligations and duties accrue to the living and near future 
generations, peoples with different understandings of time become marginalised.  
 
Identified here are a series of assumptions and principles embedded in liberally based 
Western philosophy, political philosophy, policy and legislation: the pre-eminence of material 
property, land, waters and seas as quantified ownership parcels of passive space, the 
dominance of human over nonhuman, the individual preeminent to community, and a 
privileging of present and immediate future.17 Each creates an impediment to EJ and IJ; and 
combined they stall the development of theories, policies, and practices which satisfactorily 
address climate change, resource extraction and environmental degradation. Simultaneously 
there is a presumption this Western ontology represents the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 
2002), that is ultimately the ‘best’, or ideal of human organisation and being, an ontological 
framework suited to all people, and one to which all ipso facto aspire. There is also a 
presumption of neutrality in justice theory and it is that neutrality I challenge. If different living 
                                                
17 As noted earlier, the ontologies are presented as dichotomous in the diagram and discussion—it’s 
a false dichotomy used to simply highlight key ontological opposites. The reality is more like an 
ontological continuum. A range of ontologies emerge in Western philosophy and society, and 
Indigenous communities and individuals in the settler states embrace ontologies across the continuum. 
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cultures are based in different worldviews, derived from different ontological premises, IJ and 
EJ based in the liberal framework are neither neutral nor impartial (Barry, 2002), indeed, quite 
the opposite, they have an inherent cultural bias.  
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Indigenous	Worldviews	
…consider the question of justice—the source of notions of right and wrong that underpin 
all discussions of the nature and use of power. The dominant Western conception of 
justice is rooted in a fundamentally individualistic, materialistic ideal of equality or 
sameness. By contrast, Indigenous notions of justice arose within the contest of belief in a 
universal relationship among all the elements that make up our universe. Native ideas 
centre on the imperative of respectful, balanced coexistence among all human, animal 
and spiritual beings, together with the earth. Justice is seen as a perpetual process of 
maintaining that crucial balance and demonstrating true respect for the power and dignity 
of each part of the circle of interdependency.  
(Alfred, 1999: 42) 
 
Indigenous worldviews continue to resonate in and guide people’s lives.18 While Indigenous 
Peoples who reside within the borders of the settler states may be culturally and spatially 
marginalised by (post)-colonialism, the cultures endure.19 These durable cultures offer their 
people direction in pursuit of a ‘good life’, a life well lived. Chapters 4-6 draw on case studies 
to identify the living expression of traditional and unique cosmologies and their modern 
variants. In Chapters 7 and 8 I draw from Indigenous philosophy which continues to guide 
daily practices of Indigenous IEJ to highlight how two philosophic domains, time and dignity, 
can be redrawn from Māori ontology to satisfy both Indigenous and Western demands for 
IEJ.  
 
Indigenous worldviews and philosophies have been wilfully ignored, disparaged and 
trivialised by European colonisers (Hoagland, 2007; Mills, 2007; Tully, 2002). Despite active 
attempts to replace, supplant and eliminate these beliefs and understandings of the world, 
they remain relevant to the lives of living Indigenous communities, living people, on behalf of 
whom the settler states enact policy, based in the dominant non-neutral liberal philosophies. 
These enactments impact existing lives and will impact future generations of Indigenous 
communities. A new conception of IEJ could, however, encompass and support Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous alike.  
 
                                                
18 Globally the number of people identifying as Indigenous is cited as 370,000-400,000 (see for 
instance United Nations, 2013: 003 and Whyte:2017: 88). 
19 They are among the people most vulnerable to environmental harms (Carruthers, 2010; Pellow, 
2016; Whyte, 2013; 2014; 2015; 2017). Environmental harms threaten not only the physical welfare of 
Indigenous Peoples but also the foundations of culture and identity engendered from 
human-nonhuman interconnections.   
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Some Indigenous ontologies, such as those found among the Aboriginal people of Australia, 
Māori of Aotearoa and North and South American Indigenous Peoples, are characterised as 
holistic: people have a co-participatory role with the ecosystem (Burarrwanga, L. et al., 2012). 
Without wrenching dichotomy, human and nature exist in/on a dynamic continuum. So 
intimate can be the connection the work by Burarrwanga et al includes; 
our homeland of Bawaka as co-author. That’s because the land, the water, the animals, 
the plants, the rocks, the thought and songs that make up Bawaka contribute to what we 
are saying here in important ways. They speak to us, inform what we do and have guided 
our thinking and talking (ibid: Loc 324 of 3120). 
 
This is the ground within which some Indigenous traditions are rooted, an ontology where 
there is no significant differentiation between human and nature. A complete counterpoint to 
the liberal Western binary human-nature, civilised-wild, tamed-hostile, from a holistic 
perspective ‘[h]umans are part of nature. Humans can no more go out into nature than they 
can go out into their bodies’ (Greene, H. F., 2011: 132).  
 
Liberal theories of justice claim to be neutral and impartial frameworks of justice (Barry, 
2002).20 They should, therefore, evince dignity supporting environments for all peoples 
across cultural divides, and not simply ignore ways of thinking that do not fit an arbitrary and 
incorrect notion of ‘universal’. What does IJ look like if we are to account for the ontologies of 
a range of Indigenous Peoples? Can we formulate, within the Western canon, an IJ that 
provides for Indigenous Peoples within the settler states? Are liberal theories capable of 
doing this or are the differences so great the formulation of justice is different? 
 
One place to start this conversation is to consider why the United Nations felt the necessity to 
create the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)—what is unique to 
Indigenous Peoples that makes the UDHR insufficient to support their dignity and 
capabilities? The brief answer is there are assumptions within the UDHR which do not work 
for Indigenous Peoples—assumptions about material versus nonmaterial needs, human 
relationships with place, the primacy of individuals or community, relationships with and to 
other living creatures, plants and the inanimate world, and conceptions of time. The 
philosophies that determine their values, lore and laws create a set of life needs that cannot 
be protected by the UDHR, in fact, worse, the UDHR undermines their lifestyle integrity.  
 
                                                
20 A claim that is critiqued and challenged, as will be explored throughout Chapters 3-8. Nevertheless, no 
challenge has as yet moved sufficiently beyond the confines of Western orthodoxies to fully accommodate the 
Māori and Aboriginal philosophies explored here. 
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There is a blindness in these liberal assumptions, an underlying and pervasive bias the slips 
unseen, unqualified and un-comprehended into well-meaning and, in theory at least, neutral 
thinking. This is Charles Mills’ ‘epistemological ignorance’. The creation by a dominant culture 
of a body of knowledge which has deliberately ignored the real lived experience of a sector of 
the community. So pervasive is the ‘unknown’ it becomes invisible and the dominant society 
is screened from impacts on that ‘invisible’ sector of society (Mills, 1997; 2007). Sullivan 
expanded Mills’ understanding of the Black American experience to embrace the Puerto 
Rican experience (Sullivan, 2007). With American colonial rule Puerto Ricans too, she 
argues, are subject to epistemological ignorance. Their experience, history and reality are 
whitewashed from the dominant discourse. Opportunities for equality and just treatment are 
forestalled by epistemologies blind to inequality and iniquity.  
 
Dotson and Whyte describe an ‘unknowability’ of the Indigenous experience as a feature of 
post-colonial states (Dotson & Whyte, 2013). They, along with Figueroa et al (Figueroa, 
2008), argue that unless members of the dominant culture experience, not intellectually, but 
in situ, the being-of Indigenous communities, those Indigenous communities remain invisible 
and incomprehensible to policymakers and the community at large. Society can then 
continue to assume policy and philosophy are neutral because they do not know otherwise. 
 
There is a more sinister gloss to this whitewashing—an epistemological violence borne of 
silencing the voices of Peoples (Dotson 2011, 2014). Dotson’s argument and that of this 
thesis is that epistemological ignorance is not a product of benign neglect, or a lack of 
imagination within the academy (and society and politics). Rather epistemological ignorance, 
and unknowability, are deliberate acts of exclusion and extended violence against the original 
peoples of the settler states. When the epistemologies of Māori and Aboriginal are excluded 
and belittled (as ‘primitive’) there is ‘an unwarranted infringement of the epistemic agency of 
knowers’ (Dotson, 2014: 115). There is a fundamental injustice embedded in an IEJ theorised 
within the epistemologies (and ontologies) of liberal philosophy when the theory is 
inadequate to resolve intergenerational environmental harms not only to Western heirs but 
also Indigenous Peoples who have already a body of theory and practice that overcomes 
those inadequacies.     
 
For some Indigenous communities, the assumptions I have just outlined for liberal justice are 
the antithesis of their own: they are the diametric opposite, as Taiaiake Alfred identifies 
above. It would seem then that an IJ, EJ or IEJ based in liberal values could in many respects 
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be taken to be the antithesis of one conceived from Indigenous perspectives. A brief survey of 
Indigenous frameworks follows here. In echoing the liberal worldview that dissects and 
compartmentalises knowledge, society, economics and the elements of the nonhuman realm, 
dissociating each from the other and elevating human to overlord status, the point here is to 
draw the reader to consider how unknowable the indigenous perspectives are within the 
dominant cultures of the settler states.21 These states remain, as it were, epistemologically 
ignorant. This is a broad overview, containing elements that may or may not be included by 
any one Indigenous Peoples’ worldview. They all feature in some Indigenous worldviews: 
non-materiality, sense of place, communitarianism, holism, and nonlinear temporality.  
 
Non-Material	
To talk of non-materiality within societies is not to suggest that the people as individuals and 
groups did not value ‘things’. All societies seem to create treasures of some description: 
artworks, personal adornments, refined hunting, building, cutting and grinding tools, ornate 
boats, memorials, clothing, and shelter. A non-materialistic society differs from the distinctly 
materialistic liberal society in two fundamental dimensions: production is geared for group 
sufficiency, and land- and water-based resources are identified as places of attachment to be 
engaged with, husbanded and passed to generations to come.  
 
A focus on sufficiency enables communities to conserve environmental goods particularly. 
Where a community has enough territory to support their population, which was not always 
the situation perhaps, then they were and are able to produce from that land enough to feed, 
clothe and provide the essentials of shelter and cultural activities and to pass to future 
generations a healthy environment: one which is at least as healthy as they themselves 
inherited.  
 
This is in some ways a utopian view, in that it is certainly the case that some Indigenous 
communities have been responsible for extinction events—the Moa, a large flightless bird, 
was hunted to extinction by Māori for instance—however, there is clear evidence of respect 
for environment and active conservation within knowledge practices of Indigenous 
communities historically and in the present (Gammage, 2011; Turia, 2012). In part this can be 
attributed to lack of automation, but also to cultural factors: the ability to learn and will to work 
                                                
21 It is important to note though that in doing so I have followed a Western tradition of atomisation that conflicts 
with the organisation of knowledge, the ways of being and the values of the people with whom this thesis 
engages. 
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with other elements resonates throughout various Indigenous discourses (Alfred, 1999; Int. 
AG,; Turia, 2012; Turner, 2008).  
 
The form and structure of territorial ‘ownership’ and concepts of custodianship are the domain 
in which Indigenous communities’ non-materiality dramatically contrasts with that of 
European-based cultures. The territorial domains of various community groupings, family, 
clan, tribe, are marked and acknowledged. Wars over and incursions into territories are 
historical facts, much as they were in Europe and continue to be around the globe.  
 
The difference lies in the ownership patterns within the territory. Land and/or the resources on 
and in it were not, and are still not within traditionally-based Indigenous cultures, owned by 
individuals, seen as representative of financial assets, nor transferrable to other individuals 
for monetary consideration (M. Graham, 1999: 2008; Yunupingu, 1997). Land and resources 
are seen as inalienable, material and spiritual assets, and sources of identity (Alfred, 2005; 
Durie, 1998; 2010; M. Graham, 1999: 2008; Sinclair, 1992; Whyte, 2017). The good of the 
whole is derivative of the health of nonhuman. Importantly it is seen as intergenerationally 
inalienable, a dynamic something to be passed from generation to generation within the 
same community.  
 
‘The trend in international and regional law is to use the legal framework of ‘property’ as a 
foundation for Indigenous claims to land’ (L. Graham & Friederichs, 2012: 6). However, as 
Graham notes, this does not capture Indigenous People’s worldview of land and marks an 
example of how the application of liberal justice and law can, although well intentioned, 
mismatch with Indigenous IEJ. To accommodate the Indigenous ownership structures an 
expansion of the concept of property is required. Graham & Friederichs cite some examples 
in international law (such as in the Kenyan case of the Ruby mine, national park and the 
Endorois people (ibid.)). 
 
A broader notion of property to accommodate a different worldview, a view from place rather 
than monetised resource is needed to enable settler states to fulfil obligations of 
‘…international human rights law [which] requires that a nation state conduct meaningful 
consultations with Indigenous Peoples even when an Indigenous community does not have 
recognised domestic “legal” title to the lands or natural resources’ (L. Graham & Friederichs, 
2012: 12). 
 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
32 
Place-Based	
Indigenous discourse focuses on place as a source of identity rather than as alien and 
alienable property. Landform, waterways, lakes, and seas are places with which the cultures 
create relationships — including spiritual relationships — around which story, myth, and 
legend revolve, and from which ‘law’ is made (Bird Rose, 2000). Culture and individual 
identity are closely associated with place (Bird Rose, 2000; 2012; Burarrwanga et al., 2012; 
M. Graham, 2008; Panelli & Tipa, 2007; Selby, Moore, & Mulholland, 2010; Turia, 2012; 
Watson, 2002).  
 
Variously ancestors, gods, animals, and spirits arise from the landforms, waterways, lakes, 
and seas (hereafter landscape) that form the places of Indigenous cultures (Bird Rose, 2000; 
Povinelli, 2016). All contribute to the creation of culture, social norms and behavioural 
practices within the cultures. The landscape might be described as the ‘books’ of non-booked 
cultures. In the same way that culture and knowledge are passed between generations within 
the ‘booked’ societies, the landscape forms the medium of transmission within the Indigenous 
generations (Povinelli, 2016). History is memorialised in the landscape. Without the in-tact 
landscape and forms, there is no mode of transmission, no heuristic for memory.  
 
Law arising from landscape tells of immutable truths (M. Graham, 2013; Watson, 2015). The 
law arises from the repeated patterns and interactions of all elements of landscape and 
environment. In upsetting the balance, the law is broken. ‘Modern’ land management, 
extractive industries, mining and land re-formation, and toxic waste deposits all transgress 
place-based law. The land prescribes the relationships, obligations, duties and ways of 
interaction necessary for harmonious interactions between people and people and 
environment (Watson, 2015).  
 
In this context, the form that IJ takes is very different to a property-based IJ in which loss of 
landscape by one generation may be offset by the transference of financial assets to future 
generations. Without an intact-place Indigenous Peoples are unable to establish identity nor 
transfer culture or knowledge—that leaves an impoverished world for future generations. 
 
Community	Based	 	
The natural order of the universe is interpreted by Māori and Aboriginal people as one of 
interrelationships (Durie, 1998; Randall 2003). Individuals exist, however, the dependency of 
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the individual (human, animal, plant, landform) on an integrated whole creates a framework in 
which a principle of balance between the elements is paramount (Bird Rose, 2000). The 
individual has duties to the group and the community to the individual. From early childhood, 
focus is on sharing and contributing (M. Graham, 2008).  
 
Within this life way, the individual is an integral and important element of something more 
(Bird Rose, 2000; M. Graham, 2008). The concept of an individual right taking precedence 
over the good of the group is foreign. The focus is on the survival and continuity of the 
community, linking from past to present into the future. IJ focussed in community is for these 
Indigenous communities unproblematic.  
 
A communitarian social order expects to work from the past and to nurture culture and 
environment for future generations. The expectation is that society will be sustained through 
time, that dignity comes from continuity and expectations of cultural longevity (Bird Rose, 
2000). The expectations are for more than just cultural continuity: the sense of community 
embraces living and non-living matter beyond the human (Bird Rose, 2012). 
 
Within these worldviews is a respect for the interrelationships between and continuity of all 
matter. Not only is the individual not privileged over community, nor is human privileged over 
nonhuman. Community is the whole. Dignity is situated in the continuity of this whole 
community. The realisation of ‘human rights [for such communities] … necessitate a 
surrounding environment which is intact’ (L. Graham & Friederichs, 2012: 14). 
 
From this perspective grows the potential for harmonious and mutually supportive interaction 
with people and nature. Without romanticising the relationship, and without suggesting that all 
Indigenous practices are either conservationist or perfect, it is a relationship that recognises 
the intimate interconnection between mankind and the physical, biotic and animal elements 
of the world. It acknowledges the immersion of mankind in nature. It is not a relationship of 
domination, rather it thrives from inter-relationships established through a range of cultural 
practices unique to each society. Bruce Reyburn describes his perspective of the human role 
in nature as one in which people ‘are its intelligence, playing a vital role in the 
self-government of the interactions between species and environment’ (Reyburn, 1988: 1). It 
seems the relationship of interactions between all species is acknowledged here, with no 
particularly hierarchical domination. If there is a hierarchy, then it is a hierarchy of 
custodianship. And it is a relationship from which we could anticipate IJ will take a different 
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form to that generated within the liberal Western paradigm of domination, resource 
monetisation and property rights. It is a practice of justice that considers nature alongside, or 
internal/inherent to, human. 
 
Holism	
A holistic worldview does not privilege humans. While the special features of what it is to be 
human are acknowledged, to be human does not grant extraordinary power or rights over 
nonhuman life and non-living matter. Rather there is an understanding of connectedness 
between human and nonhuman, and a recognition of interconnectivity between living and 
non-living elements of the environment.  
 
‘Other’ is not owned, dominated, nor tamed simply for human advantage. Other is to be 
respected, husbanded and supported as an integral whole and to ensure the wellbeing of 
human as one element of a total wellbeing (Bird Rose, 2012; Muecke, 2004). Within this 
understanding of people and environment obligations of justice extend to all living and 
non-living matter without an extensive privileging of human (M. Graham, 2008). There is a 
deep respect for, and understanding of interrelationships between all environmental 
elements, with the maintenance of balance paramount.  
 
Importantly cultural identity and structure are deeply entwined in and with the non-human. 
Animals, plants, and landscape elements are twinned with aspects of human behaviour and 
being. The wellbeing of human and cultural continuity are tied within the wellbeing and 
continuity of non-human elements of environment. Everything has a dignity and integrity to be 
honoured and nurtured. Rather than dichotomisation of culture and nature, there is a flowing 
connectivity between the elements.  
 
Temporal	Loops	
Time in some Indigenous societies does not privilege the present, nor charge on a linear path 
into the future. It is, conceptualised as a loop or spiral (Dupuy, n.d.; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; 
Watson, 2015), what is was and always will be. Past and future are integral to present—daily 
lived experience includes them all. And thus the present is not privileged: it is one of equals 
as it were. 
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Where past present and future are held to be concurrent to privilege any one of those time 
brackets is inconceivable. Where present and future are understood to exist along an arc 
within a spiral that includes the past, you understand the past as a constant reference and 
point of iteration. One’s acts in the present then, are respectfully referenced from the past and 
consider future generations as future referees of what is now current. In both scenarios, the 
former a reference to the cyclic nature of Aboriginal imaginings of time (Lee, 2006; Povinelli, 
2016), and Māori understanding of spiral time (McKay & Walmsley, 2003; Stewart-Harawira, 
2005) past and future are intimate bedfellows to present.  
 
While Western IJ focuses almost exclusively on future generations, Indigenous IJ is 
concerned with both ancestors and future generations. Importantly, and in contrast with most 
Western conceptions of IJ, obligations to ancestors are taken as seriously as obligations to 
future generations. Where time is understood to loop and spiral, reflexively protects the 
present for the future, while ensuring the future is no less than the past.  
 
Mismatched	Discourses	
Fig 1.1 summarises the foundations of mismatched discourses: between the dominant 
society in settler states on one hand and some of the Indigenous Peoples and sub-nations 
within their borders on the other.22 Decisions of government and business that affect the 
natural environment, resource allocations, land degradation and climate change have both 
current and long-term impacts. Additionally, these decisions are made within frame of the 
dominant worldview and liberal conceptualisation of justice. While Indigenous traditions, 
lifeways and cultural norms remain marginalised, the dominant culture remains blind to 
transgressing boundaries thus diminishing the being of Indigenous people and Peoples. It 
remains (wilfully) ignorant of the ways in which policy negates their agency and dignity. 
 
As Indigenous People and well-meaning members of the dominant cultures seek redress for 
past injustices and the elimination of injustice in the present and future, it is necessary to 
                                                
22 As noted earlier, the ontologies are presented as dichotomous in the diagram and discussion—it’s a false 
dichotomy used to simply highlight key ontological opposites. The reality is more like an ontological continuum. A 
range of ontologies emerge in Western philosophy and society, and Indigenous communities and individuals in the 
settler states embrace ontologies across the continuum. 
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consider these fundamental conceptual differences when imagining what a dignity-supporting 
environment for future generations may represent.  
 
In examining Indigenous conceptions of IJ I will be attempting to establish if non-materiality 
and place-base, community, holism, and temporal flow are inextricably linked, or if a holistic 
worldview alone might be sufficient to provide the necessary framework to expand justice 
theory to adequately account for both obligations between generations, and living and future 
Indigenous Peoples in national and international policy formulation. 
 
If colonial and post-colonial epistemologies of ignorance (Mills, 2007) are built into existing 
frameworks of IJ, justice is failed, and injustices to Indigenous Peoples perpetuated. Worse, if 
justice theory perpetrates and perpetuates epistemological violence against and 
epistemological exclusion of any group of people, it is unjust (Dotson, 2011, 2014). An 
examination of selected Indigenous worldviews and lore, how the frameworks operate and, 
where it exists, the implementation of Indigenous-based concepts in current law and policy 
may allow us to add to and strengthen understandings of IJ, moving beyond the current 
post-enlightenment ‘European cosmology’ (Greene, 2011) into new relationships between 
policy, Indigenous communities, and nature. 
 
These lifeways may also provide an alternative theoretical framework for IJ from which to 
address global anthropogenic environmental degradation. By undertaking case study 
analysis of two culturally and geographically distinct Indigenous societies (Australian 
Aboriginal and Aotearoa Māori) I will explore an imagining of IJ which accounts for 
Indigenous holistic norms. In particular, I will see if those norms may be successfully 
integrated into any existing justice frameworks. 
 
Each Chapter from 4-8 examines both a school of IEJ and a Māori or Aboriginal philosophic 
element. Counterintuitively, to do this I have artificially separated each element of the 
entangled philosophies of Māori and Aboriginal. It requires Herculean effort to keep these 
elements detached. Chapters 4-8 each deal with one aspect of the mismatched discourses 
summarised above. Chapter 4 draws from Te Whanau a Apanui’s experience from the East 
Cape region of Aotearoa as they engaged with the Crown and High Court of New Zealand 
over the opening of new oil fields off the coastal margins of the iwi’s ruhoe23 contrasting the 
                                                
23 Tribal territory. 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
37 
liberal approach to resource exploitation with that of iwi. In Chapter 5, the philosophy of 
kanyini from the Anangu people of central Australia is used as the counterpoint to 
individualistic and communitarian based approaches to IJ. The holistic approach to being and 
the extension of identity beyond human alone frame a discussion of Human Rights (HR) 
approaches to justice in Chapter 6. It is not until Chapters 7 and 8 the natural union and 
entanglements are finally returned to harmony as the thesis explores the potentialities with 
HR and the Capabilities Approach (CA) to respond to the parameters required to decolonise 
IEJ.  
 
As I seek to explore how and why the Western liberal conceptions of IJ may deny justice to 
some Indigenous Peoples within liberal settler states, I will look, too, to aspects of Indigenous 
practices of IJ for insights into how they may be integrated into a more comprehensive 
approach to IJ in addressing climate change, resource extraction, and environmental 
degradation. What I am primarily seeking here is to establish the content and context of an IJ 
that will accommodate the needs of the Indigenous people in the settler states. 
 
The next chapter takes a critical look at IJ and EJ, that is it looks at them through a decolonial 
lens.  
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Section	2	Framings	
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Chapter	2:	Liberal	Approaches	to	
Intergenerational	Environmental	Justice	
Society is, indeed, a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional 
interest may be dissolved at pleasure; but the state ought not to be considered as nothing 
better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or 
some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be 
dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it 
is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a 
temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, 
a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership 
cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between 
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those 
who are to be born.  
Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France §327 
 
… you know, there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and 
there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and 
people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, 
also, to look after our neighbours. 
Margaret Thatcher in an interview in Women's Own in 1987 
 
  
Unlike Margaret Thatcher (and other adherents of neoliberalism), the enlightenment 
philosopher Edmund Burke believed in society. He saw it as a serious, ongoing 
intergenerational project growing from the past, through the present into the future. On his 
account, society is a partnership between participants dead, living and yet-to-be-born. 
Without continuity in society, ‘[m]en would become little better than the flies of the summer’ 
(Burke, nd: §161). Critical to his understanding of trans-generational society is the idea of 
contract. Including ‘all science’, ‘all art’, ‘every virtue’ and ‘all perfection’ suggests he sees the 
intergenerational social contract as iterative. It is a social, cultural and intellectual process in 
which successive generations partner with those before and to come.  
 
Without putting words in Burke’s mouth, it might be possible to imagine he is underscoring 
the foundations of IJ. If society is a partnership between generations, and if by virtue of social 
membership we contract obligations and duties of justice to the living, then in the spirit of an 
iterative and living partnership, so too there can be obligations and duties of justice owed to 
people past and future. However, the living ‘partners’ to Burke’s philosophy, in modern 
Western liberal societies, leaders like Thatcher, and political justice theorists, have moved 
away from his Eurocentric ideal of society, and are struggling to conceptualise and implement 
intergenerationally just policies and projects. Sadly, it is in rejecting ‘a partnership [with] the 
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gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature’ (to subvert Burke) we now 
stare into the face of substantial intergenerational, environmental, and Indigenous injustice.  
  
It is the epistemic foundations of Western IJ and EJ theory this chapter focusses on. Starting 
with a survey of IJ theory, it proceeds then to EJ, and from there establishes the settler state 
experience of IEJ for Indigenous People. It critiques theory for its specifically Eurocentric 
biases, highlighting the injustice to Māori and Aboriginal as a precursor for arguments for 
decolonising theory. 
Intergenerational	Justice	
…… to seek a new consensus on global actions to safeguard the future of the planet and 
the right of future generations everywhere to live healthy and fulfilling lives. This is the 
great development challenge of the 21st century. 
Helen Clark in the forward to the Human Development Report 2011, (UNDP, 2011: iv)  
 
...the profligate generation is making a moral exception of itself, unfairly favoring its own 
interests over those of others. But when the costs rise to the level of catastrophic evils 
(such as mass starvation and death), and the benefits are minor (such as bigger cars and 
cheaper, and more exotic vacations), this becomes an especially serious kind of moral 
wrong, showing that one group has little or no regard at all for others, and far too much 
regard for itself.  
(Gardiner, 2011b: 153) 
 
Helen Clark, above, is calling for global efforts to secure future generations’ wellbeing on this 
planet. Hiskes (Hiskes, 2005; 2009) suggests IJ is at the heart of EJ. IJ is at the core of 
Indigenous Peoples’ calls for justice. And yet despite the clamour on behalf of future 
generations, Steve Gardiner is here suggesting that we the living are the ‘profligate 
generation’, consuming the future for trivial pleasures. IJ is the primary concern of this thesis. 
With these views in mind, this section traverses a number of approaches to IJ theory.   
 
The very long-term concerns of contemporary IJ are fairly new to policymaking, economics, 
business activities, and international negotiations (Gardiner, 2011b; Garnaut, 2008; 2011; 
Stern, 2007). There is little lore, tradition, nor a set of norms to hold modern Western law, 
government, land management practices or business to the global and long-term, to 
comprehensive planetary governance. Most practices focus on the local and present. Society 
is confronted by the awesome capacity humans have to alter the global biosphere, a global 
commons, irreversibly (Rockstrom et al., 2009). Divided by and into national/state 
compartments (Bodansky, 2001; Depledge, 2008), the standard tools for commons 
management are failing as people attempt to address the challenges of expansive spatial and 
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very long temporal dimensions (Baer, 2006; Garvey, 2008; Goodin, 1999; Moellendorf, 2009; 
Singer, 2010). Meanwhile, national leaders privilege short-term national economic interests 
over long-term global environmental goods (Garnaut, 2008; 2011; Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 
2009a). 
 
Jana Thompson suggests a  
society is intergenerationally just when each generation does its fair share to enable 
members of succeeding generations, both inside and outside its borders, to satisfy their 
needs, to avoid serious harm and to have the opportunity to enjoy things of value. 
(Thompson, 2009: 5) 
 
Thompson’s account is expansive. It takes obligations beyond family, Thatcher’s 
neighbourhood, and even national borders. It suggests an infinity of generations and an 
extensive breadth of protections. Privileging needs both in the present and future, it forgoes 
mention of wants. Needs are the stuff of justice theories. Needs this definition implies are 
inviolate. Current generations cannot be expected to deny their needs for future generations. 
However, this definition also suggests the wants of the living cannot be privileged over future 
generations’ needs. Thompson’s definition also protects against serious harm. To privilege 
the wants of the living over the needs of or harms to future generations would, in Gardiner’s 
word, be ‘profligate’.  
 
These are powerful requisites, however, both ‘fair share’ and ‘things of value’ are vague. How 
do we define a fair share? How might it be quantified? We have considerable debate between 
the living on what is a fair share of social burden—More or fewer taxes? More or less in 
welfare payments? More or less foreign aid? These are debates in which all protagonists 
have a voice. How might we determine ‘fair share’ when one party, the party which stands to 
bear the greatest burdens, has no voice? Similarly, ‘things of value’ are disputed between the 
living. While I value a forest for its peace, another values it for timber and income; you value a 
reef for photography, a fisher for livelihood. You and I can fight our case; future generations 
are without representation—we must assume they will value that which we value. But 
Terence Ball explains even this is far from certain (Ball 2008). Perhaps there are other ways 
of defining IJ. 
 
Edward Page conceives of IJ as ‘…concerned with the equitable distribution of benefits and 
burdens across different generations’ (Page, 2007b: 453). Page appears to offer a simpler 
definition. At first blush, it is less demanding than Thompson’s. Page does not force us to 
consider spatially distance atop of temporal distance as Thompson does. I’m not convinced 
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he is letting us out of spatial obligations—his statement is unequivocally ‘concerned with 
equitable distribution’. Distribution occurs between things, including across space and 
time—has he encompassed our spatial obligations within the noun ‘distribution’? Page 
expands our understanding of the requirements of IJ to include specifically ‘benefits and 
burdens’. It is not on his account acceptable for one generation to reap benefits which will 
leave future generations with burdens. Benefits and burdens must be equally shared across 
generations. If I reap a benefit in Australia but the burden will be felt by future generations in 
Indonesia or Sub-Saharan Africa, then under this definition I have perpetrated a harm on 
those temporally and spatially distant others: and as such my transgression is accounted for 
within Page’s definition.  
 
Page has specifically avoided including contestable valuables. He has not identified a 
privileging of current need. However, both are implied in ‘benefits and burdens’. Satisfying 
needs and enjoyment of ‘things of value’ are ‘benefits’ and to be denied either a ‘burden’.  
 
It is possible under Page’s definition to argue that since historically each generation has been 
better off technologically and economically than those before, that this increase in wealth and 
where-with-all automatically benefits future generations.24 However, the current and 
perspective scale of environmental change and harms makes this argument hard to support. 
Wealth and technology are unlikely to afford sufficient protection for conditions of equity to 
apply. It is insufficient argument to discount the definition.  
 
While Page offers us a ‘simple’ definition and Thompson a more comprehensive one, on both 
accounts living persons have duties and obligations to future generations to; bequeath an 
environment which can satisfy their needs, do them no harm, and allow for some minima of 
wellbeing. There are difficulties though with deciding fair distribution, particularly when future 
people can pass no specific benefits to the living. On both these definitions, the justice is 
directly accorded a collective—future generations—by a collective—current generations. But 
this is problematic for liberal individualists. And just who are these future persons anyway? 
Given social change and ‘progress’, how can we ascertain what future people will value?  
 
                                                
24 This is the argument of economists particularly, and is instrumentalised by applying a discount on the claims 
future generations have on the living (Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007).  
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Contract-Base	IJ	
Contractarians argue while current generations have the power to heap benefits (and 
burdens) on future generations, future generations are unable to ‘repay’ or reciprocate to 
current generations (Weston, 2012). The burdens might be shared, but not benefits. To give 
up a possible benefit in the present for the future pleasure of an unidentifiable future other, a 
future other who may not exist if we act thus seems to such theorists unjust (Parfit, 1984). In 
this section, I will review some of the implications of this impasse.  
 
Under both Thompson’s and Page’s definitions the living should be acting to curb major 
threats to coming generations. And this seems well accepted by many on an intuitive level, as 
they campaign and advocate for curbed destruction and comprehensive environmental 
protections. Yet many in government and the community are unwilling to ‘do their fair share’ 
as Thompson would have it. Stephen Gardiner describes IJ as a component of the ‘perfect 
moral storm’ we face as we attempt to deal with climate change (Gardiner, 2004; 2009; 
2011b).  
 
John Rawls suggested, ‘the question of justice between generations […] subjects any ethical 
theory to severe if not impossible tests’ (Rawls, 2009: 251). Contractarian justice is based in 
contract—albeit at times implicit—between individual people. The living, ‘put aside in each 
period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation’ (ibid: 252) for future 
generations. He suggests ‘the contract doctrine looks at the problem from the standpoint of 
the original position and requires the parties to adopt an appropriate savings principle’ (ibid: 
253). However, he concludes, even if IJ dictates each generation inherits from previous 
generations, and in turn saves for future ones, 
[t]here is no way for later generations to help the situation of the least fortunate earlier 
generation. Thus the difference principle does not hold for the question of justice between 
generations and the problem of saving must be treated in some other manner (ibid: 254). 
  
The calculation of IJ is based, he suggests, in a transgenerational project, in which we 
imagine what is fair to contribute forward based in what we (ideally) received from past 
generations. The contract between generations is unusually structured: future generations 
can make (hypothetical) contractual claims on current generations based in the (idealised) 
contractual claims the living made on past generations. That is, he suggests, ‘[t]he life of a 
people is conceived as a scheme of cooperation spread out in historical time. It is to be 
governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the cooperation of contemporaries’ 
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(ibid: 257). The duties and obligations of different generations to each other are similar to 
those of contemporaries based in virtual contractual arrangements.  
 
This chapter opened with Burke’s vision of an intergenerational society. And Rawls argues 
similarly, that we have obligations to ensure sufficient resources are available for future 
generations to maintain social and cultural gains. Avner de Shalit (de-Shalit, 1995) also 
suggests IJ is rooted in the persistence of community, and that we have responsibilities to 
future generations as members of an organic flow of social continuity. Rather than a social 
contract between individuals, IJ is generated from communities of people—the unit of justice 
is not the individual but rather the community. Within just intergenerational communities 
individual needs can be sustained. While mutations, progressions, and change are a feature 
of communities, the sense of society itself is sustained he says. The projects of the living 
continue at least into the near future, where we hope they will be picked up and continued by 
the generations who outlive us. There are connections. And with those connections come 
obligations and duties, he argues, for the living to ensure there are sufficient resources for 
future generations’ wellbeing. IJ on de Shalit’s account is not an individual but a 
communitarian project.   
 
Other contractarians argue that justice between generations is rendered impossible, as 
current generations can receive no reciprocal benefits from future generations. While 
Thompson, Page, Rawls and de Shalit may argue that we owe future generations fair and 
equitable treatment there are others for whom IJ is itself, while intuitively reasonable, a 
philosophically flawed concept (Ball, 1985; 2008; Weston, 2012). For Derek Parfit, the unit of 
justice is the individual. While acknowledging that moral relevance does not diminish with 
time, he claims we encounter a significant obstacle in arguing for IJ because justice is 
relevant only to persons, humans must have identity to qualify as persons, and future 
persons are yet to have such an identity. He calls this the ‘non-identity problem’ (Parfit, 1984) 
and argues that how we act now (what we do, who lives, who does not, where populations 
settle, etc.) in relation to IJ or not, will alter the identities of future persons.25 Thus, as the 
persons who will comprise future generations have no identity, and we, the living, cannot 
have any duties or obligations to non-identities, there can be no IJ.  
 
                                                
25 Chapter 6 examines another problem with Parfit’s ability to conceptualise IJ, that is his understanding of time. 
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Terrance Ball argues that we cannot know what will be perceived as just by future 
generations since justice is a highly mutable concept (Ball, 2008). Each moral community, he 
suggests, particularly those separated by time, understands justice differently. For instance, 
to a slave owner of the antebellum south, to abolish slavery was to unset the natural order 
and to act unjustly towards future generations. Therefore, the very notion of IJ is, he says, 
incoherent. It is impossible on this account to be intergenerational just as we cannot know 
what will be of value to future generations.  
 
While expansive definitions of IJ are ‘incoherent’ to Ball, he does not reject the need for IJ 
(and nor does Parfit). Ball states unequivocally;  
…[n]o single generation may, morally speaking, act as it pleases and without regard to 
the welfare of future generations, simply because it does not constitute the whole of a 
temporally extended (though historically ‘local’) moral community. (Ball, 2008: 334)  
 
The proviso is that we are ill-equipped to conceive or implement a justice framework that can 
create a coherent definition. Justice (and political practices) he argues have temporally 
mutable meanings, and given there is no trans-historical meaning for justice, there can be no 
valid theory of IJ. It is on his account not possible for current generations to act justly towards 
future generations as they cannot know what future generations will regard as just when 
human accounts of justice change over time. How can we, he asks, predict what future 
generations will perceive as their needs? What things will they value as enjoyable? This is 
knowledge we cannot have beforehand. And without this knowledge, Ball argues, we cannot 
define IJ, we are stuck with terminological incoherence.   
 
Ball bases much of his argument in the dynamics of social constructions of the concept of 
justice. What may appear just at one juncture, will seem unjust at another. So while Rawls 
calls for IJ to ensure future generations can ‘preserve and maintain social, political and 
cultural gains’ (Watene, 2013: 23), Ball suggests the social and cultural fabric is too 
ephemeral to contain a coherent theory of IJ.   
 
We are left here with a theory from Parfit claiming there can be no valid subjects of IJ and 
with Ball saying the essence and values of the community are so mutable there can be no 
clearly valid theories of justice that will work for the future. The subjects of justice, the 
identifiable individual for Parfit, and the individual constructed within unknown social values 
for Ball are beyond IJ theorising.   
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Human	rights	based	IJ	
 
...security of the person has been firmly entrenched in human rights law at least since the 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human rights. There is a strong argument 
that security of the person includes both physical and psychological integrity, either one of 
which may be undermined by environmental degradation. 
(Collins, 2013: 80) 
 
Established as universal and widely accepted internationally, HR would appear to give 
advocates of IJ a strong avenue for representing the needs of future generations. HR 
declarations and covenants identify unequivocally that people have rights to life, security, 
adequate health and wellbeing and to the protections that will ensure those rights (United 
Nations, 2015). Caney argues that human rights transcend time; that is, they apply to living 
and future humans. The right precedes identity thus avoiding the issues of non-identity, 
incoherence, and non-reciprocity (Caney, 2010a). Position in time, he argues, does not 
diminish duty and obligation to HR. Acknowledging an agent has a right, by definition, assigns 
an obligation on all other agents to ensure the right is realised. That being the case, on 
Caney’s account, each member of the current generation is duty bound to uphold and protect 
the HR of future generations and is obligated to act in ways which do not jeopardises those 
rights. This does appear to provide a promising way forward for IJ.  
 
Collins describes ‘security of person’ as a fundamental and widely accepted right, both in 
terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and as interpreted in some law 
(Collins, 2013). It is her contention that key elements of a person’s security can be 
undermined where there is a destabilisation of either or both their ‘physical or psychological 
integrity’ (ibid: 80). This sort of destabilisation is possible where there is ‘environmental 
degradation’ (ibid). Climate change and environmental degradation are predicted to 
undermine the physical security of millions of people (International Organisation for Migration, 
2009; Nations, 1992) and Indigenous Peoples in particular (United Nations Development 
Group, 2009). The simple threat of cataclysmic events, the events themselves and aftermath 
dislocations of such events, can quite reasonably be expected to significantly undermine 
psychological wellbeing. On Collins’ account of HR, therefore, we could argue there is an 
obligation to minimise potential harms of such events to both current and future people.  
 
The UNDHR is individualistic, property based and grants the environment instrumental value 
only. Like Caney and Collins, Richard Hiskes turns HR theory to protect both future 
generations (Hiskes, 2005; 2009). He asks in a manner similar to Breena Holland’s 
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interrogation of CA (Holland, 2008b) why the environment is not regarded as a primary good 
within HR.  
 
Hiskes suggests we must, 
recogniz[e] the reality of modern risks as emergent collective phenomena—and 
particularly those represented by environmental hazards—[and this] only intensifies the 
need for individual rights to protect citizens from them. Any theory of justice therefore 
must be careful to include environmental risks as a major element of distribution and 
participation. Not to do so threatens to make the whole project of a theory of justice 
irrelevant to an age characterized by pressing environmental concerns that confront all 
communities around the globe. (Hiskes, 2009: 20-21) 
 
On this account, it is impossible for individuals to confront emergent environmental issues 
alone. With a collective lens, which closely regards emergent qualities and unpredictable 
outcomes, we may be able to fashion solutions. Within his work, there are strong echoes of 
Indigenous ontology. He draws on three main claims to establish the emergent nature of 
rights: human identity is relational, contemporary society (and political reality) face real and 
urgent emergent risks, and ecology teaches us of the inextricable interconnectedness of 
earth systems which human technology and rapaciousness alter. There is, he claims, a duty 
to protect (emergent) rights to clean air, water, and soil now and into the future. What he 
establishes is that HR is dynamic: it must (and can) be adapted to fit emergent phenomena.  
 
Responsibility for climate change and environmental degradation cannot be sheeted home to 
the individual—as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong agues so convincingly in It’s Not My Fault 
(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010). An individual’s contribution is generally insignificant and it is not 
possible to prove a harm is the result of an individual’s action—IJ issues are generally 
problems created by the collective actions of many. There are weak causal links between 
acts and harms. Hiskes suggests we need to seek moral accountability in a foundation other 
than the individual. And to protect future generations he suggest we need to assign collective 
responsibility to the living ‘for harms associated with their behaviour’ (Hiskes, 2005: 44). 
 
To account for IJ Hiskes turns to ‘reflexive reciprocity’ sited in the community of past, living 
and future generations. He bases this reflexive reciprocity in the force of our communities— 
emphasising the deep well of connection that exists within the concept of our community, that 
continuum that includes our ancestors, peers, and progeny. ‘Reciprocity is’, he claims,  
a relational concept and moral sentiment denoting more than merely entering into 
contracts to further self-interest, but less, from a moral point of view, than selfless 
generosity or the giving of gifts. It is a relationship among individual people in a spirit if 
shared community defined by more than just economic self-interests; as such … it is 
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conceivable that reciprocity can exist between present and future generations of 
community members. (Hiskes, 2009: 51) 
 
Although individually based, this distinctly social and communal reflexive reciprocity enables 
future generations to give back to the living in that protections of the environment for the 
future can be understood as also beneficial now.  
 
Capabilities	Approach	based	IJ	
If we want to sustain the freedom of future generations to live the way they like and to 
what they have reason to value (no matter whether this corresponds to their own 
conception of their ‘needs’, not to mention our conception of their ‘needs’), then we should 
choose a freedom-based view of sustainable development. 
(Sen, 2013: 9-10)  
 
The CA to justice developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum like the HR approach, is 
philosophically promising in formulating a convincing account of IJ (Holland, 2008b; 
Nussbaum, 2007; 2011; Page, 2007b; Schlosberg, 2012a; 2014; Sen, 2009). Both Sen and 
Nussbaum are focussed on creating environments (in the broadest sense of the word) which 
provide at least the minimum conditions for human expression of potential. For Sen, this is 
having the freedoms to achieve things people value; for Nussbaum to have the capabilities to 
do so. And as quoted above, Sen, at least, sees freedoms and CA as a way to rise above 
Ball's obstacle of the unknown wants and concepts of justice which will be held by future 
generations.  
 
To fulfil our obligations to justice, on Sen's account we need to ensure we do not forcibly limit 
future generations’ capability enabling freedoms (Sen, 2013). It is conceivable, indeed likely, 
that climate change and environmental destruction will deny future generations their core 
capabilities. Sen suggests we ‘need a broad-based programme [of sustainability] that is 
freedom-oriented not just in the sense of being protective of liberty, but also in the sense of 
providing social support for crucial freedoms that people have reason to value’ (ibid: 10). This 
is important he says, as freedoms distinguish humans from mere animals—lifting humans 
above the (mindless) need-seeking behaviours of animals.26 ‘The overall effect is to integrate 
the idea of sustainability with the perspective of freedom so that we see human beings not 
merely as creatures who have needs but primarily as people whose freedoms really matter’ 
(ibid: 12).  
                                                
26 Here we encounter in Sen the preferencing of human above nonhuman that the race theorists are so critical of 
when the same ideas are used to separate human into categories of more or less human, more or less animal. 
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Importantly from Sen's account, we gather there is a possible means of reconciling current 
generations with future generations. ‘With [a] freedom-oriented modification [to concepts and 
practices of sustainability] we can see 'sustainable development' as development that 
prompts the capabilities of present people without compromising capabilities of future 
generations’ (ibid: 11). This repeats Hiskes' formulation of reflexive reciprocity. In considering 
future generations, we simultaneously enhance the freedoms, capabilities, and rights of the 
living. However, like previous theorists discussed here, Sen's focus is resolutely 
individualistic and anthropocentric in its formulation.  
 
He does, unlike our previous theorists, suggest that property rights may be an impediment to 
sustainability and thus to at least some aspects of IJ. This is important as we consider 
reconceptualising IJ. Individual property rights to resources (animal, vegetable, and mineral) 
over-ride community rights: they give the 'owner' determination over how they are preserved 
or despoiled, conserved or collateralised. As the global community considers capping carbon 
emissions through the facility of forms of emissions trading schemes they are in effect 
granting ownership of the atmosphere, until now a global common. It is Sen's position that 
this is destructive of social harmony. Limiting the combined environmental harms we 
bequeath future generations requires cooperative behaviour (which is dependent on social 
harmony). In Sen's assessment ‘attention must be paid to the interdependencies involved’ 
(ibid: 18) if future generations' freedoms are to be protected. On some Indigenous accounts, 
these interdependencies will include all sentient and non-sentient life, and the 
geosphere—not just the primarily human interdependencies to which Sen refers.  
 
Nussbaum, unlike Sen, extends consideration of justice to some sentient animals.  
One might have a theory that held that many living beings, human and even nonhuman, 
are primary subjects of justice … if one starts from the idea that many different types of 
lives have dignity and are worthy of respect (Nussbaum, 2007: 17).  
 
So while she reverts to the sufficiency of Rawls’ account of IJ (ibid: 21, 23, 33-34 and see 
Watene, 2013) she creates a space for imagining norms which would give us cause to 
consider not only humans but also some other sentient life as deserved of justice 
(Nussbaum, 2007; Schlosberg, 2012a; 2014). Three CA theorists offer a way to embrace the 
environment more intimately, and therefore possibly a new and more holistic conception of IJ. 
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Breena Holland argues that the natural environment is of ‘instrumental value to human 
capabilities’ (Holland, 2008b: 320) and as such certain basic environmental conditions are 
necessary before all other human capabilities are satisfied. Maintaining an environment that 
in turn sustains capabilities could, indeed should, be viewed a ‘meta-capability’ (ibid).  
 
Holland's 'meta-capability' does direct CA towards the future, whether deliberately or 
reflexively (as per Hiskes), protecting the environment for the living will too protect it, at least 
in some measure, for the future. If human life is dependent on nature for sustenance, as it is, 
and human capabilities can only be fulfilled if certain critical levels of natural 'goods' are 
available to maintain that life, it would appear unjust to limit future persons’ capabilities by 
degrading that same life-sustaining nature. It is her contention that the environment must be 
the foremost of capabilities: the capability upon which all others are contingent, the 
meta-capability. As a meta-capability, it is the one that must be protected, preserved, and 
maintained before advancing Nussbaum's ten capabilities (see Nussbaum, 2007: 76-8). In so 
doing, she may account (reflexively) for at least the most basic of environmental needs of 
future generations.  
 
Although protecting the environment as a meta-capability for the living might protect future 
generations it is not the specific focus of Holland's expansion. And like HR theory, this 
conception is individualistic, property based and grants the environment instrumental value 
only. 
 
Schlosberg (Schlosberg, 2012a; 2012b; 2014) builds a bridge specifically applying justice as 
capabilities to communities qua communities (not individuals), and ‘beyond its reference to 
humans alone, … into a consideration of the capabilities necessary for the non-human 
natural world to function’ (2012b: 174). By replacing 'dignity' as the signifier of justice, with 
'integrity' and embracing community as a unit of justice he imagines capabilities theory 
expanding into an encompassing and holistic realm. He recognises the possibility of people's 
primary identity emanating from their group/tribe/community affiliation rather than resting 
solely in atomised individual islands of human flesh; and he is also more holistic expanding 
the horizon to ‘larger natural systems’ (ibid: 175). 
 
Without a healthy, flourishing (non-sentient) environment, it is impossible to fully realise the 
capabilities of the sentient. Flourishing then is an entangled capability dependent on the 
integrity of the whole and component parts. Where that integrity is compromised so too the 
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capabilities of ecosystems and dependent life (ibid). By extension, if we preserve the integrity 
of the natural environment, we will have supported too opportunities for future generations to 
realise their capabilities or at least more of their capabilities than if we had not. At best we will 
enable them to flourish. If instead it is ignored, ongoing climate changes and environmental 
degradation will (severely) restrict the potential for that capability realisation. 
 
Katy Fulfer argues we can encompass eco-systems within the capabilities framework (Fulfer, 
2013). We need principles of justice for the non-sentient, says Fuller, explicitly because our 
interests inevitably conflict with the non-sentient. She proposes that following Nussbaum's 
expansion of her capabilities approach to encompass nonhuman sentient animals 
(Nussbaum, 2007), it is conceivable to similarly expand the theory to non-sentient 
ecosystems (Fulfer, 2013).  
 
Fulfer examines the measures of non-sentient life's ‘flourishing’ within the context of 
eco-systems. She is not suggesting a subjectification of individual species, geologies or 
geological features, but rather she takes it as incumbent upon us to ensure ecosystems are 
enabled to flourish (ibid). Uncontroversially, it is clear that with too little water, a plant wilts 
and dies. If enough plants die not only may the species be lost (the antithesis of flourishing), 
the soil on which they grew then becomes more vulnerable to erosion and so forth. We can 
base justice to the non-sentient in the flourishing of an ecosystem—a river can be seen to 
flourish, or not, on the basis of the ecosystem's health, a tree likewise (ibid).  
 
Her view is non-instrumental and specifically anti-positivist: the value in flourishing is not 
related back to human wellbeing nor to economic environmental value. She suggests the 
good, the justice, rests in the ability of the non-sentient system's dignity and on-going 
performance of function. Those functions may vary over time with natural variation without 
incurring an injustice. However anthropic intervention that alters the system’s flourishing may 
be seen as limiting fulfilment of capabilities and as injustice. 
 
Fulfer is not addressing IJ directly: she is, however, articulating a conception of non-sentient 
'rights' which sits closer than others discussed here with the continuum of the holistic 
worldview of the Australian Aboriginal, Aotearoa Māori, and other Indigenous Peoples. At 
odds with some in these communities she places no intrinsic value in geomorphology, 
geology, and other forms of mineral 'being' and specifically eschews the spiritual. 
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Watene, writing specifically on the accommodation of IJ within Martha Nussbaum's variant of 
CA, suggests on the other hand that ‘future generations place pressure on fundamental 
elements in Nussbaum's capability theory’ (Watene, 2013: 21). As noted earlier, Nussbaum 
herself underplays IJ, by reverting to Rawls (Nussbaum, 2007; Watene, 2013). But Rawls did 
not fully resolve IJ himself (Hiskes, 2005; 2009; Watene, 2013).27 Watene argues that it is 
unclear whether Nussbaum can accommodate IJ (Watene, 2013). If the ability to access 
Nussbaum's capabilities is the foundation of justice, it does not seem an unreasonable 
proposition to posit people of the future will be denied justice if they cannot. There exists a 
tension, a tension we see played out particularly with reference to climate change, resource 
extraction, and environmental degradation, between fulfilling capabilities now and providing 
sufficient 'space' for future generations to realise theirs.  
 
Sen is clear on his conception at least justice requires that current generations do not limit 
future generations freedom to realise their capabilities. Nussbaum acknowledges her list of 
capabilities is incomplete and has invited further discussion by stating ‘[t]he list is itself 
open-ended … no doubt it will undergo further modification in the light of criticism’ 
(Nussbaum, 2007: 76). Holland, Schlosberg, and Fulfer demonstrate that it may be possible 
to 'stretch' the theory to include the environment and non-sentient life, and whilst in Holland's 
view the environment matters not in and of itself, it is of value only on its instrumental good to 
human, Fulfer leads us towards a more holistic expansion of Nussbaum. Schlosberg expands 
capabilities into the realms of other sentient life and beyond individualism to community. 
 
Is it here the foundations of weaving in some Indigenous holistic, communitarian and 
non-material philosophies lies and thence to a more comprehensive and inclusive conception 
of IJ?  
 	
                                                
27 On Charles Mills account Rawls is also problematic as behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ everyone is white. That is, 
Rawls fails to specify that when behind the veil there is a possibility the thinker will emerge as a person of colour 
(Mills, 2017: particularly 87-88). 
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Environmental	Justice	 	
Theories of EJ have grown from liberal theories of justice—that is EJ is an issue to which 
existing justice theory has been applied—since it was first enunciated by Robert Bullard in 
1983 (Mohai, Pellow, & Roberts, 2009). It’s a youthful branch of theory because, firstly, those 
most affected have been the ‘invisible’ minorities subject to ‘white ignorance’ (Mills, 2007), 
and animalisation (Mills, 2017; Pellow, 2016), and, secondly, because damages to the 
environment have escalated in size, impact, frequency and temporal reach with 
industrialisation and population growth (Caney, 2005; Gardiner, 2011b; Jamieson, 2010; 
Shue, 2010). ‘Environmentalism’ has a longer history. It both tended and, indeed continues 
to, focus on the natural environment, species and extinction, and eschew (at times even 
demonises) the cultural environment (Purdy, 2015).28 EJ lassos the natural environment, 
cultural environment, and people and bundles them with social justice (Mohai, Pellow, & 
Roberts, 2009; Schlosberg, 1999; 2009; 2013).  
 
Environmental harms; toxins, wastes, scarred and degraded landscapes, and vulnerability to 
natural hazards, are distributed unevenly across the landscape. Their occurrence coincides 
disproportionately with settlements of poverty, racial and cultural minorities (Gonzalez, 2017; 
Mohai, Pellow, & Roberts, 2009). EJ is concerned with natural and cultural environments: 
with ‘the environmental conditions in which people are immersed in their everyday lives’ 
(Schlosberg, 2013: 39). An integral component of the cultural environment is embedded and 
(sometimes) invisible racism. The EJ discourse is then intimately entwined with black 
(American) and Indigenous rights, and has brought together, in the USA, these previously 
disparate urban (Black) and rural (Indigenous) forces (Schlosberg, 1999).  
 
At least to some measure, EJ has accepted and adopted an (Indigenous) holistic 
worldview—a view of ‘the environment’ not as ‘other’, not the ‘great wild out-there’, but rather 
as co-generated with human. The globe is ‘Mother Earth’, life forms are subjects of Mother 
Earth with entitlements of (species-specific) dignity, not objects awaiting human subjugation. 
There is within EJ a deep understanding of and commitment to an integrative whole 
(Schlosberg, 2013).  
 
EJ was conceived, to some extent concurrently, within the crucible of critical race theory, race 
politics, and racial injustices. As laws tightened to protect disadvantaged communities in the 
                                                
28 Hence the term ‘greenie’. 
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West—particularly in the USA—Western nations sought to ‘outsource’ their toxic wastes to 
poor countries and the reach moved into the realms of global justice (Mohai, Pellow, & 
Roberts, 2009).29 Likewise, with rising concerns about climate change and such practices as 
fracking, the urban rich and farmers are also identifying as burden bearers at the behest of 
corporate (and political) greed and gain. Every dimension of conceptualisations of 
environmental justice has expanded to respond to pervasive threats to human-embedded 
habitat (Mohai, Pellow, & Roberts, 2009).  
 
EJ theorists include IJ issues within their framework, particularly as the temporal reach of 
environmental injustices expands. Central to IEJ are the projected burdens of anthropogenic 
climate change, but it also includes such issues as nuclear waste and other long-lived toxin 
management. Richard Hiskes suggests IJ is at the root of all environmentalism, that is all 
calls to protect the natural environment (Hiskes, 2009). This seems to be rather too great a 
stretch for EJ given many calls are rallies for immediate redress or protection for the living. 
There is no doubt, though, that there is a conjoining of the two justices. Protecting the living 
can benefit future generations and, reciprocally, protecting the environment for future 
generations can have immediate benefits. 
 
Just and ethical environmental governance requires eliminating bias in the spread of 
environmental benefits and burdens across the community: ensuring all have adequate 
access to positive environmental services, natural and cultural, and none are unduly 
overburdened with damages and costs. IJ requires that future generations inherit at least the 
same quantum of goods as current generations inherited. Combined, as IEJ, the challenge is 
to ensure no community is unfairly burdened with environmental costs, and all share equally 
in environmental benefits now and into the far future. Entering this discourse is a thread of 
understanding long associated with Indigenous communities, and disparaged by Western 
liberal ideology: human is immersed in natural, there are no artificial barriers between people 
and the environment (Holland, 2008a; Fulfer, 2013; Pellow, 2016; Schlosberg, 2012b; 2014). 
The argument is that human cannot insulate from natural, but rather, is totally reliant on 
environmental flourishing for the support of human dignity.  
 
                                                
29 This is not to suggest that such communities are fully protected at this time. The disadvantaged remain not only 
economically disadvantaged, but also the environmentally disadvantaged. The ongoing prognosis, which this 
thesis seeks to address in some measure, is the prospect of greater environmental disadvantage for such 
communities as the impacts of anthropogenic climate change take grip around the globe. 
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Recently David Pellow has advocated for the development of critical studies of EJ (Pellow, 
2016). In doing so, like Schlosberg and Fulfer before, he is suggesting that species beyond 
human must be included in EJ, Specifically, he observes, 
…the key social category species remains, at best, at the margins of the field of EJ Studies, 
despite the fact that, generally, when and where humans suffer from environmental 
inequalities, so does the more-than-human world (and vice versa) and often as a result of 
ideological frameworks that link marginalized humans to “nature”. My point here is that since 
multiple forms of inequality drive and characterize the experience of environmental injustice, 
the field would do well to expand in that direction. (ibid: 223) 
 
Pellow, like Mills, points to the ways in which current theory based in liberal traditions fails to 
attend to ‘multiple social categories of difference’ and the ways they are ‘entangled in the 
production of environmental injustice, from race, gender, sexuality, ability, and class to 
species (Pellow, 2016: 223-4). The root of multiple environmental injustices stems from the 
unequal attention given human and nonhuman (ibid), and the West’s self-appointment as the 
crucible of superior thought, politics and philosophy (Alfred, 1999; Coulthard, 2014; Mills, 
2017; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Watson, 2015). 
 
There is no post-colonial stasis for Indigenous People. Colonisation continues in the form of 
environmental harms, and displacement (Gonzalez, 2017; Whyte, 2013; 2017). Gonzalez 
claims Native Americans are the subjects of more than their fair share of environmental 
harms, particularly from extractive industries (Gonzalez, 2017). Importantly here, this is not 
simply nor only a historical experience. Extractive industries continue to wring a 
disproportionate toll from Indigenous communities globally—this generates at least two sorts 
of harms. Firstly, laws allowing extraction are the laws imported by the settlers, they not the 
laws of the Indigenous Peoples themselves. What is right and lawful environmental 
interaction for the Indigenous Peoples carries no or little weight within the halls of power 
within the settler states. Indigenous Peoples, having been herded to the edges of the new 
nation states, physically and metaphorically, and their agency in the ongoing protection of 
their residual pockets of territory is constantly undermined by the state and legal systems. 
The second harm arises from the construction of EJ theories from within the same dominant 
paradigm and discourse as the law. As discussed in the previous chapter the foundations of 
that philosophy and law are in many fundamental respects incompatible with the Indigenous 
approaches. EJ for Indigenous Peoples can only provide justice if the foundational principles 
agree with Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies (Dodson, 1997; Durie, 1998; Mikaere, 
2005; Pearson, 1997; Watson, 2015; Whyte, 2015). It must recognise the entangled 
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complexities of land rights, self-determination, sovereignty, treaties, and identity. As Gonzalez 
argues in the USA ‘[e]nvironmental justice in the tribal context is inextricably linked with the 
struggle for self-determination, tribal sovereignty, and the right to be consulted about 
activities outside Indian reservations that may affect Native lands and resources’ (Gonzalez, 
2017: 283) so too could be argued in the other settler states.  
Discussion	 	
The crucial common claim—whether bounded in terms of class ideology, or 
androcentrism, or white normatively—is that all theorizing, both moral and non-moral, 
takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, 
and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interest of the privileged 
group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work 
as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that 
“spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as 
the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often 
be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them 
from sight or naturalizing them, while, on the other hand, concepts necessary for 
accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the 
self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to 
scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. 
(Mills, 2017: 82-83) 
 
Charles Mills reminds us your certainties may not be my certainties. This suggests it may be 
unwise for liberal justice theories to make universalist claims (Mills, 2017). Especially if it is 
possible that embedded within the theories are colonial racism, cultural hegemony, and 
epistemological ignorance. However, theorists appear to assume rationalist foundations, built 
iteratively from European roots, are the appropriate base on which to develop theories of IEJ. 
They assume certainties positioned predominantly within the left-hand column of Fig 1.1 
(page 20)—material, quantified, and monetised property, individualism, anthropocentrism 
and discontinuous forward-projecting conceptions of time. Understanding how these 
certainties impinge on Indigenous Peoples’ lives is the purpose of the following chapters. 
However, it is not only Indigenous Peoples’ lives on which they impinge: they limit the 
capacity of liberal theory to develop effective principles of IEJ. 
 
Indigenous Peoples have living, evolving, dynamic cultures that sustain them, and which they 
intend will endure to sustain future generations. The endurance, and wellbeing of the cultures 
and people, as the following chapters will show, are entangled with the environment. Justice 
is IJ is EJ and EJ is IJ is justice. However, for Indigenous Peoples to secure IEJ it must be on 
their own terms, within their own realities. That is, the theory needs to be based in the 
‘concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities’ (Mills, 2017: 83). Unless we 
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ensure there are no conceptual biases concealing and trivialising the obligations and duties 
the Indigenous Peoples of the settler states maintain to the environment and future 
generations, theories of IEJ continue to oppress. It is insufficient to assume that concepts 
such as property, individualism, anthropocentrism, forward projecting time and dignity are 
universally accepted and suitable bases of ideal theory.  
 
Including dignity in that list may be somewhat surprising. However, while a shared 
understanding of and commitment to human dignity as a foundation for justice may seem 
uncontroversial, it may be contentious. How dignity is conceptualised by the theorist may be 
an impediment to both IEJ and Indigenous dignity. Where dignity is narrowly interpreted to 
mean the dignity of the individual human entitled to exclusive property rights that diminish 
community and the long term it is problematic. None of this need suggest or assert that 
property ownership, individualism, anthropocentrism, or temporality are in themselves wrong 
or unsuitable bases for IEJ, but rather that they may be incomplete for both future 
generations within the liberal tradition, and the inheritors of some Indigenous cultures and 
traditions. They may form a satisfactory account for justice between the living within one 
cultural tradition, but they are at best an inchoate account between generations and/or for 
other cultural traditions. As the case studies in the following chapters show we need to fill out 
the Western foundations of IEJ (and even more provocatively, all justices) to implement 
intergenerationally just regimes both within the West and for some intra-national and 
international policies, agreements and conventions.  
 
Some conceptualisations of dignity limit justice's flexibility, binding it inextricably to an 
anthropocentric warp.30 In denying intrinsic worth to non-human, human dignity warps 
epistemology from reality and denies mankind's place as one of many interleaving parts of a 
dynamic biosphere. A justice based in living-human dignity prejudices future generations and 
privileges the present. Property-based justice limit perception of value, and make demands 
on other while minimising the responsibilities of 'owners' to protect and preserve, to nourish 
and nurture. An intrinsic human dignity is short-lived, lasting a single lifetime; status based 
dignity is inherently selective: each conceptualisation attempting to validate human 
exceptionalism, to move human into a realm of dominance, reinforces ignorance. It denies 
the tight interweave of human and other, community and individual, intrinsic value and 
economic value, loops of time and place and space. Human dignity, far from a rock-solid 
                                                
30 There are many conceptualisations. Doris Schroeder identifies ‘five and still counting’(Schroeder, 2010)! In 
Chapter 8 we will explore more. 
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basis upon which to establish justice theory, is a construct of the sort Mills is warning against 
above.  
 
These binaries artificially separate human, creating an epistemological illusion of aloof 
self-sufficiency, an anthropocentric ignorance of people in space through time. If we imagine 
an IJ free of these binaries, in which we recognise the co-constitutive relationships of 
dependency (de-Shalit, 1995) in which the warp of the cloth of justice is all nature we create a 
justice antithetical to Western conceptualisations but essential for a robust IEJ. Nussbaum, 
Fulfer, and Schlosberg each navigate CA beyond the anthropocentric. de Shalit, Fulfer, 
Hiskes and Schlosberg each expand justice to community. They all acknowledge the intrinsic 
value of environment to future generations—upturning exclusive ownership rights to 
destructive acts. De Shalit and Hiskes suggest that the reflexive benefits in the present of 
environmental action for future generations expands IEJ's temporal reach.  
 
The demand of IEJ for Indigenous Peoples requires a recognition of the intricate, explicit 
interweave of place and culture. Indigenous dignity can only be upheld if place is preserved. It 
is possible that with the imagining of a place embedded community harmonised with intrinsic 
respect of other, in a long continuum stretching simultaneously from the past, through the 
present, and into the future, the very need for IJ becomes redundant. 
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Chapter	3:	The	Settler	State,	Recognition	
&	Power	 	
It would be an act of imagining dystopia for our ancestors to consider the erasures we live 
through today, in which some Anishinaabek are finding it harder to obtain supplies of birch 
bark, or seeing algal blooms add to factors threatening whitefish populations, or fighting to 
ensure the legality in the eyes of the industrial settler state of protecting wild rice for 
harvest. Yet we do not give up by dwelling in a nostalgic past even though we live in our 
ancestors’ dystopia.  
Whyte 2017: 208 
 
…Because that transacting of land didn’t really make sense, even to my great grandfather 
who died in 1969. He didn’t understand: “Why is my road getting bigger in front of my 
house?” He thought the state highway was his. No one spoke to him, no one came to 
speak to him about widening the road or tarring the road, it just became something that 
happened. “Well wait what’s going on?” And it was my grandmother who had to, he was 
saying “…you have to learn English really well so you can tell me what they are doing, 
because I have no idea what they are doing.” So you need to teach me to speak English 
in the 1920’s because I have no idea what they are doing. So the over time he watched 
the erosion of his mana, because people were encroaching, Ministry of Works were 
encroaching on Māori land. And that is just one tiny example. This was going on all over 
the country. 
Int. HS. 
 
 
I was raised from the volcanic soils of Taranaki—both maunga31 and province—in a 
household made up of my father, his mother, his younger sister and me—three generations 
under one roof. The three adults grew things—pretty flowering plants, fruit—seven fruit ripe 
year round—and all our vegetables. They taught me the English, Latin and Māori names for 
the plants as we fossicked and weeded, dug and harvested. My father skin-dived and fished, 
kai moana was a staple: paua (abalone), tuatua, rock oysters, mussels, crayfish, snapper, 
tarakihi, john dory, smoked sword fish, and my favourite, the delicate inanga (whitebait) in 
season. My uncle grew dairy cows and pigs: so clotted cream, pork, ham and bacon were 
staples too. We were at the beach, or on the slopes of the mountain each weekend—we four 
and my aunties, uncles and cousins. It was an outdoor sort of childhood. A childhood nestled 
in trees, filled with the smells of moss and leaf litter, of pounding surf and salt spray, of 
swimming and diving, drift-wood fires and fascinating rock pools, mountainous sand-hills, 
bouldering, potholing, tramping, climbing, and semi-controlled ski runs. Caring for land, water 
and seas were inimitable to this life. Taking no more than needed meant we could return year 
after year safe in knowing the earth, waters and seas could provide. So much so that it was 
                                                
31 Mountain. 
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not until I was had left home for university in far-off Wellington, that my father entered for the 
first time, in his words, ‘that new-fangled place called a supermarket’.  
 
When parliament was sitting, I would return from school to find my grandmother, not in her 
beloved garden, but glued to the radio, more often than not in incensed displeasure, listening 
to “those men” debating. And I listened with her. I remember little of the details of their 
debates, but I did form the impression they were working for society. Social cohesion, 
security for all, and some sense of fairness and future underpinned those debates.  
 
The point is politics was as concerned with the social as the economic. Politicians understood 
themselves to have a role in moulding society. And while the system safeguarded four 
electorates specifically for Māori members of parliament, that vision of society was 
Eurocentric. Free education for all meant a Eurocentric education for Māori. The Māori Land 
Court continued to alienate what lands remained in Māori ownership. The mighty Waikato 
River, the sacred awa of many hapu and iwi was, during those years, dammed repeatedly 
along its path for hydro-electric power generation and the headwaters of the Whanganui 
diverted for the same ends. Te Reo32 was forbidden in schools, taonga33 stolen, the sacred 
desecrated—like the North American Anishinaabek above, Māori, such as Huhana Smith’s 
grandfather, found themselves in a bewildering dystopia. Contrary to Margaret Thatcher’s 
claim, ‘society’ existed. In Aotearoa, two societies existed—the dominating Eurocentric and 
the indefatigable, enduring Māori.  
 
It is to lived contexts that justice theories address themselves, even if ideally. Since my 
childhood, things have changed, things have stayed the same. ‘Most’ Aotearoa’s lowland 
rivers are now so polluted by industrial dairy farming they are un-swimmable (Joy, 2017). 
Industrial-scale fishing operations—some Māori owned—must be constantly monitored and 
regulated to maintain stocks (Ministry for Primary Industries, 2017). Oil and gas exploration 
expands onshore and off (Freyberg, E; 2017). Species extinctions are constantly prefigured 
(Endangered Species Foundation, nd). While Māori is one of three official languages34, and 
words and phrases of te reo nestle within much kiwi35 conversation, its spoken by fewer than 
                                                
32 Māori language. 
33 Treasures, as in, things of value. 
34 The other two are English, and New Zealand sign language.  
35 The diminutive for any person from Aotearoa New Zealand. 
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22% of the Māori population (StatsNZ, 2017). How do theories of justice formulate solutions 
to the problems of societies living together—human with human, human with nonhuman?  
 
I talk of my experience, of Aotearoa’s experience. It is not unique. The consequences of 
models of growth that fuel capitalism, liberal politics and prosperity in the settler states have 
drawn many people’s and Peoples’ attention to a far-off future. It is clear that deforestation, 
huge open-cast mines, nitrogen pollution, species extinctions, and the consequences of 
global climate change envelope Indigenous communities globally (United Nations 2013). 
They threaten to leave future generations (of all peoples but more directly the vulnerable and 
marginalised) with reduced welfare. That decreased opportunity for human flourishing 
stretches into the far future—indeed it may be permanent (United Nations, 1992). Many of the 
actions humans have taken which lead to potential harms to future generations are voluntary, 
driven by a desire for more, rather than the desire for enough (Shue, 2010). For Indigenous 
Peoples in the settler states, they reflect more of the same—a dystopian déjà vu in Kyle 
Whyte’s words (Whyte, 2017).  
 
This chapter briefly explores the contexts and tenets of decolonial theory within the settler 
state. It provides a counterpoint to the framings of Chapter 2, and advances the argument for 
reflecting on, and eliminating, the possible injustices embedded within liberal justice theory.  
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Settler	States	
Yeah well, I think it is important to remember your ancestors and have knowledge of 
ancestors. So my grandmother lived to be 100. And she worked on a station in central 
Australia. When I say worked on a station she was basically the housemaid for the 
pastoralist, and she basically bought up their three children, to the extent that those 
children used to call her ‘mum’. And she’d clean the property. 
When she was about 96 she wanted to go back to that country.  
[…] 
And then, when we left the station we were going down a track and my grand-mother 
said; ‘Just pull up here’. So we pulled up and she said to us; ‘You see that broken-down 
old fence going that way and across the track and going this way?’  
It was an old timber fence, and plain wire and old barbed wire.  
And she said; ‘I and your grandfather we built this fence.’  
And we said; ‘Ah really, and how did that happen?’  
And she said; ‘The pastoralist dropped me and your grandfather out here with axes and 
all the wire and virtually said to us’, (and she can only speak Language, she couldn’t 
speak English), ‘Said to us; “I want you to build a fence, and I want you to go across to 
that pointy hill over there and then across to that flat top hill over there then across to that 
ridge up there and then back to here”.’  
And I remember mum ask; ‘What about…how did you eat?’   
And my grandmother said; ‘No, no we just ate bush tucker and caught kangaroo and 
lizards and snakes.’  
And she said; ‘Oh ok. And how long were you out here?’  
And she said; ‘I don’t know probably months and months. And then the pastoralist came 
back and picked us up and we went off and did another job.’ 
Int. DR. 
 
The settler states were originally settled by peoples now designated ‘Indigenous Peoples’. As 
the territories of the Indigenous Peoples of these countries were annexed by the powers of 
Western Europe, the Indigenous Peoples themselves were killed, debased, terrorised, 
marginalised and disenfranchised. Their lands taken from them, they were expected to die 
out by the turn of the nineteenth century or, failing that, that they would become assimilated 
into the new colonial culture. Discouraged from speaking their native tongues, herded onto 
marginal lands, employed as cheap (or slave) labour, afforded sub-standard education and 
health care, these peoples have been relegated to the margins of both the natural and 
cultural environments of the settler states, as Des Rogers’ recollection of taking his 
96-year-old grandmother back to the station she had worked on as younger woman attests. 
While some have successfully ‘assimilated’, others have taken the best of settler 
opportunities and simultaneously retained culture—what Māori refer to as ambiculturalism 
(Int. MF.; Int. MH.). 36 Others have lost the advantages of culture and been unable to obtain 
                                                
36 The descriptor ‘ambicultural’ is widely used by Māori to describe their ability to ‘walk in two worlds’. That is, they 
have the ability to operate and move comfortably within the dominant political and social milieu and within Māori 
contexts, to observe protocol and uphold Māori law, processes and procedure. It appears first to be used by Erik 
Schwimmer in 1968 (Schwimmer, 1968 64). He identifies in a postscript its potential as a more appropriate and 
accurately descriptive word than ‘biculturalism’ which he had used within his essay in the edition. A Google 
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any benefit from the settler system: they are marginalised from their past, marginalised in the 
present and have no clear role in future society. In effect, they remain colonised peoples 
within post-colonial states (Whyte, 2013).  
 
Western models of growth, including growth in extent of settler-held lands—at the expense of 
diminishing Indigenous holdings—have driven people from their traditional territories, 
harnessed their labour—sometimes with no recompense—desecrated their sacred, 
destroyed languages, and torn relationships between human and nonhuman apart (Alfred, 
1999; Turner, 2008). However, Indigenous Peoples are not simply passive victims of the 
violent plagues of growth listed above.  
 
Indigenous Peoples have their own voices, and these voices have found expression in 
international, national and local fora. Internationally, there are the Indigenous Peoples 
Climate Change Working Group, the United Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous 
Interests, the World Congress of Indigenous Peoples and UNDRIP. At national levels 
Indigenous Peoples in the settler states have come together to demand changes—Idle No 
More in Canada,37 the DaPL/Standing Rock resistance in the USA,38 the ‘Uluru Statement 
from the Heart’ in Australia,39 and the ongoing Treaty of Waitangi negotiations in Aotearoa40 
for instance.  Each has drawn their nation’s attention to past, present and potentially future 
injustices. And at local levels, Indigenous Peoples are engaged in such actions as restoring 
language, managing lands, resisting developments, developing their own businesses, and 
negotiating with their communities. The point is Indigenous people have agency on their own 
terms despite the ravages of settler colonialism and ongoing marginalisation.  
 
However, as established earlier, within the settler states Indigenous Peoples are minorities. 
Their worldview is a minority worldview. They must obey the laws of the majority. And those 
laws are a product of epistemologies and ontologies at odds with their own (Mikaere, 2005; 
Watson, 2015). The post-colonial law is framed by a patriarchal racist liberalism which feigns 
to support equality (Mills, 2017). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Scholar search reveals it most often occurs now in relation particularly to management practices and Chinese 
Americans. I have not come across its use by Aboriginal people in Australia, although it could apply equally well 
for them as it does for Māori. For Māori being ambicultural is a signifier of something beneficially additional to that 
which the dominant society has, in contrast to the deficit discourse that frequently frames Indigenous identity.  
37 See http://www.idlenomore.ca/ 
38 See http://standwithstandingrock.net/ 
39 See https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/event/uluru-statement-from-the-heart 
40 See https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/ 
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Māori and Aboriginal live with the burden of epistemological ignorance, violence and 
oppression—that is with the majoritarian myth that all members of the society are equal and 
have equal opportunities (Dotson, 2011; 2014; Mills, 1997; 2007). A socially constructed set 
of understandings identified that as ‘natives’ Indigenous lifeways were primitive, social 
structures and political systems nascent at best, and Indigenous knowledge and lifeways 
inherently inferior to those of the settlers. Indeed, as Australia’s former Prime Minister 
demonstrated in 2014, at a breakfast with the then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, so 
ingrained is this ignorance he was able to state, with no seeming cognisance of inaccuracy, 
that before the arrival of the First Fleet, Sydney had been ‘nothing but bush’ (Henderson, 
2014). In a similar vein, when I was at the beginning of this project, I approached for comment 
and guidance a senior scholar whose writings indicate significant sympathies with Indigenous 
injustice in the settler states. Almost in passing during our conversation this scholar queried 
whether or not there could be ‘such a thing as Indigenous philosophy’. It appeared that 
‘philosophy’ is a term that may only be applied when and where it follows the form and format 
of the Western academy (Dussel, 2016). In Australia, at least, there is a perverse and 
persistent Indigenous ignorance.  
 
To be clear, therefore, throughout this thesis I take philosophy to mean endeavours to make 
sense of the world, what it is to be human, the structure and form of knowledge, right and 
wrong, and what it is to be in the world. The Māori and Aboriginal communities discussed in 
here have well-developed structures in which such knowledge is sited, participate in ongoing 
debate and deliberation on its contemporary meaning and application, and have tools and 
mechanisms for passing it to new generations (Durie, 1998; Graham, 2008; Mead, 2003; 
Watson, 2015; Yunupingu, 1994).   
 
At issue is that liberal justice is wrapped in a cultural cloth that ‘embodie[s] a series of 
culturally specific assumptions and judgments about the relative worth of other cultures, ways 
of life, value systems, social and political institutions and ways of organising property’ (Ivison, 
2000: 2). Consequently, in Settler States, Indigenous conceptions and demands of IEJ are 
disregarded by the dominating politics. However, the legitimacy of Indigenous dignity claims 
to cultural recognition, restoration, and furtherance, endorsed for example by UNDRIP, 
requires a review of the appropriateness of applying Western theories of EJ and IJ on behalf 
of Indigenous Peoples. Liberal and Indigenous philosophies, politics and culture, grounded in 
distinct foundations may overlap in some domains, however, there are substantive 
differences. 
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Recognition	
Decolonial theory, in the settler state context, focuses on the Indigenous experience. It is an 
experience of violence, rupture, loss and oppression. It is also an experience of struggle and 
resurrection (Alfred, 1999; 2005; Coulthard, 2014; Durie, 1998; King, 1992; 
Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Turner, 2008; Whyte, 2013; 2016; Yunupingu, 1997). Decolonialism 
identifies the strong links between culture, language, and custom, and the concept of 
sovereignty. A loss of the former inevitably means the loss of the latter (L. Graham & 
Friederichs, 2012). Arguably, the drive within the settler states to assimilate Indigenous 
Peoples had just this goal—by stamping out the distinctly Indigenous elements of culture and 
being, Indigenous Peoples would lose any sense of independent sovereignty and accept the 
new status quo. Deeply rooted within the goal and philosophical justifications for colonial 
expansion and ongoing domination are claims of enlightenment and white superiority (Mills, 
2017). Such was the implicit claim made by Australia’s former Prime Minister cited above.  
 
Despite their worst endeavours, the colonialists did not fully succeed in eliminating the 
Indigenous other. And, in the later part of the twentieth century Indigenous Peoples, with 
support from within their own territories and internationally, have (re)asserted their claims to 
culture, tradition, and sub-national sovereignty (Alfred, 1999; Coulthard, 2014; Dodson, 1997; 
Durie, 1998; Randall, 2003; Turner, 2008). Their claims can be unsettling to the dominant 
cultures, they challenge notions of nationhood, territorially settled property, and the modus of 
multiculturalism. As Duncan Ivison identifies, ‘indigenous peoples are not simply a litmus test 
for our thinking about pluralism but represent a much deeper challenge to the way we 
conceptualise notions of citizenship, sovereignty, democracy and freedom in the first 
place—and indeed the nature of political philosophy itself’ (Ivison, 2011: 131). 
 
On September 13, 2007, after decades of negotiation and debate, UNDRIP was ratified—143 
nations in support, four against.41 Although they have since ratified the agreement, the four 
ex-British colonies of Aotearoa, Australia, Canada and USA resisted despite, or more 
correctly, because of, the significance to populations of Indigenous Peoples within their 
                                                
41 The International Labour Organisation first raised the issue of Indigenous rights in 1957—drafting the first 
international convention ILO Convention No 107. Imperfect, in that it was drafted without direct input with the 
people it represented, it heralded a turning point in international debate on Indigenous disadvantage, 
decolonisation and discrimination. 
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borders. This declaration, like all such UN documents, is not law. There are no associate 
powers to punish those nation states or other bodies who do not respect its conditions. It 
does however clearly identify norms for promoting Indigenous Peoples’ dignity supporting 
environments.42 Recognised by regional and international bodies as ‘sub-national groups’ 
with defining characteristics, ‘[t]hese norms [in addition to land claims] include the right of 
peoples to practice and transmit their customs, traditions, languages and belief systems to 
future generations; as well as the right to maintain the dignity and diversity of their cultures’ 
(L. Graham & Friederichs, 2012: 4). 
 
Earlier I asked, why is there something different about Indigenous Peoples’ rights? Why are 
the ‘universal’ set of rights in the UDHR insufficient? The value in rights is in ‘the extent that 
they protect or promote certain crucial interests that individuals and groups have’ (Ivison, 
2003: 323). However, interests can be and are conceived differently to the conceptions within 
liberal politics and philosophy. The interests Indigenous Peoples seek to have protected and 
promoted, the duties and obligations they have in the world are the product of difference. The 
UDHR was conceived under one logic—the obligations and duties within it are not neutral nor 
impartial (Barry, 2002); they accord with a particular way of viewing the world. The UDHR 
does not protect all that Indigenous Peoples hold valuable: its normative values are different 
‘entangled [as they are] within structures of informal imperialism’ (Ivison, 2011: 132-3). 
 
Strongly evoked throughout Indigenous Peoples’ rights discourse are environment/nature, 
future generations, and respect for and obligations to past generations. Together they hold 
keys to cultural continuity and sovereignty. I stress here this is not the Luddite’s call to ‘stop 
the clock’. It is a call for co-generation within the settler states, of acts which recognise and 
work with plurality. It is a call to seek wisdom from diversity, to step from the constrictions of 
the ‘imperialism project’ into an exploration of freedom of being Indigenous and harnessing 
the depths of knowledge, experience, and ontology being Indigenous offer (Alfred, 1999; 
Coulthard, 2014; Durie, 1998; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Turner, 2008). It is an invitation to the 
dominant culture to consider lifting the shades of Indigenous ignorance and to step into the 
lived experience of Indigenous Peoples (Figueroa & Waitt, 2008; Whyte, 2011).  
 
The discourse suggests being Indigenous means connecting with, safeguarding, listen to, 
and immersion in, environment. Along with respect and language, environment, place, 
                                                
42 In the broadest sense of environment. Environment in this phrasing should be read to denote natural and 
cultural environments. 
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animals, and plants are integral to continuity of culture. The dominant cultures in settler states 
have failed to recognise the differences in philosophies and out of this unknowing failed to 
enable the dignity of their Indigenous communities (Figueroa, 2008; Whyte, 2011). The 
doctrine of Terra Nullius persists in justice theory when it attempts to universalise, wiping from 
the record the violence of colonisation, the ongoing lived experience, and the existence of 
living and evolving alternate cultures which are modern (Connell, 2007).  
 
Power	
There is a serious asymmetry of power in IEJ: the power is held by current generations of 
Westerners. Human activities have the capacity to render the earth uninhabitable within the 
foreseeable future (Rockstrom, 2009), and in so doing to inflict harms on future generations. 
What is at question is the spatial and particularly temporal distribution of goods and burdens. 
An injustice can be thought to have been wrought if the benefits accrue to the living while 
simultaneously they avoid the harms that are knowingly placed on future generations. That, 
we the living do not know the individual identity or cultural proclivities of those future people, 
will be irrelevant to them as they endure the burdens. It is conduct and actions, not the 
wronged party’s actual identity or values, that are relevant to considerations of justice 
(Kumar, 2003). Knowingly altering global climate systems, degrading the environment, and 
depleting resources can be argued to be acts of wrong when they diminish the life prospects 
of our children and grandchildren—injustice rests in the doing, the acting. Control of ‘the 
acting’ rests firmly with dominant cultures and political and legal systems which take 
responsibility for national social justice.  
 
While we may have an intuitive sense of what IJ may require of legislation, on the whole, 
existing frameworks fail to account for a worldview which might invoke a more wholehearted 
preparedness to sacrifice luxury now for (subsistence for) those who come later (Shue, 
2010). In effect these frameworks privilege the living Western human or as Charles Mills 
suggests more specifically the white, Western, male (Mills, 2017) and have difficulty 
forestalling wrong-doing.  
 
From such documents as Brundtland’s Our Common Future written in 1987 (Brundtland, 
1987), and the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 1988, 1989, 
1990 and 1991, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
68 
Nations 1992), to the Millennium Goals (United Nations 2013a), the Human Development 
Reports (UNDP 2011), and the Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate 
Change (United Nations 2009) the need to preserve the climate system and nature for the 
benefit of future generations has been recognised as imperative. Each document states or 
implies IJ should be normalised, and at the same time makes clear that the interests of future 
generations must accommodate the needs and interests of the living. Apart from the last of 
this list of reports, each is written largely from a Western liberal framework. And despite the 
list, acts of destruction continue. 
 
Why is IJ not normalised and what conceptual frameworks might facilitate a transition to such 
a normalisation? The argument throughout this thesis is that it is the conceptual frameworks, 
and that, despite intuitive acceptance, we lack experience of implementing IJ on expanded 
spatial and temporal scales. What might be needed to make IJ integral to (dominant, 
democratic) Western politics and political philosophy, economics, governance systems, and 
law and lore?  
 
Discussion	 	
As I grow, gaining in years, but not losing youth, I see more and more the importance of 
philosophy. It’s not a question of eating today, but eating tomorrow. … 
I consider philosophy to be so important that it even bewilders me when I am asked what 
it is good for. It serves to change the mind, the interpretation in order to see what we are 
doing to us. Because besides that, there are only appearances: the Coco-Cola, the 
wealth, the [North] American way of life.  
(Dussel, 2016)  
 
Indigenous Peoples' are one of the leading sets of voices in environmental and climate 
change debates. Repeated refrains in their discourses reference cultural integrity for future 
generations and environmental justice (United Nations, 2010). Concern for their inheritors is 
two-fold: for the environment per se; and for the continuation of culture through environment 
and place. It is ‘the relationship between the processes of the natural and social worlds’ 
(Schlosberg, 2012a: 451), that is critical to this Indigenous framing of IEJ. It does not imply an 
intransigent and dogmatic 'living in the past'. There is no contradiction in Indigenous People 
seeking a life in the modern world within their living unique cultures (Durie, 1998), rather the 
discourse appeals to the creation of dignity supporting environments for the living and future 
generations, in which the intimate connection of human and nonhuman is paradigmatic 
(Alfred, 1999; Greene, 2011; Watene, 2016). 
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IEJ addresses a range of issues, many of which uncomfortably challenge the existing liberal 
paradigm, including: polluting and destructive technology; increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions; threats to eco-systems; climate instability; changing disease vectors and other 
health issues related to climate change; sea level rises; flood and drought; fluid migration 
flows, with potential for environmentally triggered vast mass migrations; increasingly high 
population densities and exponential population growth; and intense demand on natural 
resources for subsistence, life-style improvements and maintenance (for a comprehensive 
analysis of global environmental threats see Rockstrom et al., 2009). The actions of the living 
can and will impact the quality and wellbeing of the lives of people in the near and very far 
future. The things people do now will have an impact on generations many removes from the 
present. Some technologies, some human behaviours have the capacity not only to destroy 
landscape and nonhuman species but also to push humans to extinction (Crutzen, 2002; 
Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; Rockstrom et al., 2009). IEJ argues for balance; human desire 
and development with the nonhuman domain, the rights of individual and community, material 
against non-material goods, past, present and future. Indigenous Peoples become 
concerned when the liberal view of balance is at odds with their own.  
 
Philosopher Charles Mills challenges Burke’s social contract narrative, liberalism and the 
objectivity of the liberal tradition. Far from framing the foundations of social order, Mills 
argues, the social contract is an intellectual sleight of hand. What is conjured is a sense of 
social equity born of shared citizenship and social participation. The partnership Burke 
proclaims is, Mills suggests, fallacious or at least non-inclusive. Society has always 
depended on the racial contract (Mills, 1997; 2007; 2017). Mills argues his case within the 
United States, here I make a similar claim for Aotearoa and Australia that;  
racial domination interferes with objective cognition, denies equal racial personhood, and 
generates rationalizations of unjust white acquisition. Thus they are all negatively 
transformed by the dynamic of racial liberalism. (Mills, 2017: xvi)  
 
The claimed objectivity of the liberal tradition is objective only to the extent it is 
self-referentially white (and male). And alarmingly, it is unconsciously so. Mills urges for ‘a 
self-conscious deracializing of liberalism that would begin by recognizing the centrality of a 
social ontology of race to the modern world and the acknowledgement of a corresponding 
history of racial exploitation that needs to be registered in liberal categories and addressed as 
a matter of liberal social justice’ (Mills, 2017: xvii). Building from this, I suggest a 
self-conscious examination of IEJ reveals, in at least two settler states, ongoing colonisation 
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of the ancestors, living and future descendants of the original inhabitants and the 
environment. 
 
Similarly, David Pellow suggests state violence towards brown and black bodies is directly 
intertwined with violence against nonhuman (what he calls the ‘more than human’), and that 
we must ‘explore their myriad connections in order to excavate the roots of racist violence no 
matter the form it takes’ (Pellow, 2016: 222). The subjects of environmental injustice are 
(primarily) people of colour, including Indigenous communities, and nonhuman. His 
suggestion is that critical EJ studies ‘extend beyond questions of distribution to incorporate a 
deeper consideration of theory and the ways that gender, sexuality, and other categories of 
difference shape EJ struggles’ (Pellow, 2016: 223). The tacit acceptance of violence towards 
nonhuman, the ‘gross animal’ to which Burke referred, is narratively extended to marginalised 
persons. That is, species/animality discourse is extended to marginalised peoples, thus 
legitimising violence against them. It is his claim that,  
‘[c]ritical EJ Studies speaks to the ways in which various social categories of difference 
work to place particular bodies at risk of exclusion, marginalization, erasure, 
discrimination, violence, and othering. These insights are important for building an 
understanding of the ways that intra-human inequality and oppressions function and how 
they intersect with human-nonhuman oppression’ (Pellow, 2016: 225).  
 
Justice based in human exceptionalism, Pellow and Mills suggest, actually protects white 
persons’ exceptionalism. In so doing people of colour, colonised Indigenes, and nonhuman 
are excluded. Justice theories need to disentangle the racialized and othered elements of 
theory for it to be decolonised and/or radicalised. Only then can theory to be inclusive in the 
settler states.  
 
While Mills and Pellow offer precedents for decolonising/radicalising liberal theory and EJ, 
theories of IJ are largely uncritical. That said, however, given all Indigenous justice reflects 
both IJ and EJ concerns, calls for Indigenous justice form a critique of both. Entangled within 
the intergenerational social contract are the very narrative roots of ‘the Indigenous problem’ 
Rosalie Kunoth-Monk so firmly rejected on QandA, when she stated:  
You know, I have a culture. I am a cultured person. … I am Arrente-Alyawarra First 
Nations person. A sovereign person from this country. … Don't try to suppress me. And 
don't call me a problem. I am not a problem. 43   
 
Indigenous Peoples’ experiences of colonial and post-colonial injustice are explicitly and 
always intergenerational and environmental (see for instance Whyte, 2017). There is a nexus 
                                                
43 The full quotation opens this thesis. 
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of interests within these justice domains. However, arising at the intersection of 
intergenerational, Indigenous and environmental justice (IIEJ) are a complex of issues yet to 
be directly resolved by liberal theorists. IIEJ pushes theory beyond the boundaries of some 
key liberal assumptions from which it arises—assumptions based in the (unconsciously?) 
white ontology of liberalism, and wilful manufacture of epistemic ignorance of the Indigenous 
experience. These overlapping domains refocus our attention back to Burke’s 
assertion—social advance depends on inescapable intergenerational obligations. Addressing 
the long-term EJ concerns of Indigenous Peoples, many of whom are minorities captured in 
the web of liberal democracies, requires stretching the fabric of each separate justice domain 
(environmental, Indigenous and intergenerational). What is required is a reconceptualization 
to weave an intentionally deracialised and decolonised liberal theory of IEJ. The ontological 
presumptions of liberalism, the obscured Eurocentric whiteness particularised in Figure 1.1, 
must be brought into the open and addressed. 
 
Bedded within my argument that IEJ must be decolonised is the claim that the colonial project 
is not yet truly post-colonial. That is, while colonial rulers may have withdrawn their interests 
from the state, while their agents may no longer have direct access to the wealth embedded 
within colonial soil, fauna, flora and human inhabitants, the culture from which those acts 
were justified is now that which dominates the settler states (Connell, 2007; Corntassel, 
2012; Keenan, 2014; Memmi, 2003; Mikaere, 2003; Moreton-Robertson, 2015; Povinelli, 
2016; Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Sullivan, 2007; Watson, 2015; Whyte, 2015). The second 
claim is that so long as this cultural domination continues Indigenous Peoples of the settler 
states remain oppressed. By exploring aspects of the ‘concepts, assumptions, norms, values, 
and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of’ (Mills, 2017: 82) 
some Māori and Aboriginal communities the next section demonstrates how thoroughly 
Indigenous agency is hamstrung. 
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Section	2:	Living	at	the	Intersection	— 
barriers	to	realising	IEJ	in	settler	states	
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Chapter	4:	Still	Talking	Past	Each	Other	— 
more	than	homo	economicus	
Indigenous peoples who seek to realize the goal of harmonious coexistence within their 
communities find that this is impossible within the mainstream political system as it is 
currently structured. 
(Alfred, 1999: 22) 
  
The preceding chapters established a number of epistemological and ontological schisms 
dividing Western and certain Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of IEJ. This chapter focuses 
on one schism: the values humans assign to place and the material, and how those values 
impact conceptions of IEJ. Based around the Aotearoa government’s desire to generate 
revenues by expanding the nation’s oil and gas exploration and mining, it explores one iwi’s 
resistance to exploration in their rohe44—specifically their coastal waters—and their assertion 
of mana moana.45 While the government values the oil beneath the ocean floor, Te Runanga 
o Te Whanau-a-Apanui46 (Apanui) values the integrity of the whole—the place. The 
government wants to extract value, Apanui wants to preserve value. The government’s goals 
reach 25 years into the future, Apanui’s stretch through all time—past, present and future. 
Apanui’s resistance included a flotilla, launched to frustrate off-shore exploration (and which 
was thwarted by naval intervention), and subsequently, an attempt to delegitimise the 
explorations via a High Court action. Reviewing the submissions and affidavits from the High 
Court case between Apanui and the Minister of Energy and Resources (MOE),47 and 
Apanui’s feedback on revisions to the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (FSA) uncovers key 
differences between the approach each has to material values and place.   
 
There are significant ruptures between the Crown and Apanui, and their approaches to 
environmental governance. Each constructs knowledge differently. The Crown works within a 
positivist epistemological frame: The earth divided into measured blocks, and resources 
quantified. Apanui uses whakapapa48 to guide their understanding of the world. 
                                                
44 Territory. 
45 Authority over the sea, respect coming from guardianship of the seas and sea life. 
46 Te Runanga o Te Whanau a Apanui represents 13 of the 15 hapu (extended) families in the approximately 
11,000-person iwi. 
47 CIV-2011-485-1897 [2012] NZHC 1422 
Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated and Te Runanga o Te Whanau-a-Apanui vs The Minister of Energy 
and Resources and Petrobras International Braspetro BV. 
48 Literally, to place in layers, whakapapa is the epistemological framework of Māori: ‘for something to exist and 
be known, it must have a whakapapa; put another way, in order to ‘know’ about a thing (or a person) one must 
know its whakapapa’ (Roberts, 2012). 
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Ontologically, the Crown is anthropocentric and the drive for economic expansion is primary 
to decision making. Apanui’s worldview entangles human and nonhuman, material and 
transcendental. It focuses on sufficiency and protection of the environment including 
commitments to reciprocity, ancestors and future generations. Despite over 150 years of 
negotiations between the Crown and Māori they are (still) talking past each other.  
 
I say “still” talking past each other to highlight the ongoing subordination of Māori values by 
the dominant Western institutions and to reference two historical moments—one political, one 
academic. First are the differences between the Treaty of Waitangi and Te Tiriti o Waitangi.49 
Signed on February 6, 1840, the history of Māori and the Crown talking past each other dates 
from at least this Treaty for there is not one but two treaties: the English rendition of the 
Treaty of Waitangi is not a faithful translation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Te Tiriti).50 And then there 
were ‘several different versions [of Te Tiriti] with significant different meanings … circulated 
around New Zealand’ (A. Henare, 2007; 54). Māori ‘signed up to’ the terms and conditions of 
the Māori rendering(s), not the English version.51 There is also reason to believe that the 
Māori signatories to Te Tiriti understood the document and the act of signing the document 
quite differently to way the representatives of Queen Victoria understood it. It is valid to ask if 
‘as members of a culture accustomed to the flexibilities of oral contractual negotiation … 
would they have appreciated the binding nature of the document in accordance with British 
intent’ (A. Henare, 2007; 54-55). The foundations of Māori knowing, whakapapa, the chiefs 
brought to Te Tiriti make it reasonable to infer not only were the translations incompatible, but 
also the epistemological groundings of British and Māori culture, understandings and ways of 
being mitigated against shared meanings.   
 
Second, Joan Metge and Patricia Kinloch’s ground-breaking paper ‘Talking Past Each Other’ 
of 1978 in which the authors compare fundamental differences in how Māori (and Pacifika) 
and Pākehā communicate (Metge & Kinloch, 1992). The Treaty of Waitangi and Te Tiriti 
differences and Metge & Kinloch’s paper draw vivid pictures of the culturally embedded 
nature of communication, communicative procedure and the assumption humans make that 
                                                
49 In it Queen Victoria of England made fundamental promises to protect the Māori people from rapacious settlers 
in return for the right to govern. Despite a history of breaches, the Treaty of Waitangi has enabled Māori to claim 
restitution and redistribution of some resources over the later part of the 20th century, continuing into the present. 
50 It was Te Tiriti (actually a number of copies of Te Tiriti) that travelled Aotearoa New Zealand in 1839-1840 
gathering the signatures of Māori leaders. 
51 There is insufficient space to examine the differences here, however, suffice it here to say they are materially 
significant. Te Tiriti is the reference for ongoing negotiations between the Crown and iwi, and for Treaty of 
Waitangi claims. 
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their way is the only way of communicating, that is, the assumption that what is familiar to me 
or us is universal.  
 
The argument is not that Māori have not embraced materialism, for indeed some have 
wholeheartedly and successfully. Rather an argument here is that when deciding on issues of 
IEJ, the decision-making parameters Māori use encompass multiple values and (very) long 
timeframes. Māori may apply Māori custom and practice in one context, and Western custom 
and practice in another. That is, there is epistemological and ontological fluidity between the 
dichotomies of Fig.1.1 (page 20) within theory and practice, in populations and within the 
individual person. The case study, however, highlights the conflicts that arise for Apanui when 
the material values and the communications style of bureaucrats acting for the MOE limit 
Apanui’s capacity to fulfil obligations and duties to pace, as Māori, according to Māori 
protocol and practice.  
 
Since colonisation, Māori have been encouraged to ‘assimilate’, to adopt the mores and 
values of a Westernised society.52 Simultaneously Māori language, culture, ontology, 
epistemology, cosmology, and traditions have survived. Many Maori can and do describe 
themselves as ambicultural:53 they understand, identify with, and operate comfortably and 
successfully within both cultural paradigms (Interviews with Marama Fox, Anake Goodall and 
Manuka Henare in 2015). Indeed, my respondents reported a quasi-geographic mappability. 
On matters of material values, Marama Fox suggests, in the city, where they hold jobs and 
own individual title to property, Māori operate within the Western material paradigm. The 
commercial objectives for iwi-owned enterprises are embedded in the capitalist structures of 
Aotearoa and global economies. Indeed, in the iwi enterprise context, Anake Goodall 
suggests Māori have learned the Western model ‘too well’ at the cost of traditional values (Int. 
AG.). However, in their tribal homelands, and tūrangawaewae,54 Māori values to the material 
remain manifest and dominant (Int. MF.).  
 
Apanui holds true to iwi traditions. Traditional lands, waters, sea and riverbeds, forests, fish 
and birds are part of their common heritage over which they are kaitiaki, or guardians for 
past, present and future generations. Simultaneously the iwi runs a number of economic 
initiatives: a fishing boat, IT company, IT training school and a school for youth offender 
                                                
52 As with Indigenous Peoples in other colonies around the world. 
53 A similar ‘learning’ of Western capitalist values is reflected upon by Taiaiake Alfred as he discusses Canada’s 
Indigenous Peoples experience (Alfred, 1999). 
54 Home place, place where one has rights of belonging through kinship. 
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‘rehab’. The Government and legal system are firmly based in a single Anglo tradition. While 
Māori and English are both official languages, the institutions of state and law are not 
ambicultural. The dominant systems inflict epistemic oppression (Dotson, 2014) and render 
Māori ontology unknowable55 and fail to accommodate Māori ambiculturalism, obliging Māori 
to reconcile intergenerational environmental obligations within two distinct, and frequently 
conflicting ontologies. 
  
Section 1 examines the theoretical problems for IEJ arising from Western material values, 
particularly property rights. Section 2 briefly backgrounds the events leading to the court 
case, tracing the government’s objectives and actions, and Apanui responses, all of which 
provide the source material for this analysis. Section 3 and Section 4 contrast Western 
material relationships with the environment, Apanui’s custodial relationship and on how 
obligations and duties to future generations are differently understood. In conclusion, the 
case studies show while IEJ is intrinsic to Apanui lifeways, the material assumptions and 
procedural frameworks of the government hamstring the consideration and realisation of both 
IEJ and IIEJ.  
 
Materialism’s	stranglehold	on	intergenerational	environmental	justice	
…owning property means that we have something of an absolute natural right to it—a 
right protected by legitimate government but one that should not be limited or modified by 
the government. (Meyer, 2015: 96) 
 
Earlier I linked my use of the word materialism to the epistemologies, ontologies and 
practices that imagine nonhuman largely in terms of its economic value and the imaginary 
where ‘value’ is understood as relative to human interests. Central to this materialist 
imaginary is property ownership. It is a basic tenet. The right to exclusive property ownership 
is an assumed ‘good’ and a ‘right’ by Western justice theory. Property rights are integral to the 
UDHR56 and the CA and legitimised in law and legislation. Indeed, they are axiomatic to 
Western social structure and so inextricably bound with notions of wellbeing and dignity, a 
critical measure of success (personal, corporate, national) is growth in material wealth. 
Property itself includes land, rights to land-use, and more abstract ideas such as the 
                                                
55 While a reference to Dotson and Whyte’s 2013 article (Whyte, 2011b), suffice it here to take the word at its 
literal level. 
56 Article 17 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
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intellectual property—it is land and the resources within the land that are the focus here. John 
Locke justified land-based property rights, and their standardisation in law and politics, in his 
Two Treatise of Government, most explicitly in The Second Treatise, Chapter V, paragraphs 
25-51(Locke, 1997):57 A tradition continued within the Western canon by, for instance, 
Bentham, Hume, Mill and Hegel (Meyer, 2015).  
 
While there is no one interpretation of Locke’s intent, his work has been influential in guiding 
liberal thought (Tuckness, 2005). Initially, in Locke’s view, land, waters, minerals, plants and 
animals (resources) become owned as property when someone through personal labour 
improved or acquired resources from ‘the commons’ (2V §27, 30, 32, 45). Money became a 
proxy for labour and allowed individuals to acquire greater property holdings than their direct 
labours could improve (2V §37, 50). Importantly, resources may be, and on Locke’s and the 
liberal account, should be, appropriated into ownership parcels to ensure their improvement 
and increased productivity/return. Ownership rights give the owner a right to gratification from 
the resource—provided, at least for Locke, there is no ‘spoilage’ (2V §31). Locke 
unequivocally identifies human dominion and property rights over all things that can be 
harvested, killed or harnessed for human use and betterment (2V §26). 
 
Thus within this key strand of Western liberal philosophy the value of nature and the 
environment, conflated to land and property, is strictly instrumental. Worth rests in the value 
of people’s labour and the price or usefulness people attach to and derive from property. The 
conundrum for IEJ is to establish a balance between instrumental property rights in the 
present, the subsistence and quality-of-life rights of future generations and any potential 
intrinsic value future people may place on the environment. 
 
IEJ addresses inequalities arising when the living extract immediate benefit from the 
environment and resources and pass burdens to future generations. Its focus is to design a 
framework to ensure ‘the profligate generation’ (Gardiner, 2011b), do not plunder the 
environment at the expense of future generations. Locke’s theory presupposed 
ever-available commons to be appropriated into ownership (2V §33), and subsequent liberal 
materialism is premised on infinite growth trajectories, increasing wealth and sophisticated 
technological fixes.58 Reconciling a finite planet with infinite material appetites and marrying 
                                                
57 Hereafter 2V. 
58 Although he does go on to identify the advent of money as a proxy for labour has enabled people to alienate 
huge tracts of land, thus reducing the opportunity of others to access it (2V §36). 
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obligations to avoid unfairly burdening future generations while tapping the environment for 
immediate benefit poses some intractable problems. 
 
Although irreversible environmental damage continues to accrue, some people call for 
continuing growth and continuity of practice.59 Based in contract, Lockean property rights, 
and expectations of increasing wealth and material gains, one response to IEJ is to 
pronounce it ‘incoherent’ (Ball, 2008) or to propose wealth and technological inheritance as 
compensation (Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007). Money, technological advances, science, 
future inheritances, are said to sufficiently compensate future generations for environmental 
damage and resource depletion.  
 
Embedded in a materialist framework liberal IEJ focusses on what current generations may 
take, without unfairly denying future generations access to similar assets or asset values. It 
interrogates the expected material wellbeing of future generations built on inherited wealth 
and iterative advances in technology and knowledge (de-Shalit, 1995). Caught in this debate 
IEJ has become an economic calculation balancing current expenditure against future wealth 
(Stern, 2009a).  
 
On this worldview, IEJ must work within a paradigm that disconnects the environment from 
the human. What is important are contracts between people—ancestors, the living, and 
future generations. In such a paradigm it is argued that future generations are owed not the 
same environment and resources, but something of similar monetary/material value. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the materialist and property ownership structures place significant 
barriers to the way we conceptualise IEJ.  
 
Where Māori apply their traditional values, their tikanga, resources are not property, but part 
of intricate kinship relationships over which Māori are kaitiaki.60 In this context, the obligation 
of kaitiaki is to improve the environment and available resources for future generations 
(Durie, 1998; Mead, 2003; M. Roberts et al., 2004; Selby et al., 2010; D. Williams, 2001). The 
next two sections examine how liberal materialism is reflected in political and legal practice in 
Aotearoa and how that limits Māori agency, and creates ontological and practical dissonance 
in the realisation of culturally appropriate IEJ obligations.  
 
                                                
59 See for instance the Australian Government’s Intergenerational Reports. 
60 Guardians/Trustees. 
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Opening	the	Raukumara	Basin	to	petroleum	exploration	and	mining	
The existing fundamental policy objective…to allow continuing investment in prospecting, 
exploration and mining for petroleum, is passive. It does not fit with the more active role 
government is determined it should take setting economic and social direction. 
Accordingly, an active policy objective promoting responsible prospecting, exploration 
and development that contributes substantially to our economy is proposed.  
(RNR13 §3:1 underline original)  
 
Superficially, the government’s commitment to revenue raising by selling rights to explore for 
and mine petroleum resources triggered the court case brought by Apanui against the 
Minister of Energy. But the conflict is, I argue, really between the Crown’s philosophical 
framework and that of Apanui. The government actively sought foreign companies to exploit 
the reserves of oil and gas in an offshore basin adjacent to and within the rohe over which 
Apanui are traditional owners and custodians and within the country’s territorial waters and 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).61 Royalties from these projects will go towards ‘economic 
and social development’ (Gendall 2012: §13). The government thought the best interests of 
the nation’s economy would be served by mining (Gendall 2012: §2.7). The philosophy and 
language of the legislation governing the Crown’s obligations to people, economy, resources 
and environment are those of the (dominant) British-based legislative and economic 
structures of Aotearoa.  
 
The substance of the introductory quotation, taken from a letter (17 October 2002) from the 
Ministry of Economic Development to the Associate MOE, set the stage for expanding the 
government’s petroleum mining ambitions and precipitated a review of the existing Minerals 
Programme for Petroleum (MPP).62 This active turn drew the MOE into conflict with Apanui, 
forcing him to defend his own and his ministry’s process and procedure. How did a move 
from passive to active policy objectives land the MOE in the High Court? The pivotal events 
are briefly outlined here. 
 
Deep within the folded and faulted layers of sedimentary and metamorphic bedrock of 
Aotearoa rest Cambrian hydrocarbon remnants of ancient forests—deposits of petroleum 
                                                
61 In Aotearoa the Crown ‘owns’ both the seas and resources in it, sea floor, and mineral reserves under the sea 
floor. I explain the complexities of this ownership claim further on in sections 2 and 3. 
62 This letter is one of numerous documents submitted on behalf of the Ministry of Energy in their defences 
submissions to the High Court case bought by Greenpeace New Zealand Incorporated and Te Runanga o Te 
Whanau-a-Apanui against the Minister of Energy and Resources and Petrobras International Braspetro BV.  
Submissions and affidavits to the case and documents RNR1-RNR46. A list of the documents used is found in 
Appendix A. 
The researcher accessed these documents, with the permission of the Court and Judge Mackenzie, at the High 
Court of New Zealand in February 2015. 
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and gas owned according to the Petroleum Act 1937 (PA) by the ‘Crown’ or government. An 
ownership disputed in 1937 and still contested by Māori (who claim the deposits form part of 
their taonga63 protected by Te Tiriti) but which the government continues to assert. These 
deposits represent considerable potential wealth for the ‘owner’.  
 
As revenues from the existing offshore drilling dwindled, the government commissioned new 
seismic testing to uncover potential oil and gas bearing geological strata along coastal 
margins and within the EEZ. New mining operations were seen as potential replacement 
sources for lost revenue streams and the increased revenues from royalties could keep taxes 
low, and fulfil the government’s goal to ‘proactively support growth’ (RNR13: §7:3).  
 
By 2007 the government had spent $3.7m (RNR 46) collecting data from the seismic testing. 
Indications were the Raukumara Basin held significant deposits. The Raukumara Basin lies 
offshore from the remote and sparsely populated East Cape (see Fig 4.2), and reasonably 
close to the major Tauranga Port facilities. It also lies within the rohe of two iwi, Ngāti Porou in 
the South East and Te Whanau a Apanui to the North West of the Cape, and their associated 
hapu.64 Divided into two blocks, the basin was opened in 2008 to tenders from 
well-resourced and experienced foreign companies.  
 
Despite a fourteen-month window for tenders, only one company entered the race, Brazil’s 
Petrobras. They received a 5-year exploration permit on 1 June 2010 and commenced 
off-shore operations in 2011.  
 
The Crown is required by law to consult with iwi ‘geographically associated with the proposal’. 
Sixty-nine iwi/hapu were notified, supplied with an outline of the proposed exploration, 
informed of the consultation process and given 20 working days to respond (RNR 46).65 The 
terms under which they could request changes to the proposed block were tightly prescribed. 
Significantly, the MOE’s obligation was simply to give the request ‘full consideration (RNR46: 
Attachment 3)’. The parameters for objections from iwi and hapu were narrow, effectively 
                                                
63 Property, goods, treasures. 
64 Sub-tribal groups with members drawn from an extended family. 
65 The 69 iwi/hapu in the region were invited to provide comments and seek direct consultation if that was their 
wish (Gendall, 2012§30). It is important to note however that the two iwi (and associated hapu) adjacent to the 
blocks and into whose traditional rohe the blocks encroach are Te Whanau a Apanui and Ngāti Porou. No other 
consulted iwi have rohe claims to the block. It might also be noted here that iwi are comprised of hapu: therefore 
for instance Te Whanau a Apanui iwi represents 15 hapu. The invitation numbers might be interpreted as 
suggesting more Māori were consulted than was actually the case as hapu are ‘double counted’ in that they are 
incorporated into iwi. 
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restricted to requests to exclude mining from their sacred places such as urupa.66 There was 
no clear opening for ontological objections to the mining. 
 
On 19 August 2008 Apanui received their invitation to comment/consult with Government 
representatives in writing or discussion kanohi ki te kanohi67 or at hui.68 
 
Dayle Takitimu, the lawyer for Apanui, responded by email (RNR41) the following day:  
I have spoken to the Crown negotiation team about this proposed consultation—and in 
fact our concern that this matter is being progressed at all while we are in negotiations 
regarding the recognition of our interests in the foreshore and seabed. We have asked 
that no action would be taken by the Crown or its departments to affect our interests until 
after the negotiations had been completed, the Crown made this undertaking in the Terms 
of Negotiation. Instead we find that this is not the case, and we have to deal with different 
Government ministries progressing their agenda whilst we are trying to protect the 
interests of the iwi. 
… [I have] conveyed [to the Ministry of Justice that] I think consultation will likely inflame a 
rather fragile negotiating situation here on the coast. Therefore, in order to preserve the 
goodwill and good faith the iwi have in negotiations we would like consultations with Te 
Whanau a Apanui managed through our negotiations team, as has become the practice 
with other government consultations … 
(RNR41, italics added) 
 
In response, Mr Robson, for the MOE, emailed, ‘I am happy to receive your views on the 
proposal as soon as you are able to forward them’ (RNR41), and he suggested that Apanui 
consider consulting with Ministerial representatives during their visits with the adjacent iwi, 
Ngāti Porou the following month.  
 
Robson ignored Apanui’s request for a single government contact and a delay until 
negotiations on the FSA were completed.69 To Apanui, the reformulation of FSA and the 
process for opening the Raukumara Basin for oil and gas exploration should properly be 
sequential. That is, it was their position, because they view the environment and activities 
within the environment as a single system, that the outcomes of the FSA flow into any 
decisions about exploring the basin. This holism was elaborated on at length in the Affidavit 
of Mr Gage to the court (Gage, 2012), and will be explored further in Section 5. Robson fails 
to acknowledge Apanui’s concerns and objectives and he failed to seek further clarification if 
                                                
66 Urupa—cemeteries—as sacred places are ontologically easily understood by Pākehā who also treat 
graveyards and key memorial sites as sacred. However, applying a sacred relationship between humans and the 
non-human realm is at odds with the Western view. 
67 Face-to-face.  
68 Meeting(s). 
69 FSA, in response to court ruling that Maori interest (traditional ‘ownership’) of the foreshore and seabed had 
never been extinguished, had hastily formalised that which the government and many New Zealanders had 
thought ‘fact’, and established the Crown as owner. 
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he was unsure of the intent. Nor does he appear to appreciate, or take into consideration that 
the iwi had few resources to apply to the two requests, or that the matters of the FSA 
remained unresolved.70 From these very early days, Apanui and the government agents 
were talking past each other—the means of problem-solving and decision making framed in 
different cultural processes and by an underlying disjuncture in ontology and worldview, as 
we will see.  
 
Apanui did not respond to subsequent attempts by the ministry to contact them nor did they 
enter into further dialogue with the ministry before exploration began. Apanui remained silent 
until Petrobras was positioning its craft to start seismic testing in the Basin by April 2011. 
Then, in conjunction with Greenpeace, they blockaded it with a flotilla of sea-vessels. Lasting 
42 days, the blockade culminated in the arrest of the skipper of Apanui’s fishing vessel San 
Pietro (Scoop, 2012) after the Government sent in the navy to break up the flotilla.71  
 
Throughout the blockade and subsequent court case, Apanui spokespeople stressed their 
mana moana—their sovereignty over, respect arising from, and obligations to the marine 
environment in its totality—and obligations to future generations. Additionally, close on the 
heels of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico Apanui feared contamination of 
their kai moana72 which remains an important part of their diet, and provides the substance 
of their manaakitanga—traditional obligations of reciprocity and hospitality to visitors (Gage, 
2012).  
 
Incomplete in their communications during the consultation process, and thwarted in their 
direct actions they embraced their ambicultural skills and enter the Anglo-based legal system 
meeting their adversary on its home turf. On 19 September 2011, Greenpeace and Apanui 
filed proceedings in the High Court at Wellington, heard 5 - 6 June 2012 before Judge 
Warwick Gendall.73 The basis of the claim was procedural rather than philosophical, 
although, at heart as we will see, this is an ontological conflict. Greenpeace and Apanui 
claimed the Minister had not complied with obligations under the MPP to assess 
environmental effects of exploration nor complied with international environmental obligations 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 1982. 
                                                
70 It was not until 28 November 2008 the MOE received an Iwi Consultation Report that noted specifically the 
Crown considered the permit process and the Foreshore and Seabed Act separate issues. 
71 There is a separate story on the legality and morality of a government using its own military forces against 
citizens, which will not be pursued here. 
72 Sea food.  
73 CIV-2011-485-1897 [2012]NZHC 1422. 
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The Judge rejected these claims on the basis of the Crown’s property right to the resource, 
and that the Minister had fulfilled his procedural duties (Gendall, 2012). An appeal lodged by 
17 July Greenpeace and Apanui with the High Court was dismissed by Judge Mackenzie on 
15 May 2013. 
 
Ironically perhaps, on 5 December 2012, Petrobras withdrew from all operations in Aotearoa 
and the government started searching for new partners to explore and exploit the Raukumara 
Basin.  
 
A detailed examination of a range of documents from the MOE, the High Court of New 
Zealand and Apanui follows. They reveal the ontological dissonance implicit in the parties’ 
engagement with the environment, resources/taonga and the material world. They highlight, 
too, a communicative divide the cultures have yet to effectively cross and conflicting 
approaches to IEJ.  
 
For	the	Crown	
In the midst of Western societies that pride themselves on their respect for freedom, the 
freedom of Indigenous people to realize their own goals has been extinguished by the 
state in law and to a great degree in practice.  
(Alfred, 1999: 47) 
 
The extensive submissions presented to the High Court by the Crown (particularly 
RNR13-46) reveal that the Crown focused throughout the decision-making process on its 
property right to the potential petroleum deposits up to 3,000 metres below the sea surface 
12-200 km offshore from East Cape, and within Apanui’s traditional rohe (RNR46). The 
Crown asserts an obligation to expand offshore mining operations, to boost revenues and 
replace diminishing production from existing mining operations. Based in the PA the property 
right is proclaimed by the Crown, a right repeatedly contested by Māori. The submissions and 
affidavit (RNR13-RNR47) of the MOE (the First Respondent) focus on the Minister’s legal 
and procedural obligations. Documenting the process undertaken to open the Raukumara 
Basin to exploration and mining they include records of policy and policy direction, cabinet 
meetings, email trails, letters, meetings, and diary notes. From within this collection, it is 
possible to identify the ontological foundation for the government’s drive to mine the reserves 
and their material values, codes of engagement and assumptions.  
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The PA undergirds all subsequent legislation governing the exploitation of mineral resources 
in Aotearoa. Each relevant Act explicitly directs decision-making procedure towards the 
material/economic obligations of the MOE and excludes environmental and intergenerational 
obligations or duties. The language of the MOE’s submissions and affidavits (and the 
judgement) focuses on Lockean material values, process, procedure, science and 
technology. 
 
The MOE’s language represents Western values. The terminology and expectations, the 
unwritten code of being, for the government and its agencies, including the courts are framed 
by secular anthropocentrism, focus on the present and drive for material wealth. So familiar, 
so engrained, is this code it appears the agents of the Government assume it is universal. But 
Metge and Kinloch identified in the 1970’s that assuming universal communicative 
understanding leads Māori and Pākehā to ‘talk past each other’ (Metge & Kinloch, 1992). 
Implicit to the case is the Crown’s assumption that the Western value system is universal. 
The Submission of the Applicants notes that while there is ‘an enduring obligation to protect 
taonga’, this is ‘only by the means reasonable in the circumstances’ (RNR 18 §84). Under 
whose standards of reason is not defined, however as the determination by the Judge to 
dismiss the case indicates it is on Western principles (Gendall, 2012). While consultation with 
iwi must consider their objections to mining, the scope of objections is bounded within the 
value system Pākehā understand—what makes the site important? Is it sacred? Is it used for 
gathering food? Are there Treaty claims over the land? (RNR 14) There is no room for 
philosophical contestation.  
 
The language of the MOE’s exchanges with the community, iwi, and the court does not 
express, significantly acknowledge nor makes comprehensive space for, any alternative 
value system or understanding of place. As the remainder of this chapter will seek to explain, 
it talks past Apanui’s culture, spirituality, and values, and their obligations and duties to the 
environment and future generations. Apanui values and responsibilities under Apanui’s own 
philosophy and system of justice are rendered invisible by language, process and procedure 
and epistemologies of ignorance.  
 
In 2002, the Government directed the Ministry of Economic Development to review policy for 
petroleum mining, aiming specifically to increase value derived from this natural resource. 
The new active policy objective included finding new petroleum resources (RNR13 §2-§3). 
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The Government’s sights were turned to taking ‘an active role in the setting of economic and 
social direction’ (RNR 13§7:3); rather than leaving it to the market as previously. ‘Of particular 
relevance to the management of the Crown mineral estate is one of the economic objectives 
of MPP that New Zealanders “Derive considerable value from our natural advantages in 
terms of resources, climate, human capital, infrastructure and sense of community”’ (RNR13 
§8:3). Oil already contributed 1% ($850 million/year) to Aotearoa's GDP (RNR13 §15:4), 
however with existing fields nearing exhaustion the government sought new mining to at least 
shore up revenues. Because Apanui is unknowable and the Crown and Apanui talk past each 
other, without a touch of irony, the Crown set about exploring for offshore oil within Apanui 
rohe, decimating the very ‘sense of community’ they describe as integral to the MMP.  
 
The Department claimed ‘[p]romoting exploration and discovery of new oil and gas fields 
provides for the nation to use to best advantage its natural geological resources’ (RNR13 
§19:5) secure in their epistemological and ontological certainties and the objective that ‘the 
Crown, as owner of the petroleum resource, should obtain a guaranteed minimum royalty 
payment from the extraction of its petroleum’ (RNR13 Appendix 1:9). Alert to the prospect of 
disagreement to the revised policy direction they identify that ‘environmental groups may 
argue such a policy is inconsistent with the government's position of reducing greenhouse 
gases and ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. It may also be seen as promoting 
the government's resource ownership interests over other interests’ (RNR13 §29:6). 
Nevertheless, these reservations were subsumed to the Government’s resolute engagement 
with extracting maximum value from Aotearoa’s petroleum resources over a twenty-five-year 
period. 
 
As already noted the PA, §3 declares petroleum is the ‘property of the Crown.’ While Māori 
have repeatedly contested this ownership (based on Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi which 
preserves their interest in their taonga (treasures) (RNR 28)) the government has 
consistently asserted an exclusive property right over minerals. The title to land, sea, lake or 
river bed, may be held in individual or communal ownership, however, the mineral resources 
under the surface may not—they belong to the Crown. This repeated declarative ownership 
isolates the material property, the mineral resources, from their context. The intricate nexus of 
mineral, rock, soil, waters and air and allied wellbeing of living things, is peripheral to the 
understanding of ownership and property rights. Rather the government’s worldview 
underpins a fragmented ownership framework, dissociating the minerals from their wider 
environmental and community context.  
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The ideological fragmentation is further embedded by the ‘precaution’ of separating 
ministerial responsibilities for mineral exploitation and environmental protections within the 
legislation. Indeed, the committee reviewing the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) 
sought to separate the MOE from environmental decisions because of a perceived potential 
for conflict of interest. Specifically, they state: 
 
The Minister of Energy is given a multiple objective mandate, including the conflicting 
roles of, on the one hand, acting as a regulator on behalf of the community in respect to 
the community’s interests in sustainable management of the minerals and, on the other, 
acting as agent for the Crown’s commercial interest in obtaining a fair financial return on 
its mineral estate. Such dual-objective management arrangements provide a formula for 
loss of accountability. This is because one of the objectives tends to provide an excuse 
for failure to perform the other, and vice versa. […] Separating such conflicting roles and 
giving them to different people has been a fundamental part of the recent reforms in the 
State sector. (RNR 15; §3.1.1; 56-7) 
 
The committee is clear that it is very likely a Minister of Energy could easily be swayed to 
preference either environmental or extractive duties. To avoid conflicts of interest they 
suggest a separation of powers—the MOE should decide on exploration and exploitation 
while separate agencies are given to power to impose safety and environmental oversight. 
Within this framework, while there is a ‘judicious’ separation of powers, simultaneously there 
is an embedded understanding the matters of wealth generation, resource extraction, 
environment, and human habitat can be fragmented and approached in isolation.  
 
By the time this case was heard, environmental, health and safety obligations were carved off 
and covered separately in the RMA, Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSE) and 
Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA). Submissions under each Act are triggered after the MOE 
has granted a Permit for mineral exploration. Each ministry is required to act in isolation and 
protection of human and nonhuman wellbeing atomised. The primary objective, revenue 
generation, is the concern of the MOE. Having granted the permit, the MOE’s role in the 
process is completed. The permit holder then engages with other government agencies on 
risks to persons and environment. The risk to humans engaged in the mineral exploration and 
exploitation process is protected by the HSE & MTA. Risks to the environment are covered by 
the RMA. No one agency takes a fully holistic overview. 
 
The MOE’s only obligation was to consider financial security when granting the permit: the 
financial viability and experience of the applicant and the revenues to be collected as 
royalties and payments to the government. The MOE’s defence rests largely on the fact he 
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was not required to consider the potential impact of prospecting or mining on animal or plant 
life, nor the environment, within or discontinuous to the permit block (RNR14). His 
understanding of his responsibility was that it encompassed maximising returns from the 
resources in isolation from wider and interconnecting human, animal, plant and environment 
relationships. The permit holder was required to apply to separate government departments, 
acting under different Acts, for sign-off on environmental and health and safety issues. 
Environmental and material considerations and responsibilities are disconnected.74 As we 
will see in the next section, this is diametrically opposed to the worldview of Apanui.  
 
The MOE is directly responsible for the maximisation of revenue potential from the country’s 
mineral reserves. The Minister’s responses to a review of the Crown Minerals Act specifically 
reject taking responsibility for future generations and ignores other IJ issues such as 
environmental damage;  
… we do not know what technological breakthroughs, particularly in respect of energy 
resources, are likely, or when they will eventuate. But it seems clear that scarcity, 
reflected through rising prices will provide much more direct and urgent signals than any 
planned (and inevitably compromised) attempt to second guess the future. (RNR16: 2) 
 
The use of market mechanisms and expectations of technological ‘compensation’ to future 
generations is a device frequently employed in the West to discount the impact of modern 
environmental exploitation.  
 
A framework which applies material value alone to environment as a ‘resource’ encourages 
immediate extraction of ‘value’ and discounting of future need. Ownership of property rights 
to the minerals enables the government to sell the entitlement. Encouraging international 
interest in exploration and mining the Raukumara Basin, the government’s express intention, 
and legal obligation, was to raise royalties (RNR13: Appendix 1: 9). At the conclusion of the 
exploration period (5 years) they expected that, if commercially viable, the permit holder 
would immediately move into production phase. At no point in their submissions in this case 
does the Crown question this ideology: to them, it as a sine qua non, firmly grounded in the 
enlightenment philosophy of separation of cultural and natural, material and spiritual, and 
implied belief in limitless growth. 
 
                                                
74 In part this is to ensure that environmental integrity is not compromised by material values and the drive to 
extract revenue from the resources. That is, by separating the duties of the MOE and Minister for the Environment 
the latter will not be influenced to ‘go easy’ by material consideration. 
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There are no obligations to hold minerals in reserve for future generations nor to establish a 
mineral wealth fund to compensate future generations for loss of access to the resource. 
Resource ownership allows the ‘owner’ to act for immediate best self-interest, and gave them 
the ability to transfer or alienate the ownership at will. 
 
As Judge Gendall identified, the government and its agents (mining permit holders) cannot be 
denied access to these resources, unless some significant mitigating circumstance was 
proven by the landowner(s). By legal fiat, the resource is, then, instrumentally valuable to the 
Crown, a source of potential revenues for the current government. The impact on future 
generations of burning the fossil fuels and adding to global greenhouse gases is at best 
downplayed, and that ‘government’s resource ownership interests’ are ‘promoted over’ the 
interests of Maori, the environment and future generations remains marginalia. While the risk 
to widely recognised climate change harms is identified, the conflict with Māori values or 
obligations is not.  
 
Indeed, in the division of the earth and sea’s surfaces into measured discrete spaces (see Fig 
4.1), which may or may not bear relationships to the physical features of the surface, ancient 
tribal boundaries, the interconnections of geological features, and animal and plant habitats 
across the prescribed boundaries are ignored. The Government describes the Raukumara 
Basin as covering ‘25,000 square kilometres of seabed and extends about 300 kilometres 
north northeast of East Cape. (RNR46:6)’, extending from the coast to depths of 3,000 
metres it is 100 kilometres wide and marginally southeast of White Island, Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s most active volcano.75 The Government proposed dividing the Basin into two 
rectangular blocks, their perimeters described by reference to points of latitude and longitude 
(RNR14-GAB4).76 (See Figs 4.1 and 4.2)  
Schedule 2 
The Land 
 
All that area of land containing 12,330 square kilometres, more or less, bounded by straight lines between the 
geographical coordinates (NZGD2000) commencing at a point: 
Latitude  Longitude  
36° 30’ 00.0000” S and 177° 30’ 00” E then east to 
36° 30’ 00.0000” S and 178° 10’ 00” E then south to 
                                                
75 Interestingly the risk posed by seismic activity in the area to mining operations and safety in noticeably missing 
from the Government’s submissions. 
76 In the event as Petrobras was the only applicant, their permit was drawn across a newly described area 
covering parts of both blocks. 
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36° 40’ 00.0000” S and 178° 10’ 00” E then east to 
36° 40’ 00.0000” S and 178° 30’ 00” E then south to 
36° 50’ 00.0000” S and 178° 50’ 00” E then east to 
36° 50’ 00.0000” S and 178° 50’ 00” E then south to 
37° 00’ 00.0000” S and 178° 50’ 00” E then west to 
37° 30’ 00.0000” S and 179° 00’ 00” E then north to 
37° 30’ 00.0000” S and 179° 00’ 00” E then west to 
37° 30’ 00.0000” S and 177° 30’ 00” E then north to 
the point of commencement. Such an area is shown in the attached plan and more particularly identified in the 
spatial database held by the Secretary.  
Fig 4.1 The Land (replicated from RNR 14, GAB4, Petroleum Exploration Permit 52707, p3) 
 
The blocks cover territories over which both Apanui and Ngāti Porou have mana moana,77 
continuing from and continuous with their mana whenua78 to what are now described as 
territorial waters (0-12 kilometres offshore) into the EEZ (12-200 Kilometres offshore). It is 
this proximity and overlap that triggers Apanui’s kaitiakitanga79 obligations. Nowhere in the 
Crown’s defence submissions is there acknowledgement of such obligations.  
 
That could be because the Crown Minerals Act 1991 §5(d)(i) states the functions of the MOE 
include an obligation to collect and disclose information to ‘promote informed investment 
decisions’ in the petroleum and gas reserves in Aotearoa (Crown Minerals Act 1991). Under 
MPP §12(b) there are obligations ‘to obtaining by the Crown of a fair financial return from its 
minerals.’ Neither Act addresses environmental, health or safety issues. The risks to the 
environment, the animal- and sea-life and inshore and nearshore environs are isolated from 
the ministry’s responsibilities to promote investment. 
 
The Crown’s submissions and affidavits detailed the process and obligations of opening the 
Raukumara Basin to exploration. They were framed by a worldview in which material and 
environmental issues are deliberately separated, sea and sea-floor described as discrete and 
discontinuous property, and time projects from the present to the near (twenty-five year) 
future. Property ownership rights and government imperatives obligated the Minister to 
extract maximum return as quickly as possible, by permitting a foreign mining company to 
extract the resource, with the assumption that technological advances will in some 
(undescribed) way provide for future generations. The damage of mining and CO2 emissions 
                                                
77 Authority based in care of the sea territory. 
78 Lands over which they have authority. 
79 The protocols of guardianship. 
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is left to the market and technology to solve in some indeterminate manner. There is no room 
here for human sentiment, intrinsic valuing of nonhuman nor for deep spiritual 
interconnectedness between human and nonhuman. Apanui’s detailed explanation of their 
complex material and spiritual immersion in whenua and moana, their kinship with and 
obligations to ‘forests and oceans, fish and fowl, the rivers and the soil and between people 
and the elements’ (Durie, 1998: 22). received cursory attention from a Judge limited by legal 
process and procedure—bound by the same epistemological and ontological constraints as 
the Crown. 
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Fig 4.2  Raukumara Basin (RNR 14, GAB4: sourced from 
https://www.nzpam.govt.nz/permits/petroleum/block-offer/previous/pre-2012/) 
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The values the government places on the environment and mineral resources, and its 
perceived obligations and duties to the environment and future generations are framed by 
this modernist, liberal worldview. It frames too, their ability to ‘know’ and accommodate 
Apanui’s duties as kaitiaki framed within and informed by a sharply contrasting ontology, 
epistemology, and worldview, and limits Apanui’s ability to affect control of their lives, 
environment and political intentions. 
For	Greenpeace	and	Te	Runanga	o	te	Whanau	a	Apanui	 	
Māori views of the world are based in the proposition that the environment is an 
interacting network of related elements, each having a relationship to the others and to 
earlier common origins. The personification of the earth and the sky as the parents Rangi 
and Papa underlines this point. Not only is a distinctly human dilemma presented as an 
explanation for creation, but by comparing the features of the environment to a family, a 
model is proposed for examining the connections and interdependencies which occur 
between forests and oceans, fish and fowl, the rivers and the soil and between people 
and the elements. In this sense … Māori give some priority to the principles which 
underlie sustainable management and the needs of future generations.  
(Durie, 1998: 22) 
 
Apanui are not anti-materialist, indeed the economic welfare of the iwi is a major objective of 
the Runanga (see for instance their website http://www.apanui.co.nz/). However, the 
relationship between humans and the environment expressed in the papers examined here is 
so fundamentally different to that of the Crown it creates an antithesis. The parameters of 
engagement with the material, imbued with spiritual, economic and social dimensions, create 
the sharp contrast. Contained in the obligations of kaitiakitanga, Māori relationship with the 
non-human is custodial and stretches through all time. The entanglement of identity and care 
with self and more-than-self are echoed throughout Aboriginal philosophy and Indigenous 
cultures throughout the world.80 I draw here on the Affidavit of Te Kou Rikirangi Gage (RG)81 
and Apanui’s feedback to the FSA authored by Rikirangi Gage and Dayle Takitimu (DT).82 
 
From the outset, RG’s affidavit identifies his purpose ‘is to clearly state my tribe’s 
understanding and views concerning its historical and current relationship and responsibilities 
in relation to our tribal lands and sea area’ (Gage, 2012: §9: 1). He attempts to create a 
communicative bridge across the ontological divide between the Crown and Apanui. He 
                                                
80 See for instance the works of Mary Graham, Irene Watson, Eileen Morton-Robinson, Deborah Bird Rose, Glen 
Coulthard, Kyle Powys-Whyte, Taiaiake Alfred, Dale Turner cited throughout this thesis.  
81 CEO of Te Runanga o Te Whanau a Apanui and a member of numerous Boards and government advisory 
panels. 
82 Dale Takitimu is the iwi co-negotiator and lawyer. 
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states he wants to establish a ‘conceptual framework as a type of “toolkit” that hopefully will 
assist in interpreting and appreciating our worldview, our tikanga (laws, customs and 
practices) and more importantly the deep spiritual nature of our interconnectedness with Te 
Ao Turoa (the natural world; our lands and territories)’ (Gage, 2012: §11(a): 1). 
Understanding that conceptual framework is critical to understanding Apanui’s relationship to 
land and sea. Importantly, it indicates ‘why [they] would never cede [their] mana or [their] 
tribal inheritance over to the Crown’ and stresses iwi concerns over activities the ‘may 
threaten the wellbeing of our mokopuna, and also the web of life and systems that our natural 
world provides’ (Gage, 2012: §13(a)&(b): 2)’. Mokopuna are the future generations.  
 
Gage clearly establishes for the Court Apanui’s relational conceptualisation of the world from 
which obligations and duties arise. While Māori may now own title to lands as part of a 
post-colonial heritage, iwi territory is more than a material asset, it is a source of identity. The 
whakapapa of the land and people is intertwined, it is ‘the means by which the 
interrelatedness of all things … is identified to our consciousness and our spirit. It relates us 
to the past and to our future, and to our mokopuna (descendants)’ (Gage, 2012: §46: 7). A 
genealogy of all things, spiritual, human and nonhuman, built up in layers from the beginnings 
of time, through ancestral links to the present the whakapapa guides the iwi’s relations and 
relationships with the territories over which they hold mana and to which they hold obligations 
of kaitiakitanga. Whakapapa is the foundation of the relationship: from it flows an 
understanding of intrinsic value in and interconnectivity between everything. When Apanui 
ask themselves the question “how must I relate?” the domain of relationships is all 
things—individually and as a collective whole. The whole and the things that make it up all 
bear intrinsic value.83  
 
Tapu, mana, and mauri describe intrinsic spiritual elements of being—in all things, human 
and non-human. Translating them is difficult and translations vary by iwi, and author. Tapu, 
mana, and mauri encompass concepts of holy, dignity, authority, and life force: ‘[d]istinctions 
between inanimate and animate objects are … blurred…Nothing is lifeless’ (Durie, 1998: 
23).84 They connect the spiritual realm with the temporal, linked through whakapapa and 
convey the message that ‘we are part of an inter connected and interrelated whole’ (Gage, 
                                                
83 See Jeremey Bendik-Keymer for an examination of the relational dimensions of morality. Applying his account 
of evil to this Māori worldview would then mean an ‘unacceptable rending of human relationships’ to all things, 
‘forests and oceans, fish and fowl, the rivers and the soil and between people and the elements’ (in Mason Durie’s 
words). That is, if evil results from destruction of the intrinsically valuable, it results from the pointless, or 
unjustifiable destruction of any part of the natural world (Bendik-Keymer,	2013). 
84 These concepts will be explored in much greater depth in Chapter 6. 
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2012: §18: 3). Through them, the relationships between people, fish and birds, plants, seas, 
rivers and land are created in a web of eternal respect and mutuality.  
 
The non-human then is kin, a part of the layered stratum of interconnections to be nurtured 
not exploited. ‘The idea of what is referred to … as “resource management” does not sit well 
with us, as it stems from a framework that sees these resources as things to be used for the 
benefit of human needs. Our framework sees these things as beings possessing their own 
tapu and their own mauri and who manage themselves quite happily without the intervention 
of man’ (Gage, 2012: §31: 5). 
 
This ethic of care and rejection of ‘resource management’ do not indicate that Māori do not 
harvest from the sea; they do. RG notes in his affidavit a major concern for Apanui is the 
possibility the offshore drilling operations will pollute and degrade that potential for harvest. 
Particularly he notes two groups for whom harvest of the oceans and nearshore regions is of 
ongoing importance. Firstly, for the poorer members of the iwi for whom gathering kai moana 
is necessary to supplement their diet. And secondly, to the iwi as a whole whose mana is 
closely tied to its ability to host visiting hapu and iwi and for whom providing feasts of kai 
moana is historically and continuously integral to that mana. So not only is protection of the 
seas important spiritually, ethically and morally, so too the iwi has practical, internal political 
duties and obligations as kaitiaki. 
 
Apanui iwi management practices aim to maintain and protect biodiversity on their lands and 
seas, to enable gathering of kai moana, critical to the iwi’s hospitality to visitors and provide 
‘backstop’ food sources to ‘economically depressed’ iwi members (Gage, 2012). Not about 
generating profits, this is a relationship of sustenance and longevity and includes 
management practice of rahui, a temporary or permanent ban on entering or taking resources 
from a described area. Harvesting of the sea is conducted always with respect for the 
‘spiritual powers and vitality of mauri to which the productivity of the food gathering areas is 
inextricably linked’ (Gage, 2012: §35: 5). 
 
The marine environment within their rohe is part of the iwi’s taonga. Discrete separations 
between human and nonhuman are not emphasised in this worldview, and neither are there 
separations between riverbed and river, or seafloor and sea. The seafloor and sea and the 
creatures within form a continuous whole as part of the iwi’s rohe (territory). Care for the sea 
and the creatures within are intrinsic to Apanui’s obligations as kaitiaki arising from mana 
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moana. Everything on this Māori worldview is interconnected and overlapping, lines on maps 
cannot corral separate elements.  
 
As described earlier the Crown identified the area for exploration as discrete ‘blocks’ 
measured by degrees of latitude and longitude, in square kilometres and metres of depth, 
virtual containers of brine atop the targeted and all important petroleum- and gas-bearing 
sedimentary substrate. In that description the foreshore, sea, sea floor and oil deposits below 
are disjointed: and marine life forms are rendered immaterial. Apanui’s worldview, however, 
‘sees our entire territory as a complete and interconnected biosphere, not something that can 
be legislatively fragmented’ (Takitimu: 9). Unable to be fragmented and integral to identity, 
these are not measured, resource bearing property, but beloved, places upon which iwi 
identity is contingent.  
 
With the Deep Water Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico fresh in their minds, Apanui 
expressed concern that should mining proceed, it would be the deepest off-shore drilling 
operation in the world sitting beside an active volcanic and seismic zone (matters not 
addressed by MOE). Apanui stresses the risk of an accident polluting their territory. Any spill 
would not remain within the discretely bounded blocks, but rather spread through the waters, 
endangering marine life to the shore. Such a spill would hinder their role as kaitiaki—they 
would be powerless to protect the territory, unable to guarantee they could pass a healthy 
territory to future generations and unable to fulfil the Māori side of their political, cultural and 
moral ambicultural duties and obligations. The issue here is not one of philosophy, but rather 
of practicality. Aware that there are risks with these operations they are concerned that their 
particular obligation, resting in specific duties to ancestors, is to pass the environment to 
future generations in a better condition that they received it. While risk management 
requirements may be enforced by the RMA, Apanui recognises that when a spill occurs the 
damages are very long term. And while commitments under the law to resuscitate the 
environment may be undertaken by the miner, the area cannot be returned to a pristine state. 
As such, the problem here is that the MOE has not taken account of Apanui’s specific 
obligations and duties over and above those within the RMA.  
 
As collective ‘owners’ the iwi holds obligations and duties to the landscape, to tipuna and 
mokopuna.85 Maori are kaitiaki, custodians, with obligations ‘to protect both the physical and 
                                                
85 Ancestors and future generations.  
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spiritual wellbeing of all taonga for the present and future generations’ (Gage, 2012: §41: 6). 
Kaitiakitanga places on iwi, hapu and whanau ‘clear lines of accountability. […] Transfer of 
ownership of a resource away from tribal ownership does not release tangata whenua from 
exercising a protective role to the environment, although it does make the task more difficult 
since others will also have an interest’ (Durie, 1998: 23). 
 
While the Crown may claim ownership of the foreshore, seabed and oil deposits (an 
ownership Apanui actively challenge in their submission to the FSA consultations), that 
ownership does not release Apanui from their obligations and duties as kaitiaki. It remains 
incumbent on Apanui to take a precautionary approach to land-use and activities at sea, and 
more. Kaitiakitanga bears an additional imperative, derived from the values of tapu and 
mana, to enhance the environment for future generations, to leave it in a better state for their 
mokopuna. Under the obligations of kaitiakitanga, it was imperative Apanui protest the oil 
explorations and challenge the MOE as a precaution to protect the environment both for itself 
and for future generations. 
 
97.3% of Apanui’s traditional territory adjoining the coastal margin remains in iwi and hapu 
ownership (Gage, 2012: §55: 8). This ‘ownership’ relationship differs from that described by 
legal transferrable title, indeed, the ‘characteristics of fee simple title … are inconsistent with 
our customary tenure. … [S]pace was traditionally utilised and governed by hapu, as 
collective entities possessing their own legal personality and authority’ (Takitimu: 4). The right 
to alienate land is a challenge to the logistics of Apanui tikanga: it is ‘inconsistent with the 
nature of collective hapu title’ (Takitimu: 4). Understood as a collective taonga, territory is 
inalienable and held in something more closely resembling a trust arrangement, by the living 
on behalf of future generations.  
 
The affidavit of RG stresses social, spiritual, material/economic and environmental values 
pervade all Apanui actions and decisions. That is, every decision in the material realm is 
screened through a spiritual, social and environmental lens. Every decision has an 
intergenerational dimension and is conducted in ‘partnership’ with the environment. As 
guardians, Apanui are responsible to ancestors for providing for future generations. They are 
responsible to the mauri, tapu and mana of the environment itself to ensure more than 
protection, they must improve on what they receive. There are no silos in this ontology, there 
is rather an interlocked, circular flow of non-living to living to non-living, ancestors to present 
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to future generations, land to sea to human to non-human, spiritual to political to material to 
ethical. Immersive connections and functioning guide relationships, obligations and duties. 
The Apanui relationship to territory described by RG and DT is the antithesis of the Crown’s;  
‘[the] terms of our relationships with the environment, … are governed by a tikanga (laws) of 
deep respect and spiritual bond’ (Gage, 2012: §18: 3). They interconnect spiritual and 
temporal realms, the continuous overlapping places, described through genealogical 
relationships in which people and the environment are part of one family, ‘in which we see 
ourselves as but a “tiana” or younger relative. (Gage, 2012: §31: 5)  
 
IEJ, constitutive of kaitiakitanga, frames a set of obligations and duties that are integral to 
being Apanui, necessary for expression of culture, political influence and determination.  
Discussion	
The critical thing about the Māori worldview is that there are two components—this is the 
traditional view—there is the spiritual world and there is the material world. 
And the material world comes out of the spiritual world, not the other way around. 
So everything one does in the world as we know it has to be referenced back to the world 
from which it has come. 
So there is always that close interactive thing between spiritual and material, between 
mother earth and humans and nature.  
And the trick to life is managing the two things. 
(MH, 2015) 
 
The submission and affidavits of Crown and Apanui representatives in this case reflect the 
contrasting epistemological and ontological paradigms of the dominant Western procedural 
and judicial worldview and that of the iwi. The agencies and operations of government are 
isolated and discrete, with values prescribed by economic and material ambitions for the 
present and near future. Apanui submissions reflect a woven complex of spiritual, social, 
cultural, environmental, economic and material values stretching backwards from the start of 
time, through the present into an infinite future. While the government’s position is 
uni-dimensionally material, Apanui’s, is not so much non- or anti- or post- or new-material, but 
rather a form of complex place-based multi-materiality, see Fig 4.3. The contrast is so great 
that throughout the consultation process, during the trial and within the judgement(s), the two 
talk past each other. The powers of state structure, the limited consideration the Crown is 
required to give the concerns Māori raised in consultations, and ministry-determined 
consultation processes perpetuate an ignorance of Kaitiakitanga. This becomes particularly 
problematic when the dominance of the Western paradigm renders political justice and IEJ 
for Apanui invisible.  
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Integral to the Apanui explanation of their obligations is immersion of material in spiritual, 
much as Henare describes in the introduction to this section. Connection between spiritual 
(which we might take as a metaphor for the connectivity humans feel with others (human and 
nonhuman, animate and inanimate) and the way we should relate to other and the material 
pervades the Apanui affidavit.86 Conversely, and in keeping with modern Western tradition, 
scientific approaches and secular government and institutions, the spiritual and connectivity 
is completely absent from the Crown’s arguments and deliberations and cannot be 
accommodated by the Court. Riki Gage’s attempt to ‘educate’ the Crown and Court on the 
complexity and depth of connection, and the concurrent and conflicting obligations and duties 
Apanui have as ambicultural citizens, must fall on barren ground. Indeed, it is effectively 
ignored in Judge Gendall’s summation (Gendall, 2012: §142-145).  
 
Western: Instrumental Value Māori: Intrinsic Value 
Isolation of cultural (human) and natural (nonhuman) 
domains. 
 
Human and nonhuman exist within an entangled continuum of 
immersive (inter)relationships. 
 
The earth is divided into discrete ‘spaces’–property–to 
which material value may be assigned. Relationships to 
property are described in terms of relationships between 
people, the nonhuman itself is outside the boundaries of 
relationship. 
 
Rohe, territory, while described and identified by geographical 
markers is viewed as a continuous interrelated place integral to 
culture, spirituality and identity; iwi has moral obligations to the 
rohe. 
 
Land, sea, waterways, resources, animals and plants are 
owned, as part of a legal structure of property rights, by 
individuals or collectives such as corporations or nation 
states. 
 
Iwi and hapu relationship with rohe rests with the collective not 
individuals. Ownership of the nonhuman realm is anathema to 
the ontology; the nonhuman is related as family with human. 
Focused in the present and future, and transferrable 
between individuals (or collectives), legal property rights 
entitle owners to extract economic value from property 
with few limitations.  
 
Cultural, political and legal practice is based in custodial 
obligation to the environment, ancestors and future generations. 
Custodianship brings duties and obligations to maintain or 
improve the environmental quality for future generations. It 
includes obligations to give back to the nonhuman. 
 
Production/harvesting is frequently geared to maximising 
value/profit/return in the present. ‘Compensation’ to future 
generations in the form of technology and 
intergenerational transfer of monetary wealth is assumed 
sufficient to fulfil any intergenerational obligations. 
 
Production/harvesting is geared to sufficiency, without a focus on 
surplus and with obligations to ensure ongoing productivity for 
the future. 
 
The value of the environment to future generations may be 
‘discounted’ against current value. 
 
The environment, a taonga, maintains constant value through 
time, past present future.  
 
Fig 4.3: The Value of Nonhuman 
                                                
86 Here I adapt Jeremy Bendick-Keymer’s understanding of spiritual objects (Bendik-Keymer, 2013 12). 
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Judge Gendall does ‘not accept council’s argument that [UNDRIP] requires the Crown to 
have regard to the impact of its activities on taonga without it being informed of Māori 
concerns during a consultation process or otherwise. (Gendall, 2012: §141)’ Despite over 150 
years of living alongside each other, despite extensive Treaty of Waitangi consultations and 
claims, despite repeatedly explaining the philosophy behind whakapapa, mauri, tapu and 
mana, the Judge expects Māori to specifically justify why a specific area is taonga. His 
materialist worldview appears to have rendered him cognitively incapable of understanding 
the universal connection of environment as taonga to Māori. His insistence that Māori must 
repeatedly re-explain their connection to place exemplifies institutional resistance to the 
validity of Māori philosophy and lifeways and the dominance of property rights in law. It is a 
clear case of epistemological exclusion (Dotson, 2014).  
 
The introduction noted that there are parallels between Māori connection to place on other 
Indigenous cultures. So too there are parallels in Anglo-law based courts’ failure to 
accommodate these connections. For instance, the sense of obligation to land expressed by 
kaitiakitanga, also finds expression in Aboriginal culture of Australia, where in 1971 it was 
held against Yolngu who were seeking to have their land rights respected. The Federal Judge 
hearing that case argued that the evidence showed that the Yolngu had ‘a more cogent 
feeling of obligation to the land than ownership of it’ (Yunupingu, 1997: 4). And he then 
proposed this ‘feeling of obligation’ did not equate to the legal construct ‘ownership’ and 
denied, therefore, the Yolngu claim to ownership of their traditional lands.  
 
While the resilience of Indigenous culture to centuries of domination and forced assimilation 
in itself offers a critique of Western epistemology and ontology, the institutions of settler 
states such as Aotearoa (and Australia), render Indigenous philosophy, in Dotson and 
Whyte’s phrasing, ‘unknowable’ at the legislative and procedural level. Alternatively, we could 
say the institutions contribute to entrenched epistemological ignorance within these states. 
Receptivity to knowing and being other than Western is severely limited by the structures and 
institutions of state. Consequently, the opportunity to pursue development within holistic 
frameworks is curtailed, as is the imagining of IEJ. Importantly for Apanui and others in 
similar situations, it renders intergenerational Indigenous environmental injustice inevitable. 
 
Whereas Māori values place IJ central to environmental decision making, the Western 
‘materialised’ environment, broken into discrete, transferrable asset parcels, available for 
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immediate extraction of financial benefit leaves little room for the consideration of future 
generations. It hinders the construction of a coherent IEJ framework. In Aotearoa, it also 
renders IIEJ difficult to achieve and limits the iwi’s capacity to fulfil its responsibilities. 
 
While integral to Apanui decision making, the submissions and affidavit of the MOE show IEJ 
is cleaved from the MOE’s responsibilities. As they (still) talk past each other, Apanui’s 
continuing role as kaitiaki is rendered unknowable to the Minister. Dotson and Whyte identify 
two types of wrongs which may be rendered unknowable: 
1 ‘[A] failure to detect that there is something immoral or unjust in a given situation…[and] 
2 Actions that involve “whole communities being placed on the border of collective 
consideration’ (Dotson & Whyte, 2013: 61). It seems here the legal and legislative structures 
that describe the MOE’s responsibilities, duties and procedural boundaries, and guided the 
High Court deliberations, are exactly these kind of wrongs.  
 
Despite RG’s detailed explanation of the principles guiding Apanui’s relationship to the 
environment and their IJ responsibilities, the boundaries of the legal process rendered them 
irrelevant and unknowable. The Judge was impelled to consider only the process by which 
the MOE granted to permit to Petrobras. That the process could not accommodate Apanui’s 
life ways renders it unknowable: there is no capacity to detect an injustice in this process. 
 
Under these conditions of unknowability Apanui are denied IIEJ. However, these same 
submissions from Apanui do grant us access to alternative ways of imagining IEJ which will 
be explored in greater depth in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
I leave the last word for this chapter to Dayle Takitimu: 
We are who we are, and we have an inherent right to maintain our way of being. The 
Government do not need to redefine us, manage us, mandate us or require us to morph 
into some other being. They need to accept us as we are; as hapu, as Treaty partners. 
(Takitimu:15) 
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Chapter	5:	You	are	Never	Alone	–	
something	more	than	individual	
…the tension between individual and collective rights so contentious within Western-style 
societies is dissipated within the integrity of a traditionally based Indigenous framework. In 
an Indigenous framework, respect for others does not require political or legal uniformity 
or assimilation to a country but rests on the principle of balance. 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 200)	
 
Kaitiakitanga is an expression of IEJ derived from Māori life ways and ‘principles of balance’. 
Based in recent epistemological and ontological expressions of Polynesian philosophies, 
themselves adaptations from the ancient Asian roots of Pacific migrations and culture (Int. 
MH.), the previous chapter explored Kaitiakitanga’s ongoing importance and expression. It 
represents one way of balancing the tension between individual rights of the living and the 
collective rights of future generations. Moving across the Tasman Sea the focus now is on 
how Australian Aboriginal peoples understand the interaction between individual and 
collective. Having lived and grown their culture, traditions, epistemologies, ontologies and 
philosophies in continental isolation from ‘the beginning of time itself’ (Watson, 2015: 11), 
Aboriginal Australians are understood to have the oldest continuous cultural traditions. These 
cultures are unique, multi-faceted, and multi-stranded: each clan group has its song-lines, 
traditions and variables. There are, however, common threads binding peoples of Aboriginal 
cultural heritage (M. Graham, 2008; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Watson, 2015). This chapter 
explores one commonality; a sense of self derived from community that generates an ethic of 
custodianship and promotes IEJ. It does so through the lens of kanyini. 
 
Kanyini is one Australian Aboriginal ‘philosophy’.87 The Anangu, whose ‘country’88 lies in the 
shadows of and is dominated by the massive presence of Uluru in central Australia, refer to 
their life way/philosophy/ontology as kanyini, and it is kanyini as articulated by Uncle Bob 
Randall that forms the backbone of this chapter.89 This Anangu philosophy, in common with 
                                                
87 In quotation marks not to question the possibility of Indigenous philosophy as others have done, but rather 
because I am applying a Western word to an Indigenous context, one in which there is a risk of constraining how 
we imagine the thinking by applying a Western label. 
88 Again not to question the validity of the concept, but quotations indicate the risk of misconceptualising the 
meaning of country in transliteration between languages and traditions. From here forth I will italicise country 
where it is used in the sense that Australians—both Aboriginal and increasingly non-Aboriginal Australians—use it 
to denote the traditional lands of groups of Aboriginal peoples, tribes, clans or mobs. 
89 Bob Randall, Anangu, was a tjilpi (elder) of the Yankunytjnatjara people, who are identified as one of the 
‘owners’ of Uluru. A musician and ‘songman’ Randall made a documentary Kanyini and that, along with his 
biography Songman, are the key sources for this section. 
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other Aboriginal peoples’, has an expansively interconnected ontological foundation (Bird 
Rose, 2000; 2011; Coulthard, 2014; Durie, 1998; M. Graham, 1999; 2008). Responsible 
human beings working within the kanyini framework are interconnected through local kinship 
networks, and to a complex web of ties to human and nonhuman that encompass the 
continent and all time (Watson, 2015). The good of the individual is determined by the welfare 
of human, other living beings, and things geo-physical in a past-present-future whole.  
 
In many ways this chapter deviates from the holism of kanyini. In doing so I distort the 
philosophical and ontological foundations of kanyini, because ‘the community’ to which 
kanyini speaks is an entangled set of human-nonhuman relationships that criss-cross the 
continent, time, the universe and the transcendent.90 Here the focus is more finely targeted 
at individualism versus communitarianism. However, because within kanyini this creates a 
false dichotomy, human-nonhuman-transcendent relationships inevitably emerge in the 
discussion.  
 
Where kaitiakitanga contrasts with liberal post-Lockean landholding, value extracting ethics, 
the principles of kanyini are the antithesis of individualism. In the liberal tradition, the 
individual is privileged (Stewart-Harawira, 2005), a privilege which when combined with the 
‘presentism’ of the property ethic, disadvantages both community and future generations. In 
contrast, Mary Graham says, ‘Aboriginal society is accustomed to looking to the long term, 
and thinking strategically. A society which has a custodial ethic has to do this’ (M. Graham, 
1999: 107). Additionally, as with other Indigenous Peoples, in Aboriginal ontology, the self is 
constituted from an expansive sense of community, and a respect for balance (Alfred, 1999; 
M. Graham, 1999; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). 
 
Individualism is fundamental to liberal justice. The good of the community as a whole is 
understood to derive from, and to be directed towards, the good of the individuated human. 
Individualism, therefore, permeates liberal IEJ. This is problematic for both IEJ and also for 
Indigenous justice where the good of the community is understood as the base-constituent of 
individual good. So long as the individual is accepted as the meaningful social unit deriving a 
coherent and compelling theory of IEJ is difficult. This is not to suggest there are no 
                                                
90 In defence of the approach, Chapter 4 explored that human-nonhuman and transcendent connectivity too, and 
Chapter 6 will focus on the obligations that derive from an understanding of immersive relationships with 
nonhuman, where the self includes all-that-there-is. Chapter 7 ventures into understanding the implications of 
time’s representation as past-present-future. And in Chapter 8 the entangled immersion of human-nonhuman is 
explored through Māori metaphysical concepts of mauri, mana and tapu. 
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challenges to individualism in the West; there are. This chapter will review the 
individualism-communitarianism debate, both from within the liberal tradition and with an 
Indigenous lens. Both Māori and Aboriginal are critical of the individualism of the 
Anglo-American tradition, as are North American Indigenous scholars (see for instance 
Alfred, 1999; Coulthard, 2014; Durie, 2010; M. Graham, 2008; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; 
Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Watson, 2015). It remains an instrument of oppression as this 
chapter uncovers.  
 
More narrowly, the question here is whether IEJ constructed within the liberal framework is 
capable of accommodating the idea of self-in-community, as articulated by kanyini. Opening 
with an examination of individualism as a pervasive Western social, I argue that as a 
foundation to social and political ontology in the settler states, individualism has two effects 
relevant here. It complicates the lives of Indigenous Peoples through negation of their 
community-based ontology and limits western capacity to theorise IEJ. It is important to note, 
however, that individualism is not the only theoretical framework within the Western canon. 
The chapter, therefore, looks specifically at one of the most-well resolved communitarian 
articulations of IEJ, that of Avner de-Shalit. Then it holds these liberal frames in contrast with 
kanyini, the philosophy of central Australia. What this exposes are ontological clashes 
between West and colonised Australian Aboriginal people, even when IEJ is expressed in 
de-Shalit’s communitarian terms. While the Western perspective offers little to Anangu, 
Anangu have much to offer if we wish to create a ‘meaningful and inclusive [intergenerational] 
global society’ (Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 46). 
 
The	Anglo-American	Tradition	of	Individualism	 	
The social ontology underlying many contemporary theories of justice…is 
methodologically individualistic or atomistic. 
(Young, 2011: 45)  
 
…the last three centuries have seen the growing power of the atomist modes of thought, 
particularly in the English-speaking world, and more, these have fostered the constitution 
of an unreflecting common sense shot through with atomist prejudices. […] Political 
societies in the understanding of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, or the twentieth-century 
common sense they have helped to shape are established by collections of individuals to 
obtain benefits through common action they could not secure individually. The action is 
collective, but the point of it remains individual. The common good is constituted out of 
individual goods, without remainder. 
(Taylor, 1997: 188. Italics added.)  
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As philosophers Iris Marion Young and Charles Taylor suggest, the individual has a powerful 
position in the contemporary Western imaginary. The rational, self-defining individual of 
enlightenment philosophy is ‘twentieth-century common sense’ (Taylor, 1997). As an 
ontological foundation for society, individualism argues it is the individual who is best suited to 
define the good life for themselves. Liberty means each individual is able to strive for their 
own good life and is equal to all other individuals. The good of society is derived then from the 
good of the individual and society (in the form of the state) should only limit freedom when an 
individual limits or interferes with the freedom of another. In this way, society protects citizens 
from tyrants and domination. An individualist foundation for social ontology is not universal. 
The thrust of this chapter is to propose that where it is supposed to be universal harms may 
be done to those for whom community is seen as the source of strength and protection for the 
person. Further, it proposes even Western communitarian ontologies are insufficient to 
encompass the community of Anangu and others. This section, then, is a point of departure 
for examining Western communitarianism—a necessarily abbreviated review of some 
aspects of individualist thought. 
 
Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Bentham and Mill situated the individual as the ontological unit of social 
contract theories (Kymlicka, 1994; Taylor, 1997; Young, 2011). The underlying argument is, 
freed ‘from the chains of social custom and hierarchy’ (Kymlicka, 1994: 263), rational 
individuals voluntarily constitute the units of society, and the laws of society are derivative of 
the demands of individual psyches. The individual forms bonds of contracted mutual benefit 
with other individuals and agrees to abide by the shared laws that govern their relationships 
(Grant, 1988). A conceptualisation of just society, then, is one that protects the rights and 
flourishing of the individual. Moreover, ‘[t]he social ontology underlying many contemporary 
theories of justice…is methodologically individualistic or atomistic’ (Young, 2011: 45). The 
individual basis of political liberalism, while protecting the individual from the pressures to 
conform to group dictate, limits the theory’s capacity to accommodate other imaginaries of 
human relations. Recent theories rethinking social goods—those within the HR and the CA to 
justice—continue to translate the good from within the individualistic paradigm (see the works 
of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen for instance). Michael Walzer suggests that 
individualistically based ‘[l]iberal theory now seems to have a power over and against real life 
that has been granted few theories in human history’ (Walzer, 1990: 10).  
 
The early thinkers who framed individualism and liberalism were rebelling against the 
confines of convention and oppressive hierarchy (MacIntyre, 1984). In doing so they created 
an exclusionary concept of the person—one in which the individual has freedom to 
preference their desires and goals, to find and realise their own personal nature, above those 
of convention or the group. Self-reliance was promoted over authoritarian conformity. 
Self-reliance and individual autonomy were, through isolation, necessity, and philosophy, 
grounding principles within the Settler States, where ‘[t]he language of individual rights [… 
remains] simply inescapable’ (Walzer, 1990: 14). While individual and community are bound, 
what is important for the individualist is that the individual is protected from the community or 
society. However, the result is these protections for the individual pose intractable dilemmas 
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for IEJ. IEJ requires a social commitment to, not protections from, non-existent, and 
unable-to-be-individualised amorphous communities of future generations.  
 
Within the individualist tradition, generally, individuals are expected to come together as a 
‘collective’ to generate goods they are unable to provide individually—such goods as the 
military, or police force, or emergency services—the classic collective instruments of the 
Hobbes-Locke tradition (Taylor, 1997). Otherwise, all being equal, the functions of society are 
to support the freedoms and autonomy of individual citizens. Individualists exhibit, in parallel 
to caring for self, antipathy towards what they see as the constraints of social institutions.  
  
Within this ontology, the individuated person has moral precedence. The socialised sense of 
self is organised around self-perception. The resultant moral and philosophical corollary is 
the idea of ‘the good’ rests in the individual: society’s role is to support and enhance the good 
of individuals and protect them from domination and abuse by the powerful. While, for 
example, Young notes more recent poststructuralist philosophers have exposed the idea of 
the atomised individual as illusory (Young, 2011), Charles Taylor suggests an 
individualism/atomism to communitarianism/holism continuum along which people sit (Taylor, 
1997). Michael Walzer suggests even when good of community is invoked, ‘[c]ommunity itself 
is largely an ideological presence in modern society’ (Walzer, 1990: 7). What is important to 
the argument here is the dominance of individualism in philosophy, politics, and the social 
imaginary, and its peculiar impacts on IEJ. When the individual is the focus, many issues of 
IEJ—climate change, toxic pollution, species depletion, etc.—seem insoluble. It might leave 
an opening for thoughtless oppression of minority groups (Krause, 2015). Future generations 
are at risk of similarly thoughtless oppression.  
 
More recently, Sharon R Krause has argued the individualist spirit is used by some to avoid 
responsibilities to marginalised and disadvantaged minorities (Krause, 2015). Where 
exceptional individuals rise above the norms for their group, it is supposed others can too. 
But this is, she suggests, to elide the fact that some responsibilities are collective 
responsibilities, some disadvantage is collective disadvantage. It is insufficient to claim, in the 
name of individualism, that freedom and achievement are the sole outcomes of individual 
self-realisation. Similarly, I suggest, it is insufficient to claim the problems of IEJ are individual 
responsibilities—generally, we could argue our individual acts have little negative or positive 
impact. It is the combined and cumulative effect of those individual acts that is problematic.  
 
Krause argues for an individualism that is beyond a conception of a tightly bordered, 
sovereign being, one separated from and distinct from other people. Non-sovereign 
individualism on this account protects the free exercise of personal agency, that capacity 
people have to express their will through unhampered action. She argues also, this ‘agency is 
not solely an inner faculty of the individual but an emergent property of intersubjective 
exchanges’ (Krause, 2015: 7). What is important to Krause is that people can affirm their 
identity through exercise of their freedoms within society. And this requires recognising that, 
consciously or not, at times this capacity is hampered because as members of a socially 
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subordinate group they are dominated by others. In this Krause recognises there is a 
‘complex constellation of causes that contribute to these outcomes’ of oppression (ibid: 8). It 
is important then, that within an understanding of individualism we recognise the dynamics of 
inter-subjectivity, moving she suggests ‘beyond the myth of sovereignty where individual 
agency is conceived as an internal property of the person and identified narrowly with 
intentional choice and control’ (ibid: 10). But Krause’s theory of the non-sovereign individual, 
while recognising the co-constitution of individual within social relations, remains problematic 
for Anangu and Māori—and other Indigenous Peoples—for whom community is not limited to 
human. 
 
George Kateb links individualism and the idea of human dignity (Kateb, 2011). However, he 
also suggests that the human species (as a whole) has dignity, and in virtue of this species 
dignity humans have a vital role as stewards of nonhuman. Even though he is writing within 
an individualist frame, he acknowledges in some sense there is something more than or 
additional to the individual, the human species. The idea of dignity elevates humanity, Kateb 
suggests, to ‘the greatest type of beings’ (Kateb, 2011: 3). He goes on to argue that the 
human species, not as individuals but rather as a species, has dignity. It is the dignity of 
human as a species that for Kateb ‘belongs to the unborn generations indefinitely into the 
future’ (Kateb, 2011: 211). On his account, it is species dignity that underscores IJ.  
 
However, for Kateb this communal dignity, as it were, the dignity of the human species as a 
whole, is conferred as a function of human separation from nonhuman in virtue of human 
exceptionalism. This dignity that human has as a species grants a stature that is greater than 
the stature of other-than-human. This elite stature confers a ‘greatness of humanity [that] 
precedes the equality of individuals’ (Kateb, 2011: 6). Our obligations to other-the-human 
derive for Kateb from our obligations to the dignity of members of the human community. 
Human are greater-than-nature in virtue of their unique capacities—speech, reason, the 
mind—and therefore ‘the human species is partly discontinuous with nature’ (Kateb, 2011: 
142). In virtue of human dignity, the human obligation is as ‘the steward of nature.’ (Kateb, 
2011: 142). Indeed, he suggests human alone are capable of this stewardship. So while 
Kateb argues for a form of value in community, a value that carries through to future 
generations, it is the individual human to whom the principles of justice apply. Kateb’s position 
is illustrative of how human exceptionalism continues to pervade the Western tradition, even 
if it moves beyond classic individualism. 
 
Kateb confers dignity to the human community, present and future, however, he resists the 
idea of dignity in the human species as a whole. That he claims, may undo the advantages 
equal status brings to individual wellbeing and stature. So, at least on Kateb’s account, whilst 
dignity is an appropriate base to human species justice, and arguably IJ, it is only in the 
sense that it confers just outcomes for individual human beings. Such a position is unable to 
accommodate the demands non-individualistic social constructions, nor one which assigns 
subjective rights to individual and collective nonhuman.  
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Two key problematics arise from individualism in politics and social imaginary that are 
important for a theory of IEJ. First, IJ becomes tangled within the non-identity problem (Parfit, 
1984, pp. 351-379: see). By focusing on ‘the good’ as ‘individual goods’, Derek Parfit poses a 
particular challenge to developing a cohesive theory of IJ—and his challenge has taxed 
theorists for the past thirty years. Briefly, the non-identity issue focuses on the reality that if 
we cannot ‘identify’ the individuals who will live in the future (those individuals whose being is 
contingent on the many choices we make within present moments of time) we, the living, 
have no ‘one’ with whom to form contractual bonds of obligation and duty. That is, we cannot 
have obligations to non-identities, so we cannot harm ‘them’. Moreover, the actions we take 
today play a part in determining the existence of those very human identities. Even if their 
lived experience is worse than the lived experience of other people who would have existed 
had we made more ecologically conservative decisions, that harm is mitigated by the good of 
existence, the very existence our behaviours in the now determined. The ‘logical’ conclusion 
to an individualistically based philosophy, Parfit argues, is that we do not, and cannot have a 
coherent theory of IJ.  
 
The second issue with individualism, in the cultural contexts of both the previous chapter and 
this one, is that there is an ontological disconnect at its core. In giving pre-eminence to the 
(human) individual as the most significant social unit, individualist liberal theory ignores the 
reality of peoples, communities, cultures and collectives of people and all nonhuman entities 
and their interconnections. It is the individual living human person only to whom consideration 
accrues. It is a social imaginary in which it is understood a fulfilled individual is the positive 
outcome, and main concern, goal, or focus, of social cohesion and communal relations.91 
 
As Krause suggests, ‘freedom for some has so often come at the expense of freedom for 
others’ (Krause, 2015: 191). She advocates that we should look at individualism as part of an 
ongoing project, that, ‘[w]e redeem our freedom by making our past and our present 
meaningful parts of a progressively unfolding narrative toward freedom for all’ (ibid: 191). In 
this, she appears to describe an intergenerational project in which individualism should 
protect diversity and the freedom of members of the political community, constantly alert to 
the dangers of either long-term or emergent domination and oppression. To do that it is 
insufficient to protect people behind walls of non-interference and non-domination. If freedom 
is the goal of liberal philosophy, we must act as both individuals and as joint members of 
society to ensure the agency of no category of persons is thwarted. Above all, though, the 
project is directed at supporting ‘individual aspirations’ (ibid: 192).  
 
                                                
91 I note and acknowledge the difference of scale and social organisation within the social units under discussion. 
The individualist liberal tradition emerged from, and exists within largely urbanised, complex, multicultural states. 
Aboriginal and Māori social structures are organised around much smaller units within which there are strong 
familial bonds and historic connections. Individualism evolved to resolve in part a set of social issues traditional 
Aboriginal and Māori had not encountered before colonisation. That said, however, the communitarian outlook of 
both has remained strong and important to people’s identity.  
I return, therefore, to the two key issues, does individualism oppress groups such as the Australian Aboriginal and 
Māori and is it an impediment to IEJ? 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
108 
Kaitiakitanga, as we have explored, establishes a set of intergenerational communitarian 
protocols. Its underlying premises rest in understanding life as an entanglement: human with 
human, human with nonhuman, nonhuman with human, human and nonhuman with 
transcendent. It does not conceive of an individual sitting outside of the entanglement, nor 
somewhere along a continuum of individual to community. What is important here, and within 
kanyini, is the entanglement. It is the strength and ‘aspirations’ of the whole that must be 
upheld. So while Krause and others focus on the individual, alert as they may be to cultural 
and minority domination, the door to accommodating ontological entanglement appears 
resolutely shut.  
 
Alasdair Macintyre suggests that ‘[w]hen the distinctively modern self was invented … [w]hat 
was then invented was the individual’ (MacIntyre, 1984: 61). While widely accepted in the 
settler states, and perhaps distorted by popularism and consumerism to appear to embrace 
an extreme bounded exclusionary imaginary, individualism is a comparatively new concept, 
one which arose to meet the demands of a particular set of social conditions within the West. 
There are, however, also theorists within the Western liberal tradition who reject the 
individualist approach. It is to communitarian justice theory to which the next section turns. 
Can communitarianism form an effective framework for IEJ and for decolonisation of the 
theory? 
 
Communitarianism	 	
Group categorisation and norms are major constituents of individual identity. 
(Young, 2011: 45). 
 
American communitarians have to recognize that there is no one out there but separated, 
rights-bearing, voluntarily associating, freely speaking, liberal selves.  
(Walzer, 1990: 15) 
 
An individualist social ontology is not the social ontology of kanyini. Nor can an individualist 
social ontology meet the protocols and obligations of kaitiakitanga. Despite theoretical claims 
to universalism, the foundational concept of individualism is simply not universal; indeed, in a 
global context, it may not even be the dominant social ontology (Sampson, 1988). Anangu no 
more than Apanui regard the individual as the unit of being. Wellbeing in both is derived from 
extensive interconnections and community: human to human, human to nonhuman, 
nonhuman to human. Each member of the societies is concerned not only for themselves but 
accept also communal responsibilities to past, present and future generations, and 
nonhuman including individual and entangled components. Both Apanui and Anangu have a 
clearly communitarian socio-political structure. However, the expansive entanglements of the 
‘community’ mean even a communitarian approach to IEJ based in Western premises is 
insufficiently expansive to encompass this worldview. Human remains privileged. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will explore ways of being constituted of a non-exclusive 
community, and the effect that has on how non-individualistic peoples conceptualise 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
109 
obligations to future generations and the environment. Starting with Western 
communitarianism in general, it then looks at the communitarian theory of intergenerational 
justice (CTIJ) developed by Avner de-Shalit, an environmental politics scholar, in response to 
the weaknesses in individualistically based theories of IJ. Later it tests CTIJ against kanyini.  
 
The communitarian description of who a human is, and how self is constituted, suggests that 
we draw identity from community. That is, unlike the atomised individualist conception of the 
self, a person is understood to arrive at an understanding of who they are, their purpose, and 
importantly for theories of justice, their obligations and responsibilities, from their community. 
The boundaries between the self and other, are then, fluid (Sampson, 1988). Rather than 
discrete and exclusionary, the self understands its being in the context of a community 
narrative. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that being human is to be immersed in ‘action and 
practice, as well as in … fictions’ (MacIntyre, 1984: 216), in story-telling. He suggests the 
source of our understanding of self and what we must do comes from the understanding of 
the communal stories of which we are a part. ‘I am never,’ says Macintyre, ‘able to seek for 
the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual’ (MacIntyre, 1984: 220). Michael Sandel 
argues ‘the liberal account of obligations is too thin’ (Sandel, 2009: 224). What is missing, he 
says, is acknowledgement that as an individual we are part of something bigger from which 
we draw. We are citizens. Citizens as co-travellers have special responsibilities to each other. 
As members of something—family, clan, nation—humans are ‘bearers of ..history’ (Sandel, 
2009: 224). And we project ourselves into the future, for;  
[t]here is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an image of 
that future which always presents itself in the form of a telos—or a variety of ends or 
goals—towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present. (MacIntyre, 
1984: 215-216)  
IJ then grows from the continuous community narrative and story-telling, into which the living 
project the image of their life projects and from which they constitute their present. 
 
Avner de-Shalit draws from the communitarian tradition to build CTIJ. ‘A genuine community’, 
de-Shalit claims, ‘as opposed to other social groupings, is one in which the members regard 
the ideas of the community as constitutive of their identity’ (de-Shalit, 1995: 24). In these 
configurations, a person, an identity, is constituted of unique qualities and identifiers. 
Additionally, they draw on their community to develop that understanding of themselves. 
Community supports who they are. Like other communitarians, his argument is that an 
identity cannot claim to be entirely self-constituted, and some obligations are generated by 
the good the person gains from those around them. 
 
De-Shalit posits that, as members of an intergenerational community, the living imagine that 
community will continue to exist—constituted in story-telling to use MacIntyre’s argument. 
Therefore, those living have normative obligations to future generations of that community. 
And his concerns are particularly focused around obligations to protect natural resources for 
the welfare of future generations (ibid.).  
 
Recognising the constraints individualism places in a construction of IJ de-Shalit proposes 
that ‘utilitarian, contractarian and rights based theories fail to provide justification for our 
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obligations to future generations’ (ibid.: 11-12). He suggests instead that ‘[o]ur obligations to 
future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over 
generations and into the future. Part of what a transgenerational community stands for is the 
idea of obligations between generations’ (ibid.: 14). He is particularly interested in the 
possibility of obligations and duties to a ‘transgenerational community that stretches and 
extends over generations and into the future’ (ibid.: 12), and develops a ‘'communitarian’ 
theory of IJ, which is based in human beings seeking a moral environment transcending 
self-interest’ (ibid.: 12). This moral environment draws attention to obligations to pass to 
future generations an environment, and environments, conducive to human wellbeing.92  
 
De-Shalit suggests that to create a theory capable of generating IJ ‘we should look for the 
moral and political debate and its two main components: reflection and the search for moral 
similarity’ (ibid.: 31). Theories that focus on the individual as the unit of justice, however, 
paralyse our conceptualisation of IJ and EJ. Basing his account on ‘reflection’ he suggests 
humans project themselves into the future—through family, the survival of our works, how we 
shape society and contribute to it.93 Our being is part of a transgenerational project: the I I 
am now is constituted of the I that was and the I I am projecting into the future (even if that I is 
not fully realised) and there is a ‘thread that connects them in time’ (ibid.: 37). The future, 
after our death, is not of ourselves, but of aspects of our life projects; so he argues the future 
can be regarded as part of ourselves. ‘By this’, he argues,’ we can enlarge our conception of 
our ‘self’, our identities: we involve in it future objects—human and nonhuman—that are part 
of us. And by this we mitigate—at least to some extent—our fear of death and mortality’ (ibid.: 
40). But this seems still a very individualist project.  
 
When reflecting then on our fear of death—our personal fear—de-Shalit acknowledges the 
indisputable. Human are individual beings. However, his argument differs from individualists 
(as do those of other communitarians) in that this individual is not understood to precede 
community. The community both precedes and continues after the individual. On the 
communitarian account, it is ‘from the communities and traditions that [individuals] shape 
[their] identity’ (Sandel, 2009: 220). The individual constitutes identity from and projects ideas 
and plans onto a community that will continue with new people. These future generations of 
people will themselves draw goods from the continuation of the social order. In that way, 
self-reflection, the projection of ideas and plans, identify human continuity with contributions 
to the future.  
 
De-Shalit does not stop with self-reflection. He extends his normative argument to a more 
expansive community-based foundation. Having identified the individual is embedded in and 
constituted by community-based relationships and projects, he suggests that the only valid 
                                                
92 The distinction I am drawing here is between a global environment, the meta environment as it were, that 
includes atmosphere, seas, land, flora and fauna acting in responsive concert, in which everything is immersed 
and more localised, micro-environments, with which a person or persons has close daily contact and interaction, 
in which they are embedded. 
93 John O’Neill reflects on this survival of works as he mounts the case for justice for the dead, for our ancestors 
(O'Neill, 1999). 
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process of cultural interaction is one that extends into the future. That is, many of our present 
projects are ones we design as future-oriented, to provide value and worth to future 
generations, beyond our lifetimes. Nonhuman artefacts, buildings, infrastructure, and art are 
obvious examples, as are projects to promote national identity and the desire to see a culture 
perpetuated. This is a community with which we can identify: one with which we share a 
‘history of cultural interaction’ (de-Shalit, 1995: 23). People in such a community, de-Shalit 
argues, ‘undergo the same political, social, and cultural experiences; they reflect on and 
interpret the significant events through discussion, literature, mass media, academy 
research, and so on’ (ibid: 23). What is more, he argues, artistic outputs ‘become common 
property’ (ibid: 23). The community to which de-Shalit refers is that in which we are each 
intimately, closely embedded. De-Shalit’s community is human and culturally similar.  
 
De-Shalit makes six comments (or claims) about his CTIJ (ibid.: 123-137). Firstly, the source 
of obligations to future generations is located in ourselves, and we must take responsibility for 
providing an environment in which they can flourish. He claims the living, as members of a 
transgenerational community, must take responsibility for the environment. It is a reflexive 
responsibility.94 Secondly, CTIJ releases us from a dependence on ‘impossible information’. 
It doesn’t pretend or aim to be neutral.95 Without foisting particular conceptions of ‘the good’ 
on future generations, it leaves open access to ‘goods’.96 Thirdly, locating IJ in community 
releases us from the ontological problems that Parfit identifies encumbrance person-affecting 
theories and with which individualists struggle. Because we are not grappling with the 
particularities of individuals, the non-identity issue dissolves. Which leads to his fourth claim 
that CTIJ is not atomistic and can, therefore, critically, include future generations within the 
current community: the boundaries of self are intergenerationally fluid.97 Time neutrality is the 
fifth claim—CTIJ does not discriminate against someone just because they will be living in 
another time. Finally, he focusses the content of obligations to future generations, claiming 
CTIJ releases us from the need to know their preferences since all we need to understand 
are our own preferences. The obligation is not to leave individual goods, but rather a 
‘package of objects’ (ibid.: 130), from which future generations can constitute their ‘goods’. 
Such a package should include ‘natural resources, achievements in art and science, 
technology, knowledge, values, financial resources’ (ibid.: 130). What is important is that 
firstly and unusually for IJ theory, de-Shalit addresses this whole range of problems and 
identifies a totality of goods on which the IJ is contingent. Secondly, his theory is not 
necessarily culturally dependent—the ‘package of objects’ may transfer to any culture. 
 
Charles Taylor claims, ‘[s]ome things have value for me and to you, and some things 
essentially have value to us. That is, their being for us enters into and constitutes their value 
                                                
94 Richard Hiskes also argues that intergenerational environmental justice is best conceived as a reflexive 
obligation (Hiskes, 2005; 2009). 
95 Thereby, relieving us of the problems Ball identifies that result from steady cultural change and the 
transformation of values over time (Ball, 1985). 
96 And here again we have the concept of reflexivity, similar to that expressed by Hiskes, that what is good for 
future generations is frequently good for the living. 
97 This intergenerational fluidity is something I will return to in detail in Chapter 6. 
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for us’ (Taylor, 1997).98 This seems also to be de-Shalit’s claim: when atomistic individualism 
is the ontological foundation we cannot constitute that which is of ‘value for us’, including 
justice for future generations, or justice within communitarian cultures. This recognition that 
the boundaries of self flow into being with and constitutive of other—both immediate 
significant others, and the others who constitute our community now and across 
time—makes it possible to extend obligations and duties to future generations of our 
community. Understanding ourselves as fluidly connected to others is to understand 
ourselves as self-in-community. On this account we, humans, are part of a bigger project than 
the atomised individual must reckon with. On this communitarian account, we have 
obligations to future generations because of what society affords—gifts—us, and because 
future generations are a part of this bigger more fluid us. This is not to imply that the 
individualist is deliberately negligent. Parfit, for one, indicates we should consider future 
generations, he just cannot find a way to conceptualise IJ within the individualist paradigm. 
Indeed, both types of ‘persons can and do act in socially responsible ways. In the 
non-contractual, communal form, however, responsibility does not issue from a firmly 
bounded self-acting on the basis of self-interest, but rather precisely because one is not 
defined’ (Sampson, 1988: 20). Positive obligations and duties are then extended outwards, to 
others within the society from which we draw identity. And, because they are not attached to a 
single, identifiable individual the duties and obligations may extend to contributing positively 
to human lives in future generations.  
 
This understanding of self, constituted of community, focuses in the present, and into the 
future in that the future contains the continuation of our projects. It is drawn from the 
narrative, the conversation, we establish between our ‘self’ and those around us, and the 
shared vision we have for society and the artefacts of that society. Unbounded, we are able to 
visualise a contextual being-ness of shared interests and values. When self-interest is not the 
primary driver of human endeavour, it is possible to imagine decisions based in the good of 
the wider intergenerational community—one from which not only one’s own good but that of 
others flow.  
 
The domination of the Anglo-American conceptualisation of hyper-individualism has made 
the ensemble individual, and communitarian IJ, appear outside the norm. It is, however, the 
norm for Apanui and, as we will see, the Anangu people of Central Australia and others. 
Obligations and duties run on de-Shalit’s account from the present to the future. IJ is 
understood as something we owe people of the future. As we are drawn now to consider 
whether in the context of IIEJ, de-Shalit’s CTIJ is a workable model, in addition to the basic 
differences between individualism and communitarianism, this forward-focus is important to 
remember. Here the question is whether de-Shalit’s CTIJ is able to include the practices of 
Māori and Anangu, or others who share similar ontologies.  
 
                                                
98 Kai Nielson makes virtually the same claim: ‘...there are some things that essentially have value for us. We 
cannot have them individually. Their being for us, and not just for you and just for me, enters into and constitutes 
their value for us’ (Nielsen:2009: 61). 
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Kanyini:	An	Aboriginal	Philosophy	
Aboriginal people have a kinship system which extends into land; this system was and still 
is organised into clans. One’s first loyalty is to one’s own clan group. It does not matter 
how Western and urbanised Aboriginal people have become, this kinship system never 
changes. (It has been damaged by, for example, cultural genocide/Stolen 
Children/Westernisation etc., but has not been altered substantially.) Every clan group 
has its own Dreaming or explanation of existence. We believe that a person finds their 
individuality within the group. To behave as if you are a discrete entity or a conscious 
isolate is to limit yourself to being an observer in an observed world. 
(M. Graham, 1999: 106) 
 
Born of the country of central Australia Bob Randall was Anangu, son, brother, husband, 
father, and a tjilpi (elder) of the Yankunytjatjara people, a member of the ‘stolen generation’, a 
singer/songwriter, public servant, businessman, educator, and activist. His philosophy (that of 
his clan,Yankunytjatjara) has been rendered in his songs, his autobiography Songman 
(Randall, 2003), an article for Resurgence & Ecologist (Randall, 2007), and the documentary, 
Kanyini (Lee, 2006). These sources form the foundation for the analysis in this section, 
supplemented with, and cross-referenced against the writings of Aboriginal philosophers and 
law experts. Epitomising the concept of ambiculturalism, Randall was as conversant with the 
protocols and procedures of his own culture(s) as he was with that of the dominant 
Anglo-Australian one. At home in the world of Yankunytjatjara custom and law, and also that 
of his adopted northern Australian ‘families’ the Iwaidja people of Corker Island, the 
Gunwingku of Western Arnhem Land, and the Gupapingu of Elcho Island in eastern Arnhem 
Land, he worked also within Anglo-Australian institutions. It is the philosophy of his blood kin, 
the Yankunytjatjara people, from which he talks.  
 
The philosophy of self-in-community of the Yankunytjatjara people runs through the 
philosophies of other Australian Aboriginal clans, language groups, and nations. It appears to 
be common to them all, however, as this analysis does not cover all aboriginal clan or kin 
groups, I cannot make that generalisation with certainty. Aboriginal philosopher Mary Graham 
observes, ‘[o]ver vast periods of time, Aboriginal people invested most of their creative 
energy in trying to understand what makes it possible for people to act purposively, or to put it 
another way, what is it exactly that makes us human’ (M. Graham, 1999: 111). Kanyini as an 
expression of what it is to be human. It is both an ancient and extant life way. Kanyini is 
formed and framed by an ontology within which neither liberal individualists nor de-Shalit has 
resonance. The temporal dimension of this philosophy explicit includes the understanding 
that past flows into and is part of present, and both are part of future. The individual is 
constituted of community, which as we have seen de-Shalit and others accommodate, 
however, this community includes ancestors, the living, future generations, of human and 
nonhuman kin. That is the nonhuman kin are of the community.  
 
Randall’s ambiculturalism facilitates his critique of individualism (and other Western values) 
from within and by comparison. It is a critique he undertakes at times with apparent bemused 
bewilderment. He offers more than mere critique, however. While reflecting on 
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Anglo-Australian lifeways, contrasting them with those Aboriginal philosophies with which he 
is familiar—in which he has been immersed—he offers a counter-narrative, an alternative 
vision of how we can be to be responsibly human. Within the kanyini framework, the 
boundaries of being and responsibility are expansive and all-encompassing. ‘We practise 
kanyini,’ says Randall, ‘by learning to restrict the ‘mine-ness’, and to develop a strong sense 
of ‘ours-ness’’ (Randall, 2003: 24). An ‘ours-ness’ based not so much in a theory of practice 
but in practised theory thousands of years in the making. Randall offers both critique and 
comparison, particularly in the documentary, as an ontological gift.  
 
In both biography and documentary, Randall locates himself first. Not through an 
autobiographical sum of achievements and accolades familiar in Western individualists. He 
doesn’t introduce himself as educator, singer/songwriter, activist, public servant, 
businessman or even as tjilpi. Randall the individual is located first as member of a clan, 
Yankunytjatjara, as kinsman and family member connected to ancestors, the living and future 
generations, in country, within his physical locale, within the land and earth and associated 
with flora and fauna. He locates himself in-place, and within an intergenerational context. 
 
Randall’s place, his country, is not quantified by measure, but described by feature, points of 
magnificence, by earth’s colours and plant species. This place exists through all time, and in 
it human exist through all time. Here he walks with his ancestors, stepping with respect on his 
mother, earth, caring for everything within the place for the good of those to come. His 
location devices are the antithesis of clinical scientific cartographic measures of degrees and 
minutes. It is clear if we are to know the man we must equally know two fundamentals: the 
clan to which he belongs and his kinship relations past present and future; and the physical 
space from whence he comes. The clan and that place determine who he is. The boundary 
between man, kin, time and place is a zone of fluid interchange, blending one into the other in 
an exchange of love and giving, care and guardianship. In his Yankunytjatjara country, ‘it is’, 
he says, ‘as if one can feel the very heartbeat of mother Earth, herself’ (Randall, 2003: 2). 
 
Tjukurrpa is creation, the beginning ‘which we need to keep alive in the present’ (Randall, 
2003:17). While there is only now, now exists contemporaneously with past and future. The 
past is not gone, but rather integrated into that which is present with the anticipation that that 
integration will fold into it the present as future time becomes present. ‘The creation period’, 
says Randall, ‘is not something that just existed in the past. To us, it is also part of the present 
and will continue to exist in the future’ (Randall, 2003: 17). Irene Watson, drawing from the 
ontology within which she grew and from other Indigenous Peoples, puts it this way: 
Kaldowinyeri, or time long ago, in the beginning, is also the time now, and time in the 
future. The beginning, the present and the future encircle the place of Kaldowinyeri. The 
Nunga ‘I am’ is not like the other, dominant Western subject of being, which is 
represented by a straight line of thought—beginning, middle and ending. Instead, a 
Nunga process encircles; within there is a process that allows a person to become one 
and to begin again. This process is non-hierarchical and non-linear; rather, it takes the 
form of a cycle, of the continuity of being, becoming another cycle, nurntikki. (Watson, 
2015: 16)  
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While Randall is an individual, his individual being is possible only within the context of clan, 
kin, family and country. His identity is attached to the identity of the whole. His personal 
stories are twinned with those of his people. His pain is the pain of them all. His decisions and 
actions, his values and responsibilities are bound by commitments to the good of, and for, his 
wider networks. The portrait Randall paints of himself is a portrait of extensive relationships 
that are as much who he is as is his physical individuation. The whole that he is is the sum of 
relationships. He makes clear the decisions he makes benefit him only if they simultaneously 
benefit this whole.  
 
In this, he is surrounded and supported by connections. ‘[B]y having … many mothers and 
fathers, sisters and brothers, and other relatives, including those who are not human beings, 
we experience our world as one of being completely surrounded by family, and so our system 
of walytja [kinship and family] is very vast’ (Randall, 2003: 24-25). This connectedness is 
expressed through kanyini as caring and responsibility to human and nonhuman alike, to 
living and non-living, earthbound and celestial. The responsibility and care are core to Law, 
philosophy, and religion (tjukurrpa), country (ngura), kin and family (waljtja), spirit, soul and 
psyche (kurunpa) (Randall, 2003; 2007). Similarly, when describing the connectivities of the 
people of Yarralin in the Northern Territory, Deborah Bird Rose observes, ‘[t]here is no single 
isolated unit within this description of connection. Each person, each individual is more, part 
of and related to, a range of networks of other, of ‘system(s) of social categories’ (Bird Rose, 
2000: 74).  
 
The tendrils of commitment extend beyond the intimate connections of blood kin and family. 
For instance, they include the welfare of Randall’s wife’s former husband. Early in his 
relationship with the woman who was to become his second wife and who was at that stage 
still technically married, Randall approached the husband to seek assurance that that 
marriage was over. After receiving confirmation, it was, Randall proceeded to explain the 
ongoing commitments he would bear. 
 
I told him, ‘I’ll be taking your wife away if she wants to come with me and, according to my 
ways, I will be responsible for your wellbeing as well.’ ‘What?’ he said, in complete 
amazement. ‘Yes,’ I told him, ‘That’s our Law. You will be in a brother relationship to me 
and I’ve got to look after you, as well as look after this wife of yours.’ They were from the 
south and did not know the ways of the north. […] Divorce for us does not create a hard 
line of separation. (Randall, 2003: 137-138) 
 
Randall’s range of clan commitments went beyond his birth clan in other ways too. Not 
unusually for one of his time, Randall was a member of the ‘Stolen Generations’. Like 
thousands of Aboriginal children, he was taken from his mother(s), kin and clan, and 
transported miles from his place in Central Australia, eventually arriving in the Northern 
Territory. Housed with other youngsters also torn from their people, there he was schooled, 
trained and put to work. This wrenching from family, kin and country Randall describes as an 
attack to his psyche, his waljtja. How could he remain complete when removed from that 
which made him who he was?  
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He describes his time on Coker Island, where he was eventually sent, as ‘a blend of two 
cultures’ (ibid: 56). In the camp, his life was governed by the ‘white missionaries and church 
workers’, while his private time was spent with the local Iwaidja people. He was adopted into 
the family, and becoming an Arrapi Aboriginal of Arnhem Land and thus his circle of being 
extended into Iwaidja. Ironically given the ‘point’ of taking Aboriginal children from their 
families was to prevent them identifying as Aboriginal, he now extended his identity to two 
Aboriginal cultures—he became able to walk with dignity and confidence in two Aboriginal 
cultures and the Anglo-Australian culture the missionaries were enforcing. Later, his 
connections within the Territory expanded to the Gunwingku of Western Arnhem Land and 
the Gupapingu of Elcho Island in eastern Arnhem Land.  
 
The point I make here, and that Randall makes in his book, is that this ambiculturalism is 
something more than just a cultural comfortability and more than just an understanding of 
protocol and procedure. He came to be Iwaidja, Gunwingku, Gupapingu and Yankunytjatjara. 
His being was tied to the being of each clan, kinship group, and family of which he was a 
member. His commitments and responsibilities, his thoughts and actions, were associated 
with, embedded in those of others, part of the whole, the totality.  
 
This totality is something more than the living alone. The totality includes and entwines with 
those gone, the ancestors, and those yet to come, the future generations. Being in the 
present includes being in the past and future. The referents for self, weave what was, is, and 
will be, in inclusive loops. A cycle of continually updating strategic being capturing spirit, 
creator beings, human, animal, plant and land. ‘Cycle is a continuum always, to become 
another, returning to its beginning, past, future. This process cannot be changed or 
extinguished, it is the law. It can be extinguished in the minds of humanity but it continues to 
exist in the reality of our natural world and those who live within it and in accordance with its 
laws and balances’ (Watson, 2000: 10-11). ‘I am,’ she says, ‘born of the land and a time 
before, here now and moving into’ (ibid: 67).99  
 
The totality includes more than the (merely) human. It extends out to trees and plants, to 
animals and landform. At birth, each child is assigned a relationship (a skin type or totemic 
link) to one or more plant or animal species—a practice described in detail by Deborah Bird 
Rose—which creates kinship ties, reciprocities and responsibilities between human and 
nonhuman, and across clan boundaries. All those assigned to the same ‘skin type’ bear 
responsibilities to the plant or animal of that type and all people who belong to it (Bird Rose, 
2000). This set of relationships then extends across the continent. Traditionally, through the 
range of blood kin, family, skin or totem groups, animal, plant, land and skies, ancestors and 
future generations, ‘[e]very Aboriginal person had a place at some intersection within the 
kinship network which extended over the whole of Australia, and every intersection within that 
grid was anchored, eternally, to some point on the landscape by the relationship with the 
Creator Being ancestors’ (M. Graham, 2008: 108). The webs of relationship, the boundaries 
                                                
99 Chapter 7 is devoted to understanding time as a cyclical or spiral concept in contrast to the Western linear 
projection. 
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of self and identity morph outwards to encompass the universe. These webs too form the 
context for Aboriginal epistemology (Bird Rose, 2000: 82). 
 
Randall describes curling to sleep on the sands, wrapped around by the warming body of his 
mother. ‘Hearing the heartbeat of mother Earth’ with nothing between them and ‘the wind, the 
heat and the cold, or the sounds of the birds and insects’ (Randall, 2003: 3). Adapted to the 
ebb and flow of country, and learning from it the laws of existence and wisdom (Watson, 
2000), the Aboriginal understanding of their commitments is comprehensive. ‘The key to 
aboriginal wisdom is,’ says Randall, ‘family. Treat every being as you would your mother, your 
sister, your father, your brother. All creatures – humans and other than humans – are family. 
That is what has kept aboriginal communities strong, despite all the treatment we have 
endured’ (Randall, 2007). This is a hugely expansive ontology. Unlike the atomised, infinitely 
in-ward, smaller and smaller units of Western philosophic and scientific endeavours, we 
witness here an all-embracing ensemble wholeness, an embrace of entwined and entangled 
being. Human is neither set aside from nor above the ‘other than humans’: human and 
nonhuman are kindred. This conceptualisation is integral, too, to whakapapa. The focus is on 
how a community of selves-in-community constitute themselves and their social, 
environmental and intergenerational obligations.  
 
‘Kanyini is the principle of connectedness through caring and responsibility that underpins 
Aboriginal life, linking four main areas of responsibility: tjukurrpa (philosophy, Law and 
religion), ngura (country), walytja (kinship and family) and kurpuna (spirt, soul and psyche)’ 
(Randall, 2003: 16). Kanyini is a way of knowing responsibility, love and care for a web of 
interconnection that includes everything. It rests within an immersive, interconnected 
ontology and epistemology that extends the fluid boundaries of self and community beyond 
the anthropocentric. This ‘community’ is not just a human community: this community is 
universe. Damage, disrespect, or destroy any part and the whole is weakened.  
 
As legal scholar Irene Watson describes it, there is no separation of human and other, no 
division of cultural and natural laws; all combine. The ‘[I]ndigenous views on human rights 
and the law are entwined and inseparable from our natural environment. The over-riding idea 
is a love of the land, a relationship of custodianship between the land and the [people of that 
land]’ (Watson, 2000: 15). Self, community and land merge and the primary human 
responsibilities are ‘respect, honor, sharing, caring and love’ (Watson, 2000: 13). Randall 
stresses that a break to any element of kanyini is an assault on the psyche. It weakens and 
diminishes the being of the Aboriginal person. Without the totality, the individual is not whole. 
The nexus and integrity of kanyini depend on the integrity of all elements. Throughout his 
discussions the threads of tjukurrpa, ngura and kurpuna are woven to support walytja.  
Walytja, our system of family relationships, is the thing that holds Aboriginal society 
together. We live it out in our relationship to immediate family members, but also to our 
wider kinship connections associated with our totemic links, to the people with whom we 
have done ceremony, and to the people with whom we share country. It is also important 
to realise that we don’t just limit this to people: we use the walytja way of thinking to relate 
to everything in our environment. (Randall, 2003: 136)  
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Here I will keep the focus on what Randall refers to throughout as ‘ours-ness’, we’ll save the 
more-than-human for the next chapter. 
 
Aboriginal Philosopher Mary Graham explains that it is much easier to be an inward-looking 
individualist. To think only of self is the starting place of infants. ‘Ours-ness’ must be learnt, 
must be practiced and constantly reinforced. She says, 
The Aboriginal understanding posits that the tendency to possess is more deeply 
embedded in the human psyche than is the tendency to share. In other words, 
possessiveness is a more ‘primitive’ mode of behaviour than sharing or altruism; 
possessiveness precedes altruism and it therefore takes a higher order of abilities to 
maintain ‘sharing’ behaviour than it takes to demonstrate possessive behaviour. 
Possessive behaviour is asserted or exhibited spontaneously and unreflectively. Sharing 
behaviour has to be inculcated in the first place and then ‘maintained’. It involves such 
abstract concepts as ‘reciprocity’, ‘strategy’, and above all ‘community’. (M. Graham, 
1999: 112) 
 
Thematic in Aboriginal lifeways/philosophy, as expressed by Kanyini and running through 
stories and myth, the law and sociology from Aboriginal clan and language groups, is this 
outward-looking, inclusive expression of what it is to be human, and how to live a good life. 
Where the Western locus centres on the individual and possessions, Kanyini creates webs of 
important value-laden relationships between people with dynamic threads of interconnection 
and co-responsibilities. Self and other interpenetrate in a constant search for equilibrium. 
Graham identifies the two important relationships in Aboriginal life: the first ‘between land and 
people and, secondly, amongst those people themselves, the second being always 
contingent on the first’ (M. Graham, 2008: 182). For this reason, she says, ‘you are never 
alone’ (ibid: 182, italics added).  
 
The Aboriginal evolved a life way in which the individual is encouraged to actively encounter 
other, to seek evidence of connection and love and to accept the responsibilities associated 
with considering others. ‘We practise kanyini by learning to restrict the ‘mine-ness’, and to 
develop a strong sense of ‘our-ness’’ (Randall, 2003: 24-25). Randall discusses his 
commitment to sharing, including the benefits he got from paid employment. 
Having all this money meant that I could now buy loads of food and look after many of my 
people. I could begin to recover kanyini. That is an Aboriginal thinking. We have never 
considered looking after other people a problem. It has always been part of our way of 
living. Anyone can come asking for money or for a ride or for food and we just give it to 
them. If we don’t have it we’ll say, ‘Sorry, I’ve got nothing.’ Everyone knows that is the 
truth because, if we have it, we’ll give it. (Randall, 2003: 79) 
 
So while the individual is the unitary being, a being is strengthened and empowered by and in 
relationship to a broad and expansive web of other. Ego has little place in this 
self-understanding. ‘The reflective and questing Aboriginal mind,’ says Graham, ‘is always 
aligned with what everyone in the group wants, and what everyone wants is to understand 
ourselves in order to have and maintain harmonious relationships’ (M. Graham, 2008: 184). 
And those relationships expand back and forward through time, through human and 
nonhuman, terrestrial and celestial, physical and spiritual.  
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How one views the embodied self is both cultural and culture-making—a complex interplay is 
at work. What is clear is that there is not ‘one way’, not one that is superior to the other, just 
different ways of being in the world. For my purposes, it is important to consider how the 
different ways of being hinder or promote IJ, EJ and Indigenous justice—and their 
intersection, IIEJ.  
Discussion	
What Aboriginal people have done is to map the great repertoire of human feeling to such 
an extent that its continuities with the psychic life of the wider world become apparent; 
Aboriginal Law is grounded in the perception of a psychic level of natural behaviour, the 
behaviour of natural entities. Aboriginal people maintain that humans are not alone. They 
are connected and made by way of relationships with a wide range of beings, and it is 
thus of prime importance to maintain and strengthen these relationships. 
(M. Graham, 2008) 
 
Everything living is family. The trees are our family. The same with the kangaroos, emus 
and all the other animals that live with us. Growing up with the oldies, our parents, the 
grandparents, they always said we are connected to everything else and the proof of that 
is being alive. Being alive connects you to every other living thing that’s around you. 
You’re spirit, you’re psychic, you’re physical, you’re mental, you’re all connected with 
other living forms. You’re never lost and you’re never alone. You’re one with everything 
else that is there. The oneness, the completeness of the oneness. 
(Lee, 2006) 
 
It is likely to be clear, now, that individualism, and the identity problem, are deeply culturally 
embedded. It also appears IJ is improbable if the ‘true’ human condition equates with tightly 
bounded, self-seeking individuals for whom responsibility is first and foremost for self. Under 
conditions in which personal freedoms, self-control and autonomous functioning are prized, 
the ultimate good is the individual’s life itself, even if future individuals’ lives are suboptimal. 
Parfit’s analysis shows that where the focus is on rational self-optimisation freed from social 
constraint, theory shackles current attempts to address global environmental destruction. So 
an individual-based ontology may be incompatible with IEJ. It is unequivocally incompatible 
with kanyini, the Anangu philosophy of care.  
 
There are two ways in which the liberal reification of the individual asserts mastery over future 
generations. Firstly, so long as individual freedom represents the apex of worth, any actions 
that might limit such freedoms are viewed with suspicion. This is problematic when solutions 
to individual acts of pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, resource depletion, topsoil erosion, 
etc., demand community-wide action, and restrictions on individual activities. Secondly, 
because future generations are not and cannot be individually identified, there are theoretical 
problems in imaging to whom the living have obligations and duties. Furthermore, theory, as 
Parfit shows, is further complicated when considered and random acts in the present 
determine who will exist in the future and the nature of the world into which they are born. 
This worldview is anathema to Indigenous people’s worldwide (Alfred, 1999). 
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Sharon Krause theorises a non-sovereign individualism—one in which she claims we can 
‘[r]edeem our freedom by making our past and our present meaningful parts of a 
progressively unfolding narrative toward freedom for all’ (Krause, 2015: 191-192). These 
forward-looking obligations require taking both individual responsibility and working together 
she says. Importantly, she argues that the freedom of the individual ‘need not rest on the 
mastery of others’ (Krause, 2015: 192). This claim is important to any theory of IEJ. Where 
duties are to identifiable individuals only, as Parfit argues, the mastery of future generations is 
inevitable. Environmental harms will limit their freedoms. Additionally, decolonising IEJ 
requires that Indigenous Peoples ontologies are not subsumed within universalist claims. If 
they are, are they not subject to the mastery Krause is rejecting?  
 
Anangu (and Māori) ontologies are communitarian—so the thought was that Western 
communitarian conceptions of IEJ may overcome this problem of mastery that individualism 
risks. Avner de-Shalit’s CTIJ is perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to theorise 
intergenerational responsibilities and obligations within the communitarian tradition. De-Shalit 
suggests there is a continuing flow of obligations not to harm that embrace the ongoing 
community and individuals within the community. The question is whether communitarianism 
and de-Shalit are able to accommodate the expansive sense of community and fluid 
boundaries expressed in kanyini, and by Aboriginal philosophers.  
 
The communitarian approach is somewhat closer to that of Anangu (other Australian 
Aboriginal peoples and Māori). Charles Taylor’s claims that there are things that are of value 
to something more than just the individual: that the value and the appreciation of the value 
depend on and are embedded in the concept that there is an ‘us’ (Taylor, 1997). It is a value 
that involves something wider and more expansive than the individual and only exists within 
the more fluidly bounded community. And Alasdair Macintyre links elements of the essence of 
being human to the wonder of story-telling, and the qualities of human-ness that emanate 
from being part of the communal story (MacIntyre,1984). We create ourselves on this 
account, from within our society. Without that society, there are no anchors to tether us. 
These communities and stories are trans- and inter-generational. It is from this tradition that 
Avner de-Shalit draws his CTIJ (de Shalit, 1995). 
 
‘[M]oral dilemmas’, suggests de-Shalit, ‘derive from the very fact that the harm caused to 
future persons is the byproduct of a genuine … desire to improve … the standard of living of 
contemporaries’ (ibid. 6). The consequence is that future generations are unlikely to inherit 
access to the same, and possibly not even similar, environmental goods those currently living 
enjoy. However, future generations have no capacity to directly appeal to the living, not 
capacity to contract with or negotiate for a different or fairer distribution of access to goods. 
‘An intertemporal contract is quite different from a simple one,’ de Shalit explains (ibid. 98). 
Power resides solely with the living. The non-identity problem may provide an excuse for 
inaction on reducing environmental harms and as such constitutes a corruption of moral 
principles. However, de Shalit goes on to articulate a ‘conception of the self’ neither bound in 
time nor ‘totally confined within the barriers of its own physical existence’. Rather ‘one’s 
self-awareness is related to one’s community, both in the present and in the future’ (ibid. 124). 
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While individual acts, considered and random, are also responsible for environmental harms, 
it is the collective impact of these individual acts that result in the most egregious challenges 
to IEJ. Solutions too must be collective. That I cease to drive my car or choose not to use air 
conditioning will not make a blind bit of difference to the global impacts of climate change 
(see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010). However, if, collectively, we all scale back in the use of 
technologies and activities that contribute to long-term environmental harms, the negative 
outcomes may be averted.  
 
However, under the Aboriginal philosophies we’ve looked at here moral corruption seems 
less conceivable. Where a sense of self is constituted from a timeless continuum of being and 
relating to multiple others, including nonhuman others, actions are directed at securing good 
for that wider time-transcending community.100 Michael Walzer claimed in 1990 that the 
‘current critique [of liberalism], whose protagonists hope only for small victories, partial 
incorporations, and when they are rebuffed or dismissed or co-opted, fade away for a time 
only to return’ (Walzer, 1990: 6). However, this is insufficient for Indigenous Peoples whose 
living communitarian philosophies are sidelined by liberal individualism. Any theory of justice 
founded on liberal individualism is incapable of affording culturally appropriate justice to those 
peoples, nor can it satisfactorily reflect their understanding of IEJ.  
 
Remembering Mary Graham’s claim that individualism is the starting place of infants, the 
question here is as an example of a more complete, nuanced and advanced understanding of 
the human condition, can de-Shalit’s CTIJ deliver just outcomes for Aboriginal peoples? That 
is, can communitarianism include Aboriginal beings (as in ontology and lived experience) in a 
wider intergenerational community of justice? Can de-Shalit’s communitarianism sufficiently 
establish an IJ of the sort imagined by Australian Aboriginal peoples? 
 
De-Shalit suggests seeking the grounds for IJ involves ‘moral and political debate and its two 
main components: reflection and the search for moral similarity’ (de-Shalit, 1995: 31). 
People’s individuation then becomes blurred: our society survives our death along with our 
projects. The future is integral to the present being, and on death, while aspects of our life 
projects cease there exists a thread of being that continues. De-Shalit goes further by 
suggesting an expanded conception of self, embraces also ‘future objects—human and 
nonhuman—that are part of us’ (ibid. 40). The nonhuman de-Shalit is imagining are the 
artefacts of human enterprise, rather than the nonhuman of other-than- or more-than-human 
                                                
100 There are those within the Western paradigm who engage with human-nonhuman entanglement and 
continuity of being. Donna Haraway and Tim Morton, for instance, attempt to theorise the entanglement of human 
and nonhuman in a way that moves us, human, to reconfigure relationships with nonhuman (Haraway, 2016; 
Morton, 2017). Their contributions, while important, are framed within Western epistemologies, and fail to 
acknowledge extant Indigenous epistemology and ontology which has already done this work. That is, my claim is 
that they ignore a body of work that has succeeded in this theorising, and more importantly perhaps, has created 
sets of practices and protocols of practice that also achieve the ends Haraway and Morton desire. While I 
appreciate that they are challenging liberal orthodoxies, by ignoring that which exists such theorists perpetuate 
practices of epistemological ignorance, violence and exclusion. 
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in the Aboriginal sense. Self on de-Shalit’s account is constituted by relationships and 
projects, has a future-oriented projection and an ongoing attachment to human social and 
physical artefacts. The desire for continuation of our culture, monuments—in the sense of 
lasting records and reflections of essence of the culture—and access to resources is 
wrapped into personal identity and projects. Then future generations are able to be reflexively 
included as part of the current community, releasing us from the bind of the non-identity 
problem. Importantly, if future generations are members of our community, privileging the 
living at the expense of future generations becomes a matter of injustice. Justice, then, 
dictates we must not discriminate based on time-of-living.  
 
Individualism seeks evidence of separation and dispassion. Both kanyini and kaitiakitanga 
seek evidence of connection and bonds, and in so doing neither distinguish the ‘when’ of 
existence—all generations, ancestors, living and future are members of the community. 
Living actors within the community, therefore, must include obligations to ancestors and 
future generations in their considerations. CTIJ also embraces a sense of communal 
continuum, of inclusive communities, and places obligations on the living to integrate future 
generations into their moral community. In essence CTIJ, kanyini, and kaitiakitanga hold the 
generations to be contemporaneously bound within the community. As contemporaries, 
actions in the present must integrate their good—the living individual may not be privileged at 
the expense of future generations. A divergence occurs, however, in understanding the 
relationship of the environment in and to community.  
 
For Aboriginal, land comes first—physically, spiritually and ontologically. Land, environment, 
is the great teacher, a guide to understanding what it is to be. The land leads human to evolve 
beyond possessive individualism. Mary Graham explains;  
that a collective responsibility to land is vital if people are even to attempt to transcend 
ego and possessiveness; the point is that land always comes before ego and 
possessions. These things tend to present a barrier to upholding obligations to look after 
land. The effect of this transcendence of ego is to inculcate a sense of communal, rather 
than individuated, identity, and, most importantly, to encourage reflective engagement in 
all activities. (M. Graham, 2008: 188) 
  
It is not possible, then, in Aboriginal philosophy for community to be ‘complete’ without 
encompassing land. For the purposes of social cohesion, land’s function or role in community 
is not as a resource so much as a way of mitigating ‘primitive’ reversion to individualism. A 
person must empathise beyond the margins of the human to achieve a cohesive 
time-spanning community. Excising land from community abridges the boundaries of human 
potentiality. Country, is valued intrinsically and inclusively. 
 
Kanyini, encapsulating the ‘principle of connectedness through caring and responsibility’ 
(Randall, 2003: 16), also exemplifies this worldview. ‘When I look at a certain rock,’ says 
Randall, ‘it is not just a rock, it is a link to my tjukurrpa and all the stories of creation that exist 
in that rock. Within a grain of sand I see me and the universe’ (ibid. 17). Where the 
boundaries of self are expanded to the universe, and the primary ethic governing 
relationships to that universe is custodial, then thinking long-term and thinking strategically. 
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‘From this perspective, short-term tactics are of less consequence: it is important to keep the 
big picture in mind’ (M. Graham, 1999: 107). A picture that transcends self, present, and the 
nature-culture divide. However, this transcendence is not captured within CTIJ. In the CTIJ 
value is bestowed on the environment by human for human—an attitude George Kateb also 
reflects when he derives obligations of stewardship of the environment from human dignity 
(Kateb, 2011).  
 
One of the major problematics arising from the liberal tradition, in both individualism, and 
communitarianism, is the masking of the complex, entangled, intermeshed web of 
connections between human and nonhuman. It masks the presence of ‘other’ on our skin, 
within our guts—other without whom we cannot function, the care and maintenance of whom 
are critical to our wellbeing, and, in the case of gut biota, who influence not only our health 
but also our thoughts (Yong, E. (2016). The very rationality of the liberal tradition that 
underpins the understanding of human as stand-alone individuals and motivates liberal 
theory, is a function of a human-nonhuman collective. We are most certainly never alone. 
Finally, returning to the two quotations introducing this section, Aboriginal ontology identifies 
there is something more to community that human alone, everything is family. The next 
chapter challenges the boundaries of ‘the person’ further, examining the implications of the 
non-anthropocentric worldview that expands responsibilities beyond the self and human 
community.  
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Chapter	6:	Growing	the	Land	Up	–	
listening	to	Country	
 
This land is something that is always yours; it doesn’t matter what nature or politics do to 
change it. We believe the land is all life. So it comes to us that we are part of the land and 
the land is part of us. It cannot be one or the other. We cannot be separated by anything 
or anyone. (Yunupingu, 1997: 2-3) 
 
I have established already that within holistic ontologies where nothing is separated and 
everything entangled, human and nonhuman are subjects of justice. However, so far the 
theories of IEJ examined focus on human welfare, with benefits accruing to the environment 
and nonhuman a reflexive benefit not an intrinsic objective of the theories. The theories are 
primarily concerned with the future wellbeing of humans. However, this is insufficient for 
people who make no sharp distinction between human and nonhuman. Specifically, this 
chapter explores this insufficiency in the Aboriginal context, where people ‘are part of the land 
and the land is part of [them]’.  
 
Dr Galarrwuy Yunupingu, of the Yorta Yorta people of Arnhem Land in Australia, is emphatic 
above. There is no separation. There is no ‘one or the other’. Without a human-nonhuman 
distinction, if justice is to serve human, it must also serve nonhuman into and out of which 
human merge and emerge. A justice framework that disconnects one form from the totality of 
all-that-is cannot be just in a context of already always interconnected. Justice frameworks for 
many Indigenous Peoples need to encompass all-that-is if it is to serve the human.  
 
The previous two chapters have found justice based on materialism and property ownership, 
individualism, and even communitarianism inadequate to the task of enveloping at least 
some Māori and Australian Aboriginal lifeways and philosophy. Hobbes' focus on ownership 
and validation of exploitation, for example, encourages waste and destruction, contrary to the 
principles of kaitiakitanga. Liberal individualism is too exclusive for the principles of kanyini. 
De Shalit’s communitarian approach too forward looking for a people who draw ancestors 
into the domain of living. Moreover, all of these theories are resolutely anthropocentric. The 
evaluation of benefits to nonhuman is primarily through the lens of human advantage. 
 
The community embraced within both kanyini and kaitiakitanga includes animals and plants, 
rock form and mountain, seas and waters. These nonhuman are not adjuncts to human 
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existence nor mere resources; they are extensions of self. As this chapter will explore, 
ontologies and societies in which nonhuman share genealogies and kinship relationships with 
human require IEJ to encompass nonhuman not instrumentally but, at the least, as agents, 
and possibly, subjects of justice. Remembering back to Chapter 4, Mary Graham explained 
that of the two relationships in Aboriginal life that between ‘land and people’ is paramount, 
and determines the relationships between people (M. Graham, 1999).101 This chapter is 
motivated by the contrast between the dominant legal construct and prescriptions for the 
good life which rather than governing relationships between people and the land, are 
contracts between people to which the land itself is an adjunct (N. Graham, 2012; Meyer, 
2015), and one in which the law and the good life are derived from relationships between land 
and human. It asks how IEJ is conceived under these latter conditions.  
 
Looking firstly at the relationship between Aboriginal people, ‘country’ and Law, the chapter 
then turns to HR as a framework for IJ and considers its strengths, both in circumventing 
some of the previous problems and for the potential to expand the theory into the nonhuman 
realm. An assessment of a current Australian IEJ issue follows, specifically the federal 
government's drive to find a suitable site on which to establish a national nuclear waste 
repository—one both physically suited and socially acceptable. Finally, it will bring the three 
together to discuss rights within non-Western paradigms.  
 
Listening	to	Country	
Animals and minerals, plants and animals, and photoautotrophs and chemoheterotrophs 
are estimates—each is external to the other only if the scale of our perception is confined 
to the skin, to a set of epidermal enclosures. But human lungs are constant reminders that 
this separation is imaginary. Where is the human body if it is viewed from the lung? The 
larger, massive biotic assemblage the lungs know intimately—including the green plants, 
photosynthetic bacteria, nonsulfur purple bacteria, hydrogen, sulfur and iron bacteria, 
animals, and microbes—is now what is thought to produce the metabolism of the 
planetary carbon cycle, which may be on the verge of a massive reorganization due to 
human action. (Povinelli, 2014: 42) 
 
My people have always been part of the earth. Every single inch of this land, and its 
waterways, is sacred land. (Lee, 2006) 
 
When my father returned from WWII, during which he had been in active service in North 
Africa, a prisoner of war in Italy and later a fighter with the Italian partisans in the hills of the 
                                                
101 There are two important relationships in Aboriginal life, the first ‘between land and people and, secondly, 
amongst those people themselves, the second being always contingent on the first’ (M. Graham, 1999: 182). 
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Po valley, the first thing he did was don a pack and walk for three weeks across Aotearoa 
from Taranaki where he was raised, to the Hawke’s Bay, home of Ngāti Kahugnunu, where 
his father, grandmother and ancestors back to the first Polynesian settlers were born and 
raised. It’s a challenging walk. Starting from the black iron-sand beaches where Taranaki 
meets the Tasman Sea, up ranges, down into gorges, past the headwaters of the Whanganui, 
across the ranges of Te Urewera, mostly through dense rain-drenched bush, he ended at the 
white-sand rim of the mighty Pacific. Throughout the journey, he lived off that land. As a child, 
I asked him: ‘Why?’. ‘I needed to know my country again’, was his simple response. It was a 
pilgrimage. Being reconnected with that rugged, dense green place, the rich humus laden air, 
whipping coastal winds and bright blue Pacific sparkle was essential for him to resettle, to 
pick up life again. He needed to breath ‘the larger massive biotic assemblage’, feel the earth, 
hear the birds, wind, rustling leaves, and water, smell the bush and salt spray to settle again. 
He was taking his country back and into himself.  
 
A lifetime later, on 8 March 2017, in the online issue of the science journal Nature, Ray Tobler 
et al., disclosed DNA research indicating the first people to settle what is now Australia 
arrived in the north of the continental landmass approximately fifty thousand years before the 
present.102 This research, however, went beyond confirming an ‘arrival date’. It traced further 
migration patterns of these first settlers. From the North Eastern tip of the continent 
(connected at that stage by a ‘land bridge’ to what is now Papua New Guinea), one group 
went west then south along the western coastline, some settling along the way. Another 
group moved down the east coast, again some settling some moving on. Tobler et al., note 
two remarkable features of these migrations and settlement. Firstly, the speed they spread 
along the coastal margins: a mere 2,000 years after the journeys began, descendants of the 
original groups met up again somewhere along the coast at the south of the continent. 
Secondly, once groups settled a territory their descendants remained there. That means 
today something in the order of 2,000 generations of a clan have lived in one area. The 
authors suggest, ‘the central cultural attachment of Aboriginal Australians to ‘country’ may 
reflect the continuous presence of populations in discrete geographic areas for up to 50 kyr’ 
(Tobler et al., 2017: 4). They suggest, also, that to survive over the generations the clans had 
to ‘know’ their country well to adapt to the vast range of climatic, vegetative and faunal 
changes that have occurred over the period of their settlement.  
 
                                                
102 This date has been revised by a more recent study of stone artefacts which indicate human occupation in 
northern Australia dates from at least 65 thousand years before the present (Clarkson et al., 2017). 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
127 
These two examples, my father’s walk and the Nature article, may seem disconnected. In a 
sense they are. Within these two paragraphs nestle two distinct epistemological and 
ontological paradigms: the ages-old experiential versus the clinically scientific; the entwined 
versus the eye-of-God; the immersive versus the detached. It is the deeply entangled 
knowing of country that Tobler connects to ancestry, and my father connected to immersion, 
that is the focus of this chapter. It examines aspects of how some Aboriginal people of 
Australia express their connection to country.103 Aboriginal legal scholar Irene Watson rejects 
the ‘scientific’ explanation of Aboriginal peoples’ arrival in Australia.104 It ‘breaks our 
connection to country. It is’, she says ‘an explanation, which runs counter to First Nations’ 
understandings, belonging and connections to place’ (Watson, 2015: 12). Presumably, she 
would be equally scathing of the explanation Tobler et al., use to explain how Aboriginal 
people know they come from and belong to their country. Because she, like Bob Randall, 
know their ‘people have always been part of the earth’ (Lee, 2006: 8:03 minutes). 
 
No other people on earth have a history of 2,000 generations growing in one place. Over 
50,000 years each clan has taken root in country. The history of country and people is 
co-constituted. Together they have weathered ice ages, sea level rise and fall, drought, and 
storms, extinctions and flourishings: these changes are recorded in their stories (Gray, 2015; 
Reid & Nunn, 2015). Truths known to the clans are accepted by mainstream Australia only 
with scientific confirmation (Gough, 2015). Mainstream Australia has difficulty understanding 
Aboriginal connection to and knowledge of country. As of the 2016 census, 26% were born 
overseas, and those who trace their lineage to the convicts have maybe 7 or 8 generations of 
Australian living. Over 66% live in capital cities, at a disconnect from food production, wildlife, 
forests, watercourses and soils (Knaus, 2017).105 Law is constructed to monitor relationships 
between humans. Western scientific epistemologies are privileged, and Western structures 
and thinking drive politics, policy and education within the nation (Donnelly, 2017; 
Henderson, 2014; Wootten, 2015). The ontological differences explored in the last two 
                                                
103 ‘Country’ is the ubiquitous Australian English term for Aboriginal home or clan territory. It means more than 
that though; country is a term that describes multidimensional spaces that carry history, ancestors, future 
generations, kinship relations, food, story, song, dance, obligations duties and the Law. Each language group, of 
course, has their own term or phrase. Here I need an encompassing term, and will use ‘country’ for this purpose, 
unless quoting from an Indigenous writer, in which case I will use the language term that writer uses. Irene Watson 
for instance uses the Nunga word ruwe.  
Country will be italicised to distinguish that it is the hold-all, stand-in word used as the universal form of different 
language terms, and to distinguish it from the standard English meaning of country. 
104 Watson is a scholar of both Aboriginal and colonial law. 
105 Of course many urban dwellers also head to the outdoors for recreation and feel real attachment to it. The 
point here is it is an optional attachment upon which survival is not at stake. 
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chapters: ownership and exploitation of nonhuman, and individualism, are also critical 
barriers to understanding.  
 
When members of a Yolngu family from the far north of the continent, ‘elders and caretakers 
for Bawaka country’, published an article in the Voiceless anthology (Burarrwanga et al., 
2012), Bawaka Country was cited as co-author. The piece begins: 
They are not voiceless, you know. Animals that is. But then neither are rocks or winds, 
tides or plants. They all speak. They all have language and knowledge and Law. They 
send messages to us; talk to us and to each other. All we have to do is listen; listen, and 
then act. (ibid: Paragraph 1) 
 
After introducing themselves and inviting the reader to learn how to listen to country the 
human authors continue: 
We’ve also included our homeland of Bawaka as a co-author. That’s because the land, 
the water, the animals, the plants, the rocks, the thoughts and songs that make up 
Bawaka contribute to what we are saying here in important ways. They speak to us, 
inform what we do and have guided our thinking and talking. They’ll guide what we do 
tonight and what we will say. So we are a mixed group as we talk to you. We are human 
and non-human, tangible and intangible and everything in between.  
 
We said that all you have to do is listen to animals to hear them, but there is more than 
that really. To say that it is just about listening makes it sound too easy. To listen closely, 
to hear, requires relating to the world in a different way, understanding ourselves in a 
different way. And once you do that, you have to act in a different way, with a different 
kind of ethics. You see, for Yolngu, humans are not inherently separate from animals, 
from Country, or from the world in which we live. We are part of it and are bound in 
relations of responsibility and reciprocity. We relate to animals as fellow beings, as kin. 
They make us who we are, just as we make them who they are. Maybe that seems 
esoteric, and it’s true that it is a matter of deep Law, deep spirituality and deep 
knowledge. But this way of living informs our day-to-day life too. We live on the land, with 
animals and other beings, so while it is deep, it’s practical too. These ways of relating to 
animals and others are part of the way we think, act, eat, talk, dream and hunt. It is who 
we are and what we do. (ibid: Paragraphs 4 & 5)  
 
There are concepts here that are repetitive of those present in the previous two chapters: an 
entangled human-nonhuman ontology; custodianship, kinship relationships with animal; an 
ethics of responsibility and reciprocity. Previously those ideas were shown to superimpose 
‘new’ parameters on our conceptualisation of IEJ, parameters including: an ethic of 
intergenerational custodianship of nonhuman that recognises a subjective nonhuman with 
something more than material values; and a self-constituted of a more-than-human 
community that expands beyond presently situated individuals. In these introductory 
paragraphs of They Are Not Voiceless, however, we are introduced to another dimension of 
being that challenges the current boundaries of liberal philosophy. Human are not the sole 
bearers of wisdom: nonhuman can teach human—if only human will listen. Even further than 
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that, nonhuman is the source of (deep) Law, a set of rules that guide all human interactions 
with kin, animate and inanimate, material and spiritual.  
 
From the land comes what there is to know, what it is to be, what it is to act. According to Mick 
Dodson,  
[t]o understand our law, our culture and our relationship to the physical and spiritual world, 
you must begin with the land. Everything about Aboriginal society is inextricably 
interwoven with, and connected to, the land. Culture is the land, the land and spirituality of 
Aboriginal people, our cultural beliefs our reason for existence is the land. You take that 
away and you take away our reason for existence. We have grown the land up. We are 
dancing, singing and painting for the land. We are celebrating for the land. Removed from 
our lands, we are literally not ourselves. (Dodson, 1997: 41)  
Here we see an ontology in which to be human is to be more than an isolated being 
contained in a human form. Identity, to be ‘one’s self’, is to be in communication with, 
‘inextricably interwoven with, and connected to, the land’. 
Everything	starts	in	Country	 	
The land is the source. It is the source of all things. The Aboriginal people come from country 
(which one reason Watson and others reject the land-bridge story of Aboriginal creation), and 
go back to it where they dwell as ancestors (see for instance: Randall, 2003; Watson, 2015). 
And there is more than this. The ancestral beings, beings who inhabited the continent before 
human habitation, gave form to the original human. That is, ‘the ontological relationship 
occurs through the intersubstantiation of ancestral beings, humans and land; it is a form of 
embodiment’ (Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 12). Says Irene Watson, ‘The Nunga ‘I am’ is not like 
the other, dominant Western subject of being, which is represented by a straight line of 
thought—beginning, middle and ending. Instead, a Nunga process encircles; within there is a 
process that allows a person to become one and to begin again. This process is 
non-hierarchical and non-linear; rather it takes the form of a cycle, of the continuity of being, 
becoming another cycle, nurntikki [to go on forever]’ (Watson, 2015: 16). A person comes 
from the earth and ancestral beings and lives on earth before returning to earth and living in 
earth, from where they may emerge again in some form. This is an ontology in which there is 
an unbounded merger of all elements within land- and sea-scape. 
 
In the listening to country Aboriginal people listen to ancestors, bringing them into the 
present, including them within an intergenerational, inter-species, inter-form community. This 
listening is active, it’s a whole of body listening, and it involves interpretation within the 
context of explicit responsibilities to county. Arrante man, Des Rogers explained to me: 
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I’ve just remembered that the desert oaks which are quite prolific in remote Australia in 
certain areas, I remember pulling up, because they actually provide a lot of shade and 
that, and I remember pulling up and someone, some of the elders from my mob, and the 
wind going through the … what are they called? They’re not pinnacles, they are not 
actually leaves, they are like needles which, yeah, which sort of are leaves, and the wind 
going through them and making the noise they make which is not a scary noise, but they 
said to me, “That is your ancestors talking to you”. And when you sit there and listen to 
that, the hair sort of stands up on the back of your neck and you think “Ah. Ok. So I know 
what that is”. (int. DR) 
 
As the desert oaks speak a reminder to Des from his ancestors, they reinforce his 
intergenerational obligations, to people, spirits, animals, plants, water, soil: his obligations to 
country. In his own words;  
…its not sort of, you sit down and say “maybe we should go up and burn that country up 
there because it hasn’t been burned for 20 years” or whatever. You sort of learn through 
your lifetime that you have to preserve and look after particular areas of your country of 
what belongs to you, what you are traditionally connected to. And so you just do it when it 
needs to be done because you know it needs to be done and you also have 
responsibilities as well. So you are tasked with the responsibility of looking after, like for 
example, my great-grandmother’s, where she was born on the Finke River, which is the 
oldest river in the world, I’ve got obligations around that small part of that area where she 
was born that I have to do. Like if I go there, for example, if I take anyone else there, the 
first thing we have to do is wash our faces in the river, to just rub the water over our arms, 
for example, just to acknowledge her, and her and my ancestors as well. We’re there as 
friends and people. We are not there to do anything else. So I mean it probably sounds a 
bit bizarre but it’s those really little things that make a big difference. And when you are 
given a responsibility, your responsibility to do this, you obviously take it seriously, and 
you have to abide by those rules. Because if don’t you are letting not only yourself down, 
but you are letting your ancestors down, your letting clan down, a whole bunch of things. 
(int. DR) 
 
Ancestors remain embodied in country, and country embodies also the spiritual world, to 
which Aboriginal relationality extends. For Aboriginal people land reverberates with spiritual 
symbols, beings, and reminders. As Moreton-Robinson puts it, ‘[t]he spiritual world is 
immediately experienced because it is synonymous with the physiography of the land’ 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 15). It is significant because this then invokes responsibility 
because not only country contains the spiritual but… 
…every Aboriginal person has a part of the essence of one of the original creative spirits 
who formed the Australian landscape. Therefore each person has a charter of 
custodianship empowering them and making them responsible for renewing that part of 
the flora and its fauna. The details of this metaphysics varied widely across the land with 
the physical environment, but the spiritual basis—the understanding that what separates 
humans from animals is the fact that each human bears a creative and spiritual identity 
which still resides in land itself—provided and still provides in many places the religious, 
social, political and economic force throughout Aboriginal Australia. (M. Graham, 2008: 
183) 
 
Protecting the spirit protects the whole expansive community beyond the confines of an 
anthropocentric ontology, beyond present, beyond the search for monetary riches.  
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The land, and how we treat it, is what determines our human-ness. Because land is 
sacred, and must be looked after, the relations between people and land becomes the 
first template for society and social relations. Therefore all meaning comes from land. (M. 
Graham, 1999: 106).  
 
The importance of meaning coming from land cannot be underplayed: it is the source, if only 
humans will listen because the rules of engagement for harmonious coexistence are 
contained within it. It speaks the Law: it has a ‘voice in the business of law and order, as the 
law emanates from all things’ (Watson, 2015: 80). Country is then more-than-physical-space.  
Entanglements	with	other	
If we think of country as more-than-physical-space, we may have to think, too, of it being 
something more than three dimensional. That is, country contains artefacts beyond (mere) 
physical representation and situation. Country contains spirituality, Law, knowledge-story, 
wisdom and being. Country is not ‘out there’ separate from human, but rather intimately 
entwined with human ontology, and essential to successful social relationships. Country has 
temporal dimensions—it contains all time. So too it is inhabited by seasons, sunshine and 
shadow, moonlight and dense darkness. Country is beyond isobars and coordinates, beyond 
latitude and longitude, kilometres and hectares. Country encapsulates all there is, was and 
might be. To country one has responsibilities of care, like the responsibilities one has to kin. 
These relationships and responsibilities are expressed in the phrase ‘grow up the country’ 
(Sharifian, 2006): akin to growing up children. That is, it is a phrase that speaks obligations to 
care, nurture, guard and protect. It is to care ‘as country’ (Bawaka Country, Suchet-Pearson, 
Wright, Lloyd, & Burarranga, 2013). 
 
IEJ in this context expands well beyond boundaries imposed by the anthropocentric theories 
of justice we have explored to date. Is there any framework within the liberal paradigm flexible 
enough to scaffold an understanding of country as wisdom giving, spirit containing, 
co-generating, timeless lawmaker? As something beyond spatial representation? How can 
justice theory accommodate an understanding of being human as being a community 
compound of human and nonhuman, past present future, simultaneously? Paradoxically 
perhaps, serious attempts have been made within the Human Rights family of justice 
theories.  
 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
132 
Rights	
… underpinning [the] legal regime is the Western ontology in which the body is theorised 
as being separate from the earth and it has no bearing on the way subjectivities, 
identities, and bodies are constituted.  
(Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 17) 
 
At first blush it may seem Human Rights (HR) approaches to justice will be the most 
anthropocentric of any. Certainly, the nomenclature indicates they are. Rights have, however, 
been used to extend protection to individual sentient animals (for instance by Nussbaum, 
2007; Regan, 2004; Schinkel, 2008; Wise, 2004). More recently the language of rights and 
the contexts within which it is used has expanded beyond the individual. In addition to the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), relevant here are UNDRIP and the 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME),106 Ecuador’s constitutional 
inclusion of Rights for Nature and Bolivia’s Rights for Mother Nature law. The language of 
rights has been harnessed for the protection of the dignity and wellbeing of Indigenous 
Peoples and the nonhuman. Also in Aotearoa two geo-regions are now legally ‘persons’ (Arif, 
2015; Hutchison, 2014; Shuttleworth, 2012), as are the Ganges River, its main tributary 
(Bhattacharya, 2017) and areas of the Himalaya Mountains including (streams, rivulets, 
glaciers and the air) in India (O'Donnell & Talbot-Jones, 2017). While none of them is fully 
international (in the sense of agreements between nation States) these mechanisms embody 
lifeways beyond the Western ontology referred to by Moreton-Robinson above. It is 
conceivable then if Indigenous Peoples’ interests can be protected by rights, if Mother 
Nature/Earth (as a proxy term for nonhuman) can have rights, and if the rights structure can 
support geo-regional nonhuman persons, that a workable model of IIEJ may be conceivable 
out of a rights-based framework too.  
 
This section will explore firstly the use of HR as a framework for IEJ. HR has proven a useful 
tool for examining the wrongs of climate change. Its framework sidesteps the problems of 
contractualism and individualism embedded within liberalism. Focusing on people as the 
endmost victims of the harms, the ultimate aim of HR is not to calculate a cost of harms and 
weigh them against costs for removing pollution from the environment (Bell, 2011). 
Importantly, in the HR framework is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of the rights 
holder. As we have seen, for peoples whose selfhood includes nonhuman everything has 
                                                
106 Drafted in conjunction with the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 
in held in Cochabamba, Brazil on 22 April 2010. As an NGO initiative it moral force and international standing is 
different to such documents and the international UDHR. 
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intrinsic value. Human and nonhuman flourishing is one. Secondly, given rights have been 
given to nonhuman in various instruments, it seems possible the rights approach is capable 
of extending IJ beyond an exclusively human interface—albeit that Martha Nussbaum 
expressly faults the approach as unable to adequately address the capabilities of nonhuman 
animals (Nussbaum, 2007), and Krushil Watene further critiques the CA’s inability, in its 
current form, to accommodate the values Māori attach to nature (Watene, 2016). The 
language and philosophical foundations of rights have been extended into the nonhuman 
realm in the instruments cited above. How to theorise IJ and accommodate nonhuman in the 
HR and CA will be explored both here and expanded further in the next two chapters.  
 
Weighty	Interests	
Rights, says Simon Caney (referencing Joseph Raz on the same topic), indicate that ‘X has 
interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on others’ (Caney, 2008: 538). 
This is a promising beginning, for perhaps X need not be a physical, individuated, living, 
human being. X need only to be something that has (or possibly, will have) ‘weighty interests’. 
But that is to get ahead of ourselves. First, we need to establish what a rights-based IJ offers 
people. 
 
The idea that X’s interests create obligations and duties on others, that the interests generate 
rights, is age-old, woven within the bodies of various world theological texts, where rights 
discourse promote concepts of equality and dignity (Coyne, 2017).107 They also appear in 
‘common law, rules and principles established by judges on case-by-case through the 
centuries’ (ibid.). The first written ‘bill of rights’, the Magna Carta, dates to 1215 (ibid.). Locke 
used ‘natural rights’ as a foundation for much of his work upon which liberal political theory 
continues to build (Locke, 1997; Raz, 1989). Historical precedence, legal, constitutional, and 
religious validation formed a very strong scaffold from which the later 1948 UDHR was built. 
With the United Nations’ validation and widespread international take-up, HR has assumed a 
universalist mantle—although this universality is contested because, once more, the spectre 
of Western bias and a very liberal individualism arise in the idea of negative rights of 
non-interference. That is, HR focuses on creating the space for the individual to create the life 
they design for themselves. Stepping away from those challenges, the first question to 
address here is: Can HR provide a sufficient framework for an IEJ?  
 
                                                
107 The concept of dignity is critical as the underpinning value of rights. It is the focus of Chapter 8. 
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The	Parameters	of	Rights	in	Declarations	
Drawing from Article 3 of the UDHR (everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person), a human right to a clean environment was recognised in the Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 (Stockholm Declaration). 
Clause 1 states:  
…Both aspects of man's (sic) environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential 
to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life itself.108 
 
Clause 6 expands the domain of interest beyond living humans: 
… For the purpose of attaining freedom in the world of nature, man (sic) must use 
knowledge to build, in collaboration with nature, a better environment. To defend and 
improve the human environment for present and future generations has become an 
imperative goal for mankind (sic) … 
 
More specifically within the Principles of the agreement, the protection of both the 
environment and future generations is linked to rights.  
Principle 1 
Man (sic) has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he (sic) 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations …  
 
Twenty years later the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development declared:  
Principle 1 
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. 
 
Principle 3 
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.  
 
The Rio+20 Declaration affirms the ‘respect for all human rights’ (Clause 8) and, in Clause 9, 
the importance of the UDHR and numerous subsequent instruments to protect human rights. 
However, it extends this rights discourse significantly in later clauses, specifically: 
39.  We recognize that planet Earth and its ecosystems are our home and that “Mother 
Earth” is a common expression in a number of countries and regions, and we note that 
some countries recognize the rights of nature in the context of the promotion of 
sustainable development. We are convinced that in order to achieve a just balance 
among the economic, social and environmental needs of present and future generations, 
it is necessary to promote harmony with nature.  
 
                                                
108 Many documents cited here use the male form as proxy for all human. I draw attention to it here alone rather 
than repeatedly. Suffice it to say that the conventions of the day and the institutions continue to pervade 
documentation. 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
135 
40.  We call for holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development that will 
guide humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. 
 
In these three documents (UDHR, Stockholm Declaration and Rio Declaration) we have 
rights to an environment conducive to human flourishing, and rights for future generations. 
Additionally, Clause 39 of Rio+20 specifically reflects the language of many Indigenous 
Peoples—with reference to non-human as ‘Mother Earth’. Leading edge, they push the 
boundaries of HR beyond protection of individuals’ civil and political liberties by states. 
However, in each case the rights are human rights; nonhuman are beneficiaries only 
in-so-much as a functioning environment advances human interests. While they self-declare 
universal ambitions, unless nonhuman are beneficiaries there remains the risk these 
Declarations thwart the agency of those for whom nonhuman are kin.  
 
Indigenous	criticisms	of	rights	discourse	
There are elements to the UDHR that make it ontologically inaccessible to some peoples 
(see, for instance, an extensive critique in Caney, 2000). This Universal Declaration can be 
found wanting because it privileges a particularly Western ontology, one in which human is 
dominant and the nonhuman a resource for human consumption and capital accumulation. 
Like Caney, I do not think HR irredeemably excludes ontological diversity. In this chapter and 
the next two, some of the assumptions that underscore HR are assessed and challenged. 
Chapters 7 and 8 then discuss how the ontologies may be reconciled.  
 
Drawing from the past three chapters, at issue are the focus on the individual, not collectives 
or peoples, privilege of individual ownership of property, separation of the human body from 
the earth (to paraphrase Moreton-Robinson (2015)) and lack of provision for a distinct 
pathway for Indigenous Peoples in settler states (or any state in which they are the minority 
population) to protect their political and cultural autonomy and interests. In part to redress this 
imbalance, UNDRIP specifically protects those and other rights for Indigenous Peoples.  
 
UNDRIP	 	
The Annex to UNDRIP affirms, in a move away from universalism ‘…that Indigenous people 
are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to 
consider themselves different, and to be respected as such’. Moreover, it proceeds to affirm 
that any ‘doctrines, policies and practices’ that advocate an individual or people are in 
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anyway—‘national origin, racial, religious, ethnic or cultural’—superior to another are ‘racist, 
scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust’. The Annex is 
then suggesting the rights structure is sufficiently flexible to accommodate these differences 
and moreover, there is a moral duty to make that accommodation. The question is, is it 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate intertwined more-than-human ontology and collective 
identity? 
 
We can look to Article 1, which deals with collective identity by simply asserting it as a right,109 
or Article 8 that protects cultural integrity.110 Article 13.1 protects ‘… the right to revitalize, 
use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, 
philosophies, writing systems and literatures …’. Using the language and frameworks familiar 
the HR tradition, collectivist peoples have, therefore, asserted a collectivist ontological 
foundation for the UNDRIP. Put another way, UNDRIP subverts the individualist approach, 
and Indigenous Peoples reworked the framework to fit their needs.  
  
Furthermore, and importantly, I suggest that implicit in Article 25 is a right for nonhuman 
inclusion in community where it fits a given cultural frame. If, as Article 25 states,  
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, 
territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their 
responsibilities to future generations in this regard,  
it seems reasonable to posit, where those relationships entangle with nonhuman, those 
relationships are also protected as a right by this clause.  
 
Finally, UNDRIP asserts Indigenous Peoples’ right to promote their own Law structures, 
protecting them under the conditions of Article 34.111 Indigenous Peoples have, it says, the 
                                                
109 Article 1 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 4 and international human rights law. 
110 Article 8 
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of 
their culture. 
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: 
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural 
values or ethnic identities; 
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; 
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; 
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; 
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. 
111 Article 34 
Indigenous Peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their 
distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical 
systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards. 
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‘… right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive 
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, 
juridical systems or customs’. Contrary to the settler state foundation myths, Indigenous 
Peoples had codes and laws through which they managed their societies. Those laws are not 
forgotten. Moreover, they can and do have different foundations to those of the 
Anglo-tradition of the settler states. 
 
Australian Aboriginal peoples’ Law is based in a long, continuous association with country. It 
grows out of the interrelations between country and human. This is in direct contrast with 
Western law which is a prescriptive set of rules governing relations between people (Watson, 
1998).  
The land, and how we treat it, is what determines our human-ness’, says Mary Graham. 
‘Because land is sacred and must be looked after, the relation between people and land 
becomes the template for society and social relations. Therefore all meaning comes from 
the land. (M. Graham, 1999: 106) 
 
Article 25 and 34 of UNDRIP, in upholding protections to land, procedures and practices, are 
advancing a right to maintain and practice Aboriginal Law, and relationships with country.  
 
Rights	as	foundation	of	intergenerational	justice	
These Declarations, and the later Millennium Goals and Sustainable Development Goals 
(based in the CA, another expression of the HR approach to justice as discussed previously), 
harness the concepts embedded in HR discourse. They contain agreements to promote 
environmental protection, and intergenerational and Indigenous wellbeing and dignity. 
However, they do not articulate the philosophical grounding for the rights framework to 
underscore their normative validity. That work is done by political philosophers. It would seem 
to be a particularly egregious oversight if those normative theories were unable to 
accommodate the rights of Indigenous Peoples as articulated in their most fundamental form 
in UNDRIP. If the theory supporting UNDRIP and other implementation mechanisms cannot 
accommodate Indigenous rights, if it denies Indigenous people access to their real relations 
with country, with ancestors and nonhuman beings over time—access to IEJ—then theory is 
at risk of exacerbating colonial wrongs. 
 
Climate change has, arguably, focussed the minds of Western political theorists on the issue 
of IJ—its effects so long-lived that previous intuitions about IJ obligations are stretched 
beyond their earlier boundaries. Cognisance of these long-term harms has prompted justice 
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theorists such as Derek Bell, Simon Caney, Tim Hayward, Lukas Meyer and Henry Shue, to 
use rights to promote climate change justice and by extension IEJ. Essentially, they each 
argue equality and dignity, guaranteed and protected by the UDHR, are not temporally 
contingent. If it is sufficient that living human beings have protected rights, those same rights, 
and their concomitant obligations and duties can be attached to future persons, qua human 
beings (Caney, 2008; Hayward, 2007). This is, however, a contested claim. 
 
Ruth Macklin and Axel Gosseries, for instance, claim HR belong to the living alone, that right 
bearers must live contemporaneously with those on whom the obligations and duties of rights 
fall, and the rights can exist only at the same time as a person exists (see Bell, 2011: 105). 
This is a claim that meshes with the non-identity problem. The fundamental argument is, 
rights may be assigned only to those we can identify, not to unidentified, abstract potential 
human beings. Such arguments fly in the face of the rights provisions in Clause 1, and 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 1 and Clause 39 of the Rio Declaration 
and Articles 13 and 25 of UNDRIP. They each specifically extends rights to future 
generations. Enshrined in international Declarations, these rights to future generations have 
normative weight. That is, the Declarations indicate that ‘X has interests which are sufficiently 
weighty to impose obligations on others’ where X, in this case, is future generations. This 
brings us back to the question: how are these rights justified? 
 
Those who claim future generations have a right to the benefits of a similar-to-Holocene 
stable climate will then assign to current generations duties to protect that right. Caney, for 
example, posits present and future generations of ‘persons have fundamental interests in 
health, subsistence and supporting themselves and … the duty to protect these interests from 
dangerous climate change is not unreasonably demanding on the appropriate would-be duty 
bearers’ (Caney, 2008: 539). He specifically denies that the discount rate as used in the 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (which ‘discounts’ the comparative value of future goods) can be 
applied to rights.112 The right inheres, he claims, to the interests of those concerned, to the 
person, not to the temporality of that interest bearer. Moreover, Caney argues the ‘rights of a 
person in the twenty-first century have the same moral standing as the rights of a person in 
the twenty-third century’ (ibid.: 540). The important argument for temporal continuity of rights, 
is on Caney’s account, that if persons have rights not to suffer the ill effects of climate change 
                                                
112 Cost-Benefit Analysis and discount rates will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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in the present, so too do future persons. The right’s ‘moral importance does not diminish over 
time’ (ibid: 551). 
 
Derek Bell takes these future rights claims one step further by asserting:  
… all human rights-based duties are current duties grounded in the future rights of 
persons living in the future (even if it is the very near or immediate future). We are 
duty-bound not to act so that a person living in the future will have one of their human 
rights violated as a consequence of our actions. … Duties come temporally before human 
rights because actions come temporally before their effects. Human rights come 
normatively ‘before’ (i.e., they justify) duties because effects on human interests come 
normatively ‘before’ (i.e., they justify) restrictions on actions that cause those effects. 
(Bell, 2011: 107-8) 
 
The argument here is that we may make claims on behalf of those people who will inhabit the 
future because every rights claim precedes the implementation of the duties and obligations 
attached to it. There is no moral difference in whether the effects are apprehended five 
minutes or five hundred years later. The duty to uphold HR is always projected future-ward 
beyond its formulation. In the context of IEJ, this means where we know our actions will 
cause harms either immediately or into the future, we have a duty not to take those actions. 
We have that duty because future people will be human and humans have rights qua humans 
no matter when they live. As future persons will be human they have rights, rights that uphold 
human dignity and flourishing. This imposes preceding duties and obligations to act to protect 
those rights.  
 
Bell claims there are threshold human rights, thresholds that describe the bare minimum 
entitlements necessary for a life of dignity. Our acts (active or of omission) violate a right 
when they cause a person ‘to fall below that threshold’ (ibid.: 109). So if, for instance, we 
jeopardise a person’s access to a threshold level of subsistence, no matter when they live or 
when the act is committed their right to subsistence has been violated.113 Neither the act nor 
duty is identity dependent. ‘Current persons’, Bell says ‘have a duty not to undertake actions 
that will violate the rights of the actual future persons who will exist’ and, addressing the 
non-identity problem, he continues, ‘even if those particular future persons would not have 
existed but for those very actions’ (ibid.: 110). If a person is worse off at any time as a result of 
an action, they have been harmed.  
 
                                                
113 The right to subsistence is designated by Shue and Caney as a ‘basic human right’. (Shue, 1980; Caney, 
2011). 
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Similarly, Simon Caney makes the case that future persons have basic rights—1) the ‘human 
right to life’, 2) the ‘right to health’, and 3) the ‘right to subsistence’ (Caney, 2015: Section 
1.2). Each is threatened he argues by climate change. By extrapolation, on a more localised 
scale so, too, do pollution of waterways and aquifers, soil erosion, species loss, air pollution, 
etc. That is, while Caney’s focus is on climate change, it is possible to extend his thesis to 
address any infringement or impact on the environment that undermines rights to life, health 
and subsistence. So on this account, we see that an environment conducive to human well 
being can be interpreted as contributing positively to the ‘weighty interests’ of life, health and 
subsistence. Concomitantly, there is a duty on the living to ensure the environment remains 
clean enough to support such weighty interests, now and into the future.  
 
Indigenous	rights	
Within this rights structure, however, the environment per se is protected only in so far as it 
supports (individual) human flourishing. ‘Life’ has a narrow definition. Communities, including 
ancestors, the past, and the environment (animate and inanimate) are not specifically 
afforded weighty interests. This is consistent with UDHR and the Stockholm Declaration. 
However, under the terms of UNDRIP Indigenous Peoples philosophies, and relationships 
with nonhuman must be protected (see, for instance, UNDRIP Articles 1, 8, 12, 25). These 
protections are a matter of Indigenous rights.  
 
Duncan Ivison specifically examines the normatively of the ‘logic of aboriginal rights’ (Ivison, 
2000; 2003). Specifically, he asks (with Paul Patton and Will Saunders),  
[i]f contemporary liberal political thought presents itself as a universal idiom for 
understanding and reflecting upon social and political relations, where does this leave 
Indigenous political thought and Indigenous understandings of their rights to land, culture 
and self-rule? (Ivison, 2000: 1) 
 
The ‘universal idiom’ of the rights discourse remains bound within the liberal ontology, as the 
discussion above on the use of rights to protect future generations demonstrates. Indigenous 
political thought that arises from listening to country, that is generated in dialogue with 
country, and the culture that is embedded within it is left out in the cold.  
 
The nature of the unique qualities of Indigenous rights was examined in Chapter 2. Drawing 
on Ivison the argument ran that Indigenous peoples’ ‘rights stem from their own collective 
lives, self-understandings, political philosophies and practices. And they are justified in light 
of them’ (Ivison, 2003: 321).  
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These rights form a foundation for supporting (often minority) Indigenous interests within 
liberal democracies. Their function is to support freedoms, wellbeing, and dignity. Within 
Indigenous rights theory runs a thread of claims linking to culturally specific philosophy, 
ontology, epistemology, and belief systems.  
 
Ivison suggests that accommodating Indigenous rights ‘will probably mean tolerating various 
departures from liberal norms’ (Ivison, 2003: 336), and ‘aboriginal rights are usually 
conceived as coexisting with those of the Crown, as opposed to being mutually exclusive’ 
(Ivison, 2003: 336). 
 
If we take as a possible normative foundation for IEJ the claim ‘X has interests which are 
sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on others’ we can then claim where X is future 
generations and weighty interests are such things as life, health and subsistence, the living 
have obligations to protect future generations from environmental damage that threatens 
their weighty interests. Moreover, we have a basis also for the obligations to Indigenous 
justice where weighty interests include the right to maintain ‘customs, spirituality, traditions, 
procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs’ 
(UNDRIP Article 34).  
 
Aboriginal	philosophy	as	foundation	for	rights	
If as Irene Watson, Mary Graham and others claim, Law comes from country—from the 
totality of all-there-is—then country has normative force. In the context of Aboriginal Law 
then, where ’X’ equals ‘country’ we can say ‘Country has interests which are sufficiently 
weighty to impose obligations on others’. Or to paraphrase ‘[country has a right] not to suffer 
from [pollution and damage] which jeopardises these interests’ (Caney, 2008: 537). This then 
grants intrinsic rights to country, all it contains, and all the entangled relationships the concept 
country incorporates.  
 
There are a number of instruments already operationalised to embed this sense that ‘country’ 
has weighty enough interests to place obligations and duties on people to protect them. The 
weighty interests include such things as life, wellbeing, and ongoing integrity. Protection 
mechanisms include the UDRME, the Ecuadorian Constitution, Bolivia’s Rights of Mother 
Earth Act and the personhood mechanism used in Aotearoa and India. Additionally, the Swiss 
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Constitution protects living things’ dignity, and both Mongolia and Bhutan place constitutional 
obligations on citizens to live in harmony with more-than-human. 
 
Not only do these instruments protect an absolute non-fungible value in nature and the 
entangled dependence of human in nonhuman, they are forward-looking. The environment’s 
right to ‘health’ in each case places obligations on humans. While Chapter 8 examines the 
foundation of the Rights for Mother Nature/Earth discourse and instruments, what is relevant 
here is that they extend rights beyond human rights, establish nonhuman weighty interests, 
and extend the rights into the future and to protect those interests establish sets of obligations 
and duties on human behaviour. In other words, it is possible to stretch the Western 
conception of rights, one that recognises only individual humans, to encompass ontologies 
with very different understandings of an entangled human-nonhuman realm.  
Where	to	put	radio-active	waste?	 	
We have an obligation and a mandate to care for and nurture all things for the benefit of 
future generations still coming. We have an obligation to pass on country to the future. 
We cannot enter agreements that would destroy life and ruwe. Proposals to develop 
nuclear waste dumps, or to construct mines that will pollute the natural world, are 
artefacts of muldarbi deals. (Watson, 2015: 161) 
 
With this background in Aboriginal philosophy and practice and HR discourse in mind, I turn 
to something of an intractable political problem for Australia’s Federal Government, and two 
Aboriginal clan groups. Over the next few pages, colonial understanding of ‘property’s 
inescapable embeddedness in social relations’ (Meyer, 2015: 116) finds resolute resistance 
in Aboriginal ways of being in and with country. The aim, here, is to examine how and if a fully 
implemented rights framework could scaffold IEJ in these communities—all the while 
remembering while Australia has no Bill of Rights the exercise is entirely hypothetical.  
 
Australia’s former Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, has spent twenty-five years trying to 
convince the nation to create a nuclear waste dump in remote Australia (See for instance, 
Butler & Compagnoni, 2016; Kinninment, 2016). This would, he claims, solve two problems. 
Firstly, global nuclear waste could be ‘safely’ stored out of sight and well away from densely 
populated areas. His vision is for the waste to be shipped to Australia in secure containers. 
Then, along with Australia’s own nuclear waste, it would be transported overland to remote 
areas with a geology suited to underground storage. There the waste would remain 
underground and radioactive for millennia. Secondly, the Aboriginal people of the area would 
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receive financial compensation for the use of their land. Australia’s Aboriginal people have an 
asset in land that they have difficulty capitalising on because it is held in common, under 
Native Title provisions, not in fee simple title. Aboriginal people, especially those in remote 
communities, are also some of the poorest in the nation, with inadequate housing, poor 
medical and educational facilities, and limited employment opportunities. If the nuclear waste 
was to be stored on their land, they could be beneficiaries of the world’s willingness to pay for 
that storage. Hawke is perplexed that Aboriginal people reject the proposal. Still not to be 
rebuffed, exhibiting the tenacity that made him a leader, again and again he has repeated the 
refrain. It is he says a perfect solution to two wicked problems.  
 
His perturbation is not unusual, and is explained away in ‘mainstream’ Australia the following 
way: ‘When Indigenous peoples resist ‘development projects’ like mining they are 
represented as being child-like or innocent of the real world, unable to comprehend the 
benefits and logic of the development, even irrational,’ however as Watson goes on to 
explain, ‘such a view illustrates a ceaseless and continuing global colonialism’ (Watson, 
2015: 97). That Hawke, a left-of-centre politician, has prosecuted this cause for twenty-five 
years without fully apprehending the reasons for Aboriginal Australian’s resistance 
demonstrates the depth of ongoing colonial rejection of Aboriginal being. For Hawke land is 
geological structures, topography, cadastral coordinates and income generating resource. He 
is steadfastly unwilling to view it otherwise: to do so may seem ‘irrational’ or ‘childlike’. 
However, Hawke is not alone in pursuing this cause.  
 
Along the populated margins of the Australian continent stores of radio-active waste from 
medical and scientific laboratories are mounting up, stored above ground in temporary 
facilities in densely populated areas. Additionally, the Australian government are contractually 
obliged to take responsibility for a ship-load of spent uranium from overseas facilities, part of 
an earlier agreement to receive the spent material back from sales of Australia uranium.114 
What successive Commonwealth governments (both progressive and conservative) want, 
and have legislated for, is to build a large, long-term nuclear waste dump on and in isolated, 
stable land far from the centres of concentrated population. They’ve met with the same 
resistance Hawke experienced.  
 
                                                
114 Specifically spent nuclear fuel rods due to be returned from reprocessing in France and Scotland from 
mid-2015. (see http://beyondnuclearinitiative.com/issues/muckaty/ accessed 21 April 2017) 
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Muckaty	Station—radio-active	nightmare	
Muckaty Station in the far north-west of the country, the traditional country of the Warumungu 
people, was nominated as the ideal site in 2007 (beyondnuclear, 2010). Meeting the essential 
criteria—stable landmass, sparse population, far from population centres—the site was 
nominated by the Northern Land Council (NLC).115 The process, some Native Title holders of 
the Muckaty Station claimed, was secretive—there was no public consultation.116 NLC relied 
on geologists and anthropologists to validate their choice. As one Native Title holder 
expressed it:  
The NLC mob didn’t come round to ask all the men “You mob come out and have a look 
around”, nothing for that. (beyondnuclear, 2010: 5:54 minutes) 
 
The Federal Government Minister responsible for finding a site at that time, Martin 
Fergusson, was roundly criticised. Criticism was specifically directed towards him for his role 
in limiting relevant State and Territory laws, suspending environment and Aboriginal Heritage 
Laws and negating the need for site nominations to have the consent of Traditional Owners. 
Importantly, he also declined community invitations to meet with them ‘on country’, unwilling 
to face the discomfort of Aboriginal opposition or as one Muckaty woman more poetically 
said: 
Fergusson sat on this issue for how long? Like an old hen waiting for an egg to hatch, he 
knew. He knew it was gonna turn out to be an ugly duckling. (beyondnuclear, 2010: 8:13 
minutes)  
 
Diane Stokes, who became a primary spokesperson for resistance to the site, was not always 
opposed to it. She had been wooed early in the piece by the government and was favourably 
disposed to the dump.117 However, discussions with family lead to her epiphany. She 
explains it this way.  
As soon as I thought to myself, am I going to have the money or have my country, my 
grandfather’s country? What am I supposed to do? Do I want to keep what I am doing 
now, saying, ‘Yes’, or say, ‘No’ to it, or do I make a full stop? [I] turned around. I started 
going against it. And I did it with a full heart. I wanted to do it because I wanted to do it for 
my people. They fought hard to get the land back. They went bush bashing around this 
                                                
115 Aust has 22 Land Councils. They are the representative body for geographically associated Aboriginal land 
holders and clan groups. See 
https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/selfdetermination/aboriginal-land-councils#axzz4m1Bnpi7J. 
116 The process was more complex than this. Sacred sites are protected under Native Title, therefore before land 
altering activities can happen there must be a survey and report commissioned to identify them. Anthropologists 
are hired as the authority for these reports. The opponents of the Muckaty nuclear dump complained that firstly the 
NLC had not come and walked with their elders to understand the songlines—describing the sites and knowledge 
associated with them—and moreover they had then kept the anthropologists’ report secret. See Muckaty Voices 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xcuNpT84Ovo.) 
117 The point to note here, as highlighted in Chapter 1, the issue is not one of wanting to remain hide-bound to the 
past. It is, rather, an issue of progress on peoples’ own terms, within their own cultural values, and in line with their 
living modern ontologies. 
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country to see the sacred sites, to see the water holes, to see the soakages. They done a 
hard job going around with bush lawyers, with anthropologists. They did the big hard work 
through the hot sun, through the winter. Until they made it to the end to get their land 
back.  
 
So I thought, that’s a very hard job and a long job and a long journey my old people who’s 
not around to talk for their country. So I stopped and I turned around and I said, ‘OK I will 
say ‘no’ to the waste and I’ll keep pushing’, and here I am for nearly eight years, seven 
years I’m still fighting hard. (Irom, 2014: 4:00 minutes) 
 
For the protesters and speakers for the clans at Muckaty, resistance to the nuclear waste 
dump was absolutely a matter of intergenerational and environmental justice. As Diane’s 
statement above indicates, ancestors are due justice, and the land itself, for whom those 
ancestors can no longer speak, is due justice. These are recurrent themes in the discourse, 
as is the process of personally identifying ancestral connections to legitimise the right to 
speak on behalf of country. At the public meetings and throughout Muckaty Voices, speakers 
introduce themselves with such references as;  
We know where we stand and we know who we are, and we know our totems and we 
know our lines, and we know the dancing, and we know the story of the country. 
(beyondnuclear, 2010: 3:18 minutes) 
 
…my mum’s dreamtime coming through there… (beyondnuclear, 2010: 1:02 minutes) 
 
…because it’s got lot of traditional things. I travelled with my father and mother, because 
my father was a Traditional Owner for the mother’s side of the land… (beyondnuclear, 
2010: 1:15 minutes) 
 
Moreover, as the following two-person sequence shows, not only are past generations 
important, so too are future generations. 
Speaker 1 
We got our kids coming up and we’ve got to show them and learn them and then they can 
carry on.  
 
Speaker 2  
We just want our grandfather’s land to be clean all the time. (beyondnuclear, 2010: 
8:52minutes) 
  
And at a different public event, a leader for resistance stated: 
We want to take responsibility for the land. What the whole last generation did for leave 
for us. The old people have all passed away now. So it’s time for me to take responsibility 
for this land. (Irom, 2014: 5:15 minutes) 
 
This reference to ancestors establishes traditional links to country and importantly flags the 
responsibilities, obligations and duties attached to the links. Obligations that extend to the 
land itself, ancestors and future generations. Many songlines cross the area, including those 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
146 
of the Milwayi, Ngapa, Wirntiku and Ngarrka peoples.118 Having spent years negotiating title 
over these traditional lands, the clans were now called to a new fight: with the NLC; within the 
clans; between the clans; and with the Government. It is a fight they won. The point of this 
section, however, is not to put the fight under a microscope, but rather to examine the 
ontology and discourse around intergenerational and environmental issues and consider 
whether a rights-based theory is capable of generating IIEJ for the people of the Milwayi, 
Ngapa, Wirntiku and Ngarrka clans, and other Aboriginal clans.  
 
Are the HR based theories of IEJ (taking the application of HR theory to climate change as 
the proxy for IEJ more broadly) capable of expressing those ways of knowing and being in 
the world? On the basis of a rights structure that states ‘X has interests which are sufficiently 
weighty to impose obligations on others’ the previous section suggested where X is future 
generations and weighty interests are such things as life, health and subsistence, the living 
have obligations to protect future generations from environmental damage that threatens 
those interests. Moreover, obligations to Indigenous justice are deemed sufficiently weighty to 
include the right to maintain ‘customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the 
cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs’, as protected in UNDRIP. 
 
Earlier I suggested that the representation of country is something more than three 
dimensional. Within the Muckaty protest video, there is a discussion over disputed claims to 
the area the dump site will cover. The invitation to settle the dispute takes the following form: 
…But the only way we can do this now is by challenging them for this dance. Whose land 
goes through here like ceremony, who’s dreaming goes through here? And then we 
corroboree, you know, to show the mark and the respect and it respect us too.  
 
Aboriginal people, we got that land, that country in our hearts and in our minds and in our 
soul. And the knowledge of it inside us. Aboriginal people have it up here all the time 
(pointing to his head). (beyondnuclear, 2010: 6:20 minutes)  
 
And, again, the connections to the land and the country’s own agency are highlighted: 
We survived through that country and we want the country to survive itself.  
And we want to be very strong to say that and we want to support each other and be very 
strong. (beyondnuclear, 2010: 9:19 minutes) 
 
The land, territory, features, creation stories, ancestors, attached history, and co-relationships 
are represented, ‘mapped’, in form and through dance and song. To prove a claim a 
dance/song corroborates the claim to belong to country. This portrait of country is 
                                                
118 Songline is an English descriptor for the oral record and recounting techniques Aboriginal people use to 
describe and delimitate territory, history, cosmology, routes, landscape features, water sources, etc. 
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multi-dimensional, multi-layered, multi-representational and, although not mentioned in the 
quotation above, multi-temporal. Importantly from a legal perspective, it indicates more than 
one group can lay claim to an interest—‘title’—over a site. Muckaty represents a complex of 
non-exclusive claims, in which land is mapped and negotiated in dance, song and finally 
negotiations require corroboree until agreement is reached. Quite unlike the Western 
understanding of a property right, the Aboriginal approach is based in continuous being, not 
dominance, cycles, not linearity (Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 36). So a rights-based justice must 
be able to respect this multi-dimensional understanding of more-than-human and the 
non-exclusive claims to traditional relationships with country in a manner that circumvents the 
liberal reliance on ‘ownership’ structures of an objectified land.  
 
Decolonising	HR:	weighty	interests	for	Country	
Can an HR-based system of justice account for the independent agency of country? Simon 
Caney has made a powerful case for including future persons’ right to a clean environment 
within the HR structure. He argues future generations are entitled to an environment that is at 
least protected in as good a state as it was received by the living. He substantiates this claim 
firstly in moral standing. Moral standing, on Caney’s account, does not diminish by virtue of 
when a human exists. Secondly, such an environment is an essential precondition for the 
rights to life, health, and subsistence. However, he theorises on behalf of individual future 
persons. The HR structure is designed to protect individual interests. Caney’s interpretation 
of HR structure is challenged by the intergenerational, interspecies, whole-of-nature 
communitarianism and philosophies of Aboriginal people. The theories of Caney, Bell, etc., 
instrumentalise the environment, as do the Stockholm, Rio and Rio+20 Declarations. For 
instance, the Rio Declaration states; ‘Human beings are at the centre of concerns for 
sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature’ (Principle 1). The obligation to reduce carbon emissions and other pollutants rests in 
the right of humans to life, health and subsistence. It is not extended to a right to life, health 
and subsistence of the environment per se.  
 
The Warumungu people have demonstrated they have weighty interests that bring with them 
obligations and duties that under the terms of UNDRIP the government is required to protect. 
They have interests to uphold their lifeways, culture, traditions, and that which they hold 
sacred. These are weighty interests in that they constitute that which it is that makes them 
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human. They are the interests that define them as human beings. These are though human 
interests. That is the rights are offered within the Western ontology. They are valid where they 
protect human interests. However, I think that is insufficient to scaffold a truly Indigenous IEJ. 
Such a validation, if it is all that applies maintains a Western lens. 
 
If we apply a structure that says only that Warumungu people have weighty interests, the risk 
is that once again ‘solutions’ to the ‘Aboriginal problem’ wrap them into the Western 
discourse, based in the liberal ontology in which HR theory is immersed. While this may lead 
to a ‘just’ outcome as with this Muckaty case, it does so via the court system, another colonial 
structure as we saw in Chapter 4 premised on Western ontologies. That is, they had to 
prosecute their rights in the language, structure and ontology of the West. Their country was 
unable to talk for or represent itself. That is, country within the system has no rights. The 
obligations for country cannot be contested in a court if the court does not recognise county’s 
subjective rights.  
 
However, legislative instruments have been engaged around the world to formally extend that 
right to the environment. In Aotearoa, Te Awa Tupua (a river system) and Te Urewera (a 
forested range complex) are legal persons, ‘with the full capacity a legal person’ (New 
Zealand Government, n.d.: 13). As a legal person, like other ‘legal persons’ (ships, 
corporations, etc.) rights of personhood include a continuing interest in a ‘species’ specific 
life, health and subsistence. However, these acts go further by including the attribution of 
mauri and mana. These are spiritual elements of being which apportion life force and 
standing to all things. These Acts, then, have moved beyond the instrumental, and assigned 
interests to life, health and subsistence to the regions per se. That is in Australian Aboriginal 
terms, country is recognised in Aotearoa as subject—at least in these two areas. And, as 
mentioned earlier, India has employed the same ‘personhood’ mechanism to recognise the 
sacred Ganges, other rivers, areas of the Himalaya and including the air.  
 
Similarly, the three Rights of Mother Earth/Nature instruments, UDRME, Ecuador’s 
Constitution and Bolivia’s Right’s for Mother Nature law, have assigned rights beyond human 
interests alone (Bolivia, 2012; Ecuador, 2008). The interests of non-human protected by 
these instruments are substantial, and more than simply a reflection of something of benefit 
to humans. In other words, the weightiness lies with the environment, rather than with a 
human right to a clean environment. For instance, Bolivia’s Law of Mother Earth states in 
Article 1, ‘This Act is intended to recognize the rights of Mother Earth, as well as the 
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obligations and duties of the Plurinational State and of the society to ensure respect for these 
rights’ (Bolivia, 2012). The HR structure has been employed to recognise that ‘Mother Earth 
has interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on others’.  
 
In Australia, no such mechanism exists. The political and judicial systems encountered by the 
Warumungu fail to acknowledge Aboriginal as cultured people, with philosophies, traditions, 
Law, duties and obligations under their own culture. That is there is no mechanism for 
recognising ‘X’ as Aboriginal cultural obligations. The government and court system do not 
acknowledge Warumungu responsibilities to navigate not only Warumungu cultural 
obligations but also the additional and separate duties and obligations to the imported law 
and customs of the current settler state apparatus. 
Discussion	
Justice demands that not only the ends are right, but so too the means. If that is the case, 
then what is required is a justice framework scaffolded by Indigenous ontologies. These 
ontologies must be ‘knowable’. Until they are, like Apanui and Māori in general, the Aboriginal 
Australians live within the fracture zone of two competing governance systems. Indeed, even 
although the end has been successful for Warumungu, without reference to a justice 
framework steeped in Indigenous ontologies, the Commonwealth Government of Australia 
has subsequently nominated a new site in South Australia on land ‘owned’ in fee simple title 
by a non-Aboriginal Australian. This has plunged the Adnyamathanha people into the mirror 
image of the Muckaty fight. Even if Australia had a Bill of Rights, unless it included specifically 
Aboriginal ontologies, Aboriginal peoples’ lifeways, philosophy, and Law would remain 
systemically unknowable (Dotson & Whyte, 2013) within the administrative system.  
 
As the chapters have unfolded here, three key themes have been developed that, it is 
argued, must be addressed for justice theory to meet Aboriginal and Māori on their own 
terms. To decolonise, to be just, the theory must not require that Aboriginal and Māori 
conform to Western ontologies if they are to seek and receive intergenerationally or 
environmentally just outcomes. Within the settler states examined here, it is argued it is the 
settler theory that must make the adjustment to achieve a just outcome for the First People. 
To continue to apply a liberal philosophic and political framework is to continue the colonial 
hegemony. It is to continue the injustice of forced assimilation. It continues the pattern of 
violence, domination, repression and invalidation of alternatives to Western ways of being.  
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The three themes include firstly, a more-than-material concern for nonhuman and obligations 
to pass healthy territories to future generations, as conceived by kaitiakitanga. Secondly, the 
exploration of kanyini demonstrated a belief that strong communities are necessary for 
individuals to flourish, as opposed to the liberal claim that community strength derives from a 
state of individualism. And finally, in this chapter the concept of country as a living, 
communicating being, a source of Law and knowledge, a companion to human, of whom 
human is one extension, and to which human-of-that-country have never-ending and deep 
intergenerational obligations and duties has been explored. 
 
The questions to be addressed in the next two chapters related to how the environment’s 
self-interest can be validated. In what, beyond a simple human speech act, can it be 
grounded? On what philosophical basis is environment afforded weighty interests that 
compel the powerful, profit-seeking, individualised human, to weigh nonhuman interests 
equally and equitably against her/his own?  
Woman’s voice 
In our land, our connection is only traditional things, gathering food and all that and doing 
traditional dances.  
We don’t believe on that [nuclear waste] because it’s poison. You can’t give your country 
away for money. (beyondnuclear, 2010: 9:40minutes) 
 
What will support this woman’s claim?   
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Section	3	New	Blueprints	
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Chapter	7:	Walking	Backwards	into	the	
Future	–	something	more	than	now	
 
The Fly, the dragon fly, and the bee that we observe flying next to us on a sunny day do 
not move in the same world as the one on which we observe them, nor do they share with 
us—or with each other—the same time and the same space.  
(Agamben, 2004) 
 
Whakangarongaro he tangata 
Toitu he whenua 
Time passes but land endures 
 
The idea of time silently, even subliminally, underscores the idea of IJ. Generations live in and 
at different time(s). Paradoxically perhaps, scholars of IJ don’t examine time itself. Indeed, 
Love and Tilley suggest ‘[c]hronologically, temporality may be the most taken-for-granted 
Western social discourse’ (Love & Tilley, 2013). The ontological assumption is time moves 
forward, the philosophy and politics of IJ, and IEJ exist in the now and look to the future. In 
Western imagination time’s arrow describes a progressive arc. A commodity to be lost, used 
wisely, but never to be wasted, time is measured by sun and moon, by light years and parts of 
seconds. It is something that elusively stands still, drags, flies and repeats itself. It’s deep and 
fleeting, dark and illuminating. And yet, this understanding of time is not universal, as has 
been constantly alluded to in the previous chapters. Here and in the following chapter, I will 
be delving more deeply into two foundational aspects of Aboriginal and Māori 
worldviews—focusing on Māori ontology, and including Aboriginal similarities. Until now the 
chapters have, from a Māori or Aboriginal perspective, artificially separated human from 
nonhuman, and past, present, and future. In the next two chapters the entanglements from 
which these antipodean ontologies grow is given greater attention, firstly by focussing on 
time, and then, in Chapter 8, looking at the idea of dignity. Critically, this chapter turns to how 
this natural ‘thing’, time, is constructed, and then, how our view of time can alter our view of 
IEJ. Engaging with the Aotearoa identities Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera, I imagine time 
from within these identities’ own ontologies and examine how that might generate potential 
and applied value for IEJ. If the Western ontology of time shapes our view of IEJ, the 
fundamental question here is, Have IEJ theories been colonised by a hegemony of 
mechanistic and purely linear time?  
 
In the twenty-first century, when the academy and civic society raise questions of IEJ, it is 
most frequently in contexts of environmental justice, environmentalism, climate change and 
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the Anthropocene (see for instance Caney, 2008; de-Shalit, 1995; Gardiner, 2011a; Page, 
2007a; Parfit, 2011; Stern, 2007). Politically IJ is harnessed to justify budget constraints.119 In 
times past IEJ, focusing on issues of distributive justice, sought to protect the living from 
overly benefitting their heirs—creating structures to ensure too much was not gifted to future 
generations at undue cost to the gifters (Caney, 2005; Gardiner, 2011a). Cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA), the economic expression of this distributive (and often utilitarian) approach, 
and ubiquitous measure of the worth of government spending, contentiously discounts future 
costs—generally limited to near future (100-150 years).120 Given the environmental impacts 
of current policy and investment decisions will continue into the deep future this seems to 
unfairly skew benefits to the living and disadvantage future generations (see for instance, 
(Caney, 2008; Nordhaus, 2008; Page, 2007b; Parfit, 1984; Stern, 2007; 2009b). Poisons and 
pollution, deforestation and over fishing, climate change and nuclear waste reverse the onus: 
concern now is focussed on limiting (quite possibly existential) harms to many future 
generations.  
 
While there are many theorists of IJ it is the philosopher Derek Parfit who has, arguably, 
identified the most perplexing hurdle for theorists to jump (Heyd, 2014). Parfit’s reasoning is 
pragmatically important too: the non-identity problem is a powerful (almost mesmerising 
given its recurrent referencing) philosophical expression of political paralysis on issues of IEJ. 
That is, the non-identity problem strongly justifies political privileging of the present. Since he 
described the problem (Parfit, 1984, see pp 351-379) many theorists have addressed the 
challenges it identifies. Some acknowledge it (sometimes obliquely) and set it aside e.g. (Ball, 
1985; Bell, 2011), others work beyond its individualist and contractual confines e.g. 
(de-Shalit, 1995; Hiskes, 2005; 2009). Others have even wrapped it within descriptions of 
paradigmatic moral corruption (Gardiner, 2011a). None, however, have critiqued, as far as I 
am aware, his covert conceptualisation of uni-directional time.121 It is an assumed norm 
(Love & Tilley: 2013).  
 
The following chapter first reviews how CBA deals with time, followed by time-relevant 
reflections on the non-identity problem. It is against the CBA and the West’s burdensome 
                                                
119 See for instance the Australian Government’s 2015 Intergenerational Report at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/2015-Intergenerational-Report. 
120 I note also the time is an essential unit in capitalism, measuring as it does one component of the value of an 
individual’s input to production, revenue, profits and ultimately individual worth to the corporate and nation. 
121 I’m not talking here of space-time in the Einsteinian sense, but rather of a cultural perception of time (or times) 
and the way it is used in politics, philosophy and personal life. In this sense of time as past present future rather 
than as minutes and seconds. 
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hegemonic time this piece pushes. Next, an examination of the question: What happens to 
our imaginings of decolonial IEJ if we think, within an indigenous ontology, of generations 
living not in competitive sequences, but as living synchronically? This is done through 
personal reflection and an examination of time from the perspectives of the Whanganui 
River-Te Awa Tupua and the Te Urewera. Finally, the potentiality for IEJ theory based in an 
ontology where there is no ‘competitive historical progress’ (Muecke, 2004: 8:), one in which 
ancestors, the living, and future generations are part of a recurrent spiral or circle of time and 
being-in-place is examined.122 
 
Accounting	for	Collective	Future	Goods	 	
The focus of governmental and political discussion most often concentrates on national 
economic performance; it is a primary measure of government effectiveness. Formulations of 
public policy stress the economic benefits of projects: the numbers of jobs created, the 
revenues generated, the financial value to the community. In Australia, for instance, the 
Australian Treasury Department, on behalf of the Federal Government, is required to publish 
an intergenerational report every five years.123 These focus closely and almost exclusively on 
economic benefits. Where the environment and climate change may be mentioned (and their 
prominence varies markedly report to report) the value of the nonhuman is inevitably couched 
in economic terms. The tool used to make calculations about the value of government 
spending projects is the CBA. What is important here, is that the CBA moves beyond the 
individualism we examined in the last chapter: it is a tool for deciding the collective good to 
society of political policy and projects.  
 
It is uncontroversial to expect that those who spend others’ money—like governments—must 
be accountable for that spending. The CBA as a tool is used to calculate and express the 
value of any particular project and to assess ‘society’s ‘willingness to pay’ for it’ (Stern, 2009b: 
80). Put simply, the CBA compares the project’s costs with the perceived future value of the 
benefits, the sum total of social welfare. This becomes problematic for IEJ when the costs to 
the living are eventually calculated to be too great compared with the benefits current 
                                                
122 Meucke was using this expression to discuss the possibility of cultures living synchronously, identifying that 
Indigenous cultures are and were already always ‘modern’: they exist in the present, in ‘modern time. His 
argument relates more to place than time, however I adopt the phrase here as it speaks effectively to the context 
of the discussion to come. 
123 See the Australian Government website at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/2015-Intergenerational-Report. 
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sacrifices will bring far future people. The CBA can be effective when the projected period 
over which the benefits will accrue is close to the present because the future value can be 
reasonably reliably calculated. However, there are two significant issues. The first is that the 
calculation includes a ‘discount rate’ for the future, based on two key and problematic 
assumptions. The first is that people and communities will be better off in the future, and 
therefore that a dollar in today’s terms will be worth less to them (Stern, 2007; 2009b). 
Second, it is assumed that people always value that which happens in the near term more 
highly than that which happens later (Parfit, 1984). With regard to the first assumption, the 
understanding is that the further into the future, the greater the accumulated wealth will be. 
The further ‘forward’ the projection the higher the relative cost to the living; therefore, 
economists apply a greater discount rate the further into the future the plan extends. This is 
problematic for IEJ when it promotes a discount, or inaction, on major environmental harms 
such as long-term contamination, radio-active waste disposal, or climate change.  
 
Secondly, economic theorists argue for ‘pure-time discounting’. That is, they argue that we 
should discount the future simply because it is the future (Stern, 2009b). In this view, people 
of the future, those unknown others, are not as valuable as our (known) contemporaries and 
heirs. Sir Nicholas Stern validates the use of the pure-time discount rate in his Stern Review 
of Climate Change (Stern, 2007) because the rate of current environmental damage 
threatens the very existence of future generations: we cannot, he says, have any certainty 
‘about whether future generations will exist’ (Stern, 2009b: 83). The sacrifices made in the 
present may be meaningless in the far future. 
 
Both of these arguments are reasonable (if contradictory): history does suggest future 
generations will be wealthier and ecological destruction does draw a question mark over 
humanity’s longevity. The ethical issue, the matter of justice, is immediate costs and pure 
time discounting (along with the individualism of the non-identity problem) are used to justify 
taking minimal, or worse, no action to limit environmental damages in the present.  
 
The point at which current costs are deemed valueless to future generations depends on the 
discount rate applied. Stern chose a rate of 0.1% in the Stern Review of Climate Change, 
justified only by the possibility of an (unknown) extinction event, otherwise, he contends he 
would apply no discount rate (Stern, 2007; 2010). Climate change contrarian Bjorn Lomborg, 
on the other hand, applies a rate of 5% per annum (Gardiner et al., 2010), because he argues 
the rate of climate change will be slow and technological advances (in climate engineering for 
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instance) will minimise the impact on future generations. William Nordhaus calculated a 
discount rate of 4% per annum is reasonable, a rate he has subsequently acknowledged as 
much too high (Nordhaus, 2008; 2016). At these rates, it becomes easy to suggest the costs 
to the living are simply too great to take action, particularly when damage will primarily be felt 
hundreds and thousands of years into the future (Gardiner, 2009).  
 
As Simon Caney and Steve Gardiner note, however, the CBA ignores the normative in favour 
of the numerical. It is unable to calculate the wrong of taking benefits while knowingly 
inflicting harm on (unidentified/unidentifiable) others (Caney, 2008; 2010b; Gardiner, 2009; 
2011a). Perhaps more relevant in the Indigenous IJ context, the CBA as designed explicitly 
endorses pursuit of short-term investments, ongoing growth, and resource exploitation to 
generate that growth. It is bound within the neoliberal and capitalist paradigms and applies no 
intrinsic value to future generations or nonhuman integrity.  
 
While the CBA can be an effective tool for calculating infrastructure projects like bridges and 
roads it is not a tool that can be applied on very long time scales: there are simply too many 
unknowns to make the selection of key values in the calculation meaningful (Stern, 2009b). 
Because the CBA discounts the value of future persons the best it can be is ‘a crude rule of 
thumb’ (Parfit, 1984: 486). It becomes a tool of paralysis (Gardiner, 2011a) and disadvantage 
to future generations and, as I will explore shortly, of no advantage to calculating value within 
a nonhuman ontology of time. A ubiquitous government calculus—really one of the core 
mechanisms for evaluating public policy—CBA embeds an ideology of ‘competitive historical 
progress’: the living are calculated to be competing with future generations for resources, and 
the value of those resources is calculated to be more valuable now than in the future. Simply 
put, the CBA aids governments in discounting the future, and future generations.  
 
Parfit	&	Time	 	
Parfit offers a different problem at the intersection of normative justifications for public policy 
and the issue of time and generations—that of our relationships to future relations. 
Individualism is profoundly important to Parfit’s ontology of time. Parfit’s dilemma, if I can put 
it that way, is that what we do in the present, the small actions we take—the decision to walk 
down this street not that, attend his party, not hers—will determine with whom we have a 
child. One small ‘other action’ will mean we fail to meet the person with whom that child will 
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be conceived. So in my case, if my father, an engineer, had not been moonlighting as a radio 
newsreader on the night my mother happened to play the piano for the same radio station, 
there would be no ‘me’. The coincidence of time is at the nub of Parfit’s problem of the identity 
of those to whom we owe obligations.  
 
Parfit confines his argument within the boundaries of a forward-looking time. His theory is 
bound by singular points on a continuum pitting living people in competition with future 
people. He straps contemporaries firmly to a present and engages solely with those we may 
individuate and identify. He describes a competitive sequence in which living identifiable 
individuals plunder and pollute the earth, without obligation to unidentifiable potential beings 
of time to come. This summary is, in part, unfair to Parfit, for he starts and maintains the 
enquiry from a position of intuitive disquiet: these harms feel wrong for they are or will be 
harms to persons (Parfit, 1984: 351- 379 & 480-486). And he acknowledges normative 
unease: after all, to do no harm is foundational to ethical thought. However, locked within 
Western epistemology, and because he is considering future persons only, Parfit overtly 
places time in a time-and-space-continuum forever moving forward, in which its ontological 
import exists now and later only in discrete instantiations—embodied in those we can never 
know. This non-identity problem is entirely consistent with ‘European ideas of time as linear’ 
(Love & Tilley, 2013: 174). It looks only one way.  
 
Parfit’s individualism and Avner de Shalit’s communitarian IJ were earlier tested against the 
view of self and community presented in the Anangu philosophy of kanyini. The Anangu 
understand themselves to be constituted within timeless relationships between beings, living 
and non-living, human and nonhuman, grounded and transcendent. Kanyini, and the 
principles of kaitiakitanga exist within unbounded interspecies synchronically 
intergenerational relationships. Parfit’s ontology is unable to accommodate either philosophy, 
and while engaging with intergenerational community effectively, de Shalit’s theory is 
anthropocentric, privileging humans, and placing primarily instrumental value in the 
nonhuman. It is, therefore, unable to accommodate intrinsic value in nonhuman in the way 
kanyini and kaitiakitanga demand.  
 
While a communitarian IEJ may transcend the individual, eliminating many of the 
encumbrances that individualism places on IJ, it remains true to Parfit’s forward projection of 
time. Obligations to ancestors, reflection on inheritances from ancestors, and concomitant 
obligations to pass similar inheritances forward are overlooked.  
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Two issues arise from Parfit’s anthropocentric, individualistic and forward-looking-time 
approach that are important for decolonial IEJ, both manifestations of liberal Western 
philosophy. To reiterate, the first is by giving pre-eminence to the individual as the most 
significant social unit, he ignores peoples, communities, cultures and collectives of people 
and all nonhuman entities—it is the individual human person only to whom he gives 
consideration. The second issue is Parfit’s imaginary of time moving endlessly and only 
forward. Past people and peoples are not important to his argument. His moral 
considerations engage living and far-future individual human beings, in particular, that is the 
generations with whom existing lives will not coincide. The sacrifices of former generations 
which benefit the living are not given significance, nor assessments of resulting obligations to 
continue the practice of ‘paying forward’ by beneficiaries of any historical beneficence. His 
sights are set into the near and far future of individual liberal contractarians. So too are those 
of his critics, Edward Page excepted. You might argue this reasonable because the 
conundrums of IEJ are related to the future, however, this idea of a time’s straight line, of past 
being past, lived and buried is not universal and this is critical to conceptualising decolonial 
IEJ. 
 
Edward	Page	&	Ancestors	
In contrast to Parfit, Edward Page suggests that IJ could be considered through the lens of 
reciprocity, ‘considered as either mutual advantage or fair play’ (Page, 2007a: 226). This he 
claims will assist overcome the impossibility of establishing contracts with (non-identifiable) 
future individuals, and does not require us to reduce the scope to ‘preserving the values of 
one’s community’ (ibid). To do this he gives weight to the benefit inheritances from ancestors 
places on obligations to future generations. He reflects on time past, present and future.  
 
Page is critical of the neglect of ancestors and suggests we need to consider past 
generations in our calculations. Engaging with the field of global distributive justice, 
non-identity per se is not for Page the stumbling block to IJ. The problem is one of reciprocity. 
‘If reciprocity’, he says, ‘determines the scope and content of justice, future persons have no 
claims against their ancestors’ (Page, 2007a: 232)—an objection also raised by other 
scholars (see for instance, (Kumar, 2003)). However, Page suggests we must, under 
conditions of global distributive justice, also consider that the living inherit goods from 
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previous generations. This inheritance then gives them a positive start, a platform of 
advantage from which they fashion their own benefits and goods. With this inheritance, 
argues Page, comes an obligation to also pass forward goods, goods if not identical to, at 
least as good as those inherited. That is, the reciprocal ‘thanks’ to ancestors is realised as 
‘gifts’ to future generations.  
 
In terms then of IEJ it is important that the environment is in no worse state for future 
generations than the state in which it has been inherited. In this sentiment, of course, we hear 
strong echoes of the essence of kaitiakitanga, the Māori obligation to improve the 
environment. Indeed, Page identifies his formulation of IJ as a form of intergenerational 
stewardship. For Page, the obligation, borne of ‘the idea of reciprocity as fair play’ (ibid: 226), 
is not necessarily to pass to the next generation exactly the same environment, so long as 
resources and the environment are not significantly degraded or destroyed. In this way, there 
are limits on how much one generation may help themselves to. Rather than abandoning 
reciprocity altogether, he suggests adopting a form of intergenerational stewardship where 
‘existing persons are bound by duties of indirect reciprocity to protect environmental and 
human resources for posterity in return for the benefits inherited from their ancestors’ (ibid: 
233). Page’s solution identifies human communities are continuums from ancestor to living to 
future generations ad infinitum, in which no one generation arises in a virgin void from which 
they alone create, for instance, wealth, science, knowledge, or social order, independently of 
those who can before. Lives of ease and wealth are built upon the work of earlier generations 
and depend on a climate system conducive to human flourishing, clear air and waterways, 
stable and productive soils, ample (uncontaminated) forest, fish and agricultural produce to 
sustain the number of humans on the earth.  
 
Page extends the examination of time to generations before and after the living. However, his 
solution remains, like Parfit’s, anthropocentric. Within his discussion, he ignores the 
preservation of nonhuman for nonhuman. In his representation of IEJ, the preservation and 
obligations attached to stewardship are for the benefit of future generations of human beings. 
While the net result may be the protection of nonhuman, this is a happy happenstance as it 
were. He expresses no normative obligation to nonhuman. In sharp contrast, in both 
kaitiakitanga and kanyini, there are normative obligations to nonhuman, and these obligations 
require a non-Western understanding of time. 
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Synchronic	Generations	 	
Within Māori ontological and cosmological paradigms it is impossible to conceive of the 
present and future as separate and distinct from the past, for the past is constitutive of the 
present and, as such, is inherently reconstituted within the future. 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 42) 
  
Returning to Parfit—who identified that IJ is extremely hard to theorise from within a 
contractual individualist paradigm even when the theorist is intuitively favourably disposed to 
protecting future generations from environmental harms. His argument is that it is significant 
that my father met my mother. For that is why I am. Without that synchronicity, I would not be. 
And while that is now a matter of history, such synchronicity is morally significant, because it 
means we cannot predict the individual identities of future generations of people. Without 
identities, we cannot form sets of contractual obligations and duties with these unknown 
people, even though we know with some certainty, individual people will exist in the future. 
What is important to Parfit is that I am an individuated I, a stand-alone I, an I who is not an 
other I. My argument here is that a critical element of the conundrum Parfit established arises 
not only from his understanding of what it is to be human but also his understanding of time. 
 
Now let me paint another picture of who I am, one I trust will illuminate more personally 
Makere Harawira-Stewart’s representation above.  
 
I am arguing here that time is neither irrefutably a forward moving measurement of space as 
represented by science (which it is for the purposes of science but not in all forms of 
knowledge, nor for my purposes) nor an ontologically neutral concept. Consider for a moment 
this possible spiral: I have ancestors; I live now, and I have children who will (all being equal) 
continue to live when I am gone; and I will have grandchildren (all things equal), etc. While I 
am living, I am also a (potential) ancestor, and my living children were once a future 
generation to me, as are my potential grandchildren, as was I to my ancestors. In time I will 
be an ancestor as will my children and my grandchildren will be living and thinking of future 
generations. The generations are co-existing, the past is always in the present, and the future 
is always in the past.  
 
Let me express that even more personally. I will recite a very personal whakapapa. I am the 
descendant of: Polynesian Pacific explorers who settled Aotearoa New Zealand and formed 
the iwi Ngāti Kahugnunu; one of the first Royal Academicians; one of few eighteenth-century 
women to exhibit at the Royal Academy; a Royal Navy explorer, geographer and artist; 
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Scottish immigrants to Ireland whose descendants then fled to Aotearoa New Zealand; 
slave-owning cotton growers from British Guiana; a Channel Islander guard of the Tower of 
London; a WWI soldier, a WWII POW. These people, and many more besides are my 
ancestors, and I am a member of their future generation for whom they, their heirs, and their 
ancestors left known for new shores and better lives for their heirs. Simultaneously, I have a 
son and a daughter. In them live: the same ancestors; their father and his ancestors; and me. 
And they are my future generation and the potential creators of even more future 
generations. And soon I and they will be ancestors to new generations.  
 
Where I view the ‘I’ that ‘I am’ as an integral part of those who have been and will be the 
boundaries of ‘I’ dissolve, and with that boundary-blurring the import Parfit attaches to identity 
also dissolves. I am, I embody, at once: ancestors, future generation, living, and ancestor. 
Rather than a notion of time as forward moving through space it becomes instead spirally 
bound and emplaced/embodied. I am concurrently future generation, living and ancestor. My 
being and knowledge oscillate between ancient and modern, current and future.  
 
One might argue, also, the I that I am embodies additionally knowledge and ontologies 
derived from non-kin ancestors. That is, I have inherited more than just genetic material. 
Euclid and Pythagoras live on in my (sadly rusty) mathematical skills. I/we am/are direct 
heirs/beneficiaries of the discoveries of Jenner and Marie Curie. The thinking of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, Kant and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke all infiltrate my/our thoughts. Knowledge of 
plants of Aotearoa—their medicinal and nutritional values, stories of the land, an ingrained 
habituated respect for and empathy with nonhuman, these are learned from the ontologies 
and knowledge of the people with whom my ancestors and I engage, from whom we have 
descended. The I that I am is an inherited amalgam of ontologies and knowledge acquired 
both consciously and subconsciously. The creators of knowledge are at once ancestors and 
living in current thought and have the potential to continue to vibrate in the lives of future 
generations.  
 
And there is more to who I am, an even older I. For in my bones are the traces of the minerals 
drawn from the volcanic soils of Taranaki in which my father grew our fruit and vegetables. In 
my muscles memory of leaping from boulder to boulder on the wild winds driving salt, iodine, 
assorted minerals into my lungs and skin. In my skin and nerves stay the vibration of the 
sand-hills of Bell Block and the cliffs of Back Beach, the thrill of Paratutu ascents and 
descents, wild ski runs down Taranaki’s slopes. In my brain the peace of the Stoney River, of 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
162 
peripatus,124 vegetable caterpillar125 and native orchid hunting in the forest, moss and decay 
on the slopes of the mountain’s foothills.  
 
My biome, which biological research is suggesting determines much of who I am (Yong, E., 
2016), is likely bearing remnants of the cows, pigs, horses, cats, dogs, lizards and pukeko 
which at various times shared my homes and life. I am intimately entangled with and a 
continuation of all these components. The moment ‘now’, is at once past, present and future: 
was, is and always will be. Here I am exploring ways of thinking time that can encompass all 
that basket of ancestry—genetic, intellectual, mythological, biological, mineralogical, 
ontological, physical and experiential. 
 
If, when contemplating IEJ, we embrace an ontology of embodied intergenerational 
coexistence with both human and nonhuman will that alter our perception of our obligations? 
Does the idea of being an ancestor—with all the cultural meaning imbued in the concept of 
ancestor, one who lived before and ‘gifted’ to the living genetic material, culture, traditions, 
rituals, knowledge, built environments, material goods and all the other things that make up 
memory and the essence of being human—living synchronically with future 
generations—alter how we imagine IEJ?  
 
Before answering that question directly, I’ll move from this personal human ontology to begin 
to imagine an econtology of time for two geo-regions in Aotearoa New Zealand.126  
 	
                                                
124 ‘Onychophorans are better known as peripatus, or velvet worms. The New Zealand peripatus are secretive, 
caterpillar-like animals, with soft, unsegmented body, velvety in appearance. They are 2.0-8.0 cm in length, 
slow-moving, with 13-16 pairs of soft stumpy legs’ (see Hilke Ruhberg 
http://soilbugs.massey.ac.nz/onychophora.php accessed 30 January 2017. 
125 Vegetable caterpillar are the caterpillars of a native moth that become infected with a fungus, which after 
absorbing the caterpillar’s nutrients mummifies the caterpillar. They are a traditional Māori ingredient of the ink 
used for moko (tattoo). (See http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/photograph/11587/vegetable-caterpillar-fungus, and 
https://www.sciencelearn.org.nz/resources/1435-vegetable-caterpillar, both accessed 30 January 2017.) 
126 Econtology as distinguished from Elizabeth Povinelli’s geontology. Here it is meant as an all-inclusive ontology 
of geological form and ecosystems rather than an ontology that distinguishes and separates of living/non-living 
form to justify human power and capitalist accumulation as used by Povinelli. It is, in this sense, the antithesis of 
geontology. 
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Non-competitive	Historical	Progress	
… when Gladwell talks spontaneously he ransacks the past, its physics and philosophy 
as well as its art, to make a history that leads to him. He’s the scavenging opportunist 
every serious innovator has to be. … The videos are about ease or difficulty in moving 
though this space, and the greater difficulty of staying still in it. Australia’s Indigenous art 
takes all this as a given, and represents a way of being in time and space that people with 
differently educated eyes and differently lived lives have to learn to see.  
(Robb, 2012: 8-9) 
 
 
By ‘[w]eaving distinct, even incommensurable vocabularies together, in legal frameworks 
… [there will be] unpredictable outcomes, but they may prove enlivening’.  
(Salmond, 2014: 305) 
 
As I recited parts of my whakapapa above, I was looped within, reaching for, drawing from an 
understanding of time as spiral, looking behind within the present to inform the future from the 
past. I am the ‘scavenging opportunist’ compiling a being who ‘leads to’ me, to paraphrase 
Peter Robb above. Each reference in the present has an anchor on a spiral of time that 
‘differently educated eyes and differently lived lives [might] learn to see’. This is not a straight 
line projection—it is both generative and regenerative.  
 
I transition now from the personal to a political solution for representing the nonhuman in 
Aotearoa New Zealand—granting legal identity/personhood status to geo-regions, 
specifically the Whanganui River system from the mountains to the sea (Te Awa Tupua) and 
Te Urewera a complex of forested ranges, rivers, lakes and settlements. I want to consider 
how that might realign human relationships to time beyond the mechanistic and forward 
thrusting representation of time we are accustomed to in the West.  
 
This legal creation of ‘personhood’ or ‘identity’ in the two regions is heralded as revolutionary 
(Salmond, 2014). And to Western legal minds, to Western political minds, to Western 
philosophers it is. For the Atihaunui-a-Paparangi (Whanganui Iwi) and Tūhoe (of the 
Urewera), it’s a returning, a reinstatement of what has always, is and will always be 
(Hutchison, 2014). Human and nonhuman share whakapapa in which human is not elevated 
above other. Human are the younger family member, the tiana (Gage: §31: 5), within a 
complete whole of ‘being on the planet’ - not beings but being on the planet earth. I am not, 
however, exploring this metaphysics here, I do that in the next chapter. What is important 
here is that which reveals itself as revolutionary when these agreements are thought through 
to what might be considered a startling conclusion. Indeed, as Anne Salmond suggests 
above, it is an opening to possibility. While the stated intention is to ‘preserve natural and 
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cultural values’ (New Zealand Government, n.d.: 13), Te Urewera geo-region is now declared 
‘to be a legal entity with the full capacity of a legal person’ (ibid.: 13), and the Te Awa Tupua 
Bill states that it ‘is “an indivisible and living whole” and comprises the Whanganui River from 
the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements and is a 
legal person with all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person’ (New Zealand 
Government, n.d.). This language suggests the neoliberal government has reached a 
settlement with Māori to ‘manage’ these geo-regions not from within specifically Māori or 
Pākehā culture and ontologies, but from within Te Awa Tupua’s and Te Urewera’s own 
ontologies.  
 
It is worth stopping for a moment to consider the term ‘settlement’ itself implies a temporal full 
stop, is redolent with connotations of time ending, of a finality and fixedness (Love & Tilley, 
2013) that is itself challenged in what follows, for nothing is static within a geo-region. To 
contextualise the discussion on imagining an econtology and to understand this always 
already changing, what follows is a brief outline of the regions’ physical presence and being. 
 
The Whanganui, an extensive river system, runs from the lava, ash and snowy flanks of Mt 
Tongariro through rugged ranges and dense podocarp forests tumbling over boulders sliding 
still through gorges to the plain that holds Wanganui township across a bar of rich black iron 
sands to the Tasman Sea. The Whanganui is not an inanimate, insensible, thing. It’s a living 
force providing energy and life force to its people, the peoples of Whanganui iwi. Hence the 
statement of belonging and being of its people: 
E rere kau mai te Awanui 
Mai i te Kahui Maunga ki Tangaroa  
Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au  
The Great River flows 
From the Mountains to the Sea 
I am the River, and the River is me  
 
Similarly, Te Urewera and Tūhoe are conjoined—together the ‘children of the mist’ (Best, 
1925). Thrust up as the Pacific Plate meets the Australian plate it’s a range of layered and 
folded sandstone and mudstone, covered in dense, really dense, forest dotted by pristine 
deep green lakes serenaded by fabulous birdsong. The region and lakes were previously 
held as national parks by the Crown. And for Tūhoe it is kin. And Te Urewera and Tūhoe 
identity are conjoined (New Zealand Government, n.d.). 
 
This designation of personhood is part of the Treaty of Waitangi settlements process, the idea 
of ‘settlement’ itself bound within the dominant temporal discourse, with closure required 
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before a new advanced stage, progress, commences (Love & Tilley, 2013). The settlement is 
designed to restore autonomy and self-determination to Ngāti Tūhoe, as they might expect 
under the terms of the original Treaty. However, if time is circular or a spiral of multi-layered 
times, as I have suggested above, there can be no finality, no endings. There are no discrete 
historic phases. Under those conditions, we must ask if there is an endpoint for Te Awa Tupua 
and Te Urewera to reach. This is getting ahead of the discussion.  
 
Iwi and the Crown have agreed, for the purposes of human understanding, these two regions 
re-engage their Māori identity-form-representation. Their being is to be respected within 
Māori ontological structures, not those of the West, even though a Western legal mechanism 
has been deployed to embed the move within the dominant administrative and political 
structures. That is, the colonial and capitalist understanding, structures and practices of 
geontology (Povinelli, 2016) are replaced by an econtology. These identities are no longer to 
be understood as inanimate spaces, as plots on a map, as property legally owned by 
individual or collective humans. They are no longer inanimate resources available for 
allocation, plunder and representation as wealth, nor economic units. The Bill granting 
personhood to Te Urewera, for instance, ‘recognises the mana and intrinsic values of Te 
Urewera by putting it beyond human ownership’.  
 
Mana is a term of respect-worthiness. Mana is intrinsic and earned. Mana both recognises 
and contributes to the dignity of the bearer. That which bears mana is a subject not an object. 
Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera are subjects, no longer enslaved by the neoliberal capitalist 
geontology. The distinction between living and non-living, rational and insensate, capital 
accumulating and exploitable underscoring geontology is shattered. Te Awa Tupua and Te 
Urewera have interests, rights, powers and duties—they have mana. This suggests they are 
decision-makers—albeit decision-makers without human speech. This lack of speech is, as 
we know, no impediment to respect and dignity-bearing in human—think of babies, the 
comatose, and otherwise mute. Mute humans are represented by guardians, kaitiaki, who act 
on their behalf, in their best interests, who act as if they were the mute person. So too Te Awa 
Tupua and Te Urewera now have guardians, kaitiaki who must speak for the interests of 
each, as if they are each. 
 
How does a human guardian represent the interests of a geo-region? How do they think as a 
geo-region? This is a complex and expansive question: while others have discussed the legal 
and practical mechanisms, for the purposes of this chapter only one small corner of the 
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demands on the kaitiaki is under consideration.127 How might we imagine a geo-region 
conceives time? And, crucially for the question of IJ, how must the kaitiaki think of time as if 
they are Te Awa Tupua or Te Urewera?  
 
How long have these geo-regions been? How can a human understand their geo-ontology, 
bio-ontology, zoo-ontology—their econtology? What is their time? Since the beginning, since 
the time the first ancestors Ranginui (the sky) and Papa-tūānuku (the earth) lay in embrace 
(Mead, 2003; Walker, 1992). And for all time in some form.  
 
The slopes of Tongariro, an andesitic cone, have built up in successive volcanic eruptions, 
the material spewed from the depths of the earth, melted from crust thrust under the 
dominating Australian plate. So the materials of the mountain date from all time. The first 
eruptions were probably flowing about one million years ago (K. Williams, n.d.). And the 
Whanganui River wends its way through ash layers, papilla, pumice, and lava fields, 
spectacular papa—mudstone—cliffs, folded sandstone ranges, picking up and depositing 
materials all the way down to the ‘modern’ floodplain to the iron sands of those temporary 
post-glacial beach formations along the land’s ragged edges. 
 
The ranges of Te Urewera are older, the base greywacke formed in sedimentary layers 
150-100ma in the late Jurassic early Cretaceous periods. They are old and ever-changing. 
The greywacke, overlaid with sandstones and mudstone were formed tens to thousands of 
kilometres to the north and migrated here on a slip fault plane as the East Cape allochthon. 
But older still, the sands and muddy deposits were previously swept to sea from an earlier 
landmass, floating out from Gondwanaland, sunk in successive layers, pressed and 
pressured into compact layers of rock, embedded with seashells and skeletal remains, sliding 
along the edges of the Australian plate and forced back up into craggy, furrowed towering 
ranges (Thornton, 1985). The lakes, the famed Waikaremoana, the charming Waikareiti, what 
is their time? The rivers that erode these ranges carrying sediment out to sea to be 
redeposited, re-pressured and reheated into compact layers of new rock. What is their time? 
They are younger than the ranges, they are older than trees, older than the weta, kiwi and 
kakapo yet their waters renew each day. How is time imagined for a river? How is that idea of 
time to be considered by those not-river? 
 
                                                
127 See for instance Carwyn Jones, Jacinta Ruru, Māmari Stephens in a special edition of the Māori Law Review 
October 2014. Also (Arif, 2015; Barraclough, 2013; Hutchison, 2014; Vines, Bruce, & Faunce, 2013). 
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What is their time? As their guardian how do we measure responsibility for them, as them, 
into the future? Parfit, and his protagonists, embodying mechanised time, ‘think of their 
location in time as similar to a stream, backs turned to the past, poised in the present, facing 
the future, being carried relentlessly into the future, and never arriving’ (McKay & Walmsley, 
2003: 92). Time is here ‘squeez[ed] … into the spatial present’ (Awatere, 1984: 61-62 in 
(McKay & Walmsley, 2003: 91). Māori kaitiaki for Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera bring a 
different understanding of time, one that does not lead ‘to a devaluing of the past, knowledge 
of the past, and experience’ (ibid.). ‘The Māori space-time construct can be thought of more 
like a constellation with the past and the people of the past always felt in the present, like the 
constellations of the sky to the voyager—enmeshing, surrounding, always before you, always 
behind, forming patterns that can be interpreted in various ways’ (McKay & Walmsley, 2003: 
92). As with Australian Aboriginal peoples, the past and ancestors live in the present, tangibly 
presenced in carving, art, trees, rocks, rivers, formations (Bird Rose, 2011; 2012; Povinelli, 
2016; Randall, 2003). For kaitiaki, the ‘physical world provokes remembering—rather than 
focussing on the immediate spatial world and its [economic] possibilities’ (McKay & 
Walmsley, 2003: 90). Relationships and links, continuity and continuation are the primary 
parameters of time and space, or as Ranginui Walker said it, ‘the Māori faces the present and 
the past which are in front of him (sic). In this time-frame he has before him the living, their 
forebears, the dead, the founding ancestors, the cultural heroes of mythology and the gods 
back to the primaeval pair Ranginui and Papatuanuku’ (Ranginui Walker in McKay & 
Walmsley, 2003: 92: 59-60). When the living draw from the past firm in the knowledge they 
will become ancestor (Int. HS), their intergenerational obligations span all time.  
 
All-time-past interests humanities scholars and geologists/palaeontologists as they wrestle 
with the implications of the Anthropocene. Following the tradition established in the 
eighteenth century James Hutton, (1726-1797) the Scots ‘father’ of geology, as he explained 
geological processes of erosion, sedimentation, uplift, erosion, etc., in opposition to the 
biblical creation myth, they use the term deep time. As Jan Zalasiewicz and others encourage 
the geological community to accept we have entered the Anthropocene (for instance: Crutzen 
& Stoermer, 2000; Steffen, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2009; Zalasiewicz, 2008; Zalasiewicz et al., 
2011), the concept of deep time is gaining ground across the humanities too (see for instance 
Irvine, 2014, in Anthropology, and perhaps best well know from his TED talk, David Christian, 
2011, on Big History). Minimising the presence of human on earth, reducing human time to 
the shaving of a fingernail through the breadth of time, deep time/big history remains, 
however good the intention to encourage ecological conscience and responsibility (see 
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again, Christian, Crutzen, Steffen and Zalasiewicz and many others), resolutely mechanical 
and linear. Deep time measures epoch and era, marking off golden-spiked boundaries as a 
progression.  
 
The very purpose of coining ‘Anthropocene’ is to indicate the end of one epoch and the 
beginning of another (Crutzen, 2002; Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; Zalasiewicz, 2008; 
Zalasiewicz et al., 2011). The Anthropocene marks a point in the record from which there is 
no going back as the work on ‘tipping points’ by Rockstrom stresses (Rockstrom et al., 2009). 
As forests are removed, rivers and seas polluted, nitrogen is spread over fields and flows in 
waterways into marine ecologies, top soils are stripped from bedrock, and temperatures 
inexorably rise the earth will shift from a stable state fit for human habitation to a new stable 
state unfit for humans and many nonhuman forms. This representation of time has no 
circularity nor is it spiral, it expresses no synchrony. This is time represented by golden 
spikes (Zalasiewicz et al., 2011), stops and starts, beginnings and endings, the time of 
evolution and progressions.128 While archetypically mechanical it also announces a huge 
human-induced disruption to the flows of ecological systems and cycles.   
 
Can our representation of time reflect constant creation and recreation in a non-linear way? A 
non-linear time is certainly not the time referenced by corporate quarterly reports or election 
cycle budgets nor even their antithesis, deep time. Mountains, ranges, lakes and waterways, 
and all living matter, human included, have a repetitive pattern, a pattern of birth, change and 
rebirth of continuity, circularity and synchrony.  
 
How can time be represented in the contexts of Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera? What is time 
to a tree? 2,000-year-old kauri, 1,000-year-old rimu, tōtara, mataī, and miro (Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council) spiral through time: they are individually and collectively living, dead, and 
regenerating simultaneously. How must one think as their guardian? How must one formulate 
their best interests? For how long are we planning? Leaves die and fall disintegrating into the 
soil, sustaining their parent tree and seeds and suckers that are at once their offspring and 
parent. What is time here and how can we justly represent the tree whose time is a present of 
simultaneous life-death-rebirth? If we go back to thinking about the tool of government, it is 
clear a cost-benefit analysis cannot account for this concurrent past-present-future time. Its 
focus is little more than a human lifespan. 
                                                
128 Golden spikes are markers placed at key points around the globe where the paradigmatic example of the 
border between one geologic epoch and the next is exemplified. 
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The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill 2017 ‘declares that Te Awa 
Tupua is “an indivisible and living whole” and comprises the Whanganui River from the 
mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements and is a legal 
person with all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person’. Similarly, Te 
Urewera-Tuhoe Bill, 2013, states: ‘Te Urewera will effectively own itself, in perpetuity’. 
However, as a mute member of society ‘Te Urewera can only act through human agents’ who 
‘will be obliged to serve Te Urewera and act in its interests, with a unity of purpose and the 
utmost good faith, rather than acting on behalf of the appointers’. Te Awa Tupua is to be 
represented by Te Pou Tupua ‘the human face of Te Awa Tupua’. Human agents then must 
speak for the mute Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua and to do so they must, I suggest, think 
like Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua. Thinking like Te Urewera, like Te Awa Tupua, is to step 
into a perpetual deep time, into a econtological spiralling past-in-present-in-future-in-past, a 
time with no stops and starts.  
 
Māori play a significant role as guardians for these geo-regions—one of two appointed in the 
Whanganui Settlement, and fifty percent for the initial 3-year term of the Te Urewera Board, 
and two-thirds thereafter. The settlements themselves are interpreted as formal recognition of 
Māori values as much as redress for past wrongs and the opportunity for the health and 
wellbeing of the entities to be restored using mātauranga Māori indicators (Aho, 2014). 
Importantly, within both settlements, there is strong recognition of the interdependence of 
human and nonhuman, their indivisibility. Secondly, as ‘settlements’ they form an apology to 
ancestors, and their descendants (Government, 2014: Part 3), that is they are 
trans-generational documents. 
 
The Te Urewera Act 2014 draws on Māori ontology in the background to the Act, so poetically 
phrased it is worth reproducing here: 
Te Urewera 
(1)  Te Urewera is ancient and enduring, a fortress of nature, alive with history; its 
scenery is abundant with mystery, adventure, and remote beauty. 
(2)  Te Urewera is a place of spiritual value, with its own mana and mauri. 
(3)  Te Urewera has an identity in and of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care. 
 
 
 Te Urewera and Tūhoe 
(4)  For Tūhoe, Te Urewera is Te Manawa o te Ika a Māui; it is the heart of the great 
fish of Maui, its name being derived from Murakareke, the son of the ancestor 
Tūhoe. 
(5)  For Tūhoe, Te Urewera is their ewe whenua, their place of origin and return, 
their homeland. 
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(6)  Te Urewera expresses and gives meaning to Tūhoe culture, language, 
customs, and identity. There Tūhoe hold mana by ahikāroa; they are tangata 
whenua and kaitiaki of Te Urewera. 
 
Challenging though this identity may be to those steeped in Western legal scholarship (Arif, 
2015), the Act challenges also the Western framing of time (‘ancient and enduring’—there is 
no end and the beginning is before the realms of history) and the animate-inanimate divide 
(‘has an identity in and of itself’ and ‘with its own mana and mauri’). The ontological 
foundation is then steeped in these notions of twined care and belonging, neither Tuhoe nor 
Te Urewera is complete without the other, a connection without beginning or end, within 
which Māori, as kaitiaki, work for the benefit of all. This is then I propose, an ontology which 
includes the econtology of Te Urewera, or Te Awa Tupua. Within the econtology ‘[a]ncestors 
and the generations to come [have] as much interest in the land as the individuals living at 
any point in time’ (Stephenson, 2001: 166). The protocols and traditions of kaitiakitanga are 
‘not passive custodianship, nor … simply the exercise of traditional property rights, but entails 
the active exercise of responsibility in a manner beneficial to the resource’ (Ruckstuhl, 
Thompson-Fawcett, & Rae, 2014). Spiral time and thinking as other, both integral to Māori 
being and thinking (Stewart-Harawira, 2005), are necessary to benefit the resource.  
 
Descendants of ocean-going Polynesian peoples (McKay & Walmsley, 2003; te Punga 
Sommerville, 2012), being Māori enfolds an ‘elaborate cosmogony beginning with the origin 
of the universe and the primal parents, then continuing to trace the descent of living and 
nonliving, material and immaterial phenomena, including humans’ (M. Roberts et al., 2004: 
21) in common with Polynesians (Henare, 2001). When genealogy weaves all things 
including the interests of non-human in decision-making, weaving natural and cultural is ever 
emergent in thinking and practices, the future seen in the past from the present. Ever present 
engagement with ancestor reminds the living they too will be ancestor, promoting a reflective 
practice of care and gifting to future generations, much as Page describes, and it prompts 
more than Page requires, for ancestor are more than human, more than genetic, more than 
physical.  
 
Discussion	 	
Westerners conceive our planet Earth as an object in space – but space can be 
considered an illusion. We think we look across space and see the moon or sun, but we 
actually see the light that left the moon a quarter second ago, and the light that left the sun 
eight minutes ago. There is physical distance between these objects, but what we see is 
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actually the past, we see the sun as it was eight minutes ago. When we look at the 
nearest star we look back in time four years, when we look across the universe we do not 
see it as it is in space, we look millions of years back in time. 
(McKay & Walmsley, 2003: 89) 
 
A particular understanding of time infiltrates IEJ theory. The theories, and the practical 
political and economic design and implementation of policy affecting future generations, 
assume time is linear, moving forward, the present fleeting, the past disengaged. However, 
while the present may be fleeting, it is also privileged. And I have suggested these 
assumptions are hegemonic. They are unable to support the ontologies and lived 
expressions of some Indigenous peoples—most notably those enveloped in Māori 
kaitiakitanga and Anangu. I have gone further than this, claiming, too, the agreements 
assigning independent identity to Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera provoke and require a 
radical reassessment of time if the terms of the agreements are to be met. While I recognise 
that technically the agreements are between the Crown and Atihaunui-a-Paparangi and the 
Crown and Ngāti Tūhoe, and that the terms of the agreements describe guardian’s 
obligations in management terms (See 2:18 Te Urewera Act, and Section 3 of Whanganui 
Settlement), my argument is that once these independent identities are established in 
perpetuity, their guardians must engage with the econtologies of the identities to fulfil their 
legal obligations as the guardians. Their role is not to speak for the human-nonhuman 
entangled persons but as these identities.  
 
The CBA concertina’s attention and responsibility into a short linear future. Although it is 
presented as a rational and neutral measure of ‘long-term’ expenditure, the choice of 
discount rate reflects the value the user chooses to place on future generations in 
competition with current beneficiaries. It tends to heavily favour the present and disregards 
intrinsic worth in nonhuman. We might argue its ontological base is in direct conflict with the 
econtologies of Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera.  
 
Parfit’s non-identity problem rests upon Western ontology that privileges the living human 
individual. Under this umbrella, obligations and duties of justice and law are limited to those 
with whom we can form implicit and explicit reciprocal interest contracts—essentially human 
beings of the present. Non-beings, humans who are dead and those yet-to-be-born, and 
nonhuman ‘things’ are beyond the umbrella’s rim. Despite his intuitive desire to protect future 
generations (of individuals) from harms, Parfit was unable to ‘reason’ a coherent 
understanding of IJ based in contract.  
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Edward Page does establish a clear set of intergenerational contractual agreements, based 
in reciprocity. He argues the living are advantaged by the accumulations of past generations 
and thus are obligated to pass at least as good to future generations. There is on his account 
a requirement by the living to acknowledge the good(s) they are born to, goods that enhance 
and facilitate their own lives and perhaps good fortunes. Inheriting an environment conducive 
to wellbeing is one of those goods. If the living are enabled in their pursuits by this 
inheritance, then they are obligated to ensure that future generations have similar good 
fortune. To plunder and plague the earth for immediate gratification to the disadvantage of 
future generations is therefore wrong. In this way, he proffers an understanding of IEJ that 
protects the environment into the future for human heirs. The benefits to Te Awa Tupua and 
Te Urewera though are incidental, a by-product of protecting future humans.  
 
And herein lies the quiet genius of Aotearoa’s Te Urewera-Tuhoe and Te Awa Tupua 
settlements. Geo-regions as legal identities are each now an 
identity-with-whom-the-community-can-engage, and from within which the contractual 
agreements (tacit or explicit) between geo-region and society can emerge. Geo-regions as 
persons entangle human-nonhuman. Geo-regions-as-persons encompass time past present 
future. Geo-regions-as-persons are identities of multiple singularities, with lifespans 
measured in less-than-days—a droplet of water joining the flowing mass of the river, moths 
fluttering in the forest—through all time—the beds of sandstone, mudstone and lava over and 
around which the waters of the Whanganui swish, meander and roar and the tilted mass of 
the Urewera on which giant trees, ferns and moss take hold. The entity with whom we, 
humans, are contracting is unbound by individuated human-lifetime-limitations and 
human-lifetime desires and welfare. Thus these agreements and the responsibilities placed 
on their voices, their kaitiaki, require imaginaries of multiple singularities bound together as 
one in deep and long time. A time that is synchronously past-present-future, an identity that is 
simultaneously multiple identities. 
 
Within these two agreements lies an imagining that frees IEJ from the hegemony of the 
individual, from the human-nonhuman divide and time. No longer in bondage to the vagaries 
of Parfit’s coincidence and synchrony, Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera are simultaneously 
ancient and infinitely young, one and multiple, human and nonhuman. These identities are 
sure in their ontology, unlikely to shift their values with the fashions as have Ball’s 
generations. Established in their identity they ‘know’ the conditions under which they flourish: 
the temperatures, rainfall, sunshine hours, soil conditions and composition, air purity and 
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wind velocities that are optimal. There is no incoherence in their needs into the future. They 
enmesh the nonhuman within the previously anthropocentric set of entitlements attached in 
law to personhood; a CBA from this worldview can contain no discounts. The 
human-nonhuman community’s boundaries explode into the infinity of past present future, 
beyond instrumentalism. The power of Page’s debt to ancestors is multiplied exponentially.  
 
Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua are regenerative entities, that is, they do not die. That does 
not mean death does not occur. Parts of the living organisms might die, and those parts 
decay and disintegrate to be recycled within the living, so the essence is re-gifted to the new 
entity. The ancestor of the seedling stands guard (literally as Peter Wohlleben, for instance, 
describes in Wohlleben, 2016 and ‘sees’ enemy as described by Taguiam, 2017) while 
dropping leaves that fertilise them each. Is time in this sense recycled as with the seasons? 
The moth, the weta, the kiwi, the tuna, and kakapo may die, but the whole, Te Awa Tupua and 
Te Urewera remain living.  
 
Aldo Leopold makes a similar point when he says:  
…[l]and then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, 
plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upward; 
death and decay return it to the soil. he circuit is not closed; some energy is dissipated in 
decay, some is added by absorption from the air, some is stored in soils, peats and 
long-lived forests; but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly augmented revolving fund of 
life. There is always a net loss by downhill wash, but this is normally small and offset by 
the decay of rocks. It is deposited in the ocean and, in the course of geological time, 
raised to form new lands and new pyramids. (Leopold, 1968: 216) 
 
The non-living (in the biological sense) being, shape and form may alter, as over a human 
being-lifespan, the essence, the unit of being, Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera exist, have 
existed and will continue to exist concurrently. The identity continues: there is no non-identity 
problem at least for periods of time beyond the imagination of human lifetime delimited scale. 
When I am the river or region and the river or region is me, I am its time and its is mine.  
 
So there are two major questions left to address: What is time to these identities? And, how 
does that imagining of time affect theories of IJ and IEJ? IJ for this environment includes 
accounts for time past-present-future. A guardian for these identities must think as the 
identity, that is they must think in terms of all time. Half the guardianship of Te Awa Tupua 
rests with Māori, and two-thirds will be Māori for Te Urewera. Now, ‘[i]t has been said that 
Māori are a people who walk backwards into the future, a reference to the importance placed 
on seeking guidance for future actions from the wisdom of the past deeds of ancestors and 
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mythical heroes’ (M. Roberts et al., 2004: 21). Maori have already a construct that is 
referential, my present connected to my past to inform my future. Here we have the 
foundations for an answer to my earlier questions: If, when contemplating IEJ, we embrace 
an ontology of embodied intergenerational coexistence, will that alter our perception of our 
obligations? Does the idea of being an ancestor living synchronically with future generations 
alter how we imagine IEJ?  
 
If our face is looking backwards, time is not moving future-ward alone. As kaitiaki, as 
guardian for Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua intergenerational environmental duties and 
obligations include recognition of the contribution ancestors continue to make to 
present-future. Part of that contribution was the care of, the active, conscious husbanding, 
guarding and nurturing by human ancestors of kin-that-is-not-human. As the voice for the 
voiceless geo-regions the expression of the econtology includes expanding obligations and 
duties into deep time. In so doing, coincident to this econtological turn, obligations to human 
kin might expand into the same realms of time. The care of one might well propel a care for 
the other.  
 
These kaitiaki are responsible for providing the voice for the voiceless. They must listen to 
these identities. The rimu seedling in the forest has another 1000 years of life: how must 
kaitiaki represent it, while simultaneously representing the weta and the kiwi, the greywacke 
and the tumbling waters, the human and the cultural?  
 
In theory, the guardians of Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua may be obliged to make 
submissions on their behalf in national and international climate change debates and 
petroleum exploration proposals. Arguably debates and decisions made kilometres away will 
have long-term effects on the potential-to-continue-to-exist for both identities and the people 
who will live within and alongside them (these geo-region identities including within their 
singular identity human beings along with other zoological, biological and geological 
matter).129 If the kaitiaki continue Māori practice of kaitiakitanga and fulfil their obligations to 
improve the state of these identities, then it would seem incumbent on kaitiaki to enter 
debates at far remove but integral to the welfare of them. Could they stand, on the regions’ 
behalf, as candidates for parliament and become the voice for all life that will exist 100, 1000, 
2000 years hence? Attend the COPs? Sue Ministers of the Crown, and pursue corporations 
                                                
129 Still more provocatively, perhaps these identities can take up causes on behalf of other geo-regions? 
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through the courts? These are, I suggest, the ‘startling conclusions’ hinted at in the opening. 
Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera are past-present-future, their time is not mired, like Parfit’s, in 
iterative moments of present unable to connect decisively with past or future. Their expanded 
horizons facilitate representation on behalf of all future generations of all being. Boundaries 
explode omni-dimensionally into the infinity of past present future. The power of any debt to 
ancestors is multiplied exponentially.  
 
Released from the hegemony of ‘competitive historical progress’ Te Awa Tupua and Te 
Urewera have the potential to represent all time in political fora. Their being draws our 
attention to ‘the present’ not a singularity as the article ‘the’ suggests, but instead as a 
multiplicity of coincident events. ‘The present’ then seen as simply a rhetorical device 
constraining human attention to singular aspects of this multiplicity. If that is so, IEJ is 
released from the identity problem and embraces beings with futures calculated in centuries. 
As McKay says above, time and space can be multiple things at a single moment. 
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Chapter	8:	Animal	Vegetable	Mineral	–	
something	more	than	human	
 
How unfathomable is the task of taking account not only of mattering but of its 
inseparability from the void, including the infinite abundance that inhabits and surrounds 
all being? (Barad, 2012; 216)  
 
There is (at least) one more domain to explore for a theory of IEJ to meet the ontological 
needs of Aboriginal and Māori peoples. In this chapter, the artificial separation of animal, 
vegetable, and mineral is rejected. The divisions of previous chapters have been contrived. 
Each focused on a singular feature—liberal capitalism/materialism, individualism, 
anthropocentrism, time—of an entangled multiplicity of being. Here I draw again on Māori 
ontology to provide a foundation for IEJ that can meet Māori conceptions of IEJ within Māori 
worldviews. If HR and/or CA offer a potential foundation for decolonising IEJ, then the theory 
must be capable of drawing nonhuman into the community of justice bearing entities. If it 
cannot, its scope will exclude those people who understand their being entangled in 
relationships with earth systems as a whole. Krushil Watene has noted, however, as currently 
formulated CA, at least, is incapable of incorporating Māori relationships to nature (Watene, 
2016). Using the concepts of mauri, tapu and mana, this chapter seeks to address multiple 
imbalances—in justice, human-nonhuman relations, cultural prerogatives, and between 
generations. 
 
Early I used Simon Caney’s formulation of rights-bearing interests. Specifically, I established 
a formulation ‘country has interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on 
others’, based in Aboriginal philosophy. I then suggested that grants some form of rights to 
country, all it contains, and all the entangled relationships the concept country incorporates 
including human relationships with nonhuman and nonhuman relationships with human. 
Further, I suggested that as a foundation, this formulation of nonhuman weighty interests may 
be useful as a theoretical underpinning for the rights for nature discourse and legislation. It 
may also provide a theoretical framework from which to understand the underlying ontologies 
motivating the personhood status of geo-regions, land and water forms. 
 
Switzerland, Ecuador, Bolivia, Aotearoa, and India have used the devices of dignity 
(Switzerland), rights (Bolivia and Ecuador) and personhood (Aotearoa and India) to make 
nature or elements of nature subjects of legal justice. While that itself does not require that 
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theories of political or philosophic justice adapt to the legal moves, the suggestion here is that 
rights and personhood for nature reflect existing philosophies and adapt them to Western 
legal structures. Furthermore, if standard, academic, Western justice theory is unable to 
accommodate such philosophies it ipso facto excludes some peoples. It is not universal. Both 
HR and CA are understood to offer universal standards of justice. This chapter attempts to 
suggest a way forward.  
 
One way to establish nonhuman weighty interests, a way implied, this chapter will argue, by 
these legal initiatives, is to consider that nonhuman has type-specific dignity. The Swiss 
Constitution has done this specifically: 
Article 120 Non-human gene technology 
1 Human beings and their environment shall be protected against the misuse of gene 
technology. 
2 The Confederation shall legislate on the use of reproductive and genetic material from 
animals, plants and other organisms. In doing so, it shall take account of the dignity of 
living beings as well as the safety of human beings, animals and the environment, and 
shall protect the genetic diversity of animal and plant species. (Confederation, 1999) 
 
Despite directing that the dignity of living beings is considered during experiments, the Swiss 
Constitution, like many theorists of justice and rights who depend on a conception of dignity 
as their normative foundation, has left dignity undefined (Nussbaum, 2007; 2011; Rosen, 
2012; Schachter, 1983; Schroeder, 2010; Waldron, 2012). Moreover, as this chapter will 
explore, no modern Western conceptualisation of dignity is capable of providing a foundation 
for nonhuman within a theory of justice.130 Conceptualising dignity from Māori ontology, 
recognising a potentiality for being and energy in all matter, it is possible to establish a 
formulation of dignity which does account for Māori and Aboriginal obligations and duties to 
nonhuman.131 Conceptualised here as an immersive functioning dignity, it is also capable of 
underpinning legal rights, personhood and justice for nature. 
 
The UDHR, justice theorist Martha Nussbaum, and others base claims of rights and justice in 
the concept of human dignity—as has been the practice since Aristotle. The claim is duties 
and obligations of justice must support the dignity of the individual dignity holder (Habermas, 
2010; Kateb, 2011; Nussbaum, 2007; 2011; Rosen, 2012; Schachter, 1983; Schroeder, 
2010; Waldron, 2012). This claim is fairly uncontroversial. Indeed, so uncontroversial the 
                                                
130 On a practical level, the lack of clarity around dignity’s conceptualisation has caused disagreements among 
scientists working within the confines of the Swiss Constitution (Willemsen, 2008). 
131 In doing so it is important to remember that the sharp distinction human-nonhuman does not exist within these 
ontologies. Entanglement was the focus of Chapters 5 and 6 particularly, yet because it is so foundational it is 
woven throughout every chapter. 
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UDHR doesn’t define human dignity. It presents dignity as universal and intuitively 
understood. 
 
Nussbaum and Schachter each separately argue it is insufficient to base justice on intuition 
(Nussbaum, 2011: 29; Schachter, 1983: 849). In conceptualising dignity for the purposes of 
grounding the CA, Nussbaum extends its range to include individual nonhuman living beings 
(Nussbaum, 2004; 2007; 2011). By acknowledging their dignity, she includes particularly 
individual sentient animals as subjects of justice. Building on Nussbaum’s conceptualisation, 
Katy Fulfer expands dignity further, locating it in ecosystems (Fulfer, 2013).132 David 
Schlosberg suggests CA can protect environmental integrity (Schlosberg, 2012b; 2014). 
Although extended well beyond the merely human, by limiting the sites of dignity these 
conceptualisations are incapable of providing the normative support required by the 
expansive dimensions of the recent legal recognitions: they cannot fully support dignity within 
the inanimate realm, which seems to be the rational end of such laws. Nor do they support 
Māori understandings of nature (Watene, 2016). 
 
Meanwhile, new legal recognitions of natural ecosystems have stretched the possibilities for 
justice beyond any boundaries placed by anthropocentric theory. They attach duties and 
obligations of rights and justice to all living things and the inanimate realm—to all matter. It 
might be argued that there is no demand to expand theories of justice to meet these legal 
moves. However, it is necessary if the same theories are to decolonise—that is if they are to 
meet the specific ontological requirements of Indigenous Peoples. To not do so is either to 
place Māori, Aboriginal and other Indigenous Peoples outside of the scope of the theory, or, if 
the theory makes claims of universality, to continue to suppress and delegitimise their 
ontologies.  
 
If dignity grounds rights and justice, what conceptualisation of dignity is required for it to 
embrace an ontology in which no sharp distinctions are drawn between human and 
nonhuman, ancestors, living and future generations? Drawing on key elements of Māori 
worldviews and ontology, here I identify how they locate normative obligations to nature. I 
re-parse dignity to incorporate all nonhuman (animal, vegetable, mineral), attend to the 
potential demands of the legal frameworks, and address ‘intuitive’ discomfort with ongoing 
                                                
132 Nussbaum could be labelled a biocentric individualist, and Fulfer an eco-centrist who locates dignity within a 
community (Bendik-Keymer, 2014). 
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destruction of the environment. I take account too, of mattering and the void, that which 
Barad suggests is unfathomable above. 
 
First, I establish a working conceptualisation of human dignity and discuss how legislation is 
framing the need for a more expansive conceptualisation. This is followed by an examination 
of some proto-holistic conceptualisations of dignity drawn from Nussbaum and Fulfer. Next 
Māori worldviews and ontology are used to explore an expansive dignity from which to draw 
claims of justice. Finally, I examine the implications this has for decolonising IEJ. 
 
Dignity	in	Convention,	Constitution	&	Law	
Dignity is an intuitive notion that is by no means utterly clear. If it is used in isolation, as if 
it is completely self-evident, it can be used capriciously and inconsistently. Thus it would 
be mistaken to use it as if it were an intuitively self-evident and solid foundation for a 
theory that would then be built upon it (Nussbaum, 2011: 29). 
 
[Dignity’s] intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large 
measure by cultural factors. When it has been invoked in concrete situations, it has been 
generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognized even if the 
abstract term cannot be defined. "I know it when I see it even if I cannot tell you what it is."  
In some situations an abstract definition is not needed; but it is not entirely satisfying to 
accept the idea that human dignity cannot be defined or analyzed in general terms. 
Without a reasonably clear general idea of its meaning, we cannot easily reject a 
specious use of the concept, nor can we without understanding its meaning draw specific 
implications for relevant conduct (Schachter, 1983: 849). 
  
Switzerland protects the ‘dignity of living beings’ in its constitution. Ecuador and Bolivia have 
granted legal ‘rights’ to nature. And Aotearoa and India have given geographic regions and 
features legal identities. Citizens of those nations are asked to treat the nonhuman realm with 
levels of respect akin to those demanded by human rights and human and corporate 
personhood. The concept of dignity is frequently used to ground justice theory based on 
rights of the person (Kateb, 2011; Nussbaum, 2004; 2007; 2011; Rosen, 2012; Waldron, 
2012). However, existing scholarly conceptualisations of dignity, and there are many, are 
unable to meet the demand for rights and personhood for nature.133 The argument here is 
                                                
133 For those interested in exploring dignity further see: 
Michael Rosen for an expansive exploration of the history and philosophy of dignity in the West (Rosen, 2012). 
Doris Schroeder examines dignity from the perspective of its use in bioethics, and finds as her title suggests five 
different conceptualisations and she is ‘still counting’ (Schroeder, 2010). 
Jeremy Waldron’s interest is in dignity as a legal concept, and his Tanner Lectures on the subject establishes 
what is quite likely the ‘intuitive’ meaning many people hold (Waldron, 2012). 
Additionally, George Kateb makes a case for dignity as a human-only quality, arguing duties to nature flow from 
respect for human dignity (Kateb, 2011). 
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two-fold: that dignity must be re-conceived to provide adequate normative grounding for 
nature to have rights and identity; and that unless dignity is reconceived as an inclusively 
holistic concept HR and CA cannot accommodate Māori, Aboriginal and other ontologies. 
That there are many different ways of parsing dignity is both a strength and weakness—it 
demonstrates the flexibility of the concept and opens a space for regular review and 
adaptation, but also means that dignity, if not clearly defined, may be regarded as ‘slippery’ 
and inadequate for substantiating the demands of justice and law as Nussbaum and 
Schachter suggest above. 
 
The UDHR arguably the most widely accepted global normative framework, opens with the 
statement, ‘[w]hereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world’ (Nations, 1948, italics added.). It fails, however, to identify how ‘inherent dignity’ is 
conceptualised. Perhaps this was a perspicacious move by the drafters if dignity has many 
conceptualisations. Not identifying with any particular concept facilitates diverse 
interpretations. However, decolonising justice requires more than intuition and assumptions, 
it requires clear specificity. I’ll start by developing a ‘working’ conceptualisation of human 
dignity based in its modern usage. 
 
The UDHR is clear about what dignity does, how it is performed (or Schachter’s ‘I know it 
when I see it’ above) and how dignity can be supported.134 It unequivocally states dignity 
inheres to all human qua human. Unlike many historical conceptualisations, it has no 
hierarchically based exclusions, there is no reference to God as a source, nor to human 
capacity to reason (Rosen, 2012; Schroeder, 2010). Jeremy Waldron suggests that modern 
legal interpretations are a form of ‘levelled-up status dignity’, that is all humans are bearers of 
equal status because they are sites of dignity (Waldron, 2012). Martha Nussbaum, too, views 
human dignity as a quality of humans qua human although she breaks with modern 
conventions and conceptualises it beyond the human realm as well (as I will cover in the next 
section) (Nussbaum, 2007; 2011).  
 
For ease of understanding, I propose that a working conceptualisation of dignity, based in 
modern human status claims, might be parsed as: 
                                                
134 Thanks to Mirjam van der Heide, Australian Catholic University, for sharing her PhD thesis prior to submission, 
in which she includes an argument that dignity is a performative concept. 
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P1  Human beings are unique (and more important than all other living and non-living 
  matter) 
P2  Human beings strive to function and fulfil their specific potential 
P3  All human beings are entitled to function and fulfil their potential qua  
  human beings 
P4  Dignity is found in freedom to access the resources to function and fulfil  
  potential 
C  Because it is theirs alone by birth right, all people are sites of dignity and all  
  people have obligations and duties to uphold and respect the dignity of human 
  beings. 
 
While this conceptualisation works for humans, affording them rights as subjects and ends in 
the Kantian sense,135 it excludes all other animate and inanimate things; they remain as it 
were, objects and means. However, rights and personhood for nonhuman could be said to 
have expanded the moral community beyond individual human alone, granting nature 
subjective rights.136 And this is consistent with the worldviews of Aboriginal and Māori 
peoples. Based in an understanding of intrinsic value in the biophysical, each incorporates 
the concept of respect for and dignity in nonhuman forms, nature or Mother Earth. Each 
accords dignity to individual and collective elements of the environment, and each does it 
differently. Moreover, much like in the UDHR, the basis for respect and intrinsic subjective 
worth of nonhuman is left to intuition. 
 
Ratified in 1999, the Swiss constitution refers to dignity as constitutive of human beings and 
other living things—animals, plants and other organisms, as quoted above. Each living thing 
is granted its own ‘being-ness’ that affords it respect. While some within the scientific 
community in Switzerland find the concept of dignity within the nonhuman realm 
                                                
135 Kant thought dignity was a value of human worth, an intrinsic status that separated humans (but not all 
humans) from and elevated them above all other. To be included in the moral community Kant argued, requires 
the power of reason: 
‘In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something 
else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a 
dignity.  
What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which, even without 
presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, that is, with a delight in the mere purposeless play of our 
mental powers has a fancy price; but that which something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value, 
that is, a price, but an inner value, that is dignity. 
Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this is 
it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable 
of morality, is that which alone has dignity’ (Kant 1988, 42 [4:434-435] in (Habermas, 2010; Rosen, 2012)). 
136 Approximately 40 years after Christopher Stone theorised this possibility in Should Trees Have Standing 
(Stone, 1972). 
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unacceptable (Willemsen, 2008), the Constitution, nevertheless, requires them to 
acknowledge the subjective rights and intrinsic respect-worthiness of all living things.  
 
The Ecuadorian Constitution states:  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Rights of nature 
Article 71. Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to 
integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life 
cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. (Ecuador, 2008) 
 
And the Bolivian Law of the Rights of Mother Nature includes in Article 7 that: 
I. Mother Earth has the following rights: 
1. To life 
2. To the diversity of life 
3. To water 
4. To clean air 
5. To equilibrium 
6. To restoration 
7. To pollution-free living. (Bolivia, 2012)  
 
These South American examples draw on what Mihnea Tanasescu refers to as an 
‘Indigenous symbol’ wherein Indigenous Peoples are represented as stewards of nature 
(Tanasescu, 2015), recognise the importance of interconnection and entanglement of human 
and nonhuman and specifically assign nature rights.137 Neither refers directly to dignity. Both, 
however, harness the familiar language of UDHR—where the demands of dignity afford the 
bearer ‘integral respect’. This is exactly the demand of Article 71 of the Ecuadorian 
Constitution: Pacha Mama has the ‘right to integral respect for its existence’ (italics added). 
Similarly, the Bolivian law does not specifically use the word dignity, however, it is couched in 
the language of rights, and states in Article 9, that ‘[t]he duties of natural persons and public 
or private legal entities [are to] 1. Uphold and respect the rights of Mother Earth’. By using the 
language of human rights, which is heavily dependent on dignity as motivator and justifier, 
these documents could be interpreted as suggesting nature also has dignity. 
 
Furthermore, Nussbaum has claimed that dignity and respect are part of the same concept 
family, that is, understanding either term relies on understanding the other (Bendik-Keymer, 
2014). They are, as it were, bound together in a tight dependency and union. Where dignity is 
debased respect is diminished, without respect there can be no dignity. So we could make 
                                                
137 I will return to address Tanasescu and the Indigenous symbol in the conclusion, however suffice it to say here I 
do not believe his criticisms of harnessing the Indigenous symbol apply in the case of the Whanganui River nor Te 
Urewera in Aotearoa, and if they do, the parsing of dignity I suggest here, may provide a means to overcome the 
pitfalls Tanasescu identifies. 
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the claim that in designating rights for nature—based in a call for integral respect—these 
South American nations are entreating citizens to uphold the dignity of nature. However, a 
conceptualisation of dignity that can embrace nonhuman in the comprehensive manner these 
documents require is not immediately available in HR and CA approaches to justice. That is 
neither the HR or CA is capable of responding to the ‘Indigenous symbol’. They are unable to 
respond to these Indigenously inspired calls for rights and respect for nature in the Peoples’ 
own terms. One way to resolve this is to reconceptualise dignity to reflect the respect for 
nonhuman these laws are demanding (Watene, 2016).  
 
In Aotearoa, the tightly bound conceptual dependency between dignity and respect that 
Nussbaum and Bendik-Keymer discuss, is echoed in the Māori concepts of tapu and mana. 
The legal identities Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua were introduced in the last chapter. Both 
the river and range are acknowledged as having full legal personality, and ‘ownership’ is 
vested in the geo-regions themselves (Aho, 2014). Both have become ‘self-governing’ 
subjects. No longer can they be treated as means and objects; like children and the mentally 
incompetent, each has guardians appointed to act in their intrinsic self-interest. Here Western 
corporate law and corporate personhood is blended with Māori philosophy. The geo-regions 
are to be respected as persons, integral stand-alone entities, a dignified whole, with standing 
in law, interest in their self-care and a ‘voice’ in decisions affecting them. 
 
The Bills creating the identities are part of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlements negotiated by 
Ngāti Tuhoe and Whanganui iwi. They are part of the process to redress to some extent the 
wrongs of colonisation and colonial rule, land appropriations and subsequent Māori 
disadvantage. I suggest that for Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera, not only have colonial 
wrongs to Māori people been addressed but so too is this an attempt to decolonise the 
country’s relationships with the two regions/persons. The language of the Bills quite 
specifically directs people to interact with each as if they bear weighty interests, interests 
which might be said to stem from their dignity.  
 
To decolonise IEJ, to ensure a theory of IEJ is sufficient to represent Māori (and other 
Indigenous Peoples) conceptions of nonhuman, dignity must be something other than the 
working conceptualisation above. It must be sufficiently nuanced to apply to nonhuman. This 
seems also the sort of argument that could be made if Aboriginal ontology is to be accounted 
for in theory. Where, for instance, Bawaka country is a co-author, country is instated as a 
co-being of equal stature with each other author. Jeremy Waldron and Michael Rosen 
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suggest, one of the roles of the idea of dignity is that we use it to bestow equal status (Rosen, 
2012; Waldron, 2012). Dignity sets the level. Can dignity be conceived in a way that grants 
human and nonhuman have some sort of equal status?  
 
Drawing from different cultural, epistemological and ontological positions (Western and 
Indigenous), dignity for nonhuman, rights for nature, and personhood status suggest animate 
and inanimate nature become the subject of intrinsic rights to respect, dignity, and integrity, to 
the freedom to flourish in their kind-specific way. The documents identify community, 
interaction, entanglement and co-dependence as inherent to these rights. Each calls on 
people to treat elements or all of the nonhuman realm as subjects of justice.  
 
Here we circle back: if a call to justice is based in dignity, what conceptualisation of dignity 
can afford justice rights to the nonhuman? Certainly, my working conceptualisation of dignity, 
based on classic and widely supported human rights, cannot.  
Proto-Holistic	Dignity	 	
Advocating for animal rights is not new. Activists, philosophers in the utilitarian school 
(Bentham, Mill, Singer (Nussbaum, 2007)), EJ and political theorists,138 are all active in this 
space. In Laudato Si Pope Francis, too, suggests human obligations and duties extend to 
animals and the environment (Francis, 2015). These theorists, however, do not develop a 
comprehensive conceptualisation of dignity for nonhuman.  
 
Within the body of political philosophy, Martha Nussbaum has ‘begun’ the work of expanding 
the scope of dignity, arguing it can be conceptualised to embrace animals (in particular those 
with sentience and intelligence).139 Referencing Aristotelian dignity (a decidedly 
non-egalitarian form) as her foundation she builds a case to include particularly individual 
higher-order sentient animals, which live in close and intimate proximity to human community, 
within the scope of justice (Nussbaum, 2004; 2007; 2011).140 
 
                                                
138 See for instance Wissenburg, M., & Schlosberg, D. (Eds.). (2014). Political Animals and Animal Politics. 
Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
139 Thomas Aquinas claimed animal vegetable and mineral bear dignity. His conceptualisation was instrumentally 
based. For him what was important was not demonstrating respect for ‘nature’ intrinsically, but that recognising 
dignity in ‘nature’ recognised God and respect for God’s creation (Rosen, 2012; Schroeder, 2010). 
140 Aristotle grants dignity only to free, high-status males. 
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The CA is, Nussbaum argues, ‘capable of recognizing a wide range of types of animal dignity, 
and of corresponding needs for flourishing and … the approach is capable of yielding norms 
of interspecies justice’ (Nussbaum, 2007: 327). Human beings, she argues, are tied together 
by altruism and self-interest, and the good of others is integral to individual wellbeing (ibid.). 
Animals living integrally with a human community become part of the social good. The 
closeness of the relationships and interdependence between humans and these animals, and 
the animals’ intelligence, sociability, ability to motivate action, etc., suggests the animals are 
entitled to something more than mere compassion. The integral entanglement of these 
animals with human lives means the animals should be included within the moral community. 
They should be bearers of individual species-specific dignity.  
 
Nussbaum’s formulation applies primarily to higher order sentient animals with whom 
humans form ‘human-animal relations’ (ibid.: 351). These animals are part of the complex of 
social cooperation, the purpose of which ‘ought to be to live decently together in a world in 
which many species try to flourish’ (ibid.: 351). Recognising dignity in animals places 
obligations on humans to facilitate their capacity to flourish in a species-specific way. As 
bearers of dignity individual animals become the subjects of justice, worthy of respect.  
 
Nussbaum motivates readers to consider embracing this extended moral community by 
recognising the inseparability of human and some animals (Fulfer, 2013; Nussbaum, 2004; 
2007; 2011; Schinkel, 2008). Her formulation demands active facilitation of the capabilities of 
these animals (and she provides a set of capabilities paralleling her list of human-centred 
capabilities) in a species-specific manner.141 I call Nussbaum’s conceptualisation Sentient 
Status Dignity and summarise it here. 
  
                                                
141 Nussbaum’s list of animal capabilities, 
1. Life 
2. Bodily Health  
3. Bodily Integrity 
4. Senses, Imagination, & Thought 
5. Emotions 
6. Practical Reason 
7. Affiliation 
8. Other Species 
9. Play 
10. Control Over One’s Environment 
(Nussbaum, 2007; 392-401) 
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P1  Higher order sentient living animals (‘intelligent creatures’ including human beings) 
  are unique  
P2  Human flourishing is entwined with relationships with higher order sentient  
  animals  
P3  Human and nonhuman higher order sentient animals (in a manner similar to 
  human beings) strive to function and fulfil their species-specific potential, and are 
  capable of a dignified existence  
P4  Dignity is found in freedom to access the resources to function and fulfil  
  potential 
C  Humans and higher order sentient living animals are sites of species-specific 
  dignity and people have obligations and duties to uphold and respect their dignity. 
 
This relational conception of dignity demands access to the capability to flourish for some 
sentient living things. While Nussbaum focuses on individual sentient animals, her idea of 
dignity here is capable of supporting an ontology in which human-nonhuman interconnection, 
with some limitations, is accepted as a flowing and entangled continuum of life.  
 
When Katy Fulfer takes up the challenge, she expands the realm of dignity to encompass the 
community within an ecosystem including the lower order sentient and non-sentient living 
things in the community (Fulfer, 2013).142 Fulfer points to the ‘(inter)connection’ of human 
and non-sentient life (ibid.: 30) and enfolds the non-sentient into the boundaries of dignity and 
relational politics by suggesting abuse of non-sentient life is an act of disrespect to its dignity.  
 
Drawing on Nussbaum’s claims of dignity for higher order sentient life, Fulfer extrapolates: 
If interdependence in relationships with animals is important, then it is likely important in 
relationships with nonsentient life as well. Justice governs our relationships with other 
humans and animals because each has capabilities that need to be protected and 
promoted. Our strivings for flourishing overlap. The same is true of nonsentient life—our 
relationships with nonsentients indicate ways in which our striving for flourishing depends 
on their flourishing (ibid.: 30). 
 
                                                
142 Breena Holland also responds to the challenge by adding a ‘meta capability’. She argues that protecting the 
flourishing of the environment is a capability which stands over and above all others (hence the ‘meta’). No other 
capability may be realised she argues, unless the environment is healthy and flourishing (Holland, 2008b). In 
some senses this is self-evident, however, sadly perhaps it is a requirement that needs articulation. She 
recognises too the importance of (elements of) environment to some peoples’ worldviews and social and cultural 
being. This meta-capability, can sustain the demands of both IJ and EJ, however, as Holland specifically claims 
the protection of the environment is an instrumental demand alone (319-323), it will not satisfy the demands of 
Indigenous justice for peoples for whom elements of the nonhuman world are warped within ontology and belief 
systems and for whom connections with nature are of intrinsic not instrumental value. Nor is it expansive enough 
to meet the demands of the constitutions and law discussed here. 
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Dignity in Nussbaum’s and Fulfer’s accounts cannot exist without access to the set of 
Nussbaum’s ten capabilities, and the capabilities of living things are grounded in dignity. 
Capabilities ‘make manifest the conception of dignity’ (ibid: 30). Fulfer’s ‘focus [is] on our 
acceptance that justice and dignity emerge out of interactions with others, and that humans 
have a great deal of privilege relative to the nonsentient life we make use of and interact with’ 
(ibid.: 31). 
 
There is more here in Fulfer’s account to indicate that CA may be an appropriate justice 
framework for IIEJ. She is incorporating nonhuman as an ecosystem, as a community. David 
Carruthers and David Schlosberg also suggest that the CA is capable of providing justice for 
communities—namely communities of Indigenous Peoples (Carruthers, 2010). EJ is as they 
note, ‘embedded in community’ (ibid.: 17). The point is where identity is understood to be 
communal (environment, people, culture, etc.), and where that communal identity is 
threatened by environmental harms then that ‘it’ can make claims for EJ. Furthermore, 
Carruthers and Schlosberg demonstrate that Indigenous communities have already a 
‘community-based, capabilities-centred conception of environmental justice’ (ibid.: 30). 
 
Separately, Schlosberg uses the term ‘integrity’ as a nonhuman extension of the concept of 
dignity to motivate ecosystem functioning as integral to framing climate change justice in the 
CA (Schlosberg, 2012b; 2014). In this way, he argues, we can extend justice to nonhuman as 
subjects, and more importantly here, it is a way for us to ‘internalize the environment’ (2012b: 
165. Italics original). The dignity of the individual element is dependent on the integrity (or 
dignity) of the whole in which all are immersed. Integrity he argues can be applied to 
ecosystems, to communities of being, in a manner individual-based dignity cannot.        
 
These conceptualisations move much closer to that required by rights for nature and 
personhood for nature. They suggest human and other living things are interwoven and 
interconnected without creating (an artificial) division. There is, on Fulfer’s and Schlosberg’s 
accounts, dignity/integrity in nature-as-community generated by both interconnection and 
immersion, a dignity that is abused by disrespect and damage to any element of the whole.  
 
Fulfer ‘suggest[s] that the nature of our [human] dependence on elements within ecosystems 
bestows a kind of dignity on them. In other words, dignity is best understood in this context as 
a relational moral property. We recognise this dignity because the relations are ones of 
interdependence [between humans and between human and nonhuman]—our [human] 
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flourishing depends on that of nonsentient life and the flourishing of nonsentient life, in part, 
depends on our actions’ (Fulfer, 2013: 31). 
 
Rather than locate this dignity within individual living things and non-living things, the dignity 
in this formulation is situated in ecosystems in which human beings, other sentient and 
nonsentient life are embedded and of which they are constituents. These conceptualisations 
can be summarised as Relational Functioning Dignity.  
P1  All humans, sentient and non-sentient life are interlinked in ecosystems  
P2  Living things and ecosystems strive to function and fulfil their (species-specific) 
  potential 
P3  It is clear when a human, living thing or ecosystem is not functioning and/or cannot 
  fulfil potential 
P4  Dignity is found in freedom to access the necessary resources to function and fulfil 
  potential 
C  People have obligations and duties to uphold and respect the dignity of all living 
  things and ecosystems 
 
This relational conceptualisation of dignity affords living things the right to flourish. As a 
relational concept, it addresses Schlosberg’s concern that for many ‘the term “dignity” is 
primarily understood as an individual psychological state referring to one’s own self respect’ 
(Schlosberg, 2012a: 175). It is also capable of supporting a cultural ontology in which 
human-nonhuman interconnection is accepted as a flowing continuum of lives. 
Interconnections, however, do not finish with living organisms: all living things are also 
dependent on air, water and soil, minerals and nutrients.  
 
Nussbaum and Fulfer indicate dignity can be embedded in animal and vegetable in a 
systemic way, and that at least some nonhuman living things should be considered subjects 
of justice. Fulfer expands the conception beyond the individual into ecosystems. And, while 
Fulfer’s definition is possibly sufficient to justify the dignity claims of the Swiss Constitution, 
neither conceptualisation gives standing to the non-living in a way required by the legal 
developments of the other nations. The next section examines how dignity can be expanded 
to include the non-living and possibly a means to overcome the ongoing colonialization in HR 
and CA theory. 
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Māori	Ontology	 	
The cosmic religious world view of Māori is as old as the culture itself and constitutes a 
philosophy, which is a love of wisdom and search for knowledge of things and their causes. 
… At the heart of [the Māori] view of the creation process is an understanding that humanity 
and all things of the natural world are always emerging, always unfolding. 
(Henare, 2001; 198) 
 
Ontological indeterminacy, a radical openness, an infinity of possibilities, is at the core of 
mattering. … Matter in its iterative materialization is a dynamic play of in/determinacy. Matter 
is never a settled matter. It is always already radically open. Closure cannot be secured 
when the conditions of im/possibilities and lived indeterminacies are integral, not 
supplementary, to what matter is. 
(Barad, 2012: 214-215) 
 
In each case, Ecuador, Bolivia and Aotearoa have drawn on the epistemologies and 
ontologies of their Indigenous Peoples and blended them with Western legal structures.143 
Taking Indigenous frameworks, they harness the language of (Western) rights and 
incorporation to structure wide ranging protections for all nonhuman elements of the 
environment. In these frameworks and new legal structure, the nonhuman is a subject and 
bearer of rights. Working within Indigenous ontology, this could be seen as a ‘logical’ 
harnessing of their post-colonial governance structures. Working within a HR or CA approach 
to justice, it seems difficult to accommodate the breadth of entangled interrelationships with 
and respect for nonhuman expressed in these documents, and by Aboriginal people, unless 
the concept of dignity can be expanded. This section traces an alternative all-embracing 
conceptualisation of dignity.  
 
Firstly, I acknowledge it is difficult to translate ontological concepts between epistemologies. 
Notwithstanding, the translation has occurred in Aotearoa law (as it has also with the 
translation of Pachamama into Ecuadorian and Bolivian legislatures). By granting Te Awa 
Tupua, and Te Urewera ‘ownership’ of themselves, the government has blended Māori 
epistemologies and ontologies and Western law. Māori ways of knowing and being in the 
                                                
143 It may be that India has too, however I know little of Indian Indigenous worldviews to make this claim. India 
may equally have simply chosen personhood as the best device to achieve environmental protection aims. 
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world recognise an integral, inseparably layered entanglement of everything, living and 
non-living across all time. They recognise, too, a vital, type-specific, subjectivity in all things. 
Everything has hau, wairua, mauri, tapu and mana. 
 
Mauri is commonly interpreted as ‘life force’ (Durie, 2010; Henare, 2001; Mead, 2003). This is 
a highly epistemically evolved concept that requires more explication than such a simple 
translation offers. Mauri binds together the spiritual components of entities. The spiritual 
components of hau, wairua, tapu and mana are bound by mauri within the individual entity. 
Mauri is also the force that binds entities together, that links everything in entangled networks 
of spiritual and physical, living and non-living. Hau is the vital essence, the label for that which 
life itself, imbued at conception and lost at death. It belongs to and of a thing during its 
existence. Wairua (like mauri) functions to protect. Wairua guards against evil and harm, a 
force for good as it were, remaining with a body from conception to death when its eternal 
essence returns to join the ancestors in Hawaiiki. Mauri binds all the component spiritual 
parts of entities with each other and the tinana (body or form). Without mauri the other 
metaphysical powers have no residence in the thing or person. If the mauri is neglected or 
abused the essence, goodness, power and potential of the whole is abused and the integrity 
of the whole is lost—be that the integrity of a single entity or an ecosystem for instance (Int. 
MH). It is mauri, tapu and mana that are important in this discussion.  
 
Māori scholar Mason Durie suggests we look at mauri within the following framework: 
[I]nanimate material objects possess their own form of life, a mauri, which both distinguishes 
them (from other objects) and also unites them within a wider network of entities. 
… 
The nature of mauri—the vitality—of [an inanimate object] depends not only on the structure 
and form but also on the relationship of [it] with the wider environment. In an Indigenous 
world objects that appear inanimate are not regarded as lifeless or static since they also 
possess an identity of their own and are part of a wider network. Belonging to that network 
creates a vibrant relationship that is at odds with the view that motionless objects lack life. … 
There are energy chains within, and dynamic relationships beyond. (Durie, 2010: 243) 
 
In the second paragraph, Durie is referring to the pyramids in Egypt. He could equally have 
been reflecting on any natural process of endless connection, creation and recreation (D. 
Williams, 2001). Physics tells us the inanimate is not ‘lifeless and static’. It is created and 
recreated by forces, by ‘energy chains within, and dynamic relationships beyond’. The 
quotations above from Māori scholar Manuka Henare and Karen Barad, physicist and 
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philosopher of physics, echo the focus on constant change and dynamism of the Māori 
ontology. These are calls well beyond ‘feel[ing] wonder [from] looking at a complex organism’ 
(Nussbaum, 2007: 349). They each call for respect of unfolding and re-emerging. The 
defining unit is not the bounded individual. Rather the shape taken is one of boundless 
interaction and interconnection. 
 
Spiritual and material are inseparable in Māori philosophy, that is all have hau, wairua, mauri, 
tapu and mana (Henare, 2001). Everything is metaphysically connected to the gods, and 
through whakapapa to ancestors and the living (M. Roberts et al., 2004; D. Williams, 2001). 
 
Life force—mauri—gives essence to everything, animate and inanimate. It is through the 
principle of mauri that the ‘energy chains within’, entangled immersion and balance are 
recognised and obligations realised. Mauri has another powerful function: it holds together 
the key spiritual elements contained within any physical body (tinana), be that animal, 
vegetable or mineral. Intrinsic to all things are hau (the breath of life and a force for good), 
wairua (akin to soul), and the integrally bound tapu and mana (Henare, 2001; Shirres, 1982). 
 
Tapu, intrinsic ‘cosmic power’ (Henare, 2001), the ‘potentiality to be’ (int. MH), ‘being with 
potentiality for power’ (Shirres, 1982: 29, 46, 50), is integral to all things and inviolable. 
Intrinsic tapu is inseparably entwined in a bound relationship with mana (Henare, 2001; 
Shirres, 1982). A quality of personal integrity commanding respect mana ‘is humanity’s 
greatest possession’ (Henare, 2001: 208). Not only humanity’s, but all things’. ‘Once a thing 
‘is’, then it has a real potentiality for power or mana’ (Shirres, 1982: 46). Where mana is 
diminished so too is tapu, and where tapu is abused, mana is reduced. Where dignity is 
abused, the entity is debased. Just as Nussbaum co-joins respect and dignity, so are mana 
and tapu co-joined. In this way Māori have ‘internalized the environment’ in Schlosberg’s 
words—no longer ‘other’ its integrity is protected (Schlosberg, 2012b; 2014). 
 
Each thing is ‘tapu in its own way’ (Shirres, 1982: 46), thus each thing calls for respect in its 
own way. Each thing is linked through all creation to its ancestral spiritual power, the ultimate 
source of tapu and mana (Henare, 2001; M. Roberts et al., 2004; Shirres, 1982; D. Williams, 
2001). ‘So the tapu of a mountain means it must be a mountain and anything that gets in the 
way to stop a mountain being a mountain is attacking the mana of the mountain…’ (Int. MH.). 
These ‘things’ may be distinguishable individual beings—a bird or tree say—or a 
The	Paralysis	of	Intergenerational	Justice:	decolonising	entangled	futures	
192 
complex—such as a mountain or river or the sea—in which no separation between 
components of the whole is distinguished.  
 
Everything has tapu, mana, hau and wairua bound together within mauri. These must be 
acknowledged in all things—that is, humans are not conceived, as they have been in the 
West, as having ‘absolute dominion’ (Ranganui Walker in D. Williams, 2001: 109) over the 
natural environment—‘everything that has mauri must be respected’ (109). Human 
dominance is tempered to ensure harmonious balance across the whole.  
 
This is more than an ‘Indigenous symbol’ (Tanasescu, 2015), of harmonious reciprocity 
between nature and indigene. This justice describes the ‘thing-power’ or ‘lively energy’ Jane 
Bennett suggests is ‘immanent in collectives that include humans, the beings best able to 
recount the experience of the force of things’ (Bennett, 2004: 365). It recognises Schlosberg’s 
argument, in expanding the CA to nonhuman, of ‘integrity of a being’ (Schlosberg, 2012a: 
175), animate or inanimate. This worldview reflects, too, Freya Mathews’ ‘creative co-action’ 
or ‘synergy’ ‘conducive to a very immediate experience of intersubjectivity’ (Mathews, 2008: 
48). It more fully binds (human) animal vegetable mineral into an intimate interconnectedness 
and materiality than each of these does. In the modern context this is not so much a 
communicative claim (Vogel, 2006), but a recognition of co-creation, co-dependencies, and a 
demand for ongoing respect for human and nonhuman.  
 
That human does not have dominion is not to suggest that human does not have a force 
within the environment—rather it motivates human to maintain harmony, ensuring human 
actions do not undermine the capabilities of nonhuman systems (Schlosberg, 2012b; 2014). 
Additionally, actions within or on nonhuman elements must augment the original as a mark of 
respect to intrinsic tapu (D. Williams, 2001). Put another way, humans have responsibilities 
and obligations to add value, enhance and maintain balance with the environment and 
elements within it, to maintain nonhuman capabilities. Recognising these concepts into law in 
Aotearoa has taken a route presaged by Christopher Stone in his seminal Should Trees Have 
Standing? (Stone, 1972).  
 
Te Awa Tupua, and Te Urewera, as bearers of tapu, mana and mauri, have their dignity 
supported when their agency is recognised—when their whole, and individual but integral 
parts are not objects but subjects. This agency is now recognised in law in the two Acts. Te 
Awa Tupua, ‘is an indivisible and living whole comprising the Whanganui River from the 
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mountains to the sea, incorporating its tributaries and all its physical and metaphysical 
elements’ (New Zealand Government 2014a: 6). Clause 2.2 and 2.3 state: ‘Te Awa Tupua is a 
legal person,’ and ‘Te Awa Tupua has the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal 
person’ (Government, 2014: 6). Furthermore, those ‘rights, powers and duties’ are to be 
executed by guardians, Te Pou Tupua, on behalf of Te Awa Tupua. 
 
Similarly, in Clause 11 of the Te Urewera Act 2014, Te Urewera is declared to be legal entity. 
Specifically:  
(1) Te Urewera is a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a 
legal person. 
(2) However,— 
(a) the rights, powers, and duties of Te Urewera must be exercised and performed 
on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera— 
  (i) by Te Urewera Board. 
(New Zealand Government, n.d.: Subpart 3) 
 
The law of Aotearoa recognises the separate and distinct existence of these entities as 
subjects of rights. It has blended the concepts of tapu, mana and mauri with the company 
model of personhood, placing each region beyond the reach of human ownership. In doing so 
the gulf between human and nonhuman is closed: all entities have rights. Given dignity is 
widely accepted as the foundation of rights this suggests Te Awa Tupua, and Te Urewera are 
dignity-bearing, and by extension if not in law, all nature.  
 
Recognition of intrinsic dignity in everything demands respect for the integrity and autonomy 
of other, to actively respect mauri within everything: respect for the integral physical and 
spiritual whole. Recognition of mauri calls for respect of tapu and mana in everything and 
acknowledgement of entangled immersion of human in environment. Conceptualising the 
existence of independent subjectivity within the elements of the ecosphere brings with it 
obligations and duties to tapu and mana.  
 
Granting personhood to a river and forest range, giving them ‘self-governance’ and 
appointing guardians to act in the interest of each creates a mechanism to draw animate and 
inanimate into the moral community. Similar conceptualisations could have been explored 
through the constitutional and legal mechanisms employed by Ecuador and Bolivia granting 
rights to Mother Nature (Bolivia, 2012; Ecuador, 2008, see also Tanasescu, 2013; 2014). 
 
In each case moral community is expanded and, I suggest, since dignity is the foundation of 
EJ and human obligations and duties, a reconfiguration of the definition of that very dignity is 
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required. The conceptualisation of this form of dignity could be labelled Immersive 
Functioning Dignity: 
P1  All humans, sentient and non-sentient life (living things) and non-living elements 
  on earth are interlinked  
P2  Living things and non-living elements have form specific integrity and life force 
P3  Living things and non-living elements have a form specific functioning and form 
  specific capabilities/potential 
P4  Non-living elements of the ecosystem contribute to the functioning of living things 
P5  It is clear when living things and non-living elements are not functioning and/or 
  cannot fulfil potential 
P6  When non-living elements are not functioning, living things cannot function or 
flourish 
P6  Dignity exists in freedom to access the necessary conditions to function and 
  fulfil form specific potential  
C   People have obligations and duties to uphold and respect the form specific dignity 
  of living things, ecosystems and non-living things 
 
Here we have a conceptualisation of dignity that supports not only human dignity, but also 
expands the domain to encompass the mauri, tapu and mana in all, and immerses human in 
an interconnected and interdependent ecosphere. The independent agency and subjectivity 
of everything is acknowledged. It can form the foundation for expanding duties and 
obligations to the dynamic interrelationships between components of interdependence and 
entanglement.   
 
When the gulf between human and other is closed, to award dignity to human alone is 
nonsensical.  
Decolonising	Dignity	
How truly sublime the notion that it is the inhuman—that which most commonly marks 
humanity’s inhumanity as a lack of compassion—that may be the very condition of 
possibility of feeling the suffering of the other, of literally being in touch with the other, of 
feeling the exchange of e-motion in the binding obligations of entanglements. That is, 
perhaps what we must face in thinking responsibility and justice is the existence of the 
inhuman as threaded through and lived through us, as enabling us, and every 
being/becoming, to reach out to the insensible otherness that we might otherwise never 
touch. (Barad, 1998 219) 
 
The CA recognises the value of culture to people’s wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2000; Watene, 
2016). Carruthers and Schlosberg identify that for Indigenous People there are community 
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capabilities that the CA can be expanded to facilitate. Fulfer, Nussbaum and Schlosberg have 
pushed the boundaries of the moral community, and the community to which we owe 
obligations and duties of justice beyond human alone, however, none expresses an 
understanding of nonhuman in a way that reflects Māori worldviews and culture. Moreover, 
they exclude also other Indigenous Peoples for whom nonhuman is bound in co-extensive 
relationships with human (Alfred, 2005; Bird Rose, 2012; Coulthard, 2014; M. Graham, 1999; 
Povinelli, 2016; Reyburn, 1988; Watson, 2015; Whyte, 2017). Taiaiake Alfred suggests an 
ontological interconnection between human and nonhuman is a common core of Indigenous 
philosophies, and ‘Indigenous notions of justice arose within the context of beliefs in a 
universal relationship among all the elements that make up our universe’ (Alfred, 1999: 42). 
Building beyond Carruthers and Schlosberg’s expansion of the CA to communities, this 
chapter has taken one possible approach to responding to the existing rupture between 
theory and Māori worldviews. It has done this by taking the foundation concept of dignity from 
which Nussbaum developed her version of the CA and reworking it to reflect the concepts of 
mauri, tapu and mana. 
 
The legitimacy of reconceptualising dignity is grounded by two factors. The first is that dignity 
has multiple conceptions within Western understandings—‘at least five’ (Schroeder, 2010). 
The second is the inability for dignity-based approaches to justice to account for Māori 
philosophy nor the philosophies of other Peoples. While the Rights for Nature/Mother Earth 
and personhood/identity status for nonhuman have been incorporated within the legal justice 
structures they remain outside Western justice theory. The argument is that flexibility can be 
brought to the CA if the already elastic concept of dignity is stretched beyond sentient beings 
and/or ecosystems. The parallel argument being that on the Māori understanding, not only is 
the ecosystem dignity bearing as Fulfer argues but so too are the constituent parts and the 
inanimate. Separately, Schlosberg sidestepped dignity as the basis for an inclusive form of 
CA, because dignity is understood as an ‘individual psychological state’ within the HR 
tradition, and it is hard to trace whether other beings experience a similar sense of their ‘own 
self-respect’ (Schlosberg, 2012b: 175). The obligations of justice on his account could be 
directed at upholding the ‘integrity’ of nonhuman. ‘[A] violation of the integrity of a being is’, he 
suggests, ‘a better marker for standing’ (ibid.).  
 
While only the work by Carruthers and Schlosberg was specifically designed to incorporate 
Indigenous worldviews, each of Nussbaum, Fulfer, Carruthers, and Schlosberg open 
pathways to decolonise the CA. The contribution here is to suggest that conceptualising 
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dignity from the Māori concepts of mauri, tapu and mana broadens dignity’s boundaries to 
include animal, vegetable, and mineral. Moreover, it assigns intrinsic worth and demands 
respect for the environment as a whole, individual features (such mountains, rivers, or 
ranges) and their constituent parts. An expansive conceptualisation of dignity such as this 
can then effectively provide a normative foundation for the constitutions of Switzerland and 
Ecuador and laws of Bolivia and Aotearoa New Zealand and for CA as a variant of the HR 
approach to justice.  
 
Nussbaum links dignity with respect in the same concept family, that is as she understands it 
the concepts are bound inseparably (Bendik-Keymer, 2014), and she applies the concepts to 
individuals of a species. The Māori concepts of tapu and mana are similarly a co-joined 
duality. Tapu like dignity twines with mana or respect: to disrespect is to abuse tapu. 
However, Nussbaum is, in Bendik-Keymer’s phrasing, a biocentric individualist (ibid.: 176). 
This individualism is at odds with Māori ontology. Recognising a constant interplay of creation 
and recreation, in Māori life ways ‘wonder’ exists in the layers of interconnection, the overlap 
and interplay between all things on earth, not just in individuals of a species. For Māori 
individual wellbeing is dependent on community wellbeing, where community is all there is 
within the environment. Awareness of vulnerabilities to and dependences on interconnectivity 
are entwined within kaitiakitanga, the Māori philosophy of care, guardianship and IJ. 
  
It is important to note that the Māori concepts of an integrative metaphysical and material 
whole, which call on human to act to support the dignity of other as a matter of justice do not 
suggest human endeavour and development must stop, ossify or regress. Rather, obligations 
and duties become grounded in respect for the dignity, the wholeness and wellbeing, of all 
things. Granting the nonhuman dignity pulls it firmly into the scope of justice shaping a body 
of obligations and duties to not only protect but also to uphold, support and enhance the 
flourishing and right to be integrally whole of all elements within the environment. 
Recognising the dignity in nonhuman establishes a common core of ‘self-interest’, and a 
means to understand the ‘binding obligations of entanglements’ Karen Barad refers to above. 
It engages IEJ’s destructive challenges by addressing the entangled immersion of human 
and nonhuman, the co-dependencies, and intimate connections. 
 
Dignity conceived this way does not rest in the individual living being. As already identified it 
can extend to a river or range and the individual elements within each. The elements of the 
ecosystems and the ecosystems themselves are united by mauri. In Mason Durie’s words, 
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mauri ‘both distinguishes them … and also unites them within a wider network of entities’. 
This unity of wider networks includes also ancestors and generates respect for their living 
continuation within genes, works, monuments, and the gift of healthy environments to the 
living. It encompasses the yet-to-be-born from respect for their place within the continuum of 
life, heritage, and endeavour, in their group identity as potentialities. It supports the demand 
of IEJ to ensure future generations receive an environment that will support their capabilities 
and dignity.  
 
Expanding our understanding of how dignity can reside in nonhuman, locates human as one 
among many elements within the environment, rather than in a position of domination over it. 
It is possible it might capture the Aboriginal understanding of relationships between human 
and nonhuman where people are understood to be nature’s ‘intelligence, playing a vital role 
in the self-government of the interactions between species and environment’ (Reyburn, 1988: 
1), but not superior to nature.  
 
If the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Energy in Aotearoa understood mana moana they may 
have expected intense resistance to the idea of seismic testing and oil drilling. For Apanui, 
mana moana includes recognition of the mauri, tapu and mana of the sea and currents, 
sea-creatures, the seabed, the seaweeds and the humans who have cared for them from 
respect for ancestors (human and spiritual), their own lives and those of future generations 
(Gage, 2012). Kaitiakitanga includes an obligation to uphold the dignity of the seas, of 
ancestors, of the living and future generations and of whakapapa—the connection of all 
things.  
 
Had the Federal Government of Australia understood the dignity of country they might have 
expected the storage of radioactive waste within its depths would elicit intense resistance. On 
a tangential note, had Americans understood the dignity of the Missouri River and Lake 
Oahe, they might not have been surprised at the intensity of resistance at Standing Rock 
(Levin, 2017a; 2017b). For within these ontologies, ‘[I]n the kingdom of ends everything has 
[…] a dignity. … [Everything] is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent’ 
to rephrase Kant (Kant 1988, 42 [4:434-435]).  
 
Mauri, tapu and mana place an onus on people to think of the nonhuman as respect-worthy 
and to recognise the existential entanglement of all things. Justice for nonhuman grounded 
by these Māori concepts acknowledges the dual place of human and nonhuman on the 
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planet, and the needs of both. It calls for respect, enhancement and co-creation. It conjures a 
duty to care for and improve the environment for and of itself from and for all time.  
 
Affording dignity to the nonhuman is a call to respect a ‘right’ to integrity, flourishing and 
support of form and function. It draws the nonhuman into the rights narrative and expands 
responsibilities within the political domain, requiring us, as Schlosberg says, ‘to think about 
the autonomy and unfolding potential of the ethical issues of interrupting […] life process’ 
(Schlosberg 2014: 81. Italics original.). 
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Section	3:	Discussion	 	
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Chapter	9:	Imagining	entanglement	
 
Indigenous people are: ‘Peoples who are regarded as Indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of 
present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (United Nations Development 
Group, 2009: 8) 
 
Decolonisation would decenter Western political theories and a global order, which is 
regulated by linear thinking, thinking that has produced a ‘colonial matrix of power’ that 
holds dispossession of those colonised by the state at its core. However, to dispossess, 
enslave, exploit and dispose of human beings is unlawful, and the state cannot continue 
to legitimise and make lawful its own crimes. (Watson, 2015: 149) 
 
 
Over ninety countries have within their population’s people who identify as Indigenous. The 
focus of this study has been primarily on two settler states—Australia and Aotearoa— 
however the principles at stake could be transported to the other settler states in which the 
cultures, philosophies, and welfare of the original inhabitants have been displaced by those of 
more recent, and more numerous migrant settlers. These are sites in which, despite 
post-colonial rhetoric, the decolonizing project seems to the dispossessed to have barely 
begun. Embedded within political structures, law and social practices are assumptions and 
processes that allow the settlers to maintain domination over the first peoples of those lands.  
 
Here the ongoing and extended colonial project has been focussed through the lens of the 
political philosophy of IEJ. Western attempts to theorise and implement IEJ have been 
compared with Indigenous theorisation and practice in Australia and Aotearoa, and it has 
touched too on North America, Ecuador and Bolivia. These people—Australian Aboriginal, 
Aotearoa Māori, North and South American first nations—are remnant populations of peoples 
who were and continue to be subject to demands by invaders to become something else. 
Unique cultures, lifeways, philosophies, political structures and laws have been smothered by 
imported language, laws, regulations, social constructions and political domination. They are 
peoples who have been subject to indignities and horrific violence: genocide, enslavement, 
forced removals, stolen children, land theft, incarceration, and linguistic, spiritual and cultural 
suppression. This regime of violence continues, although it is now an insidiously subtle and 
covert violence, thinly disguised in a garb of political concern and patronage. Denied the 
dignity of traditional territories, languages, cultures and wider social acceptance within the 
dominant societies, many are forced to the physical and social margins (Watson, 2002; 2015; 
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Whyte, 2017). And yet, despite the odds, Indigenous identity and culture persist. Indeed there 
has been an Indigenous cultural resurgence in the settler states since the 1970’s 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005). However, despite this resurgence Indigenous Peoples continue to 
be othered, and the argument here has been that Western conceptions of justice, in 
particular, IEJ, are complicit in that othering project. 
 
Entangled throughout this thesis lurks another indignity—the rejection by the mainstream of 
Indigenous philosophy. Indeed, as you may recall, so engrained is this rejection I originally 
placed the term philosophy, as applied to Indigenous Peoples’ philosophy, in scare quotes. I 
have used the term philosophy to describe the living, iterative, and ongoing search by 
Indigenous Peoples to understand the natural and cultural world and their place in it, develop 
and codify ethics, establish systems of justice and governance, and to establish ways of living 
together free of domination and harms. Based on Indigenous ontologies, epistemologies, 
laws, and philosophy conceptualising and implementing IEJ is well resolved. IEJ is neither 
esoteric nor incalculably hard. And this is where I began. For anyone steeped in a 
land/country/environment ontology, to read through Western liberal philosophers’ debates on 
IEJ is to be left with feelings of confusion and bewilderment. We know it’s not hard. We have 
it sorted. It does not connate sacrifice in the sense of ‘denial of self-interest’ as John Meyer 
suggests is invoked by contemporary Western discourse (Meyer, 2015: 14). Nor is it 
generated by the reflexive self-interest that Richard Hiskes thinks may be sufficient to 
motivate IJ (Hiskes, 2005; 2009). It does not require a complicated algebra of rights—X has 
interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on others—per Raz and Caney 
(Caney, 2010a). Why?  
 
Throughout the thesis, I have undertaken a quest to unwrap why IEJ is obvious and integral 
within my Māori heritage, to Australian Aboriginal peoples, and to other Indigenous Peoples, 
while the West largely resists its call. Through court cases, philosophy, story and scholarship 
the search has been for what are and where lie the disjunctures. Simultaneously, lessons for 
the West have been sought. Because by justice theories’ own standards decolonisation must 
be necessary, the approach has been to radically and critically ask how Western justice 
theories and theorists are perpetuating the colonial project and injustice. 
 
I have attempted to answer and resolve aspects of these questions. First, I outlined the 
philosophic boundaries of IJ, EJ and Indigenous justice as they are theorised within the 
Western academy. Then I employed three experiential location devices that identified key 
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ontological distinctions between Māori, Aboriginal and liberal philosophy. Each case identified 
how existing theories of IEJ are unable to accommodate underlying principles of Māori and 
Aboriginal life. In doing so my aim has been to demonstrate that Māori and Aboriginal 
philosophy is neither backward, backward-looking, nor fixed. Critical to this project are 
demonstrably lived and evolving life experience and lifeways. That is, I have dealt with 
modern culture, living cultures of the twenty-first century. This is not a revisionist project.  
 
Finally, two key concepts that underpin IEJ—time and dignity—were examined—each 
offering avenues to broaden the conceptual foundations and practical application of IEJ. I 
have suggested that in their conceptualisation lie the foundations of philosophic difference 
between Māori and Aboriginal and the West, and also that by reconsidering their form they 
are a bridge to decolonising IEJ. When time is understood as synchronously past, present, 
and future IEJ is released from intergenerational competition. An act now is understood to 
also have consequences within the framework of duties to past and future. Where 
everything—animal, vegetable, and mineral—is dignity-bearing and respect-worthy, human 
acts are moderated beyond instant gratification.   
 
Where and how liberal, and Māori and Aboriginal understandings of IEJ differ has been 
examined through some core conceptual underpinnings to theory and practice. Doing this, I 
have chosen to rend the entanglement of transcendental, human and nonhuman, past 
present and future intrinsic to Māori and Aboriginal ontologies. That has been difficult. Each 
intruded upon the others constantly, reflecting the entanglement as it exists in the world. 
While Western practice is to separate, to reduce to parts, to partition each into discrete 
domains, it is this very practice that creates dilemmas in IJ and EJ, and in policy and practice. 
Justice in the West has endeavoured to solve questions of interpersonal and state limits by 
focussing on human interactions. Māori and Aboriginal philosophies frame the same 
questions to include nonhuman within just practices. 
 
More importantly, the thesis has unpacked aspects of the entrenched ongoing oppression of 
first peoples within justice theory. Although presented as universal justice frameworks, and 
frequently theorised by scholars living within the settler states, Indigenous Peoples’ ongoing 
duties and obligations within their own living and lively philosophical, Law and governance 
structures are overlooked. Effectively justice theories support, knowingly or not, the 
displacement of Indigenous Law and governance to the settler regimes’ power and 
dominance. That is, they perpetuate the long colonial practice of ignoring, dismissing, or 
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denying Indigenous wellbeing, autonomy and authority. My challenge has been to see if IEJ 
can decolonise, to uncover avenues that, while maintaining core features of theory, are 
flexible enough to embrace holistic ontological perspectives. I suggest that IEJ either 
embraces the entanglements of human and nonhuman, coloniser and Indigene, past present 
and future or, if it does not, the theory cannot maintain a claim to universalism.  
 
After reviewing the key findings from each section this concluding discussion will narrow in on 
three particular conceptual adjustments which may facilitate a revitalisation of IEJ through HR 
and CA. There is of course much left untouched by the thesis—so it concludes with a brief 
review of those shortcomings and potential avenues for further research.  
 
Living	at	the	intersection	 	
Philosophic	environment	
Tribal governments have enormous—historic—responsibilities to ensure members can 
safely practice their relationships with the environment (Creation). (Whyte, 2011: 199) 
 
As the descendants and reincarnations of these ancestral beings, Indigenous people 
derive their sense of belonging to country through and from them … Colonization did not 
destroy this ontological relationship to country. (Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 12) 
 
Western justice theories respond to real needs. In different ways, they suggest how to 
organise society. They create devices to ensure each member of society is equally free from 
oppression and domination. Drawing on millennia of theory each refines and finesses the 
formulae of past ages, time, culture, and social standards. They respond to real and potential 
injustices in the world, placing boundaries around individual freedoms where they risk 
impinging on others’ freedoms. And in this, they are to some extent a juggling exercise. That 
juggle is particularly evident in theorising IEJ.  
 
Māori and Aboriginal Australians, along with other original inhabitants of what have become 
the settler states, also devised theories of cooperation and justice.144 Drawing on millennia of 
experience and theorising, they expressed these theories in story, dance, song and lived 
example, through protocol, procedure and practice. Like Western theories, they take different 
forms. And like the theories of the West, they continue to evolve. For the living members of 
these societies and cultures, these philosophies resonate. They continue to shine a light.  
                                                
144 As have many other Peoples. 
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While they too involve a juggle, it is perhaps least evident in Indigenous theories of IEJ. And 
this was the provocation for this thesis. Why do Māori of Aotearoa and Aboriginal of Australia, 
Amerindians, Northern American First Peoples embrace IEJ while Western societies wriggle 
and squirm from obligations to the environment and future generations? The introduction has 
a table summarising some key philosophic differences (see page 20) and I’ll come back to 
these shortly. For now, I want to address decolonisation.  
 
For Indigenous Peoples within settler states maintaining and sustaining culture and values is 
threatened by post-colonial political and legal structures, environmental harms, climate 
change and alienation.145 This is particularly, but not exclusively, the case where their 
numbers relegate them to minority status, and entrenched disadvantage moves them to the 
margins of social consciousness and peripheral geographic locations. My argument 
throughout this thesis is that protecting and enabling Indigenous and ambicultural values and 
acts is a matter of justice. Or conversely, I argue where Indigenous Peoples autonomy is 
suppressed injustice occurs (Carruthers, 2010; Schlosberg, 2004; Whyte, 2011; Young, 
2011).146 I have specifically addressed Indigenous Peoples of the settler states, where 
people wish to maintain and pass to their heirs, philosophies, customs and practices.147 This 
is a matter of IEJ where that culture, philosophy etc., is bound with nonhuman and in a 
territorial environment. The suggestion is, Indigenous Peoples ability to ‘walk’ equally freely in 
two worlds, the dominant culture and their Indigenous culture, where they choose to do so, 
may be impaired by the structures of state. This is particularly the case where the state 
sanctions, and/or fails to stop acts that permanently change or degrade the environment, or 
encourages and facilitates its alienation. The freedom to choose to be Indigenous, to protect 
and preserve nonhuman kin now and for future generations is then stifled.  
 
Additionally, Indigenous culture, and the obligations and duties members of Indigenous 
nations bear are not recognised and acknowledged as seriously as those of the dominant 
society. The claim is that injustice persists in settler states in circumstances where 
                                                
145 This does not exhaust the list of disadvantage. The list is limited to those areas of focus in this thesis. 
146 It should go without saying that I am referring to autonomous acts which themselves do not contravene the 
rights or capabilities of others in an unethical manner. Acts which caused injury or death for instance fall outside 
the boundaries of acceptable autonomous acts. 
147 Here I mean Indigenous Peoples’ ongoing, living, evolving but distinctly identifiable epistemologies and 
ontologies. Ones that have continued to exists and evolve within the bodies of knowledge and actions of the 
peoples. I am not talking here of the cultures of yore, but rather those that have evolve and developed since 
colonisation—much as the dominant culture has continued to evolve—and however, have remained identifiably 
distinct from those of the imported, and now dominant, culture. 
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Indigenous citizens are unable to fulfil their traditional duties and obligations to the 
environment and heirs. Moreover, I suggest, all Indigenous justice is IJ, and all Indigenous 
justice is EJ: the environment, past-present-future, being Indigenous and justice are 
inseparably entangled. Within the settler states, all Indigenous justice issues have at their 
heart IEJ. Indigenous agency is as truncated by the post-colonial project as it was by active 
colonialism. Indigenous agency is truncated, too, by Western theories of IEJ.  
 
The claim that the colonial project continues arises where the state chooses to prioritise 
dominant structures and preferences within the traditional territories of the Indigenous 
Peoples. Despite the alienation of the territories from their control and official custodianship, 
Indigenous Peoples’ identity and obligations are based in the ongoing responsibility they 
retain for their traditional territories, derived from kinship and entwined relationships between 
the people and the animals, plants, birds, waters, fish, landforms (Durie, 1998; 
Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Watson, 2015; Whyte, 2016). The introductory quotations suggest 
while territories have been removed from traditional ‘ownership’ and many acres are now 
under the fee simple title system of the settler states, these lands, waterways, seas, and 
associated lifeforms remain in the minds of their Indigenous kin within the purview of 
traditional owners’ responsibilities. This is their custom. This is their law. From a Māori or 
Aboriginal standpoint, traditional responsibilities of custodianship do not cease with 
alienation. Traditional owners still hold and maintain intergenerational and environmental 
obligations to country whether the state recognises it or not (Durie, 1998; Moreton-Robinson, 
2015; Ruckstuhl et al., 2014; Watson, 2015; Whyte, 2014; Yunupingu, 1997). However, the 
state has the power, as we saw with Apanui, to emasculate traditional owners’ capacity to 
uphold culturally important practices—practices from which identity is moulded.148  
 
For Indigenous Peoples, inclusion in a Western-style political and legal structure was, and for 
some remains, involuntary: that is the Indigenous Peoples are denied the agency to choose 
the philosophic and political structures in which they operate and from which their obligations 
and duties derive. The epistemology and ontology on which the Western laws and politics are 
based have been foist upon Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, these Peoples are compelled 
to adhere to laws through various measures of force and violence (Stewart-Harawira, 2005; 
Watson, 2015). 
                                                
148 This entanglement of identity, custom, nonhuman and territory is an essential part of the settler state 
Indigenous Peoples being. See for instance (Alfred, 1999; 2005; Coulthard, 2014; Durie, 1998; 2010; M. Graham, 
2008; Randall, 2003; 2007; Reyburn, 1988; M. Roberts et al., 2004; Watson, 2015; Walia, 2015; Whyte, 2014). 
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It is important to note this discussion is not about the West or liberalism per se. That 
Indigenous ontology is not concordant with liberal orthodoxies and vice versa is, despite the 
many words about to be dedicated to that discord, in many ways irrelevant. Importance, 
significance, and relevance rest in structures and institutions capable of acknowledging and 
supporting Indigenous Peoples autonomy and recognition. Pertinence arises where current 
Indigenous ontological orthodoxies, the scaffolds of Indigenous IEJ, are repressed and 
over-ruled within the settler states. In the vein of Iris Marion Young the claim is that, to include 
the Indigenous Peoples of the settler states upon whom their theories impact, Western IEJ 
need to be ‘imaginatively taking their positions’ (Young 1997: 341).149 As matters of IIEJ there 
are two domains with which the West must grapple: liberal philosophical orthodoxy needs 
re-examining to identify potential blocks to IEJ generated by those orthodoxies, and adapt to 
address them; and secondly, and more importantly here, liberal orthodoxy must re-examine 
itself to identify ways in which it oppresses people within its parameters of influence.  
 
The objective is not to include Indigenous Peoples within liberal philosophy and politics. 
Rather this thesis contrasts the liberal against the Indigenous and argues two things. First, for 
Indigenous Peoples to fulfil their culturally specific obligations and duties of IEJ, Western 
political philosophy must develop a deeper, respectful understanding of those duties and 
obligations and ensure they avoid further marginalising Indigenous Peoples. The project is 
about recognising Indigenous Peoples’ agency. Second, I am suggesting that by carefully 
reflecting on Indigenous ontologies, seemingly intractable liberal conundrums may dissolve, 
albeit that some individual freedoms may be curtailed. For instance, understanding human 
existence as entangled with nonhuman existence is one avenue towards maintaining a 
healthy, vibrant, regenerative environment. Including past and future generations within our 
communities facilitates a sense of continuity that focuses attention on gifts from the past and 
responsibilities to the future. That is, reflection in selected Indigenous lifeways becomes a 
site of knowledge production that challenges and enables changes to liberal orthodoxies 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2015).  
 
                                                
149 The thesis does not contain a comprehensive coverage of Young’s theory of Recognition Justice. The 
difficulties the theory holds in the Indigenous arena are thoroughly critiqued by Glenn Coulthard (Coulthard, 2014). 
Kyle Powys Whyte also identifies significant hurdles encountered when applying recognition justice when 
evaluating environmental justice for Indigenous Peoples (Whyte, 2011a). 
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Political	environments	 	
… the specific ways in which tribal sovereignty is defined and represented in relation to 
non-tribal institutions may leave the tribes open to injustice.  
(Whyte, 2011a: 199-200) 
 
[Indigenous peoples’/Aboriginal] ontological relationship to land, the ways that country is 
constitutive of us, and therefore the inalienable nature of our relation to land, marks a 
radical, indeed incommensurable, difference between us and the non-Indigenous. This 
ontological relation to land constitutes a subject position that we do not share, that cannot 
be shared, with the postcolonial subject, whose sense of belonging in this place is tied to 
migrancy.  
(Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 11) 
 
Daily, Indigenous Peoples watch the degradation of lands, waterways and seas sabotaging 
their heirs’ autonomy (Selby et al., 2010; Whyte, 2017). While many Māori self-describe as 
ambicultural, the structures and law of Aotearoa are not. Australian Aboriginal clans have 
Native Title over their lands, which oftentimes empower them with little more than entry rights 
to the territory to perform ceremonies and protect sacred sites (as long as those sites will not 
impede mineral exploration and exploitation).150 At Standing Rock in South Dakota, the 
agency to fulfil obligations to protect water has been given and removed by the strokes of two 
Presidential pens. Within these settler states Indigenous agency is circumscribed by 
provisos: firstly, agency exists within prescribed parameters—to conform to the 
dominant/dominating norms of the state—and secondly, where Indigenous norms and 
dominant norms conflict the state prevails. Protection of the environment for future 
generations is then alienated from Indigenous hands and left with the state.  
 
When Indigenous practice, philosophy, ontology, epistemology, law, language, and/or 
lifeways conflict with the settler model, it is the settler model that is favoured by institutions of 
state, as we saw with Apanui in Chapter 4. Settler property ownership laws, settler 
boundaries, settler individualisation, settler time, settler anthropocentrism, settler ontology 
underpin the liberal settler state norm and define the parameters of acceptability and legality. 
Indigenous Peoples are left in a bind. They have obligations and duties under both systems. 
But where the Indigenous system resolves problems intractable to liberal philosophy and 
politics, they are hamstrung. Liberal political philosophy’s foundations are seemingly 
unshakable.  
 
                                                
150 See for instance the Yindjibarndi Native Title - 
http://www.nntt.gov.au/searchRegApps/NativeTitleRegisters/NNTR%20Extracts/WCD2005_001/NNTRExtract_W
CD2005_001.pdf, accessed 28 march 2017. 
While the Te Urewera Bill granted personhood status to a geo-region, it secures mining rights for the Crown (New 
Zealand Government, n.d.). 
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Two separate confrontations between the State and Māori and Aboriginal people were 
examined in Chapter 4 (Aotearoa) and Chapter 6 (Australia). They are not the only ones. Nor 
are they unique or new. They simply provide context and grounding for the more esoteric 
discussion that has preceded and will proceed in this section. They are included here to 
illustrate the lived experience of Indigenous People in settler states with the neo-colonial 
experience. Each also exemplifies the clash of underlying ontological values that has and will 
continue to generate irruptions in Māori and Aboriginal agency, autonomy, human rights, and 
capability fulfilment until settler states create respectful spaces for Indigenous epistemology 
and ontology. I could equally have chosen examples from the Tar Sands territories of Canada 
or from Standing Rock in the USA. These are not problems unique to one or two groups of 
people in Aotearoa and Australia alone.  
 
Apanui, the iwi who’s rohe covers the north-eastern margins, ranges, waterways and sea of 
the East Cape region of Aotearoa, were given one month by the Department of Energy to 
respond to a complex off-shore oil and gas exploration project consultation. Their elected 
officials and lawyer were deep in preparing a submission to a related Bill—revisions to the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act (FSA). Apanui immediately made two requests: first, that the 
government appoint one ‘agent’ with whom they could negotiate on iwi related issues, and 
second, their submission to the offshore mining proposal be delayed until the FSA was 
complete. These can be seen as practically driven requests, the iwi has limited resources. 
They are also politically driven requests—Māori protocols are consensus-based. One 
meeting with the government would be insufficient to gain a consensus. The government’s 
agents ignored both requests, the mining permit was granted, a foreign company engaged, 
and the survey vessels entered the waters of Apanui traditional seas. Apanui responded with 
a flotilla blockade that was eventually broken by the country’s navy.  
 
Apanui then took the Minister for Energy to the High Court, accusing the Minister of failing to 
follow due process (Gendall, 2012). The trial considered the Minister and Ministry’s extensive 
evidence of process. It considered Apanui’s single affidavit. It found in favour of the Minister, 
as did a subsequent appeal. The court heard but could not apprehend the law of Apanui. The 
process the Minister followed was that of the dominant Anglo-based law and legislative 
regime. The process Apanui described articulated traditional responsibilities. The duties to 
ancestors, duties to nonhuman kin, duties to the seas, foreshore and land, duties to pass to 
heirs an improved environment. These are political and ethical responsibilities. They are 
kaitiakitanga. They contain Apanui’s philosophy of entanglement, their theory of IEJ. Their 
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affidavit spoke of responsibilities to the sea creatures, responsibilities based in an ontology 
that emplaces gods, ancestors, the living, future generations, fish, fowl, beast, plant, 
waterway and landform in an ever past-present-future-past spiral of interconnection 
(whakapapa). It described all time and the gifts of giving inside an entanglement with the 
intrinsic properties of all things through all time.  
 
The Milwayi, Ngapa, Wirntiku and Ngarrka clans of Warumungu people of North West 
Australia fought a long battle to have their traditional lands, country, returned under Native 
Title, to be confronted almost immediately, by a Federal Government decision to locate the 
nation’s proposed nuclear waste dump there. Traditionally, decision making is a collective 
and iterative process for Aboriginal: a decision is based on consensus (Int. DR). In this case, 
the Government and the Northern Land Council (NLC) chose to negotiate with just one family 
of the clan, and one legally designated Traditional Owner. She negotiated the terms, her 
family and the NLC received the financial benefits.  
 
The community rallied. They rallied to protect country. Country for which their ancestors have 
been custodians for at least 2000 generations. Country for which their parents and 
grandparents had fought to (re)gain title to. Country from which comes the law. Country with 
which they are each entangled. Country that must be protected for itself and heirs—human 
and nonhuman. The Traditional Owners took the same action as Apanui. They went to the 
High Court. On the eve of the hearing the Minister withdrew and announced the government 
would enter into a twelve-month search for a new site.  
 
While a victory for Warunungu, this was a pyrrhic victory for Aboriginal people. The new site, 
in South Australia, is situated on land held in fee simple title. It is on a rural landholding. The 
owner will receive financial compensation for the land and the local community funds for 
community development. Invisible to the state and the landowner are the Aboriginal people, 
the Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners who have a 50,000+-year line of direct descent from 
the original settlers to country (Tobler et al., 2017). Over these years generations have 
learned from, share kinship ties with, emplaced their ancestors and future generations, and 
fulfilled custodial obligations to this place. 2000 generations have sung, danced, and listened 
to this county. That the state structures deem it to now be owned by another in no way 
diminished these ties, kinship connections, duties and responsibilities. But state structures 
simultaneously negate the authenticity of these connections, duties and responsibilities, and 
the agency of Aboriginal people to fulfil them.  
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More recent is the matter of the Dakota Access Pipeline’ route under the Missouri River in 
North Dakota. The path of the pipeline crosses the Missouri only because it has been 
diverted ‘from a predominantly white suburb to a predominantly Native reservation’ (Geiling, 
2017). The response of the Standing Rock Lakota was the rallying cry ‘mní wičhóni’, water is 
life. Like many translations, this fails to capture the ontology behind the meaning. In addition 
to sustaining life, water is sacred (LaPier, 2017). Lakota have spiritual, philosophical, 
law-based obligations and duties to maintain its purity. After a site protest, widely supported 
by a wide range of American people, President Obama signed a hold on construction. 
President Trump picked up a pen and reversed the process allowing construction to proceed. 
Court challenges, too, have failed (Geiling, 2017). During the process the protesters have 
been attacked by police (Levin, 2017a), the North Dakota government created new criminal 
penalties and strengthen existing protest penalties (Geiling, 2017), protesters were arrested 
and face lengthy prison terms (Levin, 2017b).  
 
These cases highlight a shadow of Indigenous experience in settler states. They are selected 
to demonstrate that despite the settler states’ ongoing attempts to eliminate the cultures of 
the original nations of invaded lands, these cultures are alive and IEJ is for them a priority. 
They reveal the ongoing strength of culture and responsibilities to territories that pre-date the 
colonial invasion. Importantly, they show these cultures are not historical relics. They live in 
the present. The multi-materiality of Indigenous being is not new or post-subsistence, it 
existed and continues to exist in states of both subsistence and plenty, moneyed and 
non-moneyed economies. These, like all cultures, continue to grow, develop and evolve. 
However, the DAPL protest and fight, like Apanui’s, Warumungu’s and Adnyamathanha’s are 
symbols of ongoing systemic oppression, borne of a complete incomprehension of and lack 
of curiosity about Indigenous ontology. Archetypical epistemological ignorance it renders 
these Peoples’ philosophy, belief systems, Law and custom unknowable. In each case, the 
state offered minimal (if any) consultation and no effective avenues for negotiated outcomes 
on Indigenous terms. In each case, state actions are deemed legal within the dominant 
structures. While they transgress the Laws of the traditional owners they simultaneously 
render invisible the Indigenous Peoples’ ontology and protocols of IEJ. Unless the cloak of 
invisibility is raised, even with just procedure, the parameters within which Indigenous 
Peoples can operate in the settler states limits their capacity to fulfil the obligations of IEJ. 
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In summary, drawn from these cases common themes arise. In the minds of the Peoples 
concerned, their obligations and duties to IEJ have not been extinguished by colonisation. 
Land, waterways, seas, plants and animals are entwined with being and spirituality. Individual 
strength is rooted in community strength. Territory, integral to community and cultural identity, 
is sacred and respect-worthy. Human being is no more important than other being. All 
creation has dignity. Ancestors and future generations are alive in the present.  
 
While many of the ontological values in Figure 1.1 (page 20) have been well addressed by 
theorists, it has not been specifically for Indigenous Peoples but rather as part of general 
ontological differences within the body of liberal thought. Moreover, as Krushil Watene notes, 
‘politically liberal theories look to be unable to speak to the challenge of future generations in 
full’ (Watene, 2013: 35). Additionally, integration of nonhuman into the canon is seldom 
addressed, and the conception of time remains resolutely mechanical. The next section 
attempts to draw the elements of Figure 1.1 together. The review of the liberal canon is by 
necessity brief. The ‘new’ insights will come from the parameters Aboriginal and Māori 
philosophies describe. Strongly evoked throughout Indigenous People’s rights discourse, and 
specifically in the discourse of the key protagonists in the case-studies above, are a 
communitarianism which integrates and entangles nonhuman within the collective, attribution 
of subjectivity to environment/nature, and a sense of intergenerational justice that spans past 
present and future generations. Together they hold the key to cultural continuity and 
autonomy.  
 
Where the environment is substantially degraded, kin-species become extinct, traditional 
foods, medicines and craft-material sources lost, landscapes, seascapes, waters and sacred 
sites reshaped and/or destroyed the content and context of culture is eroded. In such 
situations then, people are unable to continue culturally significant practices, nor pass to 
future generations the knowledge and lifeways gifted to the living by ancestors. Nor are they 
able to honour cultural and moral responsibilities to those same ancestors. The choice to be 
Indigenous or ambicultural is then denied to future generations. The cultures of the settler 
states will be homogenised.151 
                                                
151 This homogeneity has been the objective of the colonial project from the outset, however, where it is not 
voluntary it can be understood to be an affront to the dignity of the people so denied and a limitation to their 
agency and autonomy, each of which is as discussed throughout this thesis foundational to modern liberal justice 
theories. 
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Inseparability:	Ontological	foundations	
[The] representation of postcolonial Australia offers the symbolic appropriation of the 
sacred as a way that white Australia can seek to achieve the unattainable imperative of 
becoming Indigenous in order to erase its unbelonging. A sentiment of belonging is 
enhanced through white possession of the “Indigenous sacred” as well as Indigenous 
lands. (Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 10) 
 
Old Aboriginal people have often stated that White Australians ‘have no Dreaming’, that 
is, they have no collective spiritual identity, together with no true understanding of having 
a correct or ‘proper’ relationship with land/reality.  
(M. Graham, 2008: 188) 
 
The environment is never far from the surface in any aspect of Māori or Aboriginal 
philosophy. Nature merges with and emerges in culture and culture merges with and 
emerges in nature. Likewise, nonhuman weaves through each of the ontological ruptures 
identified in Figure 1.1. As each is separated in this section, so each is inseparable to the 
other within Māori and Aboriginal otology. The entanglement reverberates through each 
subsection marking the irrationality of the attempted disentanglement.  
 
The project is pursued because, for instance, while Avner de Shalit’s CTIJ turns its back on 
individualism, it is unable to account for Māori conceptions of time nor Aboriginal conceptions 
of nonhuman subjectivity (de-Shalit, 1995). So too, while the individualism of Derek Parfit is 
rejected by many, holism, place, omni-dimensional past-present-future and nonhuman dignity 
find not home in their theories nor Parfit’s (Parfit, 1984). While Simon Caney’s HR based 
approach sweeps future generations into the HR dialogue he pays no head to ancestors 
(Caney, 2008). Edward Page’s IJ viewed through the lens of reciprocity can include 
communitarians and acknowledges obligations born(e) of inheritances from ancestors, 
however, it too instrumentalises nonhuman (Page, 2007b). They are all, resolutely 
anthropocentric. Martha Nussbaum’s CA (Nussbaum, 2007; 2011), while extending 
subjectivity to some nonhuman sentient beings as part of human communities, is still 
individualistic, unable to accommodate an entangled human and nonhuman worldview, and 
offers an insubstantial account of IJ (Watene, 2013).  
 
This section teases out aspects of ontology that are actually fibres of the same twine. It does 
so not to appropriate the ‘Indigenous sacred’, but rather to underscore the ongoing role 
liberally-based justice theory has on unravelling the foundations of Indigenous 
Peoples’—past present future—wellbeing, the role liberal justice theories continue to oppress 
their epistemologies and ontologies (Dotson, 2014). 
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Holism	 	
Because the ancestral spirits gave birth to humans, they share a common life force, which 
emphasizes the unity of humans with the earth rather than their separation. The 
ontological relationship occurs through the inter substantiation of ancestral beings, 
humans, and land; it is a form of embodiment. … Colonization did not destroy this 
ontological relationship with country. As the descendants and reincarnations of these 
ancestral beings, Indigenous people derive their sense of belonging to country through 
and from them. … Colonization did not destroy this ontological relationship to country.  
(Moreton-Robinson, 2015: 12) 
 
Holistic ontologies, or econtologies, do not privilege humans. They share a recognition of 
interconnectivity between living and non-living things. Human and nonhuman are understood 
to be part of the same continuous whole, each element dependent on and responsible (within 
the bounds of its capability) to the other. The focus is on ensuring harmony within the totality 
of earth systems.   
 
‘Other’ is not owned, dominated, tamed or turned solely to human advantage. Other is to be 
respected, husbanded and supported as an integral whole and to ensure the wellbeing of 
human as one element of a total wellbeing (Bird Rose, 2012; Durie, 1998; Gage, 2012; 
Henare, 2001; Muecke, 2004; Randall, 2007; M. Roberts et al., 2004; Stewart-Harawira, 
2005; Watene & Yap, 2015; Watson, 2015). Within this understanding of people and 
environment obligations of justice extend to all living and non-living matter without an 
extensive privileging of human (M. Graham, 2008). The Apanui affidavit states:  
The kapu (key philosophical message) conveyed by our ancients here is that we are part 
of an inter connected and interrelated whole, and like that whole, stand possessed of 
qualities sourced in Atua (spiritual powers). In terms of our relationships with the 
environment, they are governed by a tikanga (laws) of deep respect and spiritual bond. 
(Gage, §18, 3)  
There is awe in, and understanding of interrelationships between all elements. In these 
situations, maintaining balance is paramount.  
 
Importantly cultural identity and structure are deeply entwined in and with nonhuman as 
Henare and Moreton-Robinson identify of Māori and Aboriginal ontologies above. Animals, 
plants and landscape elements are interwoven with aspects of human behaviour and being. 
The wellbeing of human and cultural continuity are tied to the wellbeing and continuity of 
nonhuman. Everything has a dignity and integrity to be honoured and nurtured. There is flow 
between the elements.  
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This notion of dignity arises again later as it is critical to these ontologies, and may provide an 
avenue as Krushil Watene suggests, for the CA to describe justice within the Māori context 
(Watene, 2016).  
 
To decolonise IEJ requires us to dismantle the Western binary human-nature, civilised-wild, 
tamed-hostile and accommodate a worldview in which nonhuman has an inseparable 
relationship with human and which endures despite colonisation.  
 
Place-focus	
When our old people spoke of being the boss or owner for country, their meaning of being 
in ownership encompassed a relationship of love for ruwe, a relationship, which is ancient 
and continued forever; it cannot be traded or sold in exchange for beads or money. There 
can be no lawful agreement to sell the ruwe or its songs, for they are the law.  
(Watson, 2015: 153) 
 
‘Environment’ has meaning not only in economic sustainability terms, where resources 
provide, for instance, the basic food and clothing necessities, but also in political and 
cultural/spiritual terms as well.  
(Kawharu, 2010: 222)  
 
The ‘placing’ of Aboriginal clans, arises in their clan-stories from the beginning of time. For 
Māori, since landfall and disembarkation from named canoes. Māori expressions of 
attachment and inseparable connectivity with their rohe and all within its boundaries find 
voice in variants of Whanganui iwi’s expression of belonging: E rere kau mai te Awanui, Mai i 
te Kahui Maunga ki Tangaroa, Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au. The Great River flows, From 
the Mountains to the Sea, I am the River, and the River is me. A foundation for IEJ, the good 
of nonhuman and human within home-territories is so commingled they are inseparable. This 
inseparability then demands equal respect for the whole. As Watson says, place cannot be 
sold. Place, is a source of identity, for the individual and the hapu, iwi or clan: being is 
entangled with one’s home place, it is something more than resource as Kawharu reminds us 
above. 
 
Both Māori and Aboriginal discourse focusses on place rather than land as property to own, 
trade or convert to profit. Landform, waterways, lakes, and seas are places with which the 
cultures create relationships—including spiritual relationships—around which story, myth and 
legend revolve, and from which Law is made (Bird Rose, 2000; Kawharu, 2010; Watson, 
2015). Culture and individual identity are closely associated with place (Bird Rose, 2012; 
Burarranga et al., 2012; M. Graham, 2008; Turia, 2012; Watson, 2002). For Māori, marae, 
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the building and meeting space central to hapu and iwi identity, is, argues Merata Kawharu, a 
metaphor, or symbol for the whole environment with which they are linked physically, 
economically and spiritually. ‘The environment may be considered as an extension of all that 
marae symbolises, and vice versa, marae are an extension of the wider environment’ 
(Kawharu, 2010; 227-228). Physical environment, past present and future, the spiritual realm, 
human and nonhuman, ancestors and living are symbolically collapsed into hapu/iwi identity. 
Aileen Morton-Robinson argues, ‘Indigenous ontological relations to the land are 
incommensurate with those developed through capitalism, and they continue to unsettle 
white Australia’s sense of belonging, which is inextricably tied to white possession and power 
configured through the logic of capital and profound individual attachment’ 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2015: xxi). 
 
Variously ancestors, gods, animals and spirits arise from the landforms, waterways, lakes, 
and seas that form the places of these cultures. All contribute to philosophy, social norms and 
behavioural practices. Rules of human and nonhuman engagement arise from the repeated 
patterns and interactions of all elements of landscape and environment. In upsetting the 
balance, the rules are broken. ‘Modern’ land management, extractive industries, mining and 
land re-formation, and toxic waste deposits all transgress place-based rules enshrined within 
codes of conduct, laws, cosmologies, stories, songs, artworks and daily practices of 
Indigenous guardians.  
 
Relationships, obligations, duties and ways of interaction guide harmonious coexistence 
between all things through all time. In this context, the form that IJ takes is very different to a 
property and contract-based IJ in which loss of landscape by one generation may be offset by 
the transference of financial assets to future generations. These ontologies of entwined 
interconnection generate intergenerational obligations to maintain wellbeing in the nonhuman 
as inseparable to the wellbeing and identity of future generations. No-human is a subject not 
object: it cannot be owned or possessed.  
 
Decolonised IEJ, therefore, turns away from fungible property towards a custodial ethic.  
 
Communitarianism	
Aboriginal people have a kinship system which extends into land; this system was and still 
is organised into clans. One’s first loyalty is to one’s own clan group. …. We believe that a 
person finds their individuality within the group. To behave as if you are a discrete entity 
or a conscious isolate is to limit yourself to being an observer in an observed world.  
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(M. Graham, 1999: 182) 
 
E tangata is about a person who is also a people. It’s I-we stuff.  
… 
I call it a kinship view of the world. 
Apirana Ngata and other rangitira of the 1840’s would often say ‘Koe o Ngāti Porou’, ‘Koe 
o Ngāti Whatua’. ‘I am Ngāti Porou’, ‘I am Ngāti Whatua’.  
So the I and the we comes together. It means that when you slip into that mode of 
speaking, I am no longer speaking as myself, I am speaking as Ngāti Porou or I am 
speaking as Māori. 
I’m not talking to you as one person to another person.  
So we slip in and out of these things.  
… 
…the word tangata in its singular form refers to the person, but it can also refer to the 
group. We are a people. 
(Int. MH.) 
 
Linked closely to holism and attachment to place, are Indigenous People’s communitarian 
lifeways. Where a sense of self is constituted from a timeless continuum of being and relating 
to multiple others, including nonhuman others, actions are directed at securing good for that 
wider time-transcending community. 
 
For Australian Aboriginal ‘family’ and ‘community’ can have wide-sweeping meaning. Bob 
Randall of the Yankunytjatjara people describes it this way. 
Everything living is family. The trees are our family. The same with the kangaroos, emus 
and all the other animals that live with us. Growing up with the oldies, our parents, the 
grandparents, they always said we are connected to everything else and the proof of that 
is being alive. Being alive connects you to every other living things that’s around you. 
You’re spirit, you’re psychic, you’re physical, you’re mental, you’re all connected with 
other living forms. You’re never lost and you’re never alone. You’re one with everything 
else that is there. The oneness, the completeness of the oneness.’ (Lee, 2006) 
 
This connectivity is the ontological core of kanyini. As Randall describes himself it is clear if 
we are to know the man we must equally understand the boundary between man, kin, time 
and place is a zone of fluid interchange, blending one into the other in an exchange of love 
and giving, care and guardianship.  
 
Similarly, Māori concept of whakapapa describes the human descent relationships, from 
Gods to first explorer canoes, to immediate ancestors, with spirit and non-human animal and 
plant kin (Durie, 2010; Mead, 2003; M. Roberts et al., 2004). Obligations and duties move 
between realms, time, spaces and form. The cultures are dominated by webs of multiple 
interconnections, where the sense of self is enfolded in relationships with kin, animal, plant, 
land and skies, ancestors and future generations. 
 
So while the individual is the unitary being, a being is strengthened and empowered by and in 
relationship to a broad and expansive web of other. Ego has little place in this 
self-understanding. ‘The reflective and questing Aboriginal mind,’ says Graham, ‘is always 
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aligned with what everyone in the group wants, and what everyone wants is to understand 
ourselves in order to have and maintain harmonious relationships’ (M. Graham, 2008: 184). 
And those relationships expand back and forward through time, through human and 
nonhuman, terrestrial and celestial, physical and spiritual. 
 
IEJ is, therefore, communitarian and within the community are enfolded ancestors and 
non-human. IEJ acknowledges benefits accrued in the present from the past and the integrity 
of the community is understood to be necessary to support the dignity of the individual.   
 
Time	
Kaldowinyeri, or time long ago, in the beginning, is also the time now, and time in the 
future. The beginning, the present and the future encircle the place of Kaldowinyeri. The 
Nunga ‘I am’ is not like the other, dominant Western subject of being, which is 
represented by a straight line of thought — beginning, middle and ending. Instead, a 
Nunga process encircles; within there is a process that allows a person to become one 
and to begin again. This process is non-hierarchical and no-linear; rather, it takes the form 
of a cycle, of the continuity of being, becoming another cycle, nurntikki.  
(Watson, 2015: 16)   
 
In both Māori and Aboriginal ontology, past and future are in the present. Rather than 
relentlessly forward moving through a series of stops and new starts, being-in-time circles 
and spirals catching past and future in the moment in multiple tangles of beings and time (see 
Watson above). Stewart-Harawira describes it as ‘impossible to conceive of the present and 
future as separate and distinct from the past, for the past is constitutive of the present, and, 
as such, is inherently reconstituted within the future’ (Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 42). 
 
In explanation, I wrote of my personal whakapapa. I am the descendant of the Polynesian 
Pacific explorers who settled Aotearoa and formed the iwi Ngāti Kahugnunu (and a whole 
potpourri of Anglo-Celtic folks). They are my ancestors, and I am a member of their future 
generation. I have a son and a daughter. In them live the same ancestors and me. And they 
are my future generation and the potential creators of even more future generations. And 
soon I and they will be ancestors to new generations.  
 
Further, I described the intellectual entanglement that we have with non-kin ancestors. We 
each build, iteratively from those around us: family, teachers, mentors. From books and 
movies and TV. And here in this thesis I draw on, and make my own, the learning and thinking 
of multiple peoples from many cultures, across multiple generations and times. We are, I 
argued, an amalgam of acquired ontologies and knowledge. This knowledge is ancient, living 
in current thought and will vibrate through the lives of future generations. 
 
The physical me, the physical you are even older. For in our bones, tissue and fibre are 
minerals drawn from the soils in which our fruit and vegetables have grown. Salt, iodine, 
assorted minerals are lodged in our being. These minerals and salts are as old as the earth 
itself. As young as each of us is, we are simultaneously as old as earth. And when we are 
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recycled at our time of death, they will return to the earth. Are they then new or still ancient? 
Are they separated or entangled?  
 
We are told the microbes in our stomachs influence our thoughts. And we know these same 
microbes are not a static community. They come from outside of us—from our mothers during 
vaginal birth, from our foods and environment. Our skin is not ours alone. It is host to a 
teaming community of microbes. Our bodies are hosts to hosts of microbes. Without this 
intimate entanglement with microbes, we cannot fully function. Far from individual, each 
human is also multitudes of nonhuman (see Yong, 2016). These components of the living me 
have a different lifespan to the me I think of as me.  
 
All these things occur in each instant of time, simultaneously. Thinking time as encompassing 
all that basket of ancestry and future potential—genetic, intellectual, mythological, biological, 
mineralogical, ontological, physical and experiential—is a means of explaining the Māori 
conception of time. I am in the Māori expression walking into the future with the past and 
present in front of me (Ranginui Walker in (McKay & Walmsley, 2003)). The moment ‘now’, is 
at once past, present and future: was, is and always will be. Time here is not linear but a 
constantly referential spiral which entangles at once the past, the present, and the future. The 
moment ‘now’, is at once past, present, future: was, is, and always will be.  
 
Because this is how time is known IEJ does not feel like a sacrifice (Meyer, 2015). To be 
kaitiaki is to entangle ancestors, living, future generations and to become ancestor. There is 
no intergenerational competition, for all exist simultaneously. Within this entanglement, also, 
animal, vegetable and mineral become the subjects of justice for they are inseparable from 
creation, human, and the future.  
 
Past-present-future-past must underscore a decolonised IEJ.  
 
Subjectivity	
In ‘knowing’ their human selves to be fundamentally different from animals and the rest of 
the natural world, the Europeans ended up with their focus being centred on relationships 
between humans. This limited them; the focus resulted in a hegemony, a ‘master’ and 
‘slave’ relationship with the natural world (and with others of their own kind).  
(Watson, 2015: 148) 
 
One of the key objectives of our current iwi management practices is the maintenance 
and protection of the mauri of the biodiversity in our tribal lands and seas. Tikanga 
associated with the tapu of the sea and the fish and food gathering areas are there to 
ensure that mauri of the areas are not nullified or desecrated due to improper activity and 
that the tapu also of this areas and species are cared for and with regards to tapu (as 
rules) are obeyed.  
(Gage, §32, 5) 
 
Nonhuman subjectivity has woven its way throughout the last four subsections. Where 
human and nonhuman are kin no hard distinction is drawn between the intrinsic being-ness of 
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either. Care for and reciprocity between each occurs without distinction. Genealogies connect 
both. Nonhuman communicates if human will listen carefully (Burarrwanga et al., 2012). In 
contrast to the Western master-slave relationship, described above by Irene Watson, there is 
no fundamental difference between ‘things’ in the Māori and Aboriginal worldview. That is, 
everything has subjectivity. Everything is a site of justice. Everything ‘always emerging, 
always unfolding’. 
 
In the Māori ontology, this is described through the embodiment of fundamental essences 
common to all things, but with species and sort specificity. Remember Mason Durie describe 
the power of mauri to both distinguish and unite objects, and to draw them into wider 
connected networks of being. It assists us understand the inanimate as a site of relationship 
and dynamism (Durie, 2010). Two other components are integral to subjectivity within this 
Māori worldview, tapu and mana—dignity and respect. As dignity and respect are conjoined 
within Western philosophy (Bendik-Keymer, 2014), so too are tapu and mana bound 
together.  
 
Practically this means that all things have subjectivity. The human obligation is to uphold the 
mauri, tapu and mana of all nonhuman. A forest must be respected as a dignity bearing 
whole. The duties human bear are to ensure use of the forest does not damage or impair that 
dignity. ‘Development’ must be in sympathy with the intrinsic subjectivity—trees removed for 
specific (enhanced) purposes, damage limited. 
 
Removing mountain-tops for coal, polluting rivers, poisoning lakes, deafening and disabling 
whales with seismic waves, covering seabirds in spilt oil, burying leaky barrels of radioactive 
waste, depleting biodiversity assault their mauri, tapu and mana. The human responsibility is 
to respect a landforms’ life-force, dignity and respect-worthiness.  
 
Obligations and duties to decolonised IEJ stem from subjectivity in the environment per se as 
well as to future generations of humans.  
 
Blueprints:	Generating	Indigenous	Agency – expanding	liberal	scope	
…despite having been devalued, marginalized, disenfranchised and frequently 
submerged throughout the history of Western imperialism, traditional Indigenous 
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knowledge forms have a profound contribution to make towards an alternative ontology 
for a just global order.  
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005: 32) 
 
We have an obligation and a mandate to care for and nurture all things for the benefit of 
future generations still coming. We have an obligation to pass on country to the future. 
We cannot enter agreements that would destroy life and ruwe. Proposals to develop 
nuclear waste dumps, or to construct mines that will pollute the natural world, are 
artefacts of muldarbi deals’. 
(Watson, 2015: 161) 
 
Recognition justice requires that policies and programs must meet the standard of fairly 
considering and representing the cultures, values, and situations of the affected parties. 
(Whyte, 2011: 200) 
 
Makere Stewart-Harawira and Irene Watson, above, identify an imminent moment. A moment 
in which recognition paves new relations of respect between peoples and the environment, 
past, present, future. However, as Whyte suggests, theories of IEJ can only be respectful of 
and just for Indigenous Peoples if they represent ‘the cultures and values and situations’ of 
those same Peoples.  
 
This thesis has suggested five ontological understandings are required to decolonize IEJ 
theory for this imminent moment; holism, communitarianism, place-focus, 
past-in-present-in-future, and nonhuman subjectivity. It has been impossible to separate 
human from nonhuman in the five domains of the previous section. Every aspect of the 
philosophies of Māori and Aboriginal links human and nonhuman subjectivities. The 
suggestion is if justice theory is to make universalist claims it needs to integrate at least these 
five values to decolonise.  
 
While a number of existing theories may accommodate one or two of these values, none 
currently accommodates them all. Most critically, and most problematically any understanding 
of IEJ within these philosophies must include nonhuman as subject. I suggest this as the 
most difficult and the most crucial for what I hope are by now obvious reasons. Māori and 
Aboriginal Peoples, along with many other Indigenous Peoples, understand themselves as 
kin to, and in guardianship roles for, the nonhuman realm. This worldview is incompatible with 
philosophies in which nonhuman is ‘resource’, those that are constituted in opposition to 
nonhuman and where it is reduced to terms of domination over, control of, usefulness to 
humans and dollar values.  
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It is within the HR and CA to justice that developments have unfolded which may signal they 
could provide a structure for decolonised IEJ.152 
 
Drawing from the innovations in Aotearoa, Bolivia and Ecuador where nonhuman protections 
have been mandated using legal mechanisms of legal personhood and rights, offers insights 
into how decolonisation may be possible for the CA. Briefly outlined below these moves 
integrate the Indigenous ontologies of each nation within legal structures imported from the 
West.  
 
Personhood:	past	present	future	
The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill 2017  
…declares that Te Awa Tupua is “an indivisible and living whole” and comprises the 
Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and 
metaphysical elements and is a legal person with all the rights, powers, duties and 
liabilities of a legal person.  
(New Zealand Government, n.d.)  
 
Similarly, Te Urewera-Tuhoe Bill, 2013, states; ‘Te Urewera will effectively own itself, in 
perpetuity’. However, as a mute member of society, ‘Te Urewera can only act through human 
agents’ who ‘will be obliged to serve Te Urewera and act in its interests, with a unity of 
purpose and the utmost good faith, rather than acting on behalf of the appointers’ (Te 
Urewera–Tūhoe Bill 2013; Part 1).  
 
These geo-regions and their multiplicity of animate and inanimate beings, human, animal, 
plant and landform, are recognised as one being, a community of placed inter-related 
interests and dependencies. Challenging though this identity is to some (Arif, 2015), the Te 
Urewera-Tūhoe and Te Awa Tupua Bills confront the Western framing of time and the 
animate-inanimate divide.  
 
The ontological foundation is steeped in notions of twined care and belonging, neither iwi nor 
nonhuman is complete without the other, a connection without beginning or end, within which 
Māori, as kaitiaki, work for the benefit of all. This legislation embraces the ontology of Te 
Urewera and Te Awa Tupua where time is already always past present future. The time of 
folded sandstone ranges and volcanic mountain slopes, of birds, insects and human kin, 
droplets of rain merging in river flows in which tumble grains of sand and ash on their way to 
                                                
152 Martha Nussbaum identifies CA as part of the Human Rights family of justice theories (Nussbaum, 2007). 
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coastal deposit to be pressed with other grains into new sandstone layers before they are 
lifted and folded…in perpetuity. 
 
The guardians appointed to be the human representatives of the two regions are required to 
think like the nonhuman person they represent. The time they must represent includes 
elements that predate the formation of earth through to the transitory lifespan of a drop of rain 
merging with the flow of a river. Significantly, this is achieved through a Western legal 
structure.  
 
Rights	for	nature:	dignity	
The various Rights for Mother Nature/Earth mechanisms draw heavily on Indigenous 
ontologies from South America. Responsibilities and obligations extend to maintaining 
respect and reciprocal interconnection and dependence between human and nonhuman. In 
the Constitution of Ecuador and the Rights of Nature Act in Bolivia, all citizens are charged 
with obligations to respect the wellbeing of nonhuman within the structure of rights. In so 
doing they harness the language and the intellectual structures of rights, respect and dignity 
as a normative grounding. 
 
Rights protect human dignity. Human dignity within the Western canon, however, has been 
used to separate human from nonhuman. It is also conceptualised in many ways—maybe 
five, maybe more (Schroeder, 2008; 2010). Nussbaum suggests, ‘[d]ignity is an intuitive 
notion that is by no means utterly clear’ (Nussbaum, 2011). It is a flexible concept. 
 
Although Nussbaum includes sentient animals within the CA, Krushil Watene suggests the 
CA in its current form is ‘is unable to include Māori values as they apply to nature’ (Watene, 
2016). However, she also suggests that ‘the spiritual dimensions of the concepts of “mauri”, 
“mana” and “tapu” could be captured by a modified version of innate dignity’ (ibid.: 294). As 
discussed earlier mauri—life force, tapu—potentiality for being, and 
mana—respect-worthiness, inhere in all things. They are species specific qualities of 
subjectivity. Taking these three concepts as the foundation, the concept of dignity can be 
expanded to represent subjectivity in all things.  
 
Within Māori ontology, the interlinked entanglement of human, sentient and nonsentient life 
and nonliving elements on earth is bound in whakapapa. Literally, to lay down in layers, 
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whakapapa is the epistemological structure in which connections between all forms and 
through all time are articulated. From this, we know living and nonliving elements all have 
form specific integrity and life force—mauri, tapu and mana. We know too, that these same 
elements have potential for form-specific functioning and form specific capabilities and 
potential. Specifically, this worldview acknowledges that nonliving elements of the ecosystem 
contribute to the functioning of nonliving things and vice versa—the entanglement is an 
essential element of each. It is clear when living things and nonliving elements are not 
functioning and/or cannot fulfil capabilities or potential or, phrased differently, when nonliving 
elements are not functioning, living things cannot function.  
 
Now, it is the next move that brings this framework to meet the CA. If we can agree, which I 
think we can, that dignity exists in freedom to access the necessary conditions to function and 
fulfil form specific capabilities/potential then for living and nonliving things there are optimal 
conditions for their form specific dignity. This dignity, I proposed in Chapter 8, is derived from 
the life force, potential to be and respect worthiness that inheres in all things. All things have 
within them their own energies and identity-giving forces—their life forces. Each has potential 
to be, in temporary or all-time form—so while a grain of sand may tumble in the waves today, 
it may become a constituent of sedimentary rocks in the far future—whatever it has within it 
that potentiality. It is that potential to be, to be in form specificity, in relation to all other forms, 
from which mana is drawn. It has then its own dignity. And people have obligations and duties 
to uphold and respect that form specific dignity in living things, ecosystems and non-living 
things.  
 
My argument is, building on Nussbaum’s claim that nonhuman animals, particularly those 
with humans have close relationships, are bearers of dignity (Nussbaum, 2007), that dignity, 
derived from inherent being and the complex of entanglements that ensure flourishing, 
inheres in all natural things. Bearers of dignity are bearers of rights and capabilities within the 
HR and CA framings of justice. Dignity confers subjectivity. It assigns responsibilities to 
respect the freedom and interests of the subject.  
 
Rights, Simon Caney suggested, indicate that ‘X has interests which are sufficiently weighty 
to impose obligations on others’ (Caney 2008; 538). Dignity is a weighty interest. Weighty 
enough to underscore the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By including Mother Earth 
within constitution and rights law, Ecuador and Bolivia suggest human and nonhuman have a 
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weighty interest in wellbeing and flourishing to protect their inherent dignity. This weighty 
interest is sufficient to place obligations on the living to protect nonhuman on its own terms.  
 
What this thesis proposes is that to decolonise IEJ, ‘X’ must include country (to use the 
Aboriginal English term for entangled nonhuman). And I suggest the weighty interests of 
country are supported by its intrinsic dignity as derived from life force, potentiality to be, and 
respect worthiness. Country has rights. Since these rights exist prior to acts (Bell, 2011), 
human beings have obligations and duties to protect existing and future nonhuman to ensure 
the ongoing functioning, wellbeing and flourishing of that-which-is and that-which-is-not 
human. Future human and nonhuman have a weighty interest in functioning, wellbeing and 
flourishing to protect their ‘inherent dignity’. This weighty interest is sufficient to place 
obligations on the living to ensure that dignity is protected.  
 
Formed this way, a decolonised IJ protects interconnected communities of 
human-nonhuman-place and entanglements of ancestors-living-future generations-ancestor. 
Or inversely, there can be no justice without functioning interconnected communities of 
entangled multi-generational human-nonhuman-place, to paraphrase Schlosberg (2014: 78). 
Where there are such functioning communities, the obstacles of materialism, individualism, 
anthropocentrism and presentism fade.  
 
Directions	Ahead	
Law is lived, sung, danced, painted, eaten and in the walking of ruwe. Law inheres in all 
things and is alive in all things, but these days it is an ongoing struggle to keep many 
things alive in the face of the attempts to bury our law ways as part of the colonial project.  
(Watson, 2015; 12) 
 
The realisation of “human rights” necessitate a surrounding environment which is intact.  
(L. Graham & Friederichs, 2012) 
 
The key argument of this thesis has been that Western theories of IEJ as they are currently 
formulated continue to marginalise Indigenous Peoples. They maintain the colonial project, 
and its practices, prejudices and conceits. And they do this despite the well-meaning and 
compassion of the theorists. Cultural ignorance and blindness sit at its heart. An ignorance 
that is born as Charles Mills defined of epistemic ignorance—the iterative, violent, repression 
of knowledge within society and the academy of not only the lived experiences of non-white 
Peoples within settler states but of their rich cultures, knowledge, ontologies, politics and law.  
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The practice in the iterative process of politics and political philosophy references 
Anglo-European sources. Of course, this is appropriate if the body politic is Anglo-European. 
However, in the settler states, it is not. Settler states contain Indigenous Peoples who are 
thrice insulted by this practice. First through ongoing marginalisation. Second, because the 
theories of IEJ are antithetical to Indigenous practice. And lastly, because Indigenous justice 
incorporates intergenerational and environmental practices free from the resistance, 
obstacles and incomprehension of the West. Conceived from entanglement and mutuality 
between human and nonhuman, maintaining balance and harmony is both pragmatic and 
transcendental. Importantly, that Indigenous people might have something to offer the 
iterative intellectual project is at best overlooked, at worst rejected. 
 
The argument throughout was and remains, that the existing theories are not wrong per se. 
Rather, that within the confines of Western ontology they become strained at the point at 
which they meet the demands of IEJ and non-Western conceptions of the nature of being. 
The assumptions of material consumption, individualism and individual rights, 
anthropocentrism and mechanical time constrain the parameters in which theorist may 
operate. Thus there are real difficulties in theorising just outcomes for Anglo-European heirs.  
 
But more stridently the argument is there is no justice within these frameworks for Māori or 
Aboriginal peoples. Nor for other Indigenous Peoples within settler states. In making a claim 
to universalism theory perpetuates injustice. It continues to bury Indigenous Peoples ‘as part 
of the colonial project’ to which Watson refers above. There is something illiberal about a 
theory that masks the ontologies and conceptions of the good life of peoples within its remit.  
 
Martha Nussbaum suggested at the 2017 HDCA Conference that anthropocentrism is a ‘most 
extraordinary arrogance’.153 I suggest that to propose any IEJ theory is universal while it 
ignores, diminishes or trivialises Indigenous philosophies is also a most egregious arrogance. 
One of the advantages of the CA is its flexibility. Nussbaum for instance notes that her list of 
capabilities ‘is open-ended and has undergone modification over time; no doubt it will 
undergo further modification in the light of criticism’ (Nussbaum, 2007; 76). My suggestions 
here have been that, first, by engaging with philosophies outside the Western canon, 
philosophers working within the CA may find concepts which can be used to assist resolve 
                                                
153 Nussbaum made this observation in response to a question during the Roundtable: Other Species 
Capabilities, Theory and Practice, HDCA Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017. 
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the theoretical challenges of IEJ for Western subjects. That is the CA provides a frame from 
which to work in partnership with indigenous scholars to broaden the philosophical traditions 
from which it draws. Second, it is important that theorists are explicit that the CA provides a 
framework for justice within Western epistemological and ontological traditions; that is it 
cannot be seen as a universally valid framework. Furthermore, I am suggesting that, given 
the ontological divide between Māori and Aboriginal philosophies and the CA, and 
acknowledging there are multiple Indigenous philosophies, it is unrealistic to expect the CA to 
adapt to meet the needs of all. 
 
Final	thoughts	
There are numerous areas into which this thesis has not ventured, where further research is 
necessary.  
 
This is a deliberately Southern work, and Antipodean at that and so large bodies of excellent 
scholarship from the northern settler states of Canada and USA have been elided. So too 
detailed consideration of the philosophies and practices of those much older, southern settler 
states of South America. To do so would have diluted the Australian and Aotearoa 
content—which itself is already narrowly confined to the areas specifically associated with 
IEJ.  
 
There are (at least) two significant branches of theory left unexplored here. The first is the 
towering political theorist of the twentieth century—John Rawls. Rawls’ is a distributive justice 
and individualist—so for those reasons alone, his theory is ill-suited to Indigenous IEJ. More 
fundamentally though he is wedded to an economic and political model that is predicated on 
growth (Watene, 2013). Endless material growth is antithetical to both IEJ and Indigenous 
principles of harmony and balance between human and nonhuman survival and wellbeing. 
The final area of concern is the state of whiteness behind the veil of ignorance. As Charles 
Mills describes in Black Rights/White Wrongs, the assumption within Rawls is that beyond the 
veil all emerge white (see particularly Chapters 8-10 pp139-200, Mills, 2017). While Mills is 
focussed primarily on the Black American experience, Rawls failed to see the brown faces of 
the Indigenous members of modern societies also.  
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More surprisingly perhaps, theories of recognition justice were not used to scaffold a 
decolonised framework for IEJ. Glenn Coulthard, however, has provided a robust analysis of 
recognition justice and the ways in which it perpetuates the colonial project in Red Skin, 
White Masks (Coulthard, 2014). In concluding the work Coulthard suggests we must shift our 
attention ‘to a resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, 
gender-emancipatory, and economically non-exploitative alternative structures of law and 
sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and 
political traditions’ (Coulthard, 2014: 179). I have not accomplished that project; however, I do 
trust this work goes some way towards identifying some of those best traditions.  
 
The work has not considered the intergenerational and environmental aspects of social 
inequality and inherited poverty resulting from colonisation and environmental alienation and 
degradation. It could well have, for future generations of Māori and Aboriginal people and 
their non-Indigenous compatriots will all bear the brunt of both. Nor has it explored the 
compound nature of Indigenous women’s environmental and social disadvantage and the 
intergenerational components that reside with this intersectionality. Indigenous justice 
requires a decolonisation of gender (Meissner & Whyte, 2017). Likewise, I have not 
considered the intergenerational harms wrought by forced adoption, child theft, slavery and 
murders. These are more specifically intergenerational however they involve also the deep 
disconnection from homelands that contributes to the social dislocation and social 
dysfunction experienced by many Indigenous people globally.  
 
I have skirted issues of spirituality—another of my false dissections—for ‘all material is 
spiritual’ to quote Manuka Henare (Int. MH). I allude to the transcendental frequently but have 
left aside any detailed analysis of spiritual connections between living and non-living, 
ancestors, living and future generations, human and earth, waters, seas and skies. There are 
two reasons for this. First, justice theory in the Western form negotiates relationships 
between humans. Spiritual negotiation is left to the church. Second, while my personal 
experiences of spiritual connection have arisen only within the grandeur of the mountains 
(specifically when tramping and skiing in the mountains and ranges of Aotearoa and again 
tramping and skiing in the Himalaya) and when at sea, I am a product of the rational age. I am 
an atheist. Delving into the spiritual is a deeply uncomfortable place for me to go. So I 
acknowledge the connection within whakapapa of spiritual and material, and I have worked 
with that in its most philosophic guise—mauri, tapu and mana—and this work could and 
perhaps, should, have included much more. This is a reflection of my own failing. 
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There is a raft of potential in ongoing conflicts between Indigenous Peoples and resource 
extraction industries and their political allies from which this thesis could have drawn and that 
opens the way for further study. In Aotearoa, there are the ongoing efforts of the Aotearoa 
government to open the Raukumara Basin, iron-sand mining in Taranaki and ongoing 
petroleum explorations in that province and the extensions to the Karangahape Gorge gold 
mine. In Australia there are the Adani Coal mine in the Galilee Basin of Queensland versus 
Wangan and Jagalingou people, the mining destruction in Western Australia and a proposed 
Queensland gold mine that is tearing an Aboriginal community apart, the fight by the people 
of the Kimberley over uranium mining, iron ore mining, fracking, and more. Additionally, the 
uranium mining in South Australia and the threat of oil exploration and mining the Great 
Australian Bight are areas of contention. And there are the North and South American, Indian 
and African, Pacific and European cases. The raw material is endless. My hope is this work 
provides a rung in the ladder of theory from which these wrongs can be addressed. 
 
It is important to note also that Indigenous Peoples are not simply passive victims of 
environmental harms. Around the global active resistance movements lead by strong 
Indigenous people and Peoples are actively pursuing change in the areas of climate change 
action, adaptation planning, deforestation, and a raft of mining activities—these I have left 
unexamined. 
 
… 
 
Decolonising IEJ was not the original intent of this thesis. The intention was to answer the 
question of why Māori of Aotearoa and Aboriginal of Australia, and North and South American 
First Peoples embrace IEJ while Western societies wriggle and squirm from obligations to the 
environment and future generations. However, the case studies foist the issue of continuing 
colonial oppression onto these pages, over and over. In each circumstance, Apanui v Minister 
for Energy, Bob Randall’s forced removal from his family to the far north of Australia, 
Warumungu’s fight with the Australian federal government, a fight now transferred to the 
Adnyamathanha of South Australia, Rosalie Kunoth-Monk’s cry for cultural recognition, the 
limits to Indigenous Peoples’ freedom are circumscribed by foreign political philosophies. 
Those foreign political philosophies are far less adept at handling issues of IEJ than their 
own. So this became a work to decolonise IEJ. It became a work of reclamation—personal 
and theoretical: I live in the entangled intersection as did my ancestors as will my heirs.  
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Notice of Appeal. CA 429/2012 
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RNR 1 - 45  
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